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THE MARCONI SCANDAL AND RELATED ASPECTS OF BRITISH ANTI-SEMITISM, 1911-1914 
KENNETH L UNN 
SUMMARY 
The thesis sets out to examine the political importance of the Marconi 
Scandal and also to study the uee of anti-semitism during the affair and the 
wider implioations of this hostility to Jews. 
Using a wide variety of sources, the first three chapters analyse the 
Scandal and its significance in Edwardian politics, suggesting that the 
parliamentary tensions traditionally desoribed had little fundamental influence on 
the governing elite and its institutions. 
The press coverage of the Scandal is considered, indicating the political 
divisions and also the role played by anti-semitism in the affair. From this 
general approach, there develops a close study of the two journals most prominent 
in the anti-semitio campaign. These chapters examine the prinoipal characters 
involved with the journals, their views on the Jews and the translation of this 
journalistic hostility into praotioal action, a previously undocumented episode. 
Finally, the Scandal is placed in its wider oontext of British anti-semitism 
before 1914. A comparative study of contemporary attitudes towards other minority 
groups in Britain and towards Jews in other areas of the world is also made. In 
this section, the main stereotypes of Jews are identified and from this approach 
it can be shown that British anti-semitism before 1914 is an important indicator 
of attitudes after the First World War. The conspiracy theory of anti-semitism is 
apparent well before the Russian Revolution of 1917, usually claimed to be the 
impetus for the British anti-semitism of the 1920s and 30s. The conclusion is 
v 
, 
that the Marconi Scandal and its ramifications mark an important transitional 
period in the continuum of British anti-semitism. 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the significance of the Marconi Scandal has been the 
subject of some debate, largely due to the appearance of various political 
scandals in both Britain and America. Attempts to predict the outcome of the 
Watergate affair led a British journalist, Colm Brogan, to use Marconi and the 
Teapot Dome Scandal in the U.S.A. as historical evidence for his forecast, which 
1 turned out to be incorrect. The financial corruption associated with John 
Poulson, the architect, and the allegations of politioians' involvement, also 
led to journalistic publicity of historical preoedents, one of the artioles 
referred to the Marconi affair as 'the most controversial oa8e,.2 Even Private 
~, whose treatment of suoh matters is usually serious, produoed a 'letter' from 
Sir Herbert Gussett X.C.M.G. on 'Corruption in high places', referring to his 
experiences of Lloyd George. 'Apparently he had been b~ing a lot of shares in 
some Italian television comp~. If it had. got out at the time, it would have 
caused quite a rumpus." 
Since attention has been focused on the Soandal, it seems appropriate 
that a study of its events should be made. There is only one standard account, 
that of Frances Donaldson, published in 1962,4 and some of her judgements are 
open to question, as might be expected after sixteen years. In addition, there 
i. still some confusion over basic facts, a confusion reproduced in text-books 
such as the Oxford History of England.5 Therefore, the first purpose of this 
the.is is to re-examine the Marooni Soandal within the oontext of reoent researoh 
in Edwardian Britain. If, as Cox and Dyson report, 'the oonoept of pre-19l4 
England as a long summer afternoon is quite false; it was filled with oonfliot, 
politioal, social and ideologioal',6 then the implications of the Soandal must 
be tested against what now appears to be the generally acoepted model. The 
Liberal press of the time ascribed events to this kind of atmosphere. 'All the 
floating animosities of the hour - anti-Liberal, anti-Ministerial, and anti-
semitio - here oombined with these suspioions to make a particularly odious 
iv 
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chemical brew ••• ,1 A closer examination of the Soandal, however, suggests the' 
need for a more specifio description of the breakdown of Edwardian sooiety. The 
ruling elite in parliament present some superfioial differenoes but no 
fragmentation of purpose. The Soandal was not exploited to its utmost and this 
suggests the need to revise any hasty or unscientifio verdiots about the 
irreconcilable party divisions of the pre-war era. 
Some indication of the superficial differences between parties was displayed 
by the various political journals. The outrage of the Liberal press that 
allegations should be made and the splutterings of Conservatives at the utter 
corruption of the affair give the impression of great dispute. In fact, the 
Scandal was reported along the lines of a Victorian melodrama and this similarity 
extended into another facet of the affair, the most significant one for this 
studl, the involvement of Jews. 'Realism consisted not in seeing the Jew 
steadily and whole, but in treating the English reading public to the edifying 
6 
and detailed soandals of the ver.y rich.' This desoription of the treatment of 
Jews in the Viotorian novel fits equally well the coverage of the Marooni Soandal 
and therefore suggests something about the nature of British anti-semitism at 
that time. 
Bearing in mind the developments of the 1920s and 30s, the significanoe of 
this pre-war period has perhaps been underestimated. This study attempts to 
redress the balanoe. The importanoe of the Marconi Scandal in the histor.y of 
British anti-semitism, although featuring in a very sophisticated German anti-
semitic study during the Seoond World War,9has been rather neglected. 
Contemporary acoounts have been glossed over and so the language of anti-semitism 
in the period has not b.en analysed. Work on the reoent history of anti-semitism 
in Britain conoentrates on two periods, 1610-1910 and the inter-war years. There 
has been little attempt to relate the two. For example, Colin Cross, in his 
study of the British fascist movement, wrote. 'As a coherent system of thought, 
British anti-semitism can be traced back to a Rhodesian, Henry Hamilton Beamish, 
10 
who in 1919 founded an anti-Semitic sooiety in London called the Britons.' 
v 
Thus, the impression given is that the two periods were totally unconnected." One 
of the olaims of this work is that the period 1911-1914 is an important 
transitional phase, in which the ideas behind the theory of Jewish conspiracy, 
resulting in the publication of an English version of the Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion in 1919, became a dominant feature. The oft-oited 'cause' of the 
conspiraroy theory in Britain is the combined effect of war with Germany and the 
Bolshevist Revolution in Russia. ll Possibly we need to look more closely at the 
events of the pre-war period to obtain a olearer picture of the 'oauses'. 
Indeed, in spite of two reoent studies by Garrardl2 and Gainer;' it is 
still necessary to establish the extent of anti-semitism in Britain at this time. 
Its existenoe was frequently underestimated or ignored by oontemporaries14 and 
even modern texts oontinue this trend. The researcher oomes acrOBS some amazing 
statements, such as 
'Though England reoeived many Jewi.~ refugees - thus tripling the 
Jewish population there - no anti-Semitism resulted, a fact that 
may be attributed to the prestige of the Earl of Beaoonsfield, 
Benjamin ~5sraeli, a baptized Jew who brought muoh glory to 
England.' 
It is clear that some definition of 'anti-semitism' is needed in order to 
be oertain of the exact use of the term in this thesis. Indeed, by ooming to a 
definition, the limitations of a historical study oan be explained. The historian 
must accept that any survey of anti-semitism oannot tell the full extent of the 
hostility. As Robb suggests, 'Research such as this gives no indication of the 
aotual distribution of attitudes but only of the distribution of oertain kinds 
16 
ot expressions of those attitudee.' However, the historian has the techniques 
for suoh a survey, albeit a limited one. When he tries to draw on the tools of 
the psychologist and the sooiologist, he finds their exaot use almost impossible. 
Consider the question of prejudice, a conoept whioh the historian might well feel 
he should use in a disoussion of the anti-semitism surrounding the Marooni 
Soandal. The aoid test of prejudice, or the 'sooiologically important feature' 
of prejudiced views is 'their unresonable retention in the face of countervailing 
vi 
evidence or argument.' Since most of our judgements are formed unreasoningly, it 
is only the unreasonable retention of those views whioh is signifioant.17 For 
the historian, it is impossible to decide whether or not countervailing evidenoe 
has been presented and rejected, and therefore he oannot use the strict 
socio1ogioal oonoept. One might ask whether he is justified in using the term 
'prejudice' at all. 
As a result, when the word is used in this work, it conforms to the 
definition given by Allport of negative ethnio prejudioe as 'an antipathy based 
18 
upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation.' This makes no claim to test the 
ultimate signifioance of the conoept. The antipathy '~ be directed toward a 
group as a whole, or toward an'individual because he is a member of that 
group. ,19 'Anti-semitism', as used in this study, is a particular incidence of 
this negative ethnio prejudice. The partioular concern of an historical approaoh 
is that it 1ndic~tes the particular kinds of expressions of antipathy, and, 
therefore, we are interested in the ascription of 'general qualities to groups, 
irrespeotive of - and, indeed, often in defiance of - manifest differences 
20 between one member and another.' The simplest and most useful definition for 
our purposes is that of Robb, who states that anti-semitism is 'an attitude of 
hostility towards Jews as such' and that the hostility 'must be associated 
definitely with the quality of being a Jew.,2l 
The main purpose of this thesis is to pursue this partioular approaoh to 
anti-semitism. It is oonoerned with the various images of the Jew and with the 
w~ particular elements in the images were stressed. By identifying these 
elements, it should be possible to fill in the gap left between the anti-
immigration lobby and the oonspiraoy theory of the inter-war years. Modern 
British anti-semitism can then be viewed as a continuum, rather than as a series 
of disjointed outbursts, a far more realistic and rewarding approaoh to the 
topiC. 
Whilst there will be some attempt to identify the leading exponents of 
anti-semitic attitudes, history through psyohological analysis of a few 
vii 
individuals is not the main purpose of this thesis. To gain an insight into the 
particular nature of British anti-semitism at the time of the Marconi Scandal, 
the study will focus on the cultural patterns which contribute to the 
peculiarity. The newspaper sources inevitably mean that only certain cultural 
patterns are reflected. For the reasons stated above, no study can hope to be 
definitive. However, the Marconi Scandal does draw attention to questions about 
British society before 1914 and about the development of British anti-semitism 
in the first forty years of the twentieth oentury. This work begins to provide 
some answers to those questions. 
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CHAPFER. 1 
.AN OUTLINE OF THE SCANIlAL 
The story of the Marconi Scandal begins with Guglielmo Marconi's 
experiments in wireless telegraphy in his native Italy in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century. When these experiments began to show some promise, 
his father gave him full support, and his mother wrote long letters to her 
influential relatives in Ireland. She was the daughter of Andrew Jameson, a 
well-known Irish whisky distiller, and, as a result of her activities, 
Marconi was able to come to England in 1896 to further his scientific 
. t· t' 2 1nves 19a 1ons. According to Crowther, Marconi's aim from the first was to 
acquire a monopoly of wireless, patenting everything possible. 'His 
mother's connection helped him to secure financial support for founding the 
first wireless company in 1897,.3 The Italian government had shown little 
interest in his ideas, but shortly after the arrival in England, he was 
arranging practical demonstrations for the British War Office and the Navy. 
The potential of wireless was alrea~ clear. 'An obvious application for 
wireless telegraphy lay in the bridging of narrow stretches of water, as an 
alternative to submarine cables, which were expensive and, in busy seaw~s, 
extremely vulnerable; at Plymouth one particular cable was severed four 
times in four months,.4 
So, in July 1897, the English Marconi Company was founded. The ini-
tial capital was to be £100,000 in £1 shares; 60,000 going to Marconi him-
self and the remaining 40,000 being put on the market for public sub-
scription. Without going too deeply into the history of the development of 
the company? it is important to note the amount of important research under-
taken in the following few years. By December 1901, Marconi had succeeded 
in sending wireless waves across the Atlantic, a feat generally believed to 
have been impossible. 6 The need to translate his theories into practical 
application had meant a large financial outlay for demonstrations, the con-
struction of wireless stations and new equipment. Initially, there was very 
little financial reward. 'By 1900, the Marconi Company was able to offer a 
2. 
system that was, within limits, technically viable. Its financial position, 
however, was less healthy; although its one pound shares had on occasions 
been quoted at six pounds, virtually no order had been received f • 7 Thus, 
the idea of the Atlantic communication was the breakthrough planned to make a 
real impact upon the public. It was for this purpose that the Marconi 
Wireless Telegraph Company of America was registered in 1899. After the 
success of December 1901, the American company went public, in order to profit 
from this new advance. 
By 1906, the English Company felt that sufficient progress had been made 
in technical achievements for a proposal to be submitted to the British 
Colonial office. This was a plan for an Imperial Wireless Scheme, linking 
the mother countr,y with its Dominions by means of wireless stations at thou-
sand mile intervals. The idea was too radical for the government, who 
rejected it. This was a serious blow for the company, which was now faced 
with a rival in the shape of the Telefunken system, which had the financial 
support of the German government, and Geddes refers to the policy of jamming 
operated by these two companies. 8 The Marconi Company was unable to trans-
form its technical achievements into financial success. The main factor,y at 
Dalston had to be closed down. There had been relatively little profit in 
manufacturing wireless equipment, and, in order to survive, the company had 
undertaken the mass production of ignition coils for cars. However, a 
recession in the motor industry meant no more orders for coils, and, in a 
rationalisation policy, the main works were axed. 9 
In an attempt to produce vital liquid capital, a quarter of a million 
preference shares at £1 were put on the market, but Marconi, who alw~s 
identified himself ver,y closely with company policy, ran into further pro-
blems. Through resignations, he was forced to take over the managing 
directorship of the company. This involved him in the business aspects of 
the Company, as well as the scientific experimentation, and he found this 
extra responsibility very burdensome. On the Stock Exchange, the £1 shares 
had dropped to 6s.3d. and Marconi began to look around for an experienced 
businessman to take over the managing directorship and stabilise the 
company's financial situation. This would allow Marconi to devote himself 
to the necessar,y research and development needed to keep pace with possible 
competitors. He was recommended, by his brother-in-law, Donough O'Brien, to 
consider Godfrey Isaacs, a ver,y young but fairly experienced businessman and 
brother of Rufus Isaacs, at that time Liberal MP for Reading, but soon to be-
come Solicitor-General. 10 They met in the autumn of 1909, and Marconi was 
impressed by Isaacs, chiefly because of his City connections, and his in-
fluence with finance houses in London and EUrope.11 After several meetings, 
Isaacs agreed to become joint managing director with Marconi for a trial 
period of six months. This decision appears to have been the turning point 
in the fortunes of the Marconi Comp~. 
On 7 March 1910, a few weeks after his initial appointment, Isaacs 
wrote to the Colonial Office, suggesting once again the idea of an Imperial 
Wireless chain. The proposal was that the British government should give 
the com~ twenty year licences for a chain of eighteen stations throughout 
the Empire - run by the comp~ but giving preferential terms to the govern-
mente The Colonial Office did not reply to the suggestion. Isaacs, how-
ever, was a persistent man, and wrote again. This time he was told that his 
suggestion would be considered at the Imperial Conference the following year. 
In August 1910, Isaacs' trial period came to an end, and believing that he 
could make a success of the job, he became sole managing director. 
There is little doubt that Isaacs' contribution to the development of 
the com~ was crucial. Although Donaldson claims that there was little in 
his past to suggest that he would be a success,12 he undoubtedly blossomed 
into a ver,y astute and businesslike manager. Recent studies have praised 
his 'brilliantly successful appointment', describing him as 'vigorous, agile 
and enterprising in bUSiness', 14 and commented upon the long term impact of 
his 'imaginative aggressive policies,15 on the comp~. By the end of 1912, 
1 
I 
I 
J 
: 
his achievements were considerable. 
'He set out first to consolidate the Company's hold on the key 
wireless patents. Then he sought to increase turnover by 
offering new technical services, by using aggressive sales-
manship to capture business from rivals in established markets, 
and by building up the financial interest of the parent company 
in associate companies abroad,.16 
As part of its determined policy, he pursued the question of the Imperial 
scheme and pressed the government for a decision. In a letter of January 
1911, he mentioned the threat that could be posed by a German wireless chain, 
using the Telefunken process, and emphasised the importance of being first in 
establishing a network of this nature. Largely due to his persistence, the 
matter was referred to the Cables (Landing Rights) Committee, the most rele-
vant bo~ constituted at that particular time. He rejected the idea of a 
privately-run Imperial chain of stations and suggested that a state owned 
system,to be built by the Marconi Company, would be a better idea. That 
summer, the matter was referred from one committee to another - in May it was 
the Imperial Wireless Conference; in June, a sub-committee of the Committee 
for Imperial Defence. Each committee added its own recommendations, 
stressed the urgency of the situation, and then delegated it to someone else 
for another opinion. In spite of this, in the autumn of 1911, serious talks 
had begun between the Bost Office and the Marconi Company. These negoti-
ations were protracted, and many difficulties arose over such matters as the 
p~ent of royalties, the estimated cost of the stations, patent rights and 
how much should be paid for the total project. After months of discussion 
and haggling, a preliminary agreement was signed on 7 March 1912, although 
the actual contract was not drawn up and signed until 19 July, and even this 
had to be ratified by Parliament before work could begin. 
However, having virtually concluded the dealings with the English 
government in March 1912, Godfrey Isaacs set off for New York, with Marconi, 
ostensibly for a legal action against the American Marconi Company's chief 
rival, the United Wireless Company of America, over a question of patent 
5· 
infringements. Whilst they had been busy with negotiations for the Imperial 
scheme, news had reached them from the United States that United Wireless was 
in serious trouble. Some of the directors had been imprisoned for fraud and 
it seemed like~ that the compaqy would go into liquidation. If the inten-
tion was to eliminate their rival, then the American company would have to 
act quickly. All bargaining on behalf of United Wireless had been taken 
over by a group of shareholders,1 7 who might well have been able to re-
establish a viable company. 
Thus, one of the aims of the trip to America was to obtain the assets 
of United Wireless. Some indication of this intention is given by the fact 
that, accompaqying Isaacs and Marconi, was Percy Heybourn, a partner in the 
firm of Heybourn and Croft, leading jobbers in Marconi shares. If the 
United Wireless assets were obtained, or made available, they would be of 
benefit only if the working capital of 'the-American Marconi Compaqy could be 
increased to use the new assets productively. It is fairly obvious that an 
. injection of· capi tal, through a new issue of shares, had been planned for the 
American compaqy, before Isaacs and Marconi undertook their journey. 
Heybournts presence would enable these new shares to be distributed more 
easily, since he had previous experience of Marconi shares and some concept 
of the potential that existed for such stock. 
On their arrival in New York, Isaacs and Marconi discovered that a 
banquet had been arranged in their honour by the New York Times. At this 
fUnction, messages from distinguished personalities in England were received 
at the top table by a Marconi apparatus. One of the messages came from 
GOdfrey'sbrother, Rufus. In general, these messages were simple and flat-
tering, congratulating Marconi on his achievements. The text of the 
Attorney-General's tribute was: 
'Please congratulate Marconi and my brother on the successful 
development of a marvellous enterprise. I wish them all 
success in New York and hope by the time they come back the 
coal strike will be finished t .18 
f , 
6. 
Rufus Isaacs was later to defend his statements as being just as meaningless 
as the rest of the messages, but it became one of the incriminating pieces of 
evidence in the minds of those who felt there was a conspiracy between him, 
his brother Godfrey, and the Postmaster-Genera1, Herbert Samuel. Since all 
three were Jewish, a conspiracy theory was created. The message was inter-
preted as a reference to the recent agreement that had been signed by the Post 
Office. There were even suggestions that the reference to the coal strike 
was some kind of code, and that secret messages were being passed between the 
conspirators. 19 
Marconi's business in America went as had been anticipated. The 
assets of United Wireless were acquired and, in order to pay for these, and 
put them to full use, the capital of the American Marconi Company was in-
creased from 1,600,000 dollars to 10,000,000. To p~ United Wireless, 
1,400,000 dollars of this new issue would cover the acquisition of the assets, 
leaving 7,000,000 dollars to be used for expansion plans. The extent of this 
expansion programme was considered by many to be rather hasty, and some 
t 'd d th t th ·t l' d 20 exper s cons~ ere a e company was over-cap~ a ~se • 
There was also a problem of ensuring that the shares would be taken up. 
The demise of United Wireless had created an uneasy impression with the 
American public, and those involved in stocks and shares were uneasy about 
dealing in wireless. Added to this was the fact that the American Marconi 
Com~ 'had never paid any dividend and its shares stood at a heavy dis-
21 
count'. The directors of American Marconi insisted that, before they 
would agree to the increase in capital, the English company should guarantee 
the 'whole amount to be Bubscribed,.22 
Marconi was apparently reluctant to take on this financial burden and 
insisted that Godfrey Isaacs should be personally responsible for 500,000 of 
the 1,400,000 new shares at 5 dollars each, the English company guaranteeing 
the balance of 900,000. 23 Godfrey immediately negotiated with Heybourn that 
the jobber should underwrite 250,000 of these shares at par value of five 
dollars (21s3d),on condition that he introduce them to leading dealers in New 
York and London at no more than 25s. Isaacs placed 150,000 himself with 
bankers and brokers in the states before he left, which meant he had 
100,000 to distribute personally on his return to England. 24 However, 
before leaving, Godfrey concluded another decisive business deal. An agree-
ment was made whereby the Western Union Telegraph and Cable Company agreed to 
give all Marconi wireless messages preferential rates for internal delivery. 
This was a major saving, since the alternative would have been to establish 
their own system in opposition to Western Union. 25 The time spent in the 
states was an important period in the development of the company. 
Godfrey returned to England on 8 April, and, the following day he lun-
ched with his brothers, Rufus and Harry.26 Both were given a chance of some 
of the American Marconi shares that Godfrey had at his disposal, offered at 
the par value of 21s3d. Rufus was cautious because of his position in the 
government,27 not particularly wishing to deal with his brother, who was 
still technically negotiating for a contract with the Best Office. He was 
anxious about the relationship between the English and American companies, in 
case it might be thought that the purchase of American shares was the same as 
buying the shares of the English company. This would have meant that, as a 
member of the government, he was buying the shares of a government-contracted 
company and receiving favours from the head of the firm. Although this was 
not strictly illegal, it was contrary to parliamentary behaviour, and would 
have forced Isaacs to resign. Godfrey reassured his brother that the 
American Company held no shares in the English firm, and therefore could not 
benefit from the government contract, but Rufus decided that he ought not to 
deal with his brother, for the sake of appearances. Harry, who had no 
official position, and no need to question the relationship of the companies, 
bought 10,000 shares at par; later in the d~, he acquired another 6,000 for 
his wife and her relatives. 28 
8. 
Although the share dealings mentioned above were private placements, 
since the official market in the new issue of American Marconi did not open 
until 19 April, there was a tremendous general rise in Marconi stock. The 
preliminary agreement of 1 March between the English compaqy and the Post 
Office had been published by the company, and share prices soared. 'After 
remaining quiet for a few d~s, the market in Marconi shares burst out into 
fresh activity, and prices were carried mainly upward. 
work is substantial,.29 
The advance on the 
'There is simply no holding the Marconi market. It has got into 
strong hands, and the buying is said to be of a very substantial 
character •••• The ordinar,y and preference shares are about 
15s. higher compared with last week. Canadian and Spanish 
Marconi issues have also been ver,y lively •••• '30 
B.1 the middle of April, the price of shares had risen even higher. 'The 
gamble in Marconis has gone on with tremendous vigour, and while Canadians 
have hung fire the shares of the parent compaqy have touched new high 
records,.31 
'Buying of Marconi shares went on at a furious pace, and liberal 
profit-taking scaroely checked the rise, even temporarily. The 
American company, which is now controlled by the English concern, 
is supposed to have a big deal on hand which will give it control 
of practically all the wireless business in the United States, 
and fabulous dividends will be forthcoming right from the start. 
The ordinar,y and preference shares have each risen about 1i'.32 
American Marconis rose w~ above par, despite the fact that they had not 
yet officially appeared on the market, whilst the English shares reached a 
high point of over £9. 33 One of the reasons for this sudden rise, apart-
from the government contract, was the Titanic disaster of 14 April. In a 
summar,y of some Stock Exchange gambles of 1912, one writer suggested that 
the disaster 'seemed to advertise the commercial possibilities of the 
Marconi system' and 'gave a fillip to the movement (of the share price), 
which was based originally on the important foreign contracts entered into 
by the company,.34 Those who survived the shipwreck almost certainly owed 
their lives to the presence of a wireless telegraph on board the ship, a 
35 
fact that impressed a great many British investors. 
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When Rufus met his brother Harry again, on 17 April, he was told of the 
increase in the price of the American shares, which were now at £2, though 
still as yet not on the open market. Harry was convinced that they were an 
excellent investment, and this time Rufus seemed to agree with the suggestion 
that he himself should purchase some shares. He bought 10,000, justifying 
these dealings by claiming that since he was buying from Harry, he could not 
be accused of taking favours from a government contractor. To emphasise 
this point, he paid the full £2 per share, although Harry offered them at 
par. Thus, he felt, it could not be claimed that he was taking advantage of 
Godfrey's generosity the previous week. 
That same night, Rufus gave two of his close friends a chance to parti-
cipate in his investment. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and Alec Murray, the Liberal Chief Whip, were offered a thousand shares each, 
at £2. Since the shares were not yet fUlly in existence, Isaacs simply said 
that they would each take a tenth of his investment, and settle at a future 
date. Lloyd George and Murr~ were pleased to take advantage of this offer. 
All the Marconi shares continued to rise, and by the time the market in 
American Marconi was officially opened, the unofficial price was 6~s, three 
times par value. Prospective buyers were very lucky to obtain any shares 
unless they had a broker who received preferential treatment from Reybourn, 
and even then applications were scaled down. 36 Rufus Isaacs' brokers 
advised him on 19 April, the opening d~, to sell his shares, believing that 
the price was artificially high and that there would be a subsequent slump. 
He agreed to sell half his stock, as did Lloyd George and Murr~, obtaining 
an average price of 70s. Lloyd George and Murr~ reinvested in a further 
3,000 at a later date. However, such was the volatile nature of the Marconi 
market, that, by the time Lloyd George and Isaacs appeared before the Select 
Committee (March 1913) they had, along with Murr~, made a net loss on their 
transactions. 
10. 
It was these transactions which formed the basis of the subsequent 
'Scandal'. Confused and confusing rumours had begun to circulate around the 
agreement for an Imperial Wireless Chain. From a host of gossip, two themes 
seemed to emerge. The first was that the Attorney-General had been persuaded 
by his brother Godfrey to influence the negotiations for the contract. In 
addition, the Pbstmaster General, Herbert Samuel, had helped in this con-
spiracy to give the contract to the Marconi company, all three being Jews. 
The second point was that some government ministers, most often named as Lloyd 
George, Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel, had been buying Marconi shares37 at a 
low price, and selling them at the height of the boom, thus making huge 
profits. They were able to do this because of the confidential information 
they had about the forthcoming contract and the effect of its announcement on 
share prices. The situation was not improved by the strange reticence of the 
Pbstmaster-General in publishing details of the agreement. The day after the 
preliminary agreement had been signed in March, the Marconi Company brought 
out a circular with details of the tender. This was publicised widely, and 
yet the Pbst Office made no comment whatsoever, even although the Marconi 
circular omitted a certain clause to give the agreement an even more present-
able appearance on this point. 38 The Pbst Office insisted that the contract 
had not yet been signed, and that there were still terms to be arranged, 
promising to provide information once this had been done. 
The Fbst Office had some justification for taking this stand. There 
was a certain amount of inter-departmental wrangling long after 7 March. The 
Admiralty wanted more concessions from the company, the War Office was not 
happy about some details, and it was not until 19 July that the final contract 
was drawn up and signed. Samuel refused to answer any questions in the House 
until all negotiations had been completed. 39 Whether or not this attitude 
was correct procedure, it did help to create an uneasy atmosphere. If the 
Marconi Company were so eager to give details, why was the government anxious 
not to do so? What was there to hide? Perhaps the agreement was not a good 
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bargain for the government? No other tenders had been invited, as was usual 
with government contracts. The Post Office experts had maintained that only 
Marconi was capable of transmitting the required distances with any reli-
ability. Could it be that there was a real basis of fact to all the rumours 
of corruption? 
By July, many of these rumours had been put into print. What seems to 
have been the first article appeared in The Outlook, and was written by 
William Ramage Lawson. Lawson was a financial writer of some repute, having 
been, at one time, editor of the F1nancial Times. He had had a long journal-
istic career, and described himself to the Select Committee as 'a writer on 
Finance and Economics'. He had been following the question of an Imperial 
wireless scheme ver,y closely, and in July, the editor of The Outlook asked 
him to contribute his criticisms of the contract. This article led to 
others, and aroused the interest of amongst others, Leo Maxse, owner and 
editor of the National Review. Maxse asked Lawson to summarise his arguments 
against the contract, and to comment on subsequent developments. The phrase 
'Marconi Scandal', however, was coined by another journal, The EYe-Witness. 
This paper was founded in 1911 by Hilaire Belloc, largely to oppose what he 
felt was the corruption of party politics at that time. 40 Cecil Chesterton, 
younger brother of O.K. Chesterton, worked with Belloc and became editor in 
succession to him just before the first article on the Marconi Scandal was 
published. It was this piece, in August 1912, which coined the phrase 
'Marconi Scandal'. 
'What progress is the Marconi Scandal making? We ask the question 
merely from curiosity and under no illusion as to the inevitable 
end of the affair. Ever,ybody knows the record of Isaacs and his 
father, and his uncle, and in general of the whole family. 
Isaac's brother is chairman of the Marconi Company, it has there-
fore been secretly arranged between Isaacs and Samuel that the 
British people shall give the Marconi Company a ver,y large sum of 
money through the agency of the said Samuel, and for the benefit 
of the said Isaacs. Incidentally the monopoly that is to be 
granted to Isaacs no.2, through the ardent charity of Isaacs no.1 
and his colleague the Postmaster-General, is a monopoly involving 
antiquated methods, the refusal of competing tenders far cheaper 
and far more efficient, and the saddling of the countr,y with 
corruptly purchased goods ••• '.41 
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This article shows the development of a conspiracy theory, as mentioned pre-
viously, and clearly contains libellous statements against both Isaacs brothers 
and Herbert Samuel. Rather surprisingly, the politicians involved chose not 
to sue the journal. The question was contemplated, but Asquith suggested 
that 'a prosecution would secure notoriety and might bring in subscribers,.42 
The Prime Minister was anxious not to bring about too much adverse publicity 
in what were difficult times for the Liberal party. 
At this time, Parliament was in recess. The contract had come up be-
fore the Commons for ratification early in August, but had been referred till 
the next session. Opposition to the contract was very strong, and Samuel 
was forced to abandon the attempt to have ratification by the end of the 
summer session. The Liberal party had to agree in principle to investigation 
of the matter by a Select Committee, and to a debate in October when the new 
parliamentary session began. The rumours had reached the ears of many MPs, 
and the subsequent opposition was another blow to the establishment of the 
Imperial chain. 
In the October debate, Isaacs, Samuel and Lloyd George all denied that 
the contract had been given to the Marconi company as the result of any con-
spiracy or corruption. They also denied holding any shares in the English 
Marconi Company. However, they were somewhat precise in the phraseology of 
their denial. Reference was made to 'this' company, 'that' firm, which 
meant they avoided any mention of the fact that they did hold, in the case of 
Isaacs and Lloyd George, American Marconi shares. 43 Both Asquith and Samuel 
were aware of the ministers' dealings in American Marconis, but said nothing 
and took a similar attitude i.e. that American Marconi shares had nothing to 
do with English Marconis. Although the Ministers later expressed a degree 
of regret that they had not revealed their holdings at this particular time, 
they maintained that this had been done simplY,to prevent any confusion in 
the October debate. Sir John Simon, who became Solicitor General in 1910 
when Isaacs was made Attorney General, described Isaacs' attitude on the 
question. 
'Isaacs told me of the American shares immediately after he had 
made his disclaimer in the House and I begged him to make a 
supplementary statement next day. His answer was that the 
actual transaction was irrelevant, for the American company 
was entirely independent financially, and "there are others in 
this besides myself"'.44 
In spite of this rationalisation, it seems likely that the decision not 
to mention American Marconis in October saved the political careers of Lloyd 
George and Rufus Isaacs. Donaldson is of the opinion, as are most other 
historians of the period, that both men would probably have been forced to 
resign if they had given full statements in the October debate. 45 However, 
given the circumstances outlined in the following two chapters of this 
study, the strength of the parliamentary Liberal party and particularly the 
support of the ministers by Asquith, this seems unlikely. If the ministers 
were not forced to resign by the revelations of the Le Matin trial and subse-
quent events, a full statement, with regrets and apologies, in October 1912 
could hardly have been more damning. External pressures would have been the 
same; given Asquith's determination not to accept -their resignations, the 
ministers' position would have been safe, albeit uncomfortable. The 
resulting motion from the debate led to the formation of a Select Committee 
to investigate the circumstances surrounding the contract.46 The majority 
of those selected for the Committee were lawyers, although George Faber and 
Sir Frederick Banbury had financfal experience, Banbury being chairman of the 
Stock Exchange. 47 The first meeting of the Committee was on 23 October, and 
evidence was to be heard from 66 witnesses, lasting, in all, some seven 
months. A grand total of 29,276 questions were asked, many of them repeat-
ing a familiar pattern for the sake of some party point. 
Until the end of January 1913, the Committee was concerned solely with 
the technical merits of the contract and the way in which the terms had been 
settled. Experts from the departments involved, the Admiralty, the POst 
Office, the War Office and others not linked to the government, gave their 
assessment of the negotiations. An interim report was produced at this 
stage, calling for the establishment of a technical committee to examine 
thoroughly the existing wireless systems, including Marconi, to confirm the 
Pbst Office's claim that only this system could reliably carry out the 
requirements of an Imperial scheme.48 The main reason for this technical 
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committee was that claims for other systems had been made since the contract 
with Marconi had been signed in July 1912.49 Four other systems, Goldschmidt, 
Pbulsen, Galletti and Telefunken, were tested to check on any recent develop-
ments, but the committee came to a general conclusion that these claims were 
not justified, and that the Post Office had been right to assert that only 
Marconi could do the work. 
Having deliberately chosen to hear the technical evidence first, the 
Select Committee then proceeded to examine the rumours of scandal and corrup-
tion which surrounded the contract. For this purpose, they began hearing 
evidence from journalists. Lawson was the first to be examined; in total, 
he was on the stand for seven days. The questioning was very precise and 
correct, pursued often to relentless lengths, especially by the Liberal mem-
bers of the Committee, who held Lawson responsible for the creation of much 
of the hostility towards the contract. 50 By adopting such an approach, 
Lawson was made to retract many of his statements about the contract and 
allegations of corruption because he had no evidence. But this victory was 
also a rather seamy affair. Before the journalists had begun their evidence, 
RufUs Isaacs had taken the precaution of informing two Liberal members of the 
Committee, Falconer and Booth, of his dealings in American Marconis. The 
object of this was that the pair should steer away the journalistic evidence 
if it seemed to be nearing the thorny subject of ministerial share dealings. 51 
The information was given only to these two members of the Committee, and 
indeed, when the facts of the cover-up became known, led to the resignation of 
ld Sm "th f th" t" t" 52 Haro 1 rom e lnves 19a lone 
Undoubtedly the pressure on Lloyd George and Rufus Isaacs was great. 
In January, they had gone to Asquith and offered their resignations, but he 
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had refused to accept them, although admitting that they had made an error of 
judgment in purchasing the shares and then concealing the deal. 53 In spite 
of this error, Asquith felt there was no slur on their honour as ministers, and 
was determined to defend them. The pressure was brought to a head and then 
relieved by the evidence of Maxse, editor of the National Review. The French 
financial journal, Le Matin, published a garbled version of Maxse's statements, 
giving the impression that the two ministers, Samuel and Isaacs were involved 
in corrupt share dealings in the English Marconi Company. Although an apo-
logy appeared shortly afterwards, the ministers decided to sue Le Matin for 
libel. The action was undefended, and when it was heard on 19 March 1913, the 
ministers appeared in the witness-stand to defend themselves. They had pro-
cured the services of two prominent Unionist opponents, F.E. Smith54 and Sir 
]tlward Carson,55 as counsel. Although the case against the libel was proven, 
it was decided that Carson, as Isaacs' lawyer, should tell the story of the 
dealings in American Marconi shares. According to Herbert Samuel, this should 
. 
have been the end of the affair. 
'The case went very well in all respects, as we anticipated, and the 
newspaper apology could not have been more ample. The court was 
crowded to overflowing, largely with reporters, of whom there must 
have been forty or fifty; and inside there were fully t~n newspaper 
photographers standing in a row, so that one could appreciate the 
feelings of a man stood up against a wall to face a platoon of 
soldiers at a military execution. 
The statement about Rufus's and Lloyd George's American shares was 
received with equanimity, and although most of the posters of the 
evening papers are devoted to the case, only one, The star, refers 
to that aspect of it, with a placard MARCONI LLOYD GEORGE SENSATION. 
They will have to pass through a somewhat unpleasant time for a few 
d~s, and it will then be forgotten'.56 
Samuel was, however, rather hasty in his judgment, for the morning papers the 
next d~ dwelt on the 'sensation' of Isaacs' and Lloyd George's shares, and it 
lasted more than a few d~s. 
As a result of these revelations, Isaacs, Lloyd George and Samuel quickly 
appeared before the Select Committee to enlarge upon the outline of the deal-
ings mentioned at the trial. Both Isaacs and Lloyd George allowed their bank 
books to be inspected, in order to prove that they had had no other dealings 
in Marconi shares. Nothing untoward was discovered, and the Committee 
returned to the questioning of journalists and brokers and jobbers. 
Meanwhile, another legal action was pending. As part of his general 
caUlpaign against the Marconi agreement, Cecil Chesterton had been attacking 
Godfrey Isaacs in a series of articles in The New witness. 57 These con-
tained a detailed account of Isaacs' previous enterprises, none of which 
seemed to have been particularly successful. The title of one of these 
articles was 'Godfrey Isaacs: Ghastly Record'. Sandwichboard men bearing 
this legend paraded outside the House of Commons when the Select Committee 
was in session and outside Marconi headquarters in the Strand, selling 
copies of the journal. Godfrey Isaacs was naturally upset by this 
behaviour, especially as the articles suggested some discrepancies in the 
financial organisation of the companies he had been involved in. He gave 
notice of his intentions to sue Cecil Chesterton for criminal libel, 
proceedings which could have resulted in a prison sentence if Chesterton 
were to be found guilty. 
This somewhat unusual step (the recent proceedings for criminal libel 
by Sir James Goldsmith against the editor and publishers of Private EYe were 
the first against a journalist for thirty years)58 appears to have been 
taken by Isaacs as a punitive measure against Chesterton and with the aim of 
discouraging other potential critics. R.D. Muir, Isaacs' counsel, pointed 
out that a civil action would simply have resulted in the award of damages 
and Chesterton's retreat 'to the security of the Bankruptcy Court. It was 
not for libels such as these that civil proceedings were appropriate,.59 
The main justification for allowing criminal proceedings was undoubtedly the 
allegations of corruption at ministerial level. Under the 1888 Law of 
Libel Amendment Act, a libel could be considered serious enough for such an 
action if it raised an issue of vital public importance, as Chesterton's 
articles did. 60 
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The preliminary hearings were at Bow Street on 26 February, and it was 
decided that the case should go for jury trial. Isaacs v. Chesterton was 
delayed for some weeks because of Cecil Chesterton's ill-health and it was not 
until 21 May that the trial began at the Old Bailey. Carson and Smith 
appeared on behalf of Isaacs, maintaining a kind of continuity of the defence 
of the contract and its negotiations. Isaacs' case rested on the two main 
lines of libel, one concerning the companies that Isaacs had previously been 
concerned with, and the other with the allegation that Godfrey, Rufus and 
Herbert Samuel had entered into a corrupt bargain in the negotiations. The 
ministers involved gave evidence, and both Godfrey Isaacs and Cecil Chesterton 
were subjected to extensive cross-examination. The result was that Chesterton 
was found guilty on five of six counts, fined £100 and ordered to pay costs. 
Donaldson suggested that Chesterton withdrew many of his accusations during the 
course of the trial,61 but Chesterton's friends regarded the verdict as a moral 
victory, since they had expected a prison sentence, were he to be found guilty.62 
Hardly had this legal battle ended, when another shock revelation was 
brought to light. It was thought that the Select Committee had concluded its 
task, having heard all the necessary witnesses, but this was not to be. The 
new development involved Alec Murray's stockbroker, Charles Fenner, who had 
recently been declared bankrupt, and had fled from the country. An article in 
the Daily Express of 31 M~ 1913, headlined 'MYSTERY OF MISSING STOCKBROKER', 
suggested that this gentleman's books and accounts ought to be thoroughly 
investigated, since they contained some very interesting information on Marconi 
share dealings. Three days later, the Globe gave some further details, men-
tioning that Murray was involved in some way.63 The Committee called before 
them Mr Solomon, trustee in bankruptcy of Fenner's estate, and it transpired 
that Murr~, apart from his known private investments with Lloyd George, had 
bought 3,000 additional American Marconi shares for a trust fund. After some 
deliberation, it was established that this trust was for the Liberal Party 
funds. Murray had invested £9,000 of Liberal Party money in American Marconis, 
I 
but as he had retired from office in August 1912 due to ill-health, these 
investments were not revealed until this rather unfortunate bankruptcy. 
Murray had gone to South America, as an employee of Lord COWdr~,64 and it 
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seems to have been party policy, both for Liberals and Conservatives, that a 
Chief Whip's successor was not told of the previous office-holder's policy or 
investments. 65 Thus, Percy Illingworth, Murray's successor as Whip, found 
himself saddled with this rather undesirable burden. In addition, it was re-
vealed that £30,000, entrusted to Fenner by Murray in his position as Chief 
Whip, had gone missing with the broker. 66 
Telegrams were sent to South America by Sir Albert Spicer, the Select 
Committee chairman, requesting that Murray return to give evidence on these new 
findings, but he declined. He was on important business, and it would not be 
finished until July 1913 at the earliest. 67 When Murr~ eventually returned 
to England, early in 1914, he found that he still had to face an inquiry. 
Having been created Baron Murray of Elibank on his retirement from politics in 
August 1912, he was entitled to sit in the House of Lords and it was the Lords 
which produced another Select Committee. This was set up to investigate 
Murr~'s part in the Marconi Scandal, in March 1914, after a debate in which 
Murray had explained his dealings and offered his regrets at his actions. 
The Committee found him guilty of an error of judgment, but decided that there 
was no eleme~t of corruption involved. 68 
The House of Commons Select Committee had to produce a report after hear-
ing the evidence about Murr~'s dealings in American Marconis. The chairman, 
Sir Albert Spicer, began the process by drafting a document chiefly on behalf 
of the Liberal members of the Committee. By this time, the Committee had be-
come hopelessly split into party factions. In opposition to the Spicer draft, 
Lord Robert Cecil and Leo Amery produced a minority report. However, despite 
the political differences, there were similarities in the two versions. The 
purchase of the shares was called 'indiscreet' and the ministers' lack of 
frankness in the October d~bate was 'regretted'. Their conduct was censured 
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by both reports, though the Cecil version was somewhat harsher than Spicer's. 
The Cecil report concluded: 
'We .. are of the opinion that the Attorney-General acted with grave 
impropriety in making an advantageous purchase of shares in the 
Marconi Company of America upon advice and information not then 
fully available to the public given to him by the managing director 
of the English Marconi Company, which was in the course of obtaining 
a contract of very great importance - a contract which even when 
concluded with the Government had to be ratified by the House of 
Commons. B,y doing so, he placed himself, however unwittingly, in a 
position in which his private interest, or sense of obligation, 
might easily have been in conflict with his public duty. 
We think that the Chancellor and the then Chief Ministerial Whip, in 
taking over a portion of the Attorney-General's shares on the same 
advice and information are open to the same censure; and we hold 
this to be also true of the purchase of shares for the Liberal Party 
funds by the Chief Whip, so far as such purchase was due to the same 
advice and information'. 69 
This Tory minority report was rejected by the Liberal/Labour/Nationalist 
majority of the Committee. Then, whilst discussing the details of the 
Chairman's report, so many amendments were put forward that the final version 
bore little resemblance to Spicer's initial draft. Falconer, one of the 
Liberal stalwarts on the Committee, was largely responsible for the final 
version, which became the official report, the language of which was con-
siderably muted in comparison with the other two original drafts. The con-
elusion of the official version, provided a stark contrast to the criticisms 
of these earlier attempts. 
' ••• all the Ministers concerned have acted throughout in the sincere 
belief that there was nothing in their action which would in any w~ 
conflict with their duty as Ministers of the Crown'.10 
The report was published on 13 June 1913, but 'such a blatantly whitewashing 
document could not be expected to satisfy the Conservative Opposition in the 
House of Commons,.71 A censure motion was immediately put down and a debate, 
lasting the best part of two d~s, took place on 18 and 19 June. After the 
introduction of the motion, Isaacs and Lloyd George made speeches, expressing 
some regret about the purchase of the shares. This regret was chiefly because 
such a sinister interpretation had been applied to the dealings, not really an 
admission of some indiscretion or worse. Finally, by virtue of their 
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parliamentary majority, the Liberals, along with the Irish Nationalists and the 
majority of Labour members, carried an amendment to the censure motion, 
acquitting the ministers of acting other than in good faith, and declaring the 
charges of corruption to have been proved totally false. 72 Thus, their 
parliamentary integrity was officially preserved, if in a rather battered 
condition. 
There was also several extra-parliamentary events which helped to conclude 
the story of the Marconi Scandal. Yet another inquiry, this time by the Stock 
Exchange, in November 1913, took place. The objective of the investigation was 
the flotation of American Marconi shares. Several firms of stockbrokers, and 
the jobbing firm of Reybourn and Croft appeared before the committee, and were 
questioned on several aspects of the share launching. The broking companies, 
which included the firm most involved in Marconi shares, Billett, Campbell and 
Grenfell, were acquitted of all charges, but Reybourn and Croft were suspended 
from dealing on the Stock Exchange for five years. They were found guilty of a 
breach of trust between themselves and the brokers who left orders with them. 73 
The Stock Exchange verdict appeared somewhat vindictive to some observers. 
'Doubtless the business was not beautiful, and the firm sinned, but it did not 
sin by acting in defiance of Stock Exchange habits,.74 As Alan Jenkins points 
out, since the American Marconi shares were privately issued, company law at 
that time did not require the publication of a prospectus and 'dealing for 
allotment' was not illegal. 75 There had been many similar issues in the recent 
past and whilst there was general agreement on the financial press that new 
regulations should be drawn up, the feeling was that this particular case had 
been dealt with unfairly. The Investor's Review called it a 'cruel, not to 
s~ vengeful, punishment,76 and the Stockbroker asked for similar treatment for 
~ offenders or for none.77 Some Conservatives, however, interpreted the 
matter in a very different w~. In one instance, the verdict was described as 
'a vote of censure on the Government ••• no plausible distinction can be drawn 
between the conduct of brokers and that of the late Attorney-General and the 
78 Chancellor of the Exchequer'. 
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Also, prompted perhaps by the suggestion of Justice Phillimore, the judge 
in the Isaacs v. Chesterton case, an action was brought against the Marconi 
Company officials, Heybourn and Croft, Harry Isaacs and the Company.79 It was 
hoped that the profits made by Isaacs and Heybourn and others, over the issue 
of American Marconi shares, would be distributed amongst the shareholders of 
the English company, since these new American shares were legally in the 
possession of the English company, and therefore belonged to all share-
80 holders. The action seems to have had some political motive, since the writ 
was issued by Oliver Locker-Lampson, a Conservative M.P., and Beter Wright, a 
prominent Conservative outside the Commons. They, both bought one share each 
in the English Company, later increasing their holdings to ten, in order that 
they might act on behalf of the shareholders. 81 Despite del~s due to 
problems of obtaining documentation for the case and an attempt by Isaacs to 
prevent the action in the autumn of 1915, it eventually came to court, with 
'an array of advocates ••• that made legal history,.82 The hearing had only 
just begun when it was announced that the matter had been settled out of 
court. Wright's account claims that Isaacs' solicitor offered a settlement 
and, after advice, he and his colleagues accepted. Although they still 
doubted Isaacs' explanations about the shares, they were prepared to overlook 
the discrepancies and agree to an amicable agreement. As Wright put it, 
they were prepared to sacrifice victory for the good of the country during 
time of war. The defence was to contribute £14,000 towards the 
prosecution's costs, a figure Wright claimed to be far short of actual expenses. 
Donaldson points out that it was Heybourn who footed the bill, an indication of 
who had made the profits on the launching of the American shares. 83 
The original contract between the government and the Marconi Company, as 
drawn up in July 1912, was cancelled early in 1913, on the request of the 
company, because of the long delays due to the Select Committee investigations. 
A new contract was swiftly drawn up after this inquiry had ended, and was 
signed on 30 July 1913. A week later, it was ratified by parliament, in spite 
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of some protests. The terms of the contract were very similar to those pro-
poses by the first agreement; the only significant change being in the choice 
of sites, since many stations.had been built by other countries during the 
wrangling of 1912-13. 84 Work began almost immediately on construction of 
stations, but, on 30 December 1914, the contract was cancelled by the Bost 
Office. The pressures of war forced the government to alter its priorities, 
and it took over the stations alrea~ in existence. The question of com-
pensation for the company was set aside until after the war. Eventually, in 
1919, the company sued the government, and was awarded compensation of 
£600,000. 85 After this, there was a great deal of discussion about the 
possibility of a new contract, but nothing definite could be decided. 
Donaldson suggests that Godfrey Isaacs had acquired an unsavoury reputation in 
86 the eyes of the !bst Office as a result of the Scandal, and therefore the 
major obstacle to negotiations was his presence as managing director of the 
Marconi Company. The company attribute the delay in the authorization of an 
Imperial chain to 'political indecision and bickering,.81 There is, indeed, 
strong evidence that relations between the company and politicians were 
damaged to a very great extent. On hearing that the Ministry of Information, 
under Beaverbrook, planned to send as its South American representative, a man 
connected with the Marconi Company, Stanley Baldwin wrote to Beaverbrook 
advising him against it. 
'I know the House of Commons pretty well, and it would be a fatal 
error to employ anyone connected however remotely with the Company. 
The House has for the time being swallowed up your business men, 
but they would throw this particular appointment up. 
I know the feelings of the silent men as well as the vocal,.88 
Similarly, Jimmy Thomas recalled that, in 1924, as an M.P. in the first 
Labour government, he met Marconi, who complained that the Post Office were 
slow to take up his new inventions. Consequently, Thomas arranged a meeting 
between the two sides. 
'It was painfully apparent that the relations between the Post Office 
and the Marconi Company were exceedingly strained at that time. 
Mr Godfrey Isaacs was the managing director of the Marconi Company, 
and so keenly did he feel that his own personality was influencing 
the Post Office in its antagonism that at the very first meeting he 
offered to resign so that Marconi's invention should be given a fair 
chance. The offer was immediately refused:89it was not the time to allow personal feelings to retard progress'. 
Isaacs died in 1925, and by 1927, an agreement was reached with the Post 
23. 
Office for the Imperial scheme. This time the system was to be built by the 
company, but was owned by the government concerned. 90 Thus the company was 
reduced to virtually the status of building contractor. It had taken nearly 
twenty years to achieve the objective envisaged in the early pioneering d~s 
of the twentieth century, and whilst the Marconi Scandal has perhaps more 
important significance in other fields, such as political and'social history, 
its impact on wireless development, as suggested in the company's own history, 
cannot be ignored. The 'political indecision and bickering' of the scandal 
retarded the growth of wireless significantly in these early years. 
There were other consequences of the Scandal which deserve attention. 
British foreign policy was affected to some extent. Arthur Murr~, brother 
of Lord Elibank, was private secretary to Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign 
Secretary - ' ••• a fact which gave ample scope to American businessmen, 
politicians and officials who disliked Elibank's activities on behalf of Lord 
Cowdray in L~tin America f • 91 American commercial rivals could suggest that 
Cowdr~'s exploits were on behalf of the British government and that this was 
a brealDh of. the Monroe doctrine. After all, had not Elibank recently been 
part of a British government scandal involving the alleged dictation of 
national policy by a commercial company? Could it not be that Cowdr~ was 
seeking to do the same for British foreign policy?92 
. 
The Marconi affair was also a domestic political weapon, which could be 
used by opponents of the Liberal government for some time after the matter had 
died away. Some Conservative journals made certain that this was done. 
'The noisome fog of the Marconi affair stifles and poisons the entire 
political atmosphere. So it will and must continue to do till a General 
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Election sweeps out of office the men who have been responsible for this deplor-
able chapter of Ministerial impropriety and default,.93 Many journals and 
Conservative politicians continued to make great play of the Liberal Party's 
involvement in the Scandal long after 1913. It was even used by Liberals when 
the party split into Asquith and Lloyd George factions in 1916. Thus, Lord 
~sher, an Asquithian Liberal, could criticise Lloyd George's appointment as 
War Minister by referring to the affair. 
'Lloyd George's incursions into the militar,y sphere seemed to ESher 
to be blatantly political. He brought an entourage which was 
lrnown as the "Marconi gang" - headed by Lord Reading and Godfrey 
Isaacs, with Murray of Elibank. He breakfasted with newspaper 
men, posed for their cameras on dugouts eating bully beef, and 
turned up late for appointments with numbers of followers too 
large for his hosts' tables'.94 
ESher's war journals, in fact, contain much evidence of his hostility to Lloyd 
George and the 'Marconi gang'. An entry for 11 September 1916 referred to the 
Welshman as a 'clever political adventurer', surrounded by satellites such as 
Lord Reading, 'who lowers the dignity, authority and status of the great office 
he holds by dabbling in finance and politics, Murray of Elibank, whose repu-
tation for honest dealing is more than doubtful and lesser lights of equally 
questionable character,.95 
Ferhaps the man who came in for the most harsh treatment was Sir Rufus 
Isaacs. His appointment as Lord Chief Justice in October 1913 produced a 
great outcry, not the least from Rudyard Kipling, whose poem Gehazi, directed 
at Isaacs, was so full of venom that his executors refUsed permission for La~ 
Donaldson to quote it. 96 He found himself the centre of a campaign in the 
Financial News during the war which focused on the Marconi Saandal as the 
major cause of Germany's access to British classified information. The 
journal's investigation of the 'Unseen Hand' led them to point the finger at 
Rufus Isaacs as the key figure of German influence in Britain. 
'We ourselves, at the end of last year, conjectured that the source 
of the "influences" was a German "hold" over somebody "high up. 
We pointed to the unexplored recesses of the Marconi case, and to 
the undeniable fact that some very big man - of course, a politician -
operated in English Marconis, on a gigantic scale, via Hamburg. 
FUrther discreet investigation and consideration leaves us in little 
doubt that the German Government know the identity, and that a career 
can be destroyed by a disclosure. It would be superfluous to s~ 
more •••• That is the price which (on this hypothesis, and we have 
the minimum of dubiety about its soundness) we shall pay for the 
"influential" secrecy which made the Marconi inquiry abortive by 
concealing some of the most damning facts and thereb~ putting a 
magnificent weapon of war in the hands of Germany,.9"{ 
Fater Wright, who had been involved in the action against the Marconi Company, 
was in constant correspondence with H.A. Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post, 
from late 1911 onwards over the possibility of a strong campaign against 
Rufus Isaacs because of his involvement in the Marconi Scandal. It was not 
until January 1919 that the paper finally decided that a libel action, based 
on Wright's accusations in a letter of September 1911, could not be defended 
and so decided to abandon this particular angle of possible attack. 98 
Indeed, practically every new appointment taken up by Isaacs in the 
years after 1914 found him forcefully reminded of the Scandal and his 
activities in the affair. When it was announced that he was to be a British 
delegate to the Peace Conference following the war, G.K. Chesterton wrote his 
Open Letter to Lord Reading, which revealed all the hatred that had built up 
over the years. 99 It also saw the launching of a body called 'The Society 
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for Upholding Political Honour', whose propaganda was directed against Isaacs. 100 
The Financial News was closely involved in its activities, giving publicity to 
the campaign, and there were reports that mass meetings were to be held early 
in 1919 to demand that Lloyd George should confine British representation to 
101 British blood, free from German taint, an obvious reference to Isaacs. 
When news of his appointment as Viceroy for India became known in January 1921, 
the attacks were renewed in many journals. For example, Gwynne sought 
information on Isaacs' 'murky' past from Powell of the Financial News in order 
. ff t" 102 to make his campalgn more e ec lve. 
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Vendettas against the Marconi Company also included Isaacs in the target 
material. J.W. Hamilton, an ex-employee of the firm, who was sacked in a 
reorganisation in 1913, largely for taking on other work as a representative for 
the 'Rinnecott Water Softener and PUrifier', sought damages for breach of con-
t d 1 f .. 103 trac an oss 0 comm1SS10n. This was followed by a long drawn out wrangle 
against the Marconi Company, waged at great expense since it involved circular-
ising members of parliament and the press with details of his grievances and his 
\ 104 general complaints about the Scandal. He was the author of a pamphlet 
entitled The Marconi Scandal, published in 1921105 and in 1923, he circularised 
shareholders, seeking proxy votes which he could use to attack Godfrey Isaacs 
for fraud and misappropriation of funds. 106 The Company also had to face 
attacks from across the Atlantic. Hugh Bauerlein, from Denver, Colorado, was a 
persistent pamphleteer, basing his arguments on the assertation that the Marconi 
Company had stolen the assets of United Wireless back in 1912.101 All these 
campaigners used the material produced in the Financial News, which is described 
in the following chapters. Their persistence meant that publicity about the 
Scandal and those involved survived well into the 1920s. 
Thus the Scandal fulfilled a number of roles. It enabled disgruntled 
individuals to extend publicity of their grievances. It provided political 
ammunition both for individuals and for groups. A launching-pad was provided 
for the expression of anti-semitism, particularly in relation to the conspiracy 
theories which developed during and after the First World War. But its 
immediate impact, in the years 1911-1914, has been glossed over, given super-
ficial coverage, and little thorough investigation has been carried out since 
Donaldson's study. We need to know more about the affair, how it gained so 
much publicity, who was involved and why it developed in the way that it did. 
To have a better understanding of its relevance, we need to ask more and better 
questions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ALLEGATIONS, RUMOUR AND CAMPAIGNS 
Now that we have offered a descriptive account of the events of the 
Marconi Scandal, the following chapters will attempt to analyse and evaluate 
the affair. The standard account by Frances Donaldson does not achieve this 
satisfactorily, mainly because of its lack of depth in primary sources, 
particularly private papers and the press reaction. Some of Donaldson's 
comments reflect this rather shallow approach. She suggests that the Scandal 
is without 'much historical interest,.l Compared to the Great War, or the 
collapse of the Roman Empire, this may be true, but in context the Scandal is 
an illuminating case-study. Donaldson sees its significance, or rather lack of 
significance, in the effect on standards of public behaviour. Without 'Marconi' 
2 
'the rules that govern public life would be much as they are'. However, as 
mentioned in the introduction, events in the 1970s have re-focused attention on 
the Marconi Scandal, and Donaldson's verdict seems possibly too hasty. 
In addition, her view of the term 'historical significance' is a very 
narrow one. One of the aims of a case-study is to suggest that an event is 
representative of broader themes. Only by examining the circumstances of the 
Scandal in detail can we attempt to establish its wider significance. For 
example, the main contention of this thesis is that the Scandal has much to say 
about the nature of British anti-semitism in this period. But before turning to 
this, there are other political aspects which deserve attention. 
The purpose of these particular chapters is to build upon the foundations 
laid by Donaldson, and to ask questions not previously answered (in some cases, 
not yet asked). After a brief consideration of the short-term political effects 
of the incident, there will be a study of the background to the accusations of 
corruption and an attempt to identify that largely anonyIOOus group, 'the 
opposition'. In addition, there are more general political questions posed by 
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the Scandal. As Donaldson has pointed out, it symbolised 'a time of political 
emotions with no comparison in modern history. ,The ill-temper of the Opposition 
who believed in their inherent right to rule was equalled only by the invective 
used and the storms that regularly took place in the House of Comllxms.' 3 Just 
how far this atmosphere contributed to the Scandal and exactly how it functioned 
has never been spelt out, and it is the major role of these chapters to assess 
this. 
Naturally, the Scandal was a useful stick with which to beat the Liberal 
Party. In later chapters, we will look at the campaigns connected with two 
journals, The New Witness and the National Review. For the moment, it is 
sufficient to provide a few illustrations of the political scoring points made 
against the party and the ministers involved, and to note the influence of the 
Scandal on subsequent by-elections. 
Three reports from The Outlook, a Tory journal, give some indication of the 
opposition's attacks. Lord Willoughby de Broke, speaking at Newport Pagnell, 
claimed that Lloyd George's land campaign, launched just after the Scandal, 
'was devised to distract people's attention from the fact that Cabinet Ministers 
had accepted tips from Government contractors, and in virtue of those tips, they 
4 
speculated on the Stock Exchange.' Indeed, the general Conservative campaign 
against the land tax used the Marconi incident. 
'A leaflet has been issued by the National Unionist Association 
concerning the increment land duty imposed by Mr Lloyd George. 
First it cites the well-known case of the Willesden road-sweeper 
who, out of his savings, bought a house for £295. He sold it at 
a loss of £55, but was nevertheless charged £4 lSs 1d for incre-
ment duty. Next it sets forth that Mr Lloyd George bought eight 
hundred and fifty-seven American Marconi shares for £1,714. 
Inside three weeks he sold them at a gain of £1,029, but he paid 
no increment duty. The question is asked, Is this fair? What 
justice is there in saying that the increment in stocks and 
shares and movables like pictures and curios shall not be taxed, 
and that land, already unfairly burdened by taxation, shall be 
the sole form of wealth to bear this impost.'S 
Lord Claud Hamilton, at Brighton, 'referred in scathing terms to the degra-
dation of Parliamentary life, which was at once both the cause and effect of the 
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6 Marconi investments.' Sir Stuart Coats, at Deptford, noted the consequent 
loss of prestige abroad.· 'In the United States, he declared, and we think 
truly, that Sir Rufus Isaacs, under the same circumstances, could not have 
been appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court.' Sir Stuart was sorry to;'adtnit 
that the acknowledgement of the superiority of the United States in this respect 
7 put Britain 'outside the pale of civilisation'. 
Annie Kenney, the militant suffragette, also made use of the affair. 
Whilst on trial with other members of the Women's Social and Political Union on 
charges of conspiracy to commit damage and inCiting other persons to do the 
same, evidence was given about the investments of the W.S.P.U. Ms Kenney asked 
'In the investments is there any mention of Marconis?', which produced laughter 
8 
and earned a rebuke from the judge. Clearly, the Scandal provided plenty of 
ammunition for opponents of the Liberal government. 
The immediate political consequences, in electoral terms, are harder to 
assess. There were three by-elections whiCh might be said to reflect immediately 
the impact of the Scandal~ Newmarket on 16 May 1913, A1trinCham on 28 May and 
Leicester on 27 June 1913. Newmarket was a Unionist gain from Liberal, at 
A1trincham the Unionist held with an increased majority and at Leicester, the 
Liberal held on with a greatly decreased majority. This, however, fits into the 
general pattern of by-elections in the period. From December 1910 to December 
1914, 21 seats changed hands. Of these, 14 were Conservative gains from 
Liberals and 2 Conservative gains from Labour, whereas Liberal gains were only 
9 3 (2 from Labour, 1 from Conservative) • 
Did the Marconi Scandal have any influence on these three results? It 
would be impossible to state categorically either yes or no; one Can only look 
at the contemporary reports for any evidence that the Scandal was a factor of 
importance. Since in any case the electoral tide was turning against the 
Liberals, there are other significant issues to be taken into consideration. 
At Newmarket, certain Tory journals, not unsurprisingly, greeted the 
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defeat of the Liberal as an omen. Given the political trend, to hold Newmarket 
would have been a Liberal miracle. As soon as the by-election was announced, 
10 the press were predicting the result - 'Newmarket is a "gonner'" • The Throne 
11 greeted the result as the revelation of Lloyd George in his true colours, 
and the Financial News was even more emphatic - 'Newmarket Condemns The Great 
12 Marconi "Corner".' However, both candidates expressed the opinion that the 
election had been won and lost on the issue of the Insurance Act.13 The 
Scandal appears to have played little part in the campaign itself, although the 
Conservative candidate, Denison-Pender, was a director of three cable companies, 
and might, therefore, have been hostile to any wireless contract. 
Similar Tory cries of triumph greeted the Altrincham result. Although the 
14 
campaign was fought largely on the Insurance Act and Ireland, and the Labour 
Daily Citizen made no reference in its analysis of the result to Marconi, the 
word does seem to have been more prominent on the lips of Altrindham electors. 
than in Newmarket. The Knuts ford M.P., Sykes, had no doubts· on this. 
'He agrees also with the opinion of many of his colleagues in 
Parliament that the circumstances surrounding the Marconi 
contract have had a considerable effect, though Mr Hamilton 
(the Unionist candidate) did not refer to the matter in his 
speeches. Radical as well as Unionist members who addressed 
meetings testify that interruptions from their audiences 
prove that this subject has been very much in the minds of 
the electors and had a large part in deepening distrust of 
the Ministry.' IS 
Even the Manchester Guardian and the Daily News, Liberal journals, conceded that 
Marconi may have contributed to the increased Conservative majority, a confession 
16 
which delighted the Tory press. The Financial News declared that, as with 
Newmarket, middle-class votes were won on Marconi and working-class votes on 
the Insurance Act, whilst the Spectator was more considered in its verdict. 
'We do not doubt that the Marconi Scandal also played a very 
large part at Altrincham. Though cynical politicians in London 
on both sides may profess· to think that the "Marconi business 
is overdone", we are convinced that it has made a deep and pain-
ful impression in the country. It was not for nothing that the 
announcement of the Altrincham figures on the Manchester Stock 
Exchange was greeted with cries of "MarconU" What the ordinary 
Englishman especially detests is cant and hypocrisy in public 
men, and the country, even though it may be indulgent to cer-
tain aspects of the business, has with an unerring instinct 
fastened on this side of it. "They were doing just the thing 
which only a dozen years ago 'they denounced as utterly unbeco~ 
ing in Ministers. It's a bit too thick, and besides, they 
tried to keep it dark as long as they could. II Whether that is 
a fair or adequate comment we shall not discuss now - our 
readers know our opinion - but without question it is most 
damaging. ' 17 
Strachey, editor of the journal, recounted to Bonar Law his personal 
feelings over the two elections. 
'I feel it difficult to keep my delight over Newmarket and 
Altrincham within the bounds of decency. They are quite splendid. 
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I feel convinced that the Marconi business had a great deal to do 18 
with them and will do more to bring down the organised hypocrisy ••• ' 
The situation at Leicester was rather different. It was a two-member 
constituency, traditionally shared between Liberal and Labour under the 1903 
electoral agreement to prevent splits in the 'radical' vote. In the December 
1910 election, eleven Labour MPs were elected in tandem with Liberals in two-
19 
member constituencies. In this particular vacancy, the previous Liberal 
member had held a majority of over 5000 and, although there was local pressure 
for an official Labour candidate to oppose the Liberal i.e. to break the 
electDral agreement, the eventual Labour Party decision was not to do so. 
The fact that the other Leicester seat, the Labour-held one, was that of 
Ramsay MacDonald provided the opportunity for claims that the insistence on 
preserving the electoral agreement was, in this case, to ensure the Labour 
20 leader's continued survival in that constituency. 
In theory, the Leicester by-election was the testing ground for the 
parliamentary climax to the Scandal, the June debate. Certain Tory journals 
and newspapers again made great play of the reported emphasis laid on the 
affair by elQctors. 'It is generally admitted in Leicester that it is the 
Marconi affair which has stirred up the local Labour men to renounce the 
21 
agreement between them and the Liberals and run a candidate of their own.' 
The effect of the Scandal on the vote was predicted as disastrous for the 
government. 
'The Labour men have no thought of reticence on this subject, which 
has impressed itself deeply on their minds, and the Marconi argument 
will be used for all it is worth as a means of detaching working men's 
votes from the Liberal candidate.,22 
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The Morning Post, ever eager, reported that 'the cry of the workers is, "Tell 
Us about the Marconi job." It is evident that these incidents have made a deep 
impression on a large section of the electroate.,23 A later column enlarged upon 
this claim. 
'Leicester is the first by-election at which I have heard insistent 
shouts of "Marconis". There is nothing which arouses more swelling 
indignation in the breasts of Liberals, and already they are com-
plaining of "Tory mud trhowing ll , of "cowardly insinuations and impu-
tations II, and of things being said on the platform by Unionist speakers 
which their leaders dared not utter in the House of commons.,2~ 
Indeed, the Liberal Westminster Gazette recorded the suggestion that there should 
25 be a 'Marconi Day' in the campaign. However, the ~ denied that Marconi had 
been any part of the Unionist candidate, Wilshere's, campaign. 
'Some of his speakers may have alluded to admitted facts, though of 
this I have no knowledge; but you cannot muzzle audiences, and 
curiously enough the Marconi cry has been heard more often at Radical 
open-air meetings than anywhere else, and if there have been any sin-
ners on platforms they are Mr MacDonald's own friends of the local 
Labour Party .,26 
From these few selected accounts, albeit biased ones, it is obvious that the 
Scandal did play some political role in these election results. The feeling which 
comes over, however, is that it was never the most important issue, and that the 
more fundamental political arguments were more influential. The most incisive 
analysis appeared in Truth, which claimed to have no party allegiance, a few days 
before the Leicester election. 
'It is probably true that all the party capital that can be got out 
of the affair has now been extracted. This kind of capital is what 
they call in the City a IIwasting assetll. Just for the moment - at 
Leicester, for example - the magic word Marconi will be worth a good 
deal to the Opposition, but~by the time a general election comes it 
will be forgotten, and long before that attempts to trade upon it 
will become injudicious.,27 
Turning to the actual events of the Scandal, one of the first questions to be 
answered is whether an examination of more evidence, and the amassing of 
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previous research, produces new discoveries. Are there grounds for saying that 
everything about the Scandal is now known? For instance, A.J.P. Taylor, in 
conversation with Beaverbrook,heard the press baron claim that it was not 
American but Canadian Marconis which the Ministers had bought. Taylor said 
that whilst he was sure Beaverbrook was wrong, he never looked it up for fear 
28 he might be right. Whilst this may well be simply wild speculation on the 
part of Beaverbrook, Taylor's reticence does perhaps suggest there are still 
undiscovered sources and explanations. 
First, there is the question of 'undue influence'. Although it is clear 
that the Marconi Company took the initiative in proposing the Imperial wireless 
scheme, can the fact that the brother of the managing director was a leading 
politician and Attorney-General be overlooked? Although not being admitted to 
the Cabinet until June 1912, Rufus Isaacs had an important position as a Law 
Officer to the Crown and his advice would have been valuable to government 
officials in their negotiations. There were heated denials that this relation-
ship had any influence in the awarding of the contract, but these must be 
balanced against one other piece of evidence. When Godfrey Isaacs wrote to 
Marconi in 1911, saying that he now felt he knew which conditions would be 
accepted by the government and which modified (note that this was written well 
before full Cabinet discussion of the question29), he stated that this knowledge 
was 'from private information, the source of which you will assume, ,30 . .. . 
The assumption must surely be that his informant was Rufus Isaacs. There are a 
whole range of possible explanations for Godfrey's statement - was he simply 
trying to impress Marconi, for example? However, if it is true that 
Rufus Isaacs was providing inside information in this case, the question of 
just what other details were conveyed via this source is thrown wide open. 
An equally important matter for examination is whether or not the ministers 
invested/speculated in English Marconi shares, as well as their acknowledged 
involvement with American Marconis. The only valid line of defence which they 
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could use ovel:' these admitted dealings was tha.t the government were not negotia-
ting with the firm they were concerned with, American Marconi, but with a tot-
ally independent one, English Marconi. If it could be shown that they also 
had shares in the English company, then even their somewhat dubious distinction 
between the two companies would be worthless, and it would clearly show that 
they had violated any accepted code of conduct for ministers of His Majesty's 
Government. 
A study of the English company's records suggests at first glance that they 
did not possess shares during the period in question, i.e. their names do not 
31 
appear on the lists of shareholders. However, in the light of the obvious 
implications of such dealings, it is unlikely that, had they been carried out, 
the ministers' names would have been used. This point was made at the time by 
32 
many critics. Indeed, the pages of the company's records are littered with 
purchases of this nature, on behalf of clients, by brokers and other inter-
mediaries. Can one ever be certain that the transactions carried out by 
Niew Amsterdamsch Administratiekantoor, which dealt in five-figure blocks of 
33 
shares throughout 1911 and 1912 were not on behalf of Isaacs, Lloyd George 
or Murray? Obviously, it would be ludicrous to suggest that every unaccount-
able investment'might implicate these men, but the system was clearly in 
operation. 
As well as the somewhat vague claims of witnesses like Lawson, who 
suggested that the biggest transactions in English Marconi shares were carried 
34 
out by foreign banks and business houses, and Leo Maxse, who claimed that 
35 
'large fortunes have been made under strange names across the water', there 
is firm evidence that the company relied heavily on foreign finance. Godfrey 
Isaacs admitted that, in 1910, when shares were not being taken up to boost 
the capital of the company as required, they were offered to foreign bankers 
, 36 
and financiers at 25% discount. In addition, there is the example of 
nominee share holding for anonymous clients, which came to light during the 
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Select Committee hearings, because the nominee was related to Herbert Samuel. 
The list of share dealings published in the Financial News showed that 
Gerald Montagu, a cousin of the Postmaster-General and a partner in the banking 
firm of Samuel f.k)ntagu and Company, had held 2000 shares and had transferred 
them sometime between August 1911 and July 1912. This had obviously meant a 
profit for the holder, as the share value was rising consistently during this 
period. The speculation which followed the publication of Montagu's name led 
Herbert Samuel to conduct his own investigation of the matter, since it was 
being publicly debated in many journals and seemed to implicate him. For 
instance, it was alleged that Gerald Montagu had purchased the shares on the 
advice of Samuel, and that Samuel was therefore offering, corruptly, advice to 
his relatives that they might profit from the Marconi contract. Consequently, 
Samuel wrote to Sir Albert Spicer, chairman of the Select Committee, with his 
explanation of events. 
'Having observed in the Press some comments on the fact that 
transfers in the shares of the Company, standing in the name 
of my relative the Honourable Gerald S. Montagu, were affected 
about the time the Marconi Contract was in negotiation, I 
enquired of Mr Montagu, who is a partner in the banking firm of 
Samuel Montagu and Co., what were the circumstances of the case. 
I now enclose a copy of the reply which I received, for the 
information of the Select Committee, in case any of its members 
should be interested in the point.' 37 
Spicer then read out Montagu's explanation. 
'Dear Herbert - In reply to your letter of 2nd inst., I have to 
inform you that I have never held shares in the Marconi Wireless 
Telegraph Company myself. My name was used pro forma, as a 
partner in the firm of Samuel Montagu and Co., in respect to 
shares held on behalf of our Amsterdam correspondent, 
Messrs Wertheim and Gompertz. With their permission, I hereby 
forward you a letter from them, stating the facts of the case, 
to be used in any way that may be deemed expedient. ,38 
The letter from Wertheim and Gompertz, read out to the Select Committee, rein-
forced Montagu's claim that he had simply acted as a nominee for one of their 
39 
own clients, and regretted that this had caused 'so much trouble'. 
This one example of nominee holding is a somewhat tantalising piece of 
evidence. As the socialist Justice pointed out, Wertheim and Gompertz was a 
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wealthy, very respectable firm~ ~The very last people in the world whom we 
should expect to find gambling in wireless telegraphy shares.· 40 Logically, 
its discovery is no justification for suggesting that other similar happenings 
occurred. There were, of course, many accusations at the time that prominent 
politicians could be implicated to a far greater extent if these nominee hold-
ings were investigated in detail. In retrospect, most of these claims now seem 
rather rash, based on no definite evidence. Whilst many of the brokers' names 
in the shareholder lists do conceal the real identity of the holder, there is 
no concrete link with the ministers, and it now seems unlikely that any can be 
discovered. 
One attempt did come close to proving that there were suspicious aspects 
in the Marconi share dealings and that one of the ministers, Rufus Isaacs, was 
involved. It occurred in 1916, and was carried out by Ellis Thomas powell,4l 
editor of the Financial News, through the medium of the journal. Powell had 
been involved in publicity of the Scandal in his role as editor, and had given 
evidence to the Select Committee. He was, it is fair to say, a 'hostile' 
witness, pointing out some secret dealings in Marconi shares by a Hamburg firm. 
His attempts to investigate these transactions had failed because he was unable 
42 to discover the identity of the firm's clients. In addition, Powell mentioned 
that rumours in the City had implicated Winston Churchill in the ministers' 
dealings, although Powell denied that he personally gave these rumours any 
credence. This led to Churchill's fiery outburst before the Committee, defending 
43 his honour with great gusto. Powell also made some suggestions about a syndi-
cate which appeared to be attempting to conceal its dealings and provided the 
44 Committee with a list of brokers who dealt for nominees of the syndicate. 
It was Powell's concern about this syndicate which led him to an investi-
gation of Marconi share dealings. In the early stages of the Scandal, the 
Financial News seemed friendly towards the Marconi Company, and always willing 
to publish favourable material, usually Company press releases and interviews 
44. 
with Godfrey Isaacs. Indeed, Lawson, the journalist, had accused the journal 
45 
of being the Marconi 'City organ'. On 22 August 1912, at the peak of the 
rumours, an article, headlined 'Marconi Shares as an Investment: Various 
Reasons Suggested Why Holders Should not be Frightened', appeared. 
However, Powell was becoming concerned about the way that English Marconi 
shares had been bought and sold, and was suspicious that certain parties, with 
inside knowledge of the pending contract and its possible effect on the value 
of shares, had been buying stock cheaply, and selling at the height of the 
boom. This led to Powell's publication in the News of the list of leading 
dealers. 
A few days after this, the journal's campaign was in full swing, in an 
attempt to discover who was behind the profit-taking. The existence of an 
organised group was taken for granted. 
'The fact that there was a syndicate behind the Marconi dealings 
is, of course, public property. Around the identity and inspira-
tion of this syndicate a good deal of the coming investigation is 
likely to centre. It is very positively asserted, however, that 
the organisation of the syndicate and the conduct of its business 
in the share dealings were carried out with such prudent and 
scrupulous care as to render it impossible for any inquirer, even 
if armed with the wide powers of a Parliamentary Committee, to 
penetrate behind the veil. ,46 
Powell's references in his evidence to his attempt to discover the iden-
tity of the clients of the Hamburg firm were not the only effort in this field. 
A 'special correspondent' reported from Amsterdam that the biggest holdings in 
Holland were by an ' "adminstration" office', not a bank, and therefore it 
was virtually impossible to identify the real holders of the shares. 47 
In spite of these difficulties, the journal continued to stress the need 
for the investigation of all share holdings and even suggested that any public 
figure mentioned in rumours should allow his pass-books to be inspected. In 
that way, the rumour could either be quashed or confirmed. 
'If the statements be false, those persons who have put them in 
circulation ought, at the very least, to be the defendants in 
legal proceedings to recover exemplary damages. If they be true, 
the public is entitled to know it, even if the information should 
precipitate an immediate General Election. ,48 
45. 
The journal was shocked by the revelations of the ministers' dealings in 
American Marconis, and began an extremely hostile campaign against them and 
against Godfrey Isaacs. In addition, it continued to attack the new contract, 
which was ratified in August 1913. Thus, it is clear that Powell became a 
firm opponent of those involved in the Scandal and developed an obsession 
about a syndicate being responsible for vast profits at the expense of the 
ordinary shareholders. 
When the most controversial findings were published, they appeared 
several years after the Scandal had ceased to make headlines. The Financial 
~, as has already been shown, developed an extreme form of xenophobia 
during the war. It made continual references to the 'Unseen Hand' of German 
influence in British affairs. In the summer of 1916, it became increasingly 
insistent that the Marconi Scandal, and particularly the role of Rufus Isaacs, 
was the reason why the 'Unseen Hand' could operate. Germany had some hold 
over Isaacs because of share dealings during the affair, and the journal 
called for the internment of all Germans and those of German connections, a 
49 generalisation aimed specifically at Isaacs. Accusations about some share 
transactions in Hamburg which were the root of the German control were also 
50 
made. 
Isaacs' German connections were continually emphasised throughout the 
summer. In October 1916, a series of articles on the holdings of 
Ernest Cameron appeared, and it was claimed that Cameron was Isaacs' nominee, 
to avoid publicity. In addition, the Marconi Company was criticised for 
51 having some links with Germany. In all, the journal produced a substantial 
body of hostile comments and accusations, directed at Isaacs and the Marconi 
Company. Playing on popular fears, it stressed the security threat posed by 
the German links. It was a campaign seized upon by the British Empire Union, 
46. 
an anti-Communist, anti-alien and sometimes anti-semitic ~rganisation which 
52 
was an off-shoot of the Anti-German Union. Many of the News' articles on 
the 'Unseen Hand' and the Marconi Scandal were reproduced as Union pamphlets. 53 
Rupert Gwynne, a Conservative M.P. who was associated with the union,54 
asked questions in the House of Commons about the Marconi Company's German 
links. 55 However, by the end of 1916, the campaign appeared to have run its 
course. Isaacs made no attempt to defend himself against the charges, which 
seemed to produce the desired effect of allowing them to fade away. 
However, the matter was raised ,again in 1918, when Powell wrote a 
lengthy letter to Bonar Law, calling for the withdrawal of Lord Reading 
56 (Rufus Isaacs) from public affairs. It contained many of the 1916 allega-
tions, and went into some detail. Its first claim was that Mrs Godfrey 
Isaacs had traded heavily in Marconi shares under the name 'Madame Perelli
'
• 
The second was that a singing master, Ernest cameron, had operated as a 
'front man' for speculative buying on behalf, it was claimed, of Rufus Isaacs. 
When the rumours about ministers, gambling in the shares had developed in 1912, 
Godfrey Isaacs took over Cameron's account completely, putting up £60,000 
for the purpose. £30,000 of this was borrowed from a man called Segar, and 
57 
when Segar later sued Godfrey Isaacs for breach of contract, there was a 
danger of this information leaking out. Sir Thomas Berridge, Segar's counsel, 
was Chairman of the National Liberal Club, and informed Percy Illingworth, 
Liberal Chief Whip, of the dangers. According to Powell, Illingworth felt 
that these revelations would 'dynamite the Liberal Party' and told 
Godfrey Isaacs that he must settle out of court with Segar to avoid this 
disaster. Isaacs refused and the case was heard, although Powell claimed 
that Isaacs had promised to settle if he could. It was also alleged that 
Berridge was offered the Reading seat, in the presence of Rufus Isaacs, for 
his part in the proceedings. 
From these two main accusations, Powell concluded that the man behind 
47. 
Cameron must have had inside knowle,dge of the n,egotiations, and must therefore 
be either a Cabinet Minister or a senior official of the Marconi Company. 
Since Godfrey Isaacs was unlikely to cover up for a company official, it must 
therefore be a Cabinet Minister. The fact that Rufus Isaacs 'was a party to 
the offer of his own seat as an expedient for keeping the facts out of court' 
suggested that it was him. 
Powell then moved from vague possibility into the realms of fantasy (or 
what appears to have been fantasy). He suggested that the German government 
knew of all these 'facts', and that they were capable of putting pressure on 
Reading, particularly as he had relatives in Germany. Thus, the conclusion 
of the letter was that Lord Reading should either 'confess' or that His 
Majesty's Government should 'take such steps as will terminate the menace to 
the public interest which is involved in the perpetuation of Lord Reading's 
influence in public affairs.' There is no doubt that Powell held a deep-
seated grievance against the Marconi Company, its managing director and 
Rufus Isaacs. 
The conflict between the Financial News and the Isaacs family became 
apparent in another court case involving Godfrey Isaacs. Thomas Absalom 
Jackson was accused of attempting to obtain money by offering to prevent the 
printing of certain material. It transpired that Jackson had contacted 
Godfrey Isaacs in October 1916, and offered, Isaacs alleged, 35,000 shares in 
the Financial News, held by Harry Marks, a former editor. These shares would 
enable Isaacs to control the paper and so end its campaign on the Marconi 
issue. Jackson asked for a 5% commission on the sale. 
Isaacs encouraged Jackson, in the belief that the bribe was being 
delivered by Powell himself. At one stage, Isaacs had a policeman hiding in 
a cupboard in his office to record the conversation with Jackson. During the 
trial, it was obvious that Isaacs disliked Powell, and he used the court to 
produce damaging evidence against the journal and its editor. He revealed 
48. 
that the Financial News was in difficulty, having made a loss of over £7,000 
in 1915. He also claimed that Powell had tried to extract money from him 
before, in 1911 or 1912, when a messenger, purporting to be sent by the editor, 
had asked for 500. guineas 'to renew the quotation of the shares of the Marconi 
Company in the Financial Newso,58 
Powell was subpoenaed as a witness, but neither side wished him to 
appear, although he sent a note to the judge about his willingness, indeed 
59 
anxiety, to give evidence. Thus, he was unable to defend himself in court 
against Isaacs' accusations, nor to dissociate himself from Jackson's actions. 
Indeed, it appears that the defence did not call him because of the damage he 
would have done to their case. In spite of this, Jackson was sentenced to 
three years penal servitude, and it was revealed that he had a record of 
offences including bigamy, theft, obtaining money under false pretences, . 
60 perjury, fraud and forgeryo 
Bearing in mind the obvious ill-feeling between Powell and both Rufus 
61 
and Godfrey Isaacs, this letter to Bonar Law should be treated with some 
caution. However, it cannot be ignored, for its claims may have some validity~ 
Although Powell stated that all his facts could be checked within a few hours, 
sixty years on this has proved rather more difficult and time-consuming. 
On the subject of 'Madame Perelli', the lists of shareholders do show 
62 
extensive dealings by a person of that nameo The address given appears to 
be that of Godfrey Isaacs. This would not be unusual, however, since 
Mrs Isaacs was known to hold shares in other companies associated with her 
63 husband. Similarly, the dealings of Ernest Cameron are recorded, but there 
is nothing to link him with Rufus Isaacs, nor any evidence to suggest that 
he was a 'front man'. One of the obvious difficulties in assessing Powell's 
allegations is that one would not expect to find evidence of this nature, 
should such an arrangement have been made. 
49. 
The' more serious charges involving the takeover of Cameron's account by 
Godfrey Isaacs are equally mystifying. Unfortunately, the indenture which 
Powell refers to in the letter was not attached to the original in the 
Strachey collection, and so' his claim lacks this obviously important piece 
of verification. As to the money which Isaacs is alleged to have borrowed 
from Segar to help pay for this act, the only reference in the Segar v. Isaacs 
case to a loan was for a much smaller sum. According to Segar, on 14 May 1912, 
Isaacs asked for money to enable him to buy 4000 shares. It was felt that if 
these shares had been allowed onto the market at that particular time, it 
would have depressed the price of the shares. Consequently, Segar lent 
Isaacs £14,000 at 5~%64. This payment bears some resemblance to that alleged 
by Powell, but in the other aspects of the Segar case, Powell is either 
mistaken or is blatantly twisting evidence to fit his idea of 'the facts'. 
Powell stressed the attempts to delay or prevent the Segar case which 
the Liberal Party made. He placed a very sinister interpretation on this, 
claiming that Berridge was offered the Reading seat as a reward for his 
services in delaying the case. From Berridge's evidence, it seems he only 
informed Illingworth, the Chief Whip, of the dangers after he had been offered 
the seat. In fact, Berridge claimed he turned down the offer because of his 
involvement in the tangled web of Marconi and the possible misinterpretation 
65 ' 
which might be placed upon the acceptance of the seat • Powell also quoted 
Illingworth incorrectly. He did not use the phrase 'dynamite the Liberal Party'. 
66 This appears to have originated with Segar • 
Powell's other implication, of the German dossier on Rufus Isaacs' 
transactions, seems fanciful, although a possibility. There is no evidence 
as yet to confirm his statements. Taken together, the accusations do not 
appear to be as significant as they might be. There are half-truths, and 
elements of reasonable doubt, which suggest that there may be material 
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~hich could implicate politicians and Marconi officials. The door which seemed 
slammed shut by Donaldson's work may perhaps still be prised open. 
There is other evidence which suggests these rumours might have some sub-
stance, or at least reactes the atmosphere within which dealings could be credible. 
An era of Stonehouse and Poulson, with its attendant publicity, gives an impress-
ion that previous generations have been more respectable in their financial affairs. 
(Similar sentiments we re frequently expressed during the 11arconi Scandal!). We 
ought to place the known speculation of Lloyd George, Rufus Isaacs and Lord Murray 
in context. In the Marconi era, and indeed throughout British history, members 
of parliament, even ministers, invested, speculated and dealt in securities on a 
fairly wide scale. There are ample illustrations of this kind of activity in 
Edwardian times. 
'At a meeting of the Mid-Norfolk Unionist Association a letter was 
read from Mr W.L. Boyle, M.P., for the division, stating that 
largely owing to an unfortunate purchase of Cuban Port Shares, he 
has suffered such a heavy financial loss that he will have to 
resign his seat.,67 
Investment and even speculation was not illegal for an M.P.; the only regu1a-
tions relating to such matters were 'that no Member who has a direct pecuniary 
68 interest in a question shall be allowed to vote upon it.' but even this rule was 
69 interpreted so nicely as to be scarcely applied. There were obvious ethical 
objections to particular instances, such as the one alleged in the Marconi Scandal, 
~hereby ministers held shares as the result of a gift or favour from a government 
contractor, but, in general terms, dealing in stocks and shares was an acceptable 
part of an M.P.'s financial life. Bonar Law, leader of the Opposition, had begun 
a financial partnership with Max Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, in 1910, putting 
down £100,000 for a syndicate with Aitken and several others. 
'Thereafter their dealings were incessant, even when Law became 
a cabinet minister. Nine-tenths of their considerable corres-
pondence between 1910 and 1923 was on financial matters, much 
to Law's profit ••• Prob~ly he benefitted to the extent of 
some £10,000 a year, of course tax-free.,70 
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Another Unionist who benefitted from share dealings by Aitken was F.E. Smith, 
71 
who had no small part to play in the Marconi affair. 
More specifically, there were several M.P. s who bought English Marconi 
shares. Large numbers were purchased by John Wood, Conservative M.P. for 
Stalybridge, and his wife (2000 in 1911), Penry Williams, Liberal M.P. for 
Middlesborough (700 in 1912), Major Godfrey White, Conservative M.P. for 
Southport (500 in 1912) and Viscount Dalrymple, Conservative M.P. for Wigton 
(100 in 1913) .72 One of the most interesting names in the returns is that of 
the Conservative M.P. for Dublin University, James Campbell, who was counsel 
for Le MatiD in the libel action which allowed the ministers to reveal their 
dealings in American Marconis. 
One of the politicians, John Wood, made some general comments about the 
affair which takes on an obvious significance in the light of his dealings. 
Whilst describing it as ' ••• indiscreet on the part of Cabinet Ministers to 
speculate in stocks and shares when such Ministers received large salaries 
to place them in such a position that they would be above the need for such 
73 
speculation' , he also declared that ' " ••• if what these Ministers did 
had been done by a private member of either party so long as he did not 
74 
object to gambling there was no harm in it.'" Since Wood had sold many 
of his English Marconi shares in the early months of 1912, at inflated prices 
and presumably for a sizeable profit, it was only consistent that he should 
take this stand, although he made no reference to his own transactions in 
the speech. 
The ministers who purchased these American shares were themselves no 
strangers to the world of finance, however much Lloyd George might protest 
his innocence. At one point in his career, Rufus Isaacs had been a member of 
the Stock Exchange, although joining at nineteen and making a false declara-
75 tion that he was 'of age'. He progressed steadily until he was eventually 
trading on his own account in foreign bonds and securities. However, he 
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suffered badly during a slump in the foreign market in 1884 and, by August 
of that year, was unable to meet his obligations. He was 'hammered' and left 
with liabilities of £8,000. Although his membership of the Stock Exchange 
was terminated, he was not a bankrupt in the legal sense, since, as Hyde 
explains, the usual 'House' procedure was to treat such affairs as internal 
76 
matters and put its own mechanism for repayment into operation. There was 
no problem, therefore, of releasing himself from debt, a necessary operation 
before standing for parliament. Hyde points out that the creditors had been 
paid in full by the time of Isaacs' death; indeed by this time Isaacs was 
77 
worth more than a quarter of a million pounds. This episode, particularly 
the false declaration, naturally provided a target for his critics during 
the Scandal. Apart from his admission that he regularly purchased shares in 
his brother Godfrey's enterprises, little else is known about Rufus Isaacs' 
financial arrangements. 
Lloyd George's attitude is better documented. Some recent studies have 
shown that the man who frequently condemned unearned increment was himself 
. 
involved in the twilight zone of share deals. Robert Blake explains that 
Lloyd George had 'a certain lack of scruple over money. He was hard-up by 
the standards of the politicians with whom he mixed, and his behaviour can 
be explained less by greed than a desire to enjoy the sort of freedom they 
had.,78 John Grigg has demonstrated how this desire influenced even his 
early parliamentary career. 
'Money never interested him for its own sake: he was after power, 
not self. But he craved the freedom of action, the freedom from 
worry, and the freedom from a nagging sense of obligation to 
others, which money alone would confer. He wanted to be able to 
concentrate upon politics without being bothered about how his 
household bills were to be paid, and he wanted to enjoy a standard 
of living which was luxurious without being sybaritic.,79 
Whilst his financial situation improved with his appointment to office, 
it is now clear that Lloyd George continued to dabble in finance. His letters 
to his wife Margaret in 1912 show that Marconis were not his only concern. 
'So you have only E50 to spare. Very wekk, I will invest that 
for you. Sorry you have no more available as I think it is quite 
a good thing I have got.,ao 
'Well your spec. has corne off and you have each of you made another 
E100. Llwydyn won't sell as she thinks that by holding out she will 
get morel I also made a few hundred out of it so we are a little 
better off than we were at the beginning of the week.,SI 
'I got a cheque from my last Argentinian Railway deal today. I have 
made E567. But the thing I have been talking to you about is a 
new thing.' 82 
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Certainly then, in this particular period, the purchase of shares by Ministers 
Was not uncommon. The particular deal in American Marconis may be classed as mere 
Speculation or as corruption, taking advantage of inside information and so on. 
In the final analysis it becomes a matter of personal analysis and of semantics. 
Whether or not the admitted facts are the sum total· of the ministers' involvement 
is hard to establish. There are, I feel, various unexplained aspects of the 
manipulation of the share market and links with politicians, which allow the his-
torian to suggest that all has not yet been discovered. Those inclined to do so 
may find, by exhaustive research, some incriminating evidence in this field. 
However, the purpose of this study is not to pursue that end, which necess-
arily involves a certain amount of personal speculation and suggestion. It has 
frequently been claimed that the known facts, the involvement of Isaacs and 
Lloyd George in the affiar, would have been sufficient to force their resigna-
83 tions. It seems more historically important to study why the available evi-
dence did not ensure this, and how the political struggles of the Scandal were 
acted out. 
One of the factors not clearly outlined by Donaldson in her work is 'The 
84 
opposition'. For any really significant analysis, it is important to 
establish the various elements of this amorphous group. In this way, it is 
POssible to appreciate why and how the Scandal developed in the way ib did. 
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Donaldson does point briefly to certain groups, but there are omissions and 
errors which ought to be corrected. 
Jolly, in his study of Marconi, sees three strands of 'reputable 
opposition' to the awarding of the contract to the Marconi Company. 
'There was commercial opposition from rival firms whose 
supporters stated their case in the newspapers and in 
Parliament. There was ideological opposition from 
those who believed that such a vital public service 
should be run by a department of State rather than a 
private company. There was political opposition from 
the Unionist Party in Parliament to this Liberal pro-
posal. Interwoven with these three principal strands 
were dozens of minor threads of dissent, malice and se1f-
interest, springing from motives varying from the worthy 
to the despicab1e.'SS 
The author is right to point to the confusion of motives and the naivety 
of any simplistic analysis. An investigation of the three strands he refers 
to shows this quite clearly. For example, it becomes apparent that commer-
cial and political opposition combined early on in the campaign, in order to 
consolidate the anti-Marconi propaganda. Therefore, to understand subsequent 
events, it is vital to discover how 'the opposition' worked, the reasons for 
the hostility and the people and agencies who constituted its numbers. 
On the question of commercial opposition, both Donaldson and, to some 
extent, Jolly, have overlooked the part played by the cable companies, as well 
as rival wireless firms. In the early years of the century, the cable companies 
86 had become aware of the threat posed by long-range wireless , and. even by 1912 
there were many experts who were still convinced of the superiority of cables. 
Even the government departments during the negotiations with the Marconi com-
pany were not totally committed to a wireless chain. The Admiralty felt that 
wireless would reduce costs partly because of its challenge to the cable monop-
oly and the ensuing competition between the two systems. The Cabinet discus-
sions also included the suggestion that there should be a back-up cable system 
to minimise losses should the wireless chain prove unsatisfactory. It was 
reported that the Eastern Telegraph Company had indicated its willingness in 
this direction. 87 
55. 
At this particular time in communications history, the relative merits 
of each system seem to have been argued almost totally in terms of superiority/ 
inferiority rather than their complementary nature. Certain journals, for 
example the Investors' Review, argued along these lines during the time of 
the Scandal and referred to the detrimental effect of a wireless chain on the 
cable companies. After the signing of the preliminary agreement in MRrch 1912, 
it noted the fall in price of cable stocks. However, the article claimed 
there was room for both systems, with wireless as an auxiliary service to 
cables which had the advantage in 'accuracy, speed, and will probably soon 
88 have it also in cheapness.' The journal continued to press this point in 
various editions in April, May and July of that year. 
Similarly, The Outlook, the journal in which Lawson's articles first 
appeared, favoured cable communication. 'The Empire and Cable Communication', 
published before the preliminary agreement, opposed Herbert Samuel's concept 
of an 'All-Red Wireless Route'. It argued that, at best, wireless had only a 
secondary role to play and suggested that 'competent authorities', including 
89 90 Sir Charles Bright, agreed with this view. A month later, Bright was 
quoted again, expressing his belief that the Empire needed cables, which were 
" 91 tested and proven, rather than the untried wireless system. 
Hostility, therefore, came not only from wireless companies but from the 
advocates of the cable system. Major Martin Archer-Shee, who played such a 
prominent part in criticising the contract, was a supporter of the cable com-
panies. His opposition to the proposed scheme of Imperial wireless stations 
arose because of his preference for a state-owned Atlantic cable, 'the inter-
ests of which (he considered) to be directly antagonistic to any wireless 
92 
scheme.' Whether there was a similar public relations campaign by cable 
companies as the one mounted by Marconi's wireless rivals is not clear. The 
Investors' Review told its readers not to sell cable shares, and may have 
done so on the prompting of the companies. There is no firm evidence on this. 
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The wireless campaign is very different, and can be traced with little 
difficulty. 
Donaldson suggests that, whilst at the beginning of 1912, the words 
'Marconi' and 'wireless' were synonymous, by the October debate, Poulsen and 
Telefunken, the two main rivals, had also become household names. 
'When the M.P. s who opposed the contract reached the 
House of Commons on October 11, they were so well-
informed on matters relating to wireless telegraphy 
that it was clear they had been well-briefed. This, 
however, is in the ordinary course of events and it 
is proper that, in a case where one company has 
signed a contract with the, government, members of 
the Opposition should be approached by their rivals 
and should seek to present their case,~3 
It is interesting, however, to take this statement a step further, and examine 
how this opposition functioned, and who was behind it. Most of the prompting 
came from the Poulsen wireless syndicate and a fairly comprehensive account of 
its campaign can be produced by fitting together various testimonies before 
the Select Committee. 
There was, in fact, no British Poulsen company at the time of the nego-
tiations. The Poulsen system originated in Denmark, and in May 1910, a 
Poulsen Syndicate Limited had been formed in Britain, with a share issue of 
94 E13oo, largely to test the system in practical operation. The patents for 
certain apparatus expired in February 1911 and the syndicate went into liqui-
dation in June of that year. The option was taken up by a Mr Barton of 
Basil Montgomery and Company and attempts were being made to form a company 
during the government's talks with Marconi.95 A prospectus appears to have 
96 been published as early as April 1911. News of a potential contract between 
the two, which appeared in the Evening standard in October 1911, was a body 
blow to these attempts. Viggo Gandil, the English representative for Poulsen, 
wrote asking for an opportunity to tender for the contract. Hearing no defin-
ite news, he then submitted an offer in January 1912, but this was rejected. 
Gandil's main complaint was the lack of information on the requirements of 
1 
1 
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any contract. The government maintained that their own experts felt that the 
Poulsen system could not fulfil the test conditions, and wanted too long to 
97 
arrange a trial. 
The protests from the' Poulsen representatives centred on their contention 
that the contract would virtually strangle all their British developments. 
Eggar, the solicitor, stated that the announcement of the probable agreement 
delayed the formation of a British company, since potential investors feared 
that the government would not allow the new system a licence. He appears to 
have been convinced that the monopoly created would make the Poulsen system 
worthless; without a licence, the Marconi company would simply step in and 
99 purchase their patents very cheaply, hence extending the monopoly. Poulsen 
opposition to the contract was based around this monopolistic threat. 
First awareness of the Poulsen intervention came when the Select Committee 
learned that Lawson had had contact with many of the leading opponents of the 
99 
contract, amongst whom was named Eggar. At a later date, Lawson admitted 
that he had made the initial approach to Eggar, and that he might have received 
100 papers and information from the Poulsen representative. 
More detailed information became available when Godfrey Isaacs charged 
the Poulsen interest with the initiation of the various attacks on the 
contract. He alleged that there was an informal 'syndicate I acting against 
the Marconi company, using M.P. s, and even suggested that it was this group 
101 
who manufactured the rumours of ministerial investment and the like. 
In denying these accusations, Harcourt Rose gave a fairly comprehensive account 
of the extent of the Poulsen campaign. 
The initial move had been to contact Archer-Shee, the Conservative M.P. 
for Finsbury Central, in February or March 1912. It seems this was done 
102 initially because his secretary was a relative of the Poulsen solicitor. 
Archer-Shee was a champion of the cable system, and declined to take a finan-
103 
cial interest in Poulsen, which was offered. He was, however, impressed by 
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the information Poulsen conveyed to him, and it was agreed that.he could use 
104 it to ask questions in the House about the contract. About the same time, 
(19 April 1912), a handout was distributed to most daily and technical journals, 
presumably with the same information and criticisms which had made such an 
105 impact on Archer-Shee. Rose freely admitted that the purpose of this was 
to prevent ratification of the contract in Parliament. If this had been 
achieved, it would have been disastrous for the Poulsen interests. They were, 
at this stage, optimistic, believing that there had only to be a full dis-
cussion and 'it would be seen that it was such an outrageous document that 
106 it could not possibly be confirmed without alteration.' From Rose's evi-
dence, it seems he had particular contact with the Daily News, a Liberal 
107 paper. 
Shortly before the August recession, when it was still possible that the 
contract might be ratified, the Poulsen group sent McMaster and George Cave, 
two Conservative M.P.s who had shown themselves opposed to the contract, an 
account of the negotiations, details of the monopoly which would be created 
and so on. A similar handout was sent to all M.~s before the October debate, 
whilst those who were going to speak in the debate received, in addition, a 
list of arguments against the contract. Amongst those men were Archer-Shee, 
lOB 109 110 Mi tchell Thompson, Lord Hugh Cecil, , Lord Robert Cecil, , Lord 
Balcarres, the Tory Whip, Alfred Lyttleton and George Lansbury. In addition, 
a letter with information was sent to the Press Association on 2 August 1912. 
All these measures were designed to prevent ratification in August, and then 
to prime opponents for the October debate. A press release, on 7 October, 
furthered the publicity; the Manchester Guardian, Daily News and The Times 
111 
receiving additional information during September and October. 
In addition to the publicity aspect, the Poulsen group also played a more 
direct part in preventing ratification of the contract being pushed through in 
August 1912. According to Rose's account, he was informed on 6 August by 
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Steele of the Daily News that Samuel would try to have the contract ratified 
before the recess. Rose said that the Unionist Whips had been assured this 
would not happen, and so Gandil and Eggar had left the country for other 
business. Steele suggested that Rose should go down to the House of Commons 
to see George Lansbury. The tension lifted somewhat when Asquith spoke that 
afternoon and implied that a decision on the contract would be postponed. 
Archer-Shee telephoned Rose later in the day to say that the whips had .agreed 
to a postponement. The next morning, the 7th, Archer-Shee's secretary told 
Rose that Herbert Samuel had approached the M.P. and said that the government 
still intended to push the contract through before the break. Rose immediately 
contacted Lansbury, who promised to try to prevent this. In addition, 
Archer-Shee was 'primed' with the details of the Poulsen discussions with the 
Post Office in its attempt to bid for the contract and also of the firm's 
criticisms in general terms of the Marconi agreement. This information Archer-
Shee said he would pass on to Sir Hugh Cecil, who was due to speak on the 
subject that day.112 
The Poulsen group, therefore, played an important role in the campaign 
against the Marconi contract, largely as propagandists. They denied that the 
purpose of this exercise was to have the contract for themselves, although 
some press statements by Baxendale, the managing director of the British 
company, Universal Radio Syndicate, which was eventually formed in September 
1912, tend to contradict this. The main objection which the group stressed 
was the disastrous effect that such a monopolistiC agreement would have on 
other potentially more impressive systems. This was why the campaign was 
pursued so energetically and, in fact, it seems that the Poulsen forecast was 
fulfilled, at least in the short term. A report of a speech by Sir Henry 
113 Norman, a Liberal M.P. opposed to the contract, in the Commons in June 1914 
purported to show the effect· of the 1913 agreement. 
'The Goldschmidt company has .been bought up, the Poulsen 
company has ceased to be a formidable competitor in this 
country, and an arrangement has been made with the 
Telefunken company whereby the Marconi system is to have 
a free field in the British Isles. Thus all effective 
rivalry has been eliminated and the Marconi position is 
made unassailable. As Sir Henry put it, "The monopoly was 
being obtained partly by really good work in wireless, but 
also by skilful commercial and financial arrangements, and 
it ·could not possibly fail ultimately to be disastrous to 
the public interest. ,114 
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Donaldson refers to Poulsen and Telefunken as the chief rivals of Marconi. 
In fact, when a Technical Sub-Committee was set up to investigate the relative 
merits of the various systems, five were considered. These were Marconi, 
Telefunken, Poulsen, Goldschmidt and Galletti. Of the four, Telefunken were 
undountedly the strongest rivals to Marconi. Jolly described the varying 
tactics used by Godfrey Isaacs in the long battle against the German firm. 
'He gave up any attempt to compete in Germany itself where 
the Imperial Government so strongly supported its own 
national company that opportunities in wireless for 
foreigners were negligible: he brought patent actions in 
courts outside Germany to restrict Telefunken's foreign 
activities; he negotiated a merger of Marconi and Tele-
funken interests in maritime wireless into the Debeg 
Company; but, above all, he fought Telefunken for new con-
tracts to build and operate long distance stations ·in 
Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece and other countries. ,lIS 
In spite of this rivalry, there is no indication that Telefunken took any 
part in compaigning for this particular contract. Telefunken were apparently 
not considered for this work. As Sir Alexander King explained, it was not a 
116 British firm, and because the company infringed certain Marconi patents, 
thereby making it worthless in Britain. Shortly afterwards, the two rivals 
concluded the agreement referred to by Sir Henry Norman, and the question of 
competition within Britain was resolved. 
Donaldson makes no mention of another competitor, the Goldschmidt system, 
which the Technical Sub-Committee felt had great potential. In fact, the 
Anglo-French Wireless Company, which used this system, sent a letter to all 
M.Rs before the October debate. This stated that the company had been offered 
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no chance to tender for the contract, and made a list of comparisons between 
the Goldschmidt system and Marconi. According to its claim, Goldschmidt was 
cheaper, more efficient, more reliable, able to send as far as Marconi, un-
tappable and used the wave, as opposed to spark, system, which inv91ved no 
risk of patent infringements. The company were prepared to put up any deposit 
required and simply wanted the chance to compete for the contract. It also 
called for an investigation into all systems before the contract was awarded. 117 
When the Technical Sub-Committee carried out this suggestion, it declared that, 
whilst GoldsChmidt was valuable for short distance work, and the wave system 
had more potential than the spark (which meant Marconi, Telefunken et al.), 
it had not yet achieved the necessary 2000 mile test in commercial conditions. llB 
Even after this decision, the Goldschmidt company were anxious to maintain 
their challenge. Letters were written to Samuel and Sir Alexander King in 
July 1913, claiming that tests of 3500 miles had been achieved, and that they 
119 
wished to tender for the contract. The company also contacted the Conserva-
tive leader with details of their request, through Charles Watney of the 
St Stephen's Intelligence Bureau. Watney told Bonar Law that the Goldschmidt 
people were 'strongly Conservative', and since the whole question of the con-
tract had become so political, urged Law to meet Dr Goldschmidt or Sir Oliver 
120 Lodge, a British wireless expert, to discuss the merits of this system. 
Watney also kept Law informed of further Goldschmidt attempts to influence 
121 the Post Office to change its attitude. 
Therefore, of the four Marconi rivals, at least two were actively campaign-
ing against the contract. This, as Donaldson stated, was a legitimate process, 
and had some legitimate businessgfievances as its motive. However, this priming 
of opponents meant that frequently those who opposed the contract for other 
reasons - ideology and politics, for example, were identified with these 
commercial criticisms. (And indeed, as has been mentioned, the rival firms 
were quick to use political diversions, viz. Goldschmidt). 
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These other streams of recorded opposition were expressed chiefly in 
Parliament and the press. Its proponents were mainly of Unionist sympathy, 
although there were a few Liberal M.Ps and journals which raised technical 
and ethical objections. Tory opponents of the contract used this fact to 
suggest that all criticisms were therefore non-political and not due simply 
122 to party malice. However, by no stretch of the imagination can some of 
the Conservative attacks be attributed to rational criticism of the terms 
of the agreement. 
The arguments of Liberal experts like Sir Henry Norman and Sir George 
Croydon-Marks, M.P. for Launceston can, for the purposes of this particular 
study, be disposed of without much debate. They represent what Jolly calls 
the ideological strand of the opposition. Norman opposed the creation of a 
monopoly and felt that wireless was still in the developmental stages. 
Therefore, it was wroIlJ to commit so much to one company. In addition, he 
saw more potential in the wave system than the spark. Finally, there was a 
certain humiliation that the government should hand over so much work to a 
commercial company. 
'What the Australian Post Office and the American Army can 
do, surely this country can do also, as indeed the Admiralty 
has shown. I regard any suggestion to the contrary as 
humiliating, and however little authority may attach to my 
views, I protest against it as an affront to British science 
and British enterprise.' 123 
Norman was, however, anxious to dissociate himself from the charges of corrup-
tion made against the ministers. 'I believe that is not only wi thout a shadow 
124 
of foundation, but that it is preposterous.' 
Similarly, Marks, who was something of an expert in patent law, pointed 
out that a monopoly in that early stage of wireless would discourage other 
developments, a point also made by the Poulsen group. He believed that, under 
the terms of the Patent Acts, the government were entitled to all the necessary 
information at a far lower price. However, this was not intended as a criti-
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cism of the company. 'I was not criticising this as a Marconi contract, but 
as a contract prejudicial to the industry, no matter who the persons might be 
125 
who were concerned in the contract.' Again, his suggestions dismissed 
totally any allegations of corruption, he simply felt that the contract was 
a bad one for the government in its present form. 
126 These two men, along with the Daily News and the Nation, were repre-
sentative of Liberal criticisms of the terms of the agreement and the techni- . 
cal merits of the"question. There were Conservatives who put forward the 
same criticisms and, as in the case of Archer-Shee, had a genuine interest in 
the field of communications. However, in many cases, there was an additional 
factor, the third strand of opposition mentioned by Jolly, the political 
hostility of Conservatives to a Liberal government measure. In Jolly's 
". 
opinion, it was this political hostility which made the Scandal such a 
prominent business. 
'Parliament and its adjuncts provided the stage for most of 
the violent scenes, with the peculiarly bitter antagonism 
which existed at that time between the Liberal and Unionist 
parties over more important matters exacerbating a situation 
which, although unpleasant enough, hardly justified the almost 
hysterical national response.,127 
Clearly this last aspect of the opposition is historically the most important. 
Jolly's statement must be tested, for it is by no meanS certain that his 
assumptions are justified. In short, the generalisations about the state of 
parliamentary politics in this period still need to be refined. 
64. 
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Note A. 
Samuel Segar was a Russian Pole who came to England in the l880s. He 
built up a business in the timber trade, describing himself as a 'mahogony 
merchant' (The Times, 31 october 1914). He also made a considerable living as 
a speculator on the Stock Exchange. He was a member of the same bridge club 
as Godfrey Isaacs and also met him at the National Liberal Club. It is appar-
ent, from the evidence in the case, that Segar consistently asked Isaacs for 
advice on Marconi shares, which he began to buy in 1911. He accompanied 
Isaacs and Heybourn on their American trip, and Segar claimed that he was 
promised some American Marconi shares by Heybourn. In the event, he received 
1000 but appears to have been dissatisfied. When Isaacs and Heybourn gave 
evidence to the Select Committee, he felt that they had misled him on certain 
details, and that they had made huge profits for themselves out of the launch-
ing of the American shares. In addition, there was a certain element of 
resentment that, whilst others had sold their Marconi shares while the price 
was high, Segar had held on too long and had made very little profit. 
In April 1913, the two men met and both gave different versions of what 
happened. Segar claimed that he accused Isaacs of making vast profits for 
himself, and that he had misinformed the public. Segar himself was left with 
9000 English Marconi shares, 5000 American and 1400 Pekin Syndicate, which 
Heybourn had suggested he buy. All these shares had now fallen below the price 
Segar had paid for them, and, according to Segar's story, Isaacs offered to 
take them off his hands, in order to placate him. 
Isaacs stated that, at this meeting, Segar's hostility had been directed 
solely against Heybourn, and that no agreement about shares had been made. 
Segar then claimed that, at a later date, Isaacs had told him to sell the 
shares, and that he would pay the difference between the cost price and the 
selling price. Segar sold but then found Isaacs unwilling to pay the difference. 
Isaacs withheld payment on the advice of his solicitor, Steadman. In 
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evidence, Steadman referred to the difficult situation at the time of the 
alleged agreement (April 1913). Isaacs was involved with his action against 
Cecil Chesterton and Steadman felt that any payment made to Segar would seem 
like a deal, a purchase of silence, which might well influence the outcome of 
the trial. There was also the additional factor of blackmail, which Segar 
appeared to be applying to Isaacs. 
In deciding whether or not an agreement had been reached, the judge accepted 
Segar's version of the story. However, he rejected the claim for breach of 
contract on the grounds that Segar had forced Isaacs into the agreement by 
blackmail. It transpired that Segar had threatened to place himself before the 
Select Committee, to make allegations that Rufus Isaacs was giving inside infor-
mation to his brother Godfrey, so that he could carry out profitable share 
transactions. Rufus Isaacs had been acting as arbitrator in the take-over of 
the National Telephone Company by the Post Office, and it appears there was 
some speculation in the company's shares, in the hope of higher prices after the 
settlement. Godfrey Isaacs had some of these shares, and had mentioned to 
Segar that they were a worthwhile investment. Segar had therefore purchased 
some. 
Rufus Isaacs was, at this time, conscious of public opinion in relation to 
financial dealings, and anxious not to expose himself to further accusations. 
When his brother Harry mentioned that Godfrey held these telephone shares, 
Rufus expressed regret and advised that Godfrey dispose of them, to avoid any 
trouble. When the final settlement between company and Post Office was 
achieved, at a lower price than forecast, Segar was annoyed to find that he 
was caught once more with some shares, and even more upset to find that Godfrey 
Isaacs was not. He therefore threatened to reveal the 'corruption' to the 
Marconi Committee. 
It is understandable that the Isaacs would not want a statement of this 
kind to be made, particularly in the atmosphere of the Marconi revelations. 
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Although the judge accepted that the allegations were based on malice rather 
than fact; 'it was a suggestion of.a discreditable kind and one which on 
ordinary occasions would be laughed at' (The Times, 21 November 1914) , he 
recognised that this was not an ordinary occasion. Consequently, he found that 
Godfrey Isaacs had made the agreement with Segar under extraordinary stress, 
and found for the defendant, although with no costs. 
[Based on reports in The Times, 31 October, 3,4,5,11,12,20,21 November 1914] 
CHAPTER 3 
PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS AND MARCONI 
••• there was, especially in the last years before the First 
World War, an atmosphere of uneasiness, of disorientation, 
of tension, which contradicts the journalistic impression of 
a stable belle epcque of ostrich-plumed ladies, country 
houses and music-hall stars. These were not only the years 
of the sudden emergence of Labour as an electora~: force, of 
radicalization on the socialist left, of flaring bush fires 
of labour 'unrest', but also years of political breakdown. 
Indeed, they were the only years when the stable and flex-
ible mechanism of British political adjustment ceased to 
function, and when the naked bones of power emerged from the 
accumulations of tissue which normally concealed them.' 
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The writer then goes on to identify the various ways in which these elements 
were exposed. 
'These were the years when the Lords defied the Commons, when 
an extreme right, not merely ultra-conservative but national-
istic, vitriolic, demagogic and anti-semitic, looked like 
emerging into the open, when scandals of financial corruption 
rocked governments, when - most serious of all - army officers 
with the backing of the Conservative Party mutinied against 
laws passed by Parliament.' 
These 'symptoms of a crisis in economy and society' could not be disguised 
by the superficial gloss of the 'golden Edwardian era' and Hobsbawm suggests 
that the outbreak of war in 1914 was, therefore, not seen as the catastrophe 
which later writers would come to describe. 'It came as a respite from crisis, 
a diversion, perhaps even as some sort of solution. At all events, there is 
an element of hysteria in the welcome the poets gave to it.,l 
Hobsbawm's summary of the late Edwardian period is concise and conveys 
with admirable skill the atmosphere of tension in this era. It reflects the 
unease illustrated by a contemporary commentator, C.F.G. Masterman - 'We 
know little of the forces fermenting in that strange laboratory which is the 
birthplace of the coming time. We are uncertain whether civilisation is 
about to blossom into flower, or wither in tangle of dead leaves and faded 
2 gold' and it is the theme of social 'breakdown' which runs through the still 
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3 influential work of George Dangerfield on the 'death' of Liberal England. 
A microcosm of these tensions was to be found in the parliaments of the 
day, as J.L. Hammond recorded. 
'Passions have rarely run so high in politics as they ran 
in these years, The House of Lords, Ireland, Women's 
Suffrage, the German rivalry in ship-building, the 
Insurance Bill, the Marconi Scandal - these were all the 
issues raising ungovernable elements in the temper of 
politics : sex hatred, class hatred, race hatred, religious 
hatred, fear of domestic revolution, fear of foreign agres-
sion, a general sense of disturbance and unrest,,4 
The overall impression is that these passions were unable to find sufficient 
outlet through the normal constitutional channels. 
'From 1909 onwards there was ••• a growing lack of faith in 
the whole parliamentary system. This was expressed in out-
bursts of unconstitutional violence by militant suffragettes, 
by militant trade unionists and by the opponents of the Home 
Rule Bill for Ireland which the Government introduced in 1912.,5 
Recent attempts to analyse this failure of the governmental system to 
accommodate the political demands have centred on the nature of the British 
parliamentary system. For example, Aikin has stressed the importance of 
'inter-party consensus', which provided the means of compromising political 
and ideological differences, and suggests that these years show the Liberals 
failing to make the necessary concessions which would allow the system to 
6 function smoothly. One of the results of this was that Conservatives, 
disturbed by the attack upon the House of Lords, symbol of their power in or 
out of office, set out to disrupt parliamentary business. 'Abandoning the 
inter-party consensus, they were prepared to stop at nothing to defeat the 
7 Government.' 
It is one of the purposes of this chapter to suggest that the Marconi 
Scandal contradicts the claim made by Aikin and others. It may have some 
validity if applied to the situation of Conservative support for Ulster 
Unionists - ('They had been inhibited in their tactics only by the fear of 
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losing elections, and no such fear was present during the promotion of the 
8 Ulster civil war') - but as an unqualified generalisation, it must be 
questioned. 
Certainly there are obvious manifestations of Conservative attempts to 
disrupt parliamentary proceedings. A chapter of Philip Snowden's biography 
is entitled 'Rowdyism in the Commons', and points particularly to two inci-
dents, both involving Asquith, as the most disgraceful outbursts. The fact 
occurred during the final stages of the Parliament Bill, on 24 July 1911. 
Asquith was prevented from speaking by sustained opposition shouting, led, 
Snowden alleged, by Lord Hugh Cecil and F.E. Smith. Other evidence confirms 
9 their leadership. Eventually, Asquith was able to continue, although jeer-
ing greeted every word he uttered. He was followed by the opposition leader, 
Arthur Balfour, who' ••• made no apology, he expressed no regret, but 
excused their conducton the ground that deep and passionate resentment was 
10 felt with the policy of the Government.' 
The second occurrence cited by Snowden was in November 1912, during a 
debate on the Home Rule Bill. The Conservatives had defeated the government 
on an amendment during the debate, but two days later, Asquith proposed a 
resolution which simply reversed the earlier decision. There were cries of 
'Traitor' from the Tory benches, directed chiefly at Winston Churchill, a 
former Conservative, and one member, Sir William Bull, admitted using the 
word. He withdrew from the chamber, and the Conservatives then broke into 
a chant of 'Adjourn' when Rufus Isaacs was speaking. 'It was clearly evi-
dent that there was a determined conspiracy to prevent any discussion. ,II 
The sitting was suspended, but, on resumption, produced the same result, 
and had to be adjourned. As members were dispersing, it was seen that 
Winston Churchill and Colonel Seely, both former Conservatives now members 
of the Liberal government, were leaving together. There were shouts of 
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'Ratsl' and Ronald McNeill, an Ulster Unionist M.P., hurled a book at 
Churchill, striking him in the face. 
More recent studies confirm Snowden's assessment of the situation. 'The 
"scene" (but not the fight) was planned in advance by the Unionist leaders, 
who were seriously considering the decision to make all business in the 
12 House impossible.' As Snowden pointed out, Balfour himself was party to 
this policy, although with some reluctance. He realised that, in particular, 
the Irish Question had reached a position that was beyond debate. 
'Balfour did not dissent, but said in a tone of extreme 
depression that he had never expected to have to admit 
that such a thing could be true in this country. The 
mere admission of its possibility, by him, brought into 
consciousness the unexampled passions which were rending 
our familiar world.,13 
Balfour's successor, Bonar Law, took a similarly hostile attitude to the 
Liberal government, at least in public debate - '''I am afraid I shall have 
14 to show myself very vicious, Mr Asquith, this session'" - and this fitted 
into the general Conservative pattern of opposition. 'Law's unrestrained 
abuse of the Liberals certainly struck a responsive chord among the unionist 
15 backbenchers and journalists.' 
How, then, are we to equate the outcome of the Scandal with the preceding 
account of bitter parliamentary hostility? Most standard historical works 
appear to agree that the Liberal government was in danger of being destroyed 
by the affair. The Oxford History of England suggested that, had Bonar Law's 
amendment been carried in the final debate, the ministers would have been 
16 forced to resign. Donaldson speculates that, for eighteen months, careers 
17 
were in danger. Frequently, the essential survival factor is seen as the 
18 
support given to the ministers by Asquith. But was the Conservative oppo-
sition as concerted and as ru,thless as Aikin's theory would suggest? How 
are we to account for Winston Churchill's remarks on the Scandal? He claimed 
that the Liberal government could have been destroyed by the affair; that 
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the Conservatives failed to exploit the situation. 'Some of them were too 
19 
stupid and, frankly, some of them were too nice.' 
Part of the answer must be implicit in what has already been said about 
the political hostility of the period. In physics, Newton's Law states that 
every action has an equal and opposite reaction, and in historical terms, the 
'unity' temporarily created in the Conservative Party by the various crises 
also led to strong Liberal reaction, However undesirable the end result of 
the parliamentary aspect of the Scandal, the party vote in the censure debate, 
it was a fact that Liberal M.P$, with three exceptions, voted solidly against 
any Conservative attempt to bring down either the government or the ministers. 
Similarly, when it was possible that ministers might have resigned over the 
Scandal, the fact that Asquith refused to accept this course of action 
20 
reflects this partisanship. 
The other part of the explanation, hinted at in Churchill's words, is 
that Conservatives did not ruthlessly seek to destroy the government over the 
Scandal. Here, it is necessary to identify which elements in the Conserva-
tive party were responsible for opposing the contract and to what extent they 
were prepared to carry this opposition. As many historians have pointed out, 
it is wrong to see the Conservatives as a united party in this period, and, 
on the question of the Marconi Scandal, as on many other issues, there were 
obvious divisions of opinion and of action. 
What does become apparent is that at no time did all Conservatives de-
test all Liberals. There was the phenomenon of proposals for an all-party 
21 
coalition, which occurred over the questions of the Lords and of Horne Rule. 
Whilst these reflect the breakdown of the traditional constitutional machin-
ery, and the need for an alternative method of government to overcome these 
difficulties, it also shows that there were members of both parties who 
22 
exhibited a 'cross-bench frame of mind.' Politicians like Churchill, 
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Balfour and F.E. Smith (except possibly over Ulster) had a less &·visive and 
more long-term view of politics, which was shown in the Marconi Scandal, as 
well as the constitutional conferences, Their views transcended at times 
the political bickering of the period and brought accusations of betrayal 
from their own party supporters. 
Simultaneously there arose a wave of protest about the very nature of 
the parliamentary system, suggesting that this 'cross-bench' attitude was 
symptomatic of the decay of democracy, in that power now rested with an 
elite, who forsook party principles for the rewards of office. To those 
party stalwarts who were unaware of this new development, it must have 
appeared that politics had gone mad. As G.K. Chesterton explained: 
'But what makes me laugh is the thought of those poor 
puzzled, honest and indignant Tories, who read the 
Morning Post and imagined that a Tory chivalry was 
storming the fortress of corrupt Radicalism, when they 
read the Parliamentary Debates on the subject; and 
especially the passage in which Arthur Balfour said 
that they must judge men like Lloyd George (whom they 
knew so well and loved so much) more leniently than 
they would judge a common outsider. The poor Primrose 
League must have been horribly mystified by the problem 
of this mildness on the Front Benches. They would have 
found the answer to the problem in a book called 
The Party System. ,23 
This work, The Party System, was written after the December 1910 elec-
tion by Cecil Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc. It was an indictment of the 
representative system of government. Power, the authors maintained, no 
longer rested with 'the will of the people'; it belonged to the tiny minor-
ity who sat on both Front Benches. The 'party system' allowed these few to 
alternate the rewards of office, and thus genuine party issues became 
obsolete. 'No difference of economic interest or of political principle any 
longer exists among its members to form the basis of a rational line of 
24 party division.' Whilst the sham of infighting was maintained to pre-
serve a semblance of reality, policy decisions were made in ' ••• those 
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thousand private conferences between opposing leaders behind the Speaker's 
chair and at dinner parties and social clubs which give their real direction 
25 to the politics and to the destinies of modern England.' 
Without accepting the more paranoid suggestions of this work, which saw 
deliberate conspiracy and collusion at every turn, there is a strong element 
of perceptive analysis in their claims. It is an established fact that the 
social divisions between M.P$ of various parties were becoming blurred. 
Blewett, writing of the 1910 elections, states 'Only religion, the residulw 
of an earlier socio-economic and cultural division, provided any sharp con-
26 trast in the social background of the major parties' candidates.' In an 
impressionistic way, this is confirmed by reading the brief bibliographies 
of M.P.s of this time as they are given in the footnotes to Ensor's 
27 England, 1870-1914. The fact was that, during a time of apparently heated 
and violent public debate, there seemed to be a coming-together of leading 
politicians of both sides, which created the atmosphere of suspicion and 
disenchantment, 
Edward Moyle, news editor of The People, wrote to Bonar Law, mentioning 
the story that Law, Rufus Isaacs and Lloyd George had met whilst in France, 
lunched together and played golf. He asked Law for a contradiction of this 
28 
rumour, to satisfy himself and presumably his readers. He would not have 
obtained a denial, for Law and Balfour had been 'fraternising' with leading 
29 Liberal ministers at Cannes only a week earlier. A recent study of Balfour 
shows his friendship with leading Liberals like Grey, Asquith and Haldane. 30 
W.S. Blunt's diary tells of the close relationship between Churchill and 
F.E. Smith, their holidays together, and of Smith's being godfather to 
31 Churchill's son, Randolph. Hyndman, former leader of the Social Democratic 
Federation recently merged into the British Socialist Party, criticised the 
approach of the Conservative party towards the Marconi issue in his corres-
pondence with R.D. Blumenfeld, editor of the Tory Daily Express - 'I cannot 
32 
understand the attitude of some of your party organs.' Later, he savagely 
castigated Law for allowing the Liberals to escape and attributed this to 
33 his 'conniving' with Lloyd George on the Riviera. Even Handel Booth, a 
Liberal M.P., felt that 'there was rather more personal friendship between 
the two Front Benches than he liked; and he was not as fond of compromises 
34 in the House as the Front Benches were. (hear, hear) .' 
It might be said that these attitudes and criticisms are an inevitable 
81. 
and perpetual part of the British parliamentary system. Revolutionaries 
regard Parliamentary conflicts as sham battles in a largely private war fought 
by political mercenaries who are far removed from contact with real forces 
35 
of discontent.' However, by no stretch of the imagination can all those 
who exhibited such feelings at this particular time be classified as revolu-
tionaries. In a time of real political bitterness, this apparent friendship 
and supra-party attitude confused many who saw themselves as ordinary party 
supporters. This apparently contradictory political approach was particularly 
evident in the Marconi Scandal. 
The previous chapter has suggested the role played by party feelings in 
the Scandal. We have seen that, whilst critics like Archer-Shee had commer-
cial and ethical objections to the contract, they may also have been influenced 
by their political beliefs. The part played by the Conservative Party, or at 
least by some of its members, is important, in the light of the remarks made 
above. It is necessary to identify the elements of the Opposition that were 
actively hostile and those that were not. In addition, those ministers 
involved were indebted to the strength of the Liberal party and the support of 
the Prime Minister, Asquith, and we shall look briefly at the way this 
functioned. 
The involvement of certain Conservatives went beyond the mere questioning 
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and debate in parliament. Two of the legal cases arising out of the Scandal 
illustrate this well, Oliver Locker-Lampson, Conservative M.P. for North 
Huntingdon was responsible for the organisation and financial assistance 
involved in Cecil Chesterton's defence in the action brought by Godfrey Isaacs. 
Public attention was drawn to this in the June 1913 debate by Sir Arthur 
Markham. Following Balfour~s speech, in which he suggested that there was 
no hint of corruption in the ministers' actions, Markham then asked if Balfour 
was aware that 'a Member of his own party has gone down into the City collect-
ing subscriptions on behalf of Mr Chesterton. \36 Markham was also upset that 
Locker-Lampson was involved in the shareholders' action against the Marconi 
Company, which had arisen from the Isaacs-Chesterton case. He particularly 
attacked his purchase of one preference share in the company in order to 
initiate the action, a gesture which seemed to be in direct contradiction to 
Balfour's suggestion that there was no question of corruption against the 
ministers. 
'When the hon. Member for North Huntingdon knows perfectly 
well that Mr Chesterton charged my right hone friends with 
wrong doing, why has he been soliciting subscriptions to 
defend Mr Chesterton? After criminal proceedings have been 
started, is it not very strange that the hone member opposite 
should then announce, through some of the people with whom 
he is aSSOCiated, that he had purchased one share in the 
American Marconi Company, and that he was going to test the 
legality of this matter and find out whether Mr Godfrey Isaacs 
was an honest man or not. That was on the morning of the 
criminal trial; that was the time the hone Gentleman intimated 
the fact through the usual Press channels to the general public. 
I say that is not playing the game. You have now got to stand 
up here and sa~ there has been corruption, or else you have to 
remain silent. 7 
Markham's attack does suggest that there were divisions in the Opposition 
approach to the Scandal and that certain Conservatives were more keen to exploit 
the situation than others. Locker-Lampson was obviously anxious to bring 
attention to events. Later in the debate, he defended his role in both the 
Chesterton case and the action against the Marconi company, Explaining that 
he had assisted Chesterton, he justified this act. 
'Mr Chesterton is not a Unionist and not a Liberal; he is 
a Socialist; (sic) he is suppo~ted by no party and by few 
people. He made certain statements which not only I regretted, 
but which I told him I thought.were indefensible in the extreme. 
Mr Chesterton attacked Ministers in a way anybody must regret. 
He went beyond the legitimate limits of controversy. I was 
approached by friends of his in order to assist him. On the 
one side there was Mr Chesterton, a solitary journalist belong-
ing-to no party, to no action, to no faction. Pitted against 
him were the millions of the Marconi company and the huge 
influence of the Liberal party. I was asked to give some 
assistance to Mr Chesterton. I did my best to get him to apolo-
gise. I said I felt he had no right to make the statements he 
did about Ministers of the Crown holding office at the present 
moment. I did my best to get him to apologise for statements 
which contravened what was right in regard to them. He abso-
lutely refused. I then saw his father, and he explained that 
if he had to fight a case of this sort on behalf of his son it 
would mean the sale by him of the only property he had got. 
After that I did my best to help Mr Chesterton and enable him 
to put up a fight in the Courts, and not be compelled to stand 
up unaided against trained counsels at the Bar and be smashed 
to atoms. ,38 
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He concluded by expressing a desire for equal rights for all before the law, 
implying that his action in this case was motivated by this sentiment. The 
explanation seems rather self-righteous and there is no doubt that Locker-
Lampson's involvement also served a more partisan cause; that of creating 
publicity for the Scandal. His involvement in the Chesterton defence led to 
the disclosure of the purchase of American Marconi shares with Liberal Party 
funds. Writing to Bonar Law with some details of the Chesterton case, 
Locker-Lampson mentioned how this occurred. 
, Finally, but for the Chesterton case the Master of 
Elibank's purchase through Fenner would never have 
come out. We found this out, but were not allowed 
to bring it out in court for technical reasons. We 
therefore introduced it to the public through the press, 
and then sent the information on to the Marconi Committee. 
We hope to have some more later on.,39 
Locker-Lampson also mentioned in this letter that the judge, in his summing-up, 
had given him new hope for the action against the company. Most standard his-
40 tories, including Donaldson, suggest that it was at the judge's suggestion 
that the shareholders' action was initiated, but the evidence shows it was 
already well under way at this time. The New·Witness informed its readers of 
the possibility of an action against the company and mentioned that a 
41 
committee of shareholders was being formed as early as April. Locker-
42 Lampson purchased two shares in April and Lawson, the journalist, was 
advocating an action about the same time. ·An action for breach of trust 
would clearly lie against all the directors of the English Marconi Company 
who diverted more than half of the American issue fram the rightful owners 
43 
and made money out of them for themselves and their friends.' Thus, the 
initiative for such an action owed little to the judge's suggestion in the 
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Chesterton case; it can only, as Locker-Lampson said, have provided encour-
agement to proceed. 
Locker-Lampson's partner in the action against the Marconi company was 
Peter Wright. Wright was already involved in the Scandal, through his friend-
ship with Archer-Shee. It is known that Wright was advising Archer-Shee on 
aspects of the relationship between the American and British companies, and 
44 priming him with information for questions to be asked in the House. 
Wright also took part, with Locker-Lampson, in a campaign against Godfrey 
Isaacs, of which the shareholders' action was simply one facet. Cecil 
45 Chesterton's publicity of 'Godfrey Isaacs. Ghastly Record' was closely 
linked to this and its propaganda spread into the House of Commons. In the 
main, attention centred round the St David's companies, mining developments 
for gold, copper and other minerals in Wales, which had been some of Isaacs' 
many ventures. Results from these companies had not been too successful. 
'One paid dividends from 1900 to 1904. Two were dissolved 
by the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, four went into 
voluntary liquidation, and one was reconstructed and absorbed 
into one of the others. At the time of Chesterton's articles 
two were still in existence, neither quoted on the Stock 
Exchange. ' If 6 
It was the basis of Chesterton's articles that Isaacs had broken various 
aspects of company law with regard to these concerns and particularly that 
those who had invested in the companies had not received dividends due to them. 
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As Godfrey Isaacs' solicitors co~lained to Asquith, when Cecil Chesterton 
was silenced by legal proceedings, the challenge was taken up by M.P.s. 
First, Fred Hall of Dulwich asked, whilst prosecution was pending, if 
the President of the Board of Trade was going to investigate the affair of 
the St Davids Mining Co~any Limited (1908} 'with a view to the prosecution 
47 
of those responsible for what the facts show to have been a bogus flotation.' 
Hall refused to withdraw his allegations in spite of what the solicitors 
called countermanding evidence. Following this, on 17 April, Locker-Lampson 
asked a further question in the House as to whether any action was to be 
taken against Isaacs over his companies' records. This happened again while 
the action against Cecil Chesterton was pending, as Isaacs' solicitors 
complained. 
'Upon the appearance of the question on the order paper we 
attended the Speaker and pointed out the grave injury which 
would be done to our client Mr Godfrey Isaacs by the publi-
cation of the question and we begged him to expunge it. 
Parliamentary practice however left the Speaker no alterna-
tive but to decline to accede to our request. 
This question was not only printed in the Journals of 
the House but was reprinted in a newspaper with scare head-
lines one of which coupled the insinuation in the libel 
with the name of Mr Godfrey Isaacs. 
Since the publication of the question we have written 
several letters to Mr O. Locker-Lampson and his solicitors 
for a copy of the statement referred to in the question but 
we have been absolutely refused any information and any 
redress. 
Mr O. Locker-Lampson is protected by the Privilege of 
Parliament and no proceedings are possible against him.,48 
After listing other incidents which had blackened the reputation of their 
client, the solicitors asked Asquith if he could prevent further occurrences. 
'We trust that for the honour of Parliament and its members 
and in the interests of ordinary fairplay, justice shall not 
any longer be tampered with by cowardly and untruthful libels 
being circulated under the cover of the Privilege enjoyed by 
members of Parliament, who aepear to be regardless of the 
rights of their fellow men.' 9 
Wright's part in this campaign seems to have been complementary to 
Locker-Lampson's. Whilst Locker-Lampson worked in parliament and the law 
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courts, Wright circul~ted companies and in~vidu~ls who had invested in the 
St Davids companies, telling them about the efforts to recover their funds. 
A copy of his circular appeared in The Times. 
'An effort is on foot to obtain ~ full investigation into the 
various St Davids Companies, in one of which I notice you 
were a shareholder. It is felt that there is much in conn ex-
ion with them that could be investigated with profit, and that 
some money might possibly be recovered for the shareholders. 
If the matter is of interest to you, I should be very glad if 
you would communicate with me. Let me make it quite clear 
that in no event will you be asked to contribute anything to-
wards these efforts financially. I shall be glad if you could 
let me have any papers in respect of this matter.'SO 
The campaign by Wright and Locker-Lampson against Godfrey Isaacs and 
the Marconi Company was obviously timed to create unease in the public mind. 
Notice of the shareholders' action appeared in The Times on the same day as 
the repor~ of the first day's proceedings in the Isaacs v. Chesterton case. 
Although the basis of the action was to recover for the shareholders the 
surplus value of the shares placed by Isaacs and Heybourn, evidence suggests 
that the real motive was to discredit the company and Godfrey Isaacs in 
particular. From Locker-Lampson's speech in the June debate, it is clear 
that he saw a close relationship between the company and the Liberal party, 
and therefore an attack on one also involved the other. At this particular 
time, Locker-Lampson was deeply concerned about the political future of the 
Conservative Party. In August 1912, there was an appeal in Our Flag, a 
partisan Conservative monthly, by the M.P. for his 'Unionist Working Men 
Candidates Fund' , which was designed to counteract the challenge of the 
Labour Party (and the Liberals) for the working-class vote. The address for 
this fund, 48 Dover Street, London WI, was the same one from which the 
American Marconi Shareholders Association, under the secretaryship of 
51 Archer-Shee, operated. Advertisements for this association appeared in 
The New Witness, although there 1s no evidence of any outcome from the 
campaign. However, this links together Archer-Shee, Locker-Lampson and 
the Witness. Further details will show that Locker-Lampson was a supporter 
of the National League for Clean Government, which continued a publicity 
drive against the Liberal government and its 'corruption.,S2 
In conclusion, these facts show the close relationship between these 
Conservatives, wright,Archer-Shee and Locker-Lampson and The New Witness. 
The following chapters will deal with the anti-semitic attitudes of 
Cecil Chesterton and the journal with particular reference to the Marconi 
Scandal. It would be wrong to say that the Conservative Party per se 
can be associated with this campaign, but the elements of connection should 
not be ignored. 
It is also the thesis of this work that the outcome of the Scandal was 
partly due to the strength of the Liberal party. The clear indication of 
solidarity, at least at Cabinet level, is the preViously-mentioned support 
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given by Asquith to his ministers, His refusal to accept the offers of resigna-
tion is the most obvious manifestation of this. Here again, Donaldson's study 
needs refining. From a secondary source, Harold Nicholson's biography of 
53 George V, she recounts an interview between Asquith and the king in January 
1913, in which the prime minister revealed that Lloyd George and Isaacs had 
offered to resign over the affair, Donaldson claims that this is the only 
54 published record that the Ministers ever considered resignation, and suggests 
that it came too late in the affair to be acceptable. Such an action could 
only have led to the downfall of the Liberal government and thus Asquith was 
forced to support his colleagues. , ••• When he rejected their resignation it 
amounted to a tacit if enforced agreement that he would stand behind them.'SS 
This, of course, presumes that Asquith was pressurised into support, whereas 
other historians have, as al:ready shown, pointed to the more general inclination 
of Asquith in this direction of loyalty and indeed commented upon the rarity 
of this phenomenon amongst prime ministers. 
Donaldson also misses another offer of resignation by one of the Marconi 
88. 
ministers, again due to the somewhat limited scope of her sources. 56 In 
July 1913, after publicity about certain aspects of Rufus Isaacs' early 
career in the Stock Exchange, when he had falsely declared himself to be 'of 
age' in order to become a full member, Isaacs gave Asquith the opportunity to 
dispense with his services. 
'Until quite recently I thought that the error of my early 
youth had been completely effaced and that I should be 
judged by my life at the Bar and in the public service ••• 
If with knowledge of these facts (which I told you quite 
recently and now repeat) you think my position as a member 
of the Government has been or may be weakened or the value 
of my services impaired I shall sunmit at once to your 
judgement and shall forthwith place my office at your dis-
posal retaining always the memory of your unfailing kind-
ness to me during the years I have been so closely associated 
with you.,S7 
Asquith turned down this rather tentative offer, saying that the publicity 
about Isaacs' early life was of no serious consequence, 
'I am glad, but not surprised, to find that it has received no 
countenance in any quarter of the opposition which commands 
or deserves respect. 
I need not assure you that I count on your continued and 
much valued cooperation in the services of the state.'SS 
These two occasions illustrate the support given by Asquith to his 
colleagues. Both Isaacs and Lloyd George were aware of the position; 
Margot Asquith at one point spoke in great length of her husband's deter-
mination to defend Lloyd George. She reported that Henry was stirred up by 
the 'caddish behaviour of Bonar Law, Bob Cecil and others,' and that at 
dinner he had proclaimed his intentions. '''If Lloyd George and Rufus play 
their cards well show the proper spirit!. will let the opposition have itll 
S9 They shall sweat under what I've got to say!'" Although Asquith's speech 
in the same debate was not quite as dynamic as his promise, he did stand up 
for the ministers. Isaacs and Lloyd George recognised that their careers 
had been saved by his actionsl indeed, it has been suggested that Lloyd 
George was upset by the obligation he owed to Asquith, seeing it as a limita-
60 tion on his power and his political freedom. As Roy Jenkins has written, 
'Lloyd George and Isaacs were both lucky in the Prime Minister under whom 
they made their errors of judgement. ,61 
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There also seems to have been support at Cabinet level for the two mini-
sters. The procedure for the June debate was discussed at two Cabinet meet-
ings and the outlines of the speeches to be made by Lloyd George and Isaacs 
were heard. On 17 June, Asquith was able to write to the king that their 
statements would 'while disclaiming anything in the nature of inpropriety 
62 
••• admit errors of judgement.' Clearly, the meetings serve to reinforce 
Asquith's support and also to influence the actions of the two ministers. 
One other indication of Liberal strength was the fact that, despite some 
misgivings, only three Liberal M.Ps voted against the motion put forward by 
the Liberals in the June debate. That all three should be unseated shortly 
after the occurrence could be seen as a pointer to the determination of the 
Liberal Party. Some journals had no doubt that their voting had brought 
swift retribution. For instance, The New Witness sawall three being removed 
63 because of their stand for clean government. However, a more rational 
examination suggests that the Scandal was not the sole reason for the depart-
ure of these three M.Ps. Two, Joseph Martin (East St Pancras) and D.M. Mason 
(Coventry) were voted out by the local constituency party and the other, 
R.C. Munro-Ferguson (Leith) was offered the position of Governor-General 
of Australia, and so resigned his seat. 
64 Both Martin and Mason were something of rebels in the party. Martin 
was Canadian-born, an ex-Premier of Columbia, with 'extensive business 
interests in Vancouver'. In spite of this, his 'frequent criticism and 
recent support for the Labour candidate at Hanley have rendered him a thorn 
6S in the flesh to the Government.' In August 1913, it was rumoured that both 
he and George Croydon Marks were being boycotted and that their seats were in 
danger.66 Martin's dismissal came finally in April 1914 because of his his-
tory of voting against the government and for criticising ministers, accord-
ing to the local party secretary.67 
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Mason's demise came about because of a difference over the retrenchment 
of armaments, which became a complete split with the local party after he 
68 
voted against the government on this issue. Munro-Ferguson also voted 
against the government in this division and shortly afterwards the announce-
. de 69 
ment of his Australian appo~ntment was ma • He, too, had a reputation as 
a rebel. Churchill wrote to Elibank to warn him of the possible opposition 
by the Leith M.P. to the Home Rule Bill. 70 On the Marconi vote, Munro-Ferguson 
explained that he felt public servants ought to maintain a strict rigidity 
in their financial dealings. When Chamberlain had been attacked in the 
Kynoch affair, he had voted against the Unionist government, and therefore 
felt the present situation warranted the same standards of judgement and 
71 
action. 
Whilst these three M.Ps did create trouble for the Liberals, they were 
by no means the only rebels. The Marconi vote seems to have been the common 
factor in their fall from office. Were they hounded from their seats because 
of their action over Marconi? There is some evidence that Lloyd George noted 
two of the three, since a copy of the division list for the vote in June 1913 
72 in his papers shows the names of Mason and Munro-Ferguson underlined. 
There does not, however, appear to be any other direct link. Whatever the 
exact motivation for the removal of these three, the impression given is one 
of particular solidarity in the party on the Marconi issue. 
Of course, when referring to the Liberal majority in the House of Commons, 
which saved the ministers in the censure debate, we should remember that, in 
fact, both Conservative and Liberal parties returned exactly the same number 
of M.Ps at the December 1910 election - 272. The Liberal government depended 
on its 'natural' majority of Irish Nationalist and Labour M.Ps. It would 
be of particular interest to see how the Labour Party tackled the various 
problems cast up by the Scandal. Its role is largely ignored by the standard 
works and apart from the facts that James Parker, a veteran Labour M.P., sat 
-- ---'"-----~~------=-----
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on the Select Committee, and that five M.Ps, O'Grady, Thorne, Snowden, 
Jowett and Walsh, abstained from voting in the June debate, little is known. 
It might be expected that certain Labour members would use the Scandal 
to criticise the government and the existing parliamentary system and point 
to the corruption of the ruling class. On isolated occasions this did occur 
but the reality of the Labour Party's parliamentary situation meant virtually 
total support of the Liberal ministers. The Scandal pointed to the indebted-
ness which Labour owed to the Liberals and illustrated the weakness of the 
party in the parliamentary situation. As Roy Douglas has pointed out, what 
seemed to be a strong paper position was used only once between 1910 and 
73 1914, in the Trade Union Bill of 1911. The old MacDonald-Gladstone pact, 
which had just helped Labour M.P.s to be elected, still existed in spirit. 
Of the 42 Labour members in December 1910, only two had been opposed in a 
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straight fight with Liberals. In parliamentary terms, Labour M.P.s were 
in a difficult situation. To vote against the Liberals, who were seen as 
taking the initiative in social reform, was a difficult and dangerous ploy. 
After January 1910, when the Liberals lost their overall majority, what 
little fiEedom Labour had was gone, since a Liberal downfall would mean a 
Conservative government. Yet another General Election, following so closely 
the two in 1910, would have been a financial disaster. Thus, for many 
reasons the leadership of the party tended to ally with that of the Liberals 
75 
and so stifle the more rebellious of its members. 
The problems of this situation were obvious and were recognised by the 
party. A special conference on policy was held in Glasgow in January 1914 
to meet and discuss criticism of the party's voting record, its alliance 
with the Liberals and the lack of distinctive alternatives to the Asquith 
government's plans. One of the major issues raised at this conference was 
the party decision to supply a member of the Select Committee investigating 
76 
the Marconi Scandal, thus giving the findings Labour Party approval. 
--------~----- - --- -
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Indeed, Parker's membership of the committee showed quite clearly the 
weakness of the official Labour position. He sided with the Liberal members 
77 
on most occasions and was a party to the Majority report. Explaining his 
attitude to the topic in the June debate (and since he was the only Labour 
speaker, it suggests he was the party spokesman on this occasion) , he con-
tended that, whilst the ministers' actions had been indiscreet, they were 
not deliberately corrupt. He went on to speak of the more serious corruption 
which existed in parliament; M,Bs voting money into their own pockets by 
way of their interests in armaments, railways etc. When these men voted 
on issues to increase their own wealth, the Marconi Scandal sank into 
78 
relQtive obscurity. Earlier in his speech, Parker had suggested that 
Labour had given, its members a free vote over the affair, which helps to 
explain the absence of any positive party line throughout. 
This is apparent in the pages of the Daily Citizen, the official 
79 Labour Party journal launched in October 1912. Its reports on the Scandal 
were mostly verbatim accounts of speeches and Select Committee proceedings, 
with very little comment. At times, a note of despair can be detected. 
'The question of Ministers investing in wireless telegraphy shares, 
concerning which everybody is talking, poses a serious, if not grave, issue 
on which, at the right time, Labour leaders will doubtless have something 
80 to say.' However, by the time of the June debate, the journal could 
report that Labour had taken its own line on Marconi. Whilst criticising 
the actions of ministers as 
' ••• singularly unwise and ill-advised, ••• dangerous if 
not to the traditions of public life at least to that 
standard of financial discretion and integrity which the 
Labour movement desires to set up '0., rash and foolish 
(exhibiting) a lack of discretion and judgement that is 
really amazing,' 
... , 
It was made quite clear that the party had no sympathy with the Conservatives' 
approach. This was seen blatantly one-sided, ignoring its own members' 
--------------------------------------_ .. _--
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transgressions in order to force the resignation of those involved.8l For this 
reason, Labour was to act independently, although in practical terms this meant 
support of the Liberals. The Citizen recorded its satisfaction with the middle 
course adopted by the Adkins resolution, which was finally passed by the House. 
'It was couched in Parliamentary terms, but it puts a seal on the expressions 
of regret tendered to the House by the Ministers, and will be of value should 
82 
any similar incident arise in future.' 
The official attitude produced attacks from both the right and left. The 
Daily Herald, a more socialist-inclined journal, criticised lack of opposition 
from both Conservative and Labour parties, stating that fear of reprisals by 
83 Lloyd George waa the reason. When the Majority report was published, it 
called on the Labour Party to disown Parker and to attack the Liberals on the 
84 
censure debate. A debate began between the editor of the New Age, a syndi-
calist journal, Alfred Orage, and the voice of the new British Socialist Party, 
Justice. Orage maintained that the Scandal was \D'l.important for socialists, 
but Justice disagreed, sayin'J \ that it would show the masses the depths of 
indecency to which government could sink, and urged that maximum publicity 
should be given to the affair, thus criticising the Labour Party's support of 
85 
the government. 
Right-wing papers criticised the Lib-Lab alliance. The Financial News 
was IOOckingly delighted by the outcome of the debate, which it greeted with 
the headlines 'Commons Register Their Approval of Secret Ministerial Share 
86 Gambling.' Recording the turnabout of many 'Radicals, Labour, Noncomformists 
and Socialists' in now saying that the Stock Exchange was a fine institution, 
whereas before they had 'scathing criticism of all the methods of the market', 
it welcomed the fact that all M.Bs criticised by Radicals as Stock Exchange 
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members now had the perfect riposte. Similarly, the Parker approach enabled 
other attacks to be made. 
'In the course of the Marconi debate Mr J. Parker (Social-
ist) said that if a code of conduct was to be laid down it 
should not apply to Ministers only. IIf Sir Frederick 
Banbury voted for a Bill to raise railway rates he would 
be voting for a Bill to put money into his own pocket." 
But Sir Frederick would hardly desceni to the level of the 
politicians who vote themselves £400 a year from the public 
purse in return for services which would be over-valued at 
sixpence. ,88 
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The Pall Mall Gazette chose to exploit the differences of opinion among 
Labour members about the affair, which led to the abstentions. 
'The most significant feature of the division was the fact 
that the Labour party, although they had twice consulted 
amongst themselves at the instigation of their chairman, 
were divided, the Socialist section leaving their colleagues 
and walking out of the House. ,89 
The journal then provided a list of all the Labour members who had voted with 
the Government. Another Conservative paper, The Outlook, also pointed to the 
splits in the Labour movement which· the Scandal had emphasised. It reported 
the proceedings of the Glasgow Labour Congress, something which it would not 
have done in usual circumstances, but politically useful on this occasion. 
Speakers at this congress h~ criticised Parker for signing the Majority report 
and Ramsay MacDonald for allying with· the Liberals in the Commons vote. 
, "Think," cried Mr Brownlie, of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, "of the position of the Post Office official who 
was punished because he had a ten-pound note in Marconis, and 
contrast this with the reward of one of the mediums of the 
chief actor who induced the unsophisticated Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Master of Elibank to dabble in Marconis, 
and has now been placed in the high and dignified position of 
Lord Chief Justice of England. I 90 
The journal took great delight in pointing out the discrepancies between the 
official Labour attitude and its grass-roots support. 
Thus, for the Labour movement, the Marconi Scandal was an embarrassment. 
Because of the Parliamentary party's political dependance on the Liberals, it 
became entangled in the partisan disputes and was exposed to the same kind of 
stresses as the Liberal Party. It helped to expose the splits within the 
Labour movement and to reveal the weakness of its parliamentary position. 
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What were the advantages of Liberal solidarity and how was it used to 
control events of the Scandal? First of all since Liberals were in positions 
of power it meant that the scandal was nearly avoided. We know that the bulk 
of criticism in 1912 came from Conservative sources. Before the August recess, 
there were seven motions before the House, all from Conservative M.Ps, either 
calling for outright rejection of the agreement or for a Select Committee 
91 investigation. This appears to have increased the determination to push 
through ratification before the recess, at least in the mind of Herbert Samuel. 
From the account of the Poulsen interest, we know that Samuel approached 
Archer-Shee on the night of 6 August, when it had seemed decided not to force a 
vote on the matter, and had told him that he still intended to try for ratifica-
tion. Samuel admitted to the Select Committee that he asked Archer-Shee to 
withdraw his opposition because the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial 
Defence wanted the stations built as soon as possible. He agreed that he may 
have said he was still looking for ratification up to the last minute.92 It 
seems Samuel had been deluding himself on the strength of the opposition. On 
the 4th, he was able to write that although he was having trouble over the 
Marconi contract, it would be resolved in time. 'I have refused to consent to 
its being postponed till the autumn.,93 By the 6th, it seemed that he had 
conceded defeat. 'I am to make my statement on Marconi tomorrow, but cannot 
94 yet get the approval of the House this side of the recess.' Yet he was still 
prepared to approach Archer-Shee that night with a promise of action which was 
sincere enough to scare the Poulsen group and its supporters. Samuel's con-
duct in this episode naturally provoked hostility, particularly when the 
facts of the ministerial share purchases were known, and it was suggested that 
the contract was being hustled through to avoid any embarrassing inquiry. 
For instance, The Outlook, claimed: 
'It was brought up at the last moment (August 6) - not for dis-
cussion, but, as was said at the time, in order to try to rush 
it through. This did not look very likebuming anxiet~ on 
the part of any Minister to make a clean breast of it.' 5 
The appointment of a Select Committee did nothing to lessen the party 
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divisions which the Scandal had emphasised. Its composition of six Liberals, 
two Irish Nationalists and one Labour was an in-built government majority 
against the six Conservatives, provided that unity could be preserved. With 
this proviso, the majority could dominate the workings of the Committee. The 
basic procedure was for Conservatives to cross-examine government officials 
and for Liberals to defend them. Liberal members quizzed Conservative joum-
alists involved in the campaign against the contract, Conservative members 
regaled the Liberal minister with details of their investments in American 
Marconis. 
The minutes of evidence show the votes taken in the Committee, and the 
majority of these were decided on strict 'party' lines. The most blatant 
example of manipulation was the way the Committee's Majority report was produced. 
An original draft by the Liberal chairman, Sir Albert Spicer, which was mildly 
censorious, was opposed by a Conservative version, largely drawn up by Sir 
Robert Cecil. This alternative report was rejected by the majority, but then 
a process of obliteration was carried out on the chairman's draft. One vote 
removed paragraphs 7 to 30 inclusive. The resultant report was the one widely 
decided as a 'whitewash' and owed much to one of the main Liberal spokesmen on 
the Committee, Falconer. It was presumably this attitude which led Cecil to 
publish his report in defiance of the official verdict. 
There were other instances when party or partisan views influenced 
Committee decisions. For example, attempts were made, chiefly by Conservative 
members, to obtain fuller infomation from Percy Heybourn about the distribu-
tion of American Marconi shares before the official opening date. Plans were 
drawn up to re-examine his evidence, but were rejected by the Liberal-led 
section of the Committee. Similarly, the Conservatives were anxious that no 
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cover-up should be implemented when the pass-books of Isaacs and Lloyd George 
were examined. It was suggested that the chairman and an accountant be entrus-
ted with this task, but Conservatives wanted two other members of the Committee 
to be involved, to prevent any collusion and perhaps to gain some politically 
useful information on the financial status of the two ministers. This move 
was also voted down by the Liberal majority. This section also rejected the 
possibility of hearing Cecil Chesterton's evidence, simply by allowing him 
only a short period of grace after the initial postponement of his appearance. 
This was at a time when the Godfrey Isaacs proceedings hung over Chesterton's 
head and he was troubled by ill-health. The Conservative attempts to extend 
the time limit for his evidence were of no avail. 
The most noteworthy attempt to postpone the appearance of the facts lay 
96 
with Rufus Isaacs' priming of two members of the Committee, Booth and Falconer. 
It seems that he told Falconer of the purchase of American Marconis on 22 
97 January 1913, just before the journalists were to appear before the Committee. 
The expressed objective of this act was to prevent any leak of information be-
fore the ministers had had an opportunity to make their confession. The imp11-
cation is that they were, at this stage, ready to reveal their transactions. 
Isaacs' son wrote of his father: 
'His decision to postpone a declaration as to his holding 
in the American Company had miscarried owing to the unfore-
Seen delays. He had informed Mr Falconer and Mr Handel Booth. 
privately of these transactions, in order that they might be 
forearmed when the journalists came to give evidence, but 
nothing had yet been publicly divulged. Meanwhile the atmos-
phere was becoming daily more heavily charged with electricity 
and the longer a full statement had to be postponed, the louder 
would be the explosion throughout the country when the moment 
finally arrived.,9a 
The day prior to the questioning of Isaacs about his informing Falconer 
and Booth, Archer-Shee had asked Asquith a question in the House on the matter. 
The Prime Minister was asked if and when he knew of the American dealings and 
if he had informed any members of the Committee of the transactions.98 When 
98. 
Asquith denied informing anyone, it was clear that the source must have been 
Isaacs himself, as he admitted to the Committee the following day. Subsequently, 
in the House, Asquith denied any knowledge of this act of Isaacs and refused 
100 to comment on its ethics. The Liberal majority, led by Falconer himself, 
prevented any public discussion by the Select Committee that might reveal the 
101 details of the matter. When Bonar Law, in the June debate, accused Isaacs 
of using Falconer and Booth to steer away from dangerous ground and suggested 
that the reason why the ministers were reluctant to reveal their transactions 
102 
was because they felt they might not have to do so, it was difficult to 
refute his words. 
From the start, the Liberals were committed to a policy of not telling un-
less forced to, which had unfortunate repercussions when the truth was pain-
fully extracted. Their attitude was typified in the exchange between Butcher 
and Captain Arthur Murray, brother of Elibank and trustee of the Liberal Party's 
Marconi shares. 'Had it not been for the facts which came to light in this 
Committee I suppose we shoulQnever have heard of this purchase of American 
103 Marconis on behalf of the Liberal Party? - That is quite probable.' When 
Leo Amery, a Conservative member of the Committee and persistent critic of the 
contract wrote 'never ••• in the whole course of our political history, has 
104 there been a worse Select Committee than this one,' he was referring to the 
party squabbles and the manipulation which allowed episodes like the Booth/ 
Falconer one to exist. 
The intransigence of both sides was also clearly visible in the June 
debate. On the one hand, Liberals were obviously not prepared to accept any 
pointed reference or criticism of the ministers' actions, maintaining that a 
Conservative motion, proposed by George Cave, would, in fact, force Isaacs 
and Lloyd George to resign if carried, Whilst both were prepared to admit that 
errors of judgement had been made; for example, Isaacs described the decision 
not to reveal their dealings during the 11 October 1912 debate as a 'mistaken 
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course,lOS neither he nor the Liberal party was prepared to accept criticism 
from a Conservative motion. ~quith rejected the Conservative motion on two 
grounds. First, it was ungenerous, since many of the rumours and wild accusa-
tions had been proved false and yet the ministers had undergone a great ordeal 
because of this abuse. Second, he felt that the motion was one of direct 
106 
censure, which he maintained the ministers' actions had not called for. 
The Conservative leaders felt that the ministers had been involved in specula-
tion and a process of concealment, and that therefore some expression of 
107 
regret by the House, not just those concerned, must be placed on record. 
No compromise could be found, and so the Liberal amendment was finally put to 
the House, being carried with the support of the Nationalist and Labour members. 
Whilst there was a great deal of regret that the party bickering had not been 
overcome, the result appears to have been predictable. 
though Mr Balfour and Mr Bonar Law gently accused them of 
impropriety and lack of moral courage, it was obvious that 
Parliament had washed its hands of the whole affair. The 
Tories realized that they had done Mr George's reputation 
a good deal of damage,.and they saw no point in turning him 
into a martyr. I lOB 
The other revealing action of the ministers was their involvement in the 
Le Matin case, when they chose to make the long-awaited disclosure about 
American Marconis. Whilst most serious studies agree that the appearance of 
libellous material in the journal was a most fortunate occurrence, given the 
pressures which were on the ministers at that time, few have taken the matter 
further. There were allegations that the trial, and the libel, were deliberately 
designed to allow the disclosures. As the New Age put it, the whole affair 
109 
was 'carelessly contrived.' Donaldson dismisses these charges as a 
110 
'curious theory' , yet notes that Sir Robert Cecil, nearly forty years after 
the Scandal, could write: 'During the recess it was arranged, presumably by 
Ministers, that the French newspaper the Matin should publish an extreme 
111 
version of the charges.' Is there now any evidence to reinforce Cecil's 
claim? 
100. 
Certainly, there is no denying that the purpose of the exercise was to 
make known the various purchases of American Marconis, and not to punish the 
journal. 112 In this respect, it was a political action, rather than a legal one. 
Maxse's evidence, a garbled version of which was reproduced by Le Matin and 
allowed the action, had suggested that he suspected the American dealings and 
so an explanation by the ministers was vital before Maxse could reveal all. 
Another possible explanation was that Godfrey Isaacs' action against Cecil 
Chesterton also threatened to produce some untimely revelations. This 
suggestion was mooted at the time. 
'Is it possible that the Godfrey Isaacs-Chesterton case is the 
cause of the sudden haste and newly found disregard of mini-
sters for relevancy? Did they realise that this information, 
which they had so carefully concealed in the House of Commons, 
could look even more damaging dragged out of unwilling wit-
nesses under hostile cross-examination?,113 
~roof that the trial was artificially created is hard to find. The racia1-
ist arguments of the Witness that Le Matin was a Jewish paper (it was not speci-
fied in what way) helping out Jewish politicians need more than their continued 
b id d i 'de 114 statement to e cons ere as ser ous ev~ nce. It would, of course, be 
very surprising if there was any surviving evidence to show that the case had 
been rigged. There is, however, a series of circumstances which at least cast 
doubt on Donaldson's rather naive assessment. 
First, there is the fact that the Le Matin article came at a very convenient 
time. Ministers had considered .suing The Eye-Witness in August 1912, but 
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rejected the idea for various reasons. There was no intention at that time 
to reveal the shareholdings. By the following year, pressure was mounting on 
them to disclose the dealings. Lloyd George was prepared to take some action 
in February 1913, which suggests he was anxious to end the obviously trying 
time. He contacted the legal firm of Lewis and Lewis and asked them to retain 
F.E. Smith for an action which might develop, promising further details at a 
116 later date. Following letters revealed that the action was to be against 
101. 
Leo Maxse, and that Edward Carson was also to be retained. These arrangements 
were completed by 11 February, the day before Maxse was to appear before the 
117 Select Committee. The letters suggest that the action would be as a result 
of Maxse' s evidence to this body. Lloyd George presumably expected that Maxse 
would have something libellous to say, but could not be sure. It seems rather 
much of a coincidence that when Maxse disappointed the Chancellor, a garbled 
version of his evidence appeared in Le Matin, the same legal firm and the same 
lawyers being retained for the case. 
A second reason for suspicion, albeit less convincing and possibly libell-
ous in itself, is the use of the firm of Lewis and Lewis. It had something of 
a reputation for 'handling ticklish affairs and litigation concerning "high 
118 
society" and governmental and public circles,' largely built around Sir 
119 George Lewis, the founder of the firm. Sir George was knighted for his part 
120 in ~xposing the forged letters presented to the Parnell Commission, but his 
name had become famous for less publicised reasons. 
'His real accomplishments were in privately helping people 
who found themselves in trouble. He acquired an immense know-
ledge of the seamy side of society and he combined with this 
a remarkable memory so he had to make very few notes. Among 
his clients were numbered members of the royal family, and he 
was a personal friend of King Edward VII ••• Not everyone 
admired him, for he sometimes espoused the causes of people 
widely considered to be scoundrels. A friend told him once 
that he thought that in a certain case he had done the public 
no service. The reply Lewis gave was: "The public was not my 
client." Unforttmately for history Lewis destroyed all his 
papers before he died and eschewed writing any memoirs; such 
a document could have been a fascinating expose of the under-
side of society life in late Victorian and Edwardian times.,l21 
Unfortunately, too, for the story of the Marconi Scandal, Sir George died 
at the end of 1911, and so played no part in the Le Matin affair, but his son, 
who had been virtually running the firm since 1908, no doubt followed the 
traditional pattern of litigation. If there was any deliberate rigging of the 
Le Matin affair, then Lewis and Lewis were not unused to 'privately helping 
122 people of importance who found themselves in trouble.' In addition, if the 
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ministers wished specifically to use Carson and Smith, prominent Conservatives, 
in order to create the impression of blamelessness, then they employed the 
correct firm. Lewis and Lewis had a long history of connections with both, 
123 
and frequently called on their services. 
That the case was brought solely for the purpose of making the disclosures 
is beyond doUbt. The correspondence between Isaacs and Samuel, mentioned in a 
f i d L . 124 b f b letter rom Lew s an ew~s, cannot e ound, ut it is clear that the ques-
tion of litigation had been discussed by the two before the action was officially 
confirmed with the solicitors. On 16 February, two days after the Le Matin 
article, and two days before Lewis and Lewis wrote asking if Samuel wished to 
pursue the matter, Samuel had written to his mother with details of the proposed 
action. He felt that.it was unfortunate proceedings had to be against a French 
journal, but that the chance had to be taken. They would probably go ahead if 
the journal apologised. 125 Damages would not be sought, only costs. Samuel's 
information, even at this early date, was remarkable, for this is exactly what 
happened. On the 18th, the journal published an apology but the ministers con-
tinued their action. Asquith was informed of this decision and agreed, although 
expressing regret, like Samuel, that it should be a French and not an English 
126 journal. On 9 March, Samuel knew that the case would be undefended, that 
there would be apologies by the defence counsel, that Le Matin would pay the 
costs and that the ministers would be able to make their disclosures - 'the 
box and the effect will be excellent.,127 This is evidence that, to a lesser 
extent, the case ~ rigged i.e. that the outcome was clear before the start 
and continued only for a purpose beyond the original libel. On the wider 
implications, there is sufficient evidence to suggest the idea of deliberate 
libel and conspiracy in the affair is not as preposterous as has been suggested. 
The other significant facet of the case was the employment of two Conser-
vatives as counsel. This brings us back to the question of party collusion and 
the cross-bench attitude of leading politicians in the midst of obvious party 
103. 
differences. The choice of Smith and Carson is extremely interesting •. What-
ever the reason for their acceptance of the brief, it did provide material for 
128 
suggestions of Front Bench cooperation and created much disturbance within 
the Conservative party. Bonar Law was unaware of his colleagues' involvement 
until James Campbell, the Unionist M.P., who had been asked to act for Le Matin, 
asked whether he should take the case. Law agreed to this but was obviously 
upset by news of Smith and Carson's interest. 129 Soon after the case, indigna-
tion grew as it became known that Smith was to take a brief for Godfrey Isaacs 
in his action against Cecil Chesterton.130 When this case was being heard, 
George Younger, the Tory chief whip, complained that the second reading of the 
Home Rule Bill had been postponed because the ministers were involved in court 
131 
and criticised the part being played by Smith and Carson. It was felt, he 
recorded, 'amongst our men', that they had betrayed their party, by precluding 
132 themselves from any Conservative attack over the Marconi Scandal. 
The delay of the Home Rule Bill also annoyed Law, who told Younger that 
Smi th and Carson had been going to refuse the Isaacs' brief precisely because 
it would interfere with its passage. Law cursed the 'trickery of the present 
133 Government' in postponing the bill to ensure the Ulster leaders' cooperation. 
He also wrote to Carson to ask if he should publicize the fact that Home Rule 
134 
was being postponed 'entirely to suit the Ministers.' 
Discontent was also voiced by Lord Charles Beresford, Conservative M.P. 
for Portsmouth and a strong supporter of Ulster Unionism. He warned Law of the 
dangers inherentin the appearance of Smith and Carson. 'The feeling against 
Carson appearing in this case is not only strong it is violent, I have had 
numerous letters about it, couched in very strong terms.' He claimed many of 
these called Carson a traitor, and that men were withdrawing money from the 
Ulster fund. Beresford maintained that three weeks previously, Carson had said 
he was returning the brief, but had changed his mind yet again. 'If he continues 
this case it will do him as leader ineferable harm and our cause suffer to an 
-------------------~~~-=~=-~-~-~---~~~~----------------~-------------
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extent that may be fatal. We all look to you to stop this action of Carson's.' 
The defence of Rufus Isaacs was serious enough but this new development was the 
last straw. In a postscript, Beresford added that the English vote was needed 
to stop Home Rule. He maintained that the English were becoming tired of the 
Irish question (sic) and that if Carson 'defends a corrupt individual on the 
other side', then support for the Unionist cause would dwindle and the vote 
l35 
would swing towards Home Rule. 
Beresford's arguments have an air of convincing logic to them. Earlier 
references have shown the disgruntlement of Nationalist supporters who had 
allied themselves to a Liberal government in the hope of achieving Home Rule, 
only to find their goal threatened by the Scandal. Similarly, Unionists, who 
had declared that they would stop at nothing to destroy the Liberal government, 
finding themselves in a situation which, as Blake points out, could well have 
had that effect, then discovered that two of their leaders were helping Liberal 
ministers to survive, and precluding themselves from any parliamentary criticism 
136 
of the affair. No wonder that confusion reigned in the party. It was 
admirably expressed in one particular letter to Bonar Law from Claude Sisley. 
'I write to you as a convinced Tory, and as one wbo is still, 
to some extent a Unionist. But when I ponder over the present 
position of the party I wonder why on earth I should render it 
any allegiance. 
Heaven knows we had a jellyfish as a leader when Mr Balfour 
was at the head of the Party. He ran away to the Continent after 
he had sold the consistent members of the House of Lords to the 
Radicals. 
What we have in you, Sir, I will not set down. 
When the whole country was in arms against the Insurance Bill 
and you had the chance of putting the Unionist Party in an unassail-
able position by voting against it, you chose the cowardly course 
of scuttling out of the House and abstaining. 
This, Sir, in spite of the fact that the proud boast of the 
Unionists has always been that they have opposed interference with 
personal liberty. 
Newmarket election condemns the thing once more - and you say 
nothing. 
The Unionist Party has declared that Mr Lloyd George is a danger 
to the country. The Marconi Revelations found you and a great part 
of the Unionist press endeavouring to screen the man and his Hebrew 
associate from any unpleasant consequences. Prominent Unionists 
rush to their assistance. in that very odd affair - the case against 
------------~------- - -
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Le Matin. My non-Party friends are making the sneering comment: 
"Oh, the Unionists were in it too!" -
You profess to hate Home Rule and Welsh Disestablishment. 
The time is rapidly approaching when these measures will become 
law. It evidently does not alarm you, for you do nothing to 
prevent it. 
Why on earth, Sir, should I be a Unionist? 
As you must have a good deal of unoccupied time on your hands, 
perhaps you will spare a moment to write and tell me.,137 
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Sisley was obviously disillusioned with a great deal of Conservative policy 
and lack of action. In the particular case of the Marconi Scandal, can we vali-
date his claim that inter-party consensus contributed to the survival of 
Isaacs, Lloyd George and possibly the Liberal government? A range of evidence 
suggests we can. 
In the June debate, Asquith spoke of the vicious rumour with which mini-
sters had to contend 
'The wide range which was given to these scandalous statements was 
largely due to the action and the influence of a certain section 
of the Press. I gladly acknowledge that the great organs of the 
Press, those in particular that represent the party opposite, 
behaved from the beginning to the end of these transactions with 
dignity, with moderation, with restraint, and in a manner which 
calls for no adverse comment or criticism. ,138 
Similarly, Herbert Samuel made several comments about the restraint of the bulk 
of the Tory press. In a letter to his mother shortly after the Le Matin trial, 
he wrote 'The opposition press, with few exceptions, has behaved decently 
139 
about it.' Two weeks later, he noted: 'The Unionist Press has said some 
140 
very kind things about my evidence before the Commdttee.' When the second 
Marconi contract was about to go before the House in August 1913, Samuel told 
his wife: 'The opposition press has dropped the Marconi contract and one hears 
141 
nothing of it here.' Clearly the Scandal was not exploited by the Conser-
vative press to its full potential. 142 
What about the censure debate in June 19l3? Did that not show the bitter 
party feeling on both sides, compromise impossible 'and a straight party vote 
to decide the matter? True, there were harsh words on both sides, but it had 
the appearance of ritual confrontation, rather than a full-blooded attempt to 
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destroy a government. Given reasonable sUPPOrt from Nationalists and Labour, 
the Liberals had little to fear from the Conservative attacks. Dangerfield's 
analysis of the situation, noted above, seems to ring true. If one looks at 
the speeches of the Conservative leaders, Balfour and Bonar Law, their rebukes 
appear rather mild. Margot Asquith's appraisal of Balfour's words bear this 
out. 'Arthur Balfour's noble speech saved our men - no real human being wants 
143 to hound these young men more or less to their doom.' Even Bonar Law has 
expressed the fear that he had been too censorious. 
'The whole situation was very difficult, and I was afraid at the 
time that I might be two harsh, and I am not sure that I was not; 
but we had to justify our refusing to accept their proposal, and 
I do not think that could be done without making it clear that we 
did look upon the charges made against them as serious. ,144 
Further evidence of the ritual nature of, particularly, Law's opposition is 
Blake's assessment of his involvement in the 'New Tactics' of the time. Blake 
suggests that these were employed in order that his own followers might forget 
their own feuds and unite in 'hatred of the common enemy'. There is some reason 
to suppose that Law regretted the rather petty attacks he made on the Liberals 
145 in this pre-war period. If, as has been asserted, his only passionate cause 
was Tariff Reform and Ulster, then the significance of ' the Scandal for the 
Conservative leadership is clearly diminished. Given the already mentioned 
'cross-bench' attitude of leaders of both parties, the less than ruthless 
approach to the Marconi Scandal seems to fit into context. Perhaps the Liberals 
recognised this, as Churchill's phrases suggest. Robert Cecil, one of the 
leading agitators, said of Rufus Isaacs, 'He has always been extraordinarily 
146 
nice to me in spite of Marconi.' 
Another contributory factor to the Conservative approach was the treatment 
of the Liberal ministers by certain right-wing journals, not necessarily 
directly involved with the party. The accusations levelled and rumours repeated 
have been shown, as far as is known, to be out of all proportion to the actual 
events. Therefore, it was difficult for any criticism to be made without it 
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seeming to be part of the more widespread and scurrilous attack. Thus, in the 
June debate, Conservatives who wished to express some degree of censure were 
forced first to divorce themselves totally from the wilder charges, pointing 
out that they, nor the Conservative Party as a whole, made no complaint about 
'corruption'. This had the effect of detracting from any later criticism which 
they had to make. Law and Balfour may have felt that the admitted errors of 
judgement, although serious, were inconsequential compared to some of the 
journalistic gossip and so found it difficult to challenge Isaacs and Lloyd George 
in a ruthless manner. Margot Asquith made the remark that, had there not been 
147 
so many wild accusations, the opposition's case would have been much stronger. 
Similarly, Asquith confided to Lloyd George that the Liberals were bound to 
win the June debate 'because of the low charges they (the Conservatives) made 
without a shadow of evidence and after all is said and done the Committee have 
proved nothing but ••• indiscretion. ,148 
Although certain back-bench Conservative M.~s and many 'grass-roots' 
supporters felt differently, the leadership of the party certainly seems to 
149 have been deflected by the over-anxious and exaggerated push from behind. 
It also had the effect of strengthening Liberal support. Using Margot Asquith 
as a selective example, it can be shown that there was a definite reaction to 
the hostile campaign. She maintained that although Lloyd George and Isaacs 
had not been correct in all their actions, the violence of the attacks which 
150 they had had to suffer made her support them all the more. 
Finally, perhaps we ought to ask just how concerned was the British 
'public', including politicians, with the affair and with financial scandals 
in general. In an era when investigative journalism seems to have been re-
discovered, perhaps it is too early to formulate any general theory, but we 
might attempt some conclusion about Edwardian England. There is, at present, 
a school of historical thinking which seeks to analyse the generalisations 
about the Edwardian age and to differentiate between the different strata of 
108. 
of thoughts and actions. In this vein, Paul Thompson has recently asked just 
how serious was the crisis referred to at the beginning of this chapter and 
has suggested that the tensions of the period can be seen as a reflection of 
the feelings of those in authority rather than as a general sense of foreboding. lSl 
The elitist nature of much source material is something which must be continu-
ally stressed. Similarly, whilst this chapter has attempted to analyse the 
political significance of the Scandal, there is no real way of measuring the 
extent of its influence or importance for the total population. Writing about 
the lack of impact in the Kynoch affair of 1899-1900, when Lloyd George savagely 
attacked Joseph Chamberlain over his family's financial interests in armaments, 
Elie Halevy claimed: 
'These attacks do not appear to have affected public opinion. 
A great mercantile nation like England has little fondness for 
the public exposure of pecuniary scandals in which politics are 
mixed up with business. It was as though the Press and the 
political parties had entered into a tacit agreement to hush 
themup.,152 
Now the Marconi Scandal has shown that this was not the case, that there 
was no press censorship, despite the claims of the less well-established journals. 
Yet Robert Tressell, writing nearer the time of the Scandal, described the 
reaction of the citizens of 'Mugsborough' to the corruption of their town 
councillors, in much the same way as 'H.a1evy described reaction to Kynoch. 
'Now and then, when details of some unusually scandalous 
proceedings of the Council's leaked out, the townspeople -
roused for a brief space from their customary indifference -
would discuss the matter in a casual, half-indignant, ha1f-
amused, helpless sort of way; but always as if it were some-
thing that did not directly concern them. It was during some 
such nine days' wonder that the title of "The Forty Thieves· 
was bestowed on the memers of the Council by their semi-
imbecile constituents, who, not possessing sufficient intelli-
gence to devise means of punishing the culprit, affected to 
regard the manoeuvres of the Brigands as a huge joke.,153 
On a slightly more patronising level, we find the same comments in the Witness 
by an anonymous correspondent who claimed that only the educated despised 
154 Isaacs and company for their activities; the working class chuckled at them. 
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Therefore, if we accept that the importance of financial scandals may not 
have been as long-lasting or mind-shattering as we might want to believe, and 
if parliamentary politics, at least at the governing elite level, did not seek 
to exploit the situation to its utmost, then we must ask why the Marconi Scandal 
aroused so much hysteria. This is not too strong a word to describe the pages 
of The Eye-Witness or the National Review during the affair, and it seems that 
the essential ingredient of the Scandal which provoked such a reaction was the 
fact that Jews were involved. Its significance was not that it was a financial/ 
political scandal, but a financial/political scandal about Jews. Just how 
this factor was identified and treated 1s the purpose of the main body of this 
study. 
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119. 
CHAPTER 4 THE PRESS AND THE SCANDAL 
If it is to be maintained that the outcome of the Scandal was partly due 
to Liberal strength and unity on the issue, then the Liberal press must be 
included in that proposal. During the period under consideration, the avail-
able platforms in journalism for Liberals were declining, proportionally, in 
1 
number, as Alan Lee has recently shown. Although the number of Liberal journals 
2 in the provinces still outnumbered those identifiable as 'Conservative', it 
has been claimed that, by 1910, the circulation figures of the London dailies 
3 
showed a two to one advantage in favour of the Unionists. This statistic, 
however, does not take account of the divisions and. di.fferences which were 
apparent amongst the Opposition journals, which was obviously a weakening 
4 factor. In 1910, it is suggested that there was a far greater degree of unity 
in the Liberal press. 
'The three London morning dailies, the evening Star, 
the Liberal Sunday newspapers and the weekly Nation 
were yoked to the Radical wing of the party. The 
westminster Gazette spoke for the moderate elements 
in the party, but disagreed little with the Radical 
press in the emphasis placed on electoral issues. 5 
At the time of the Scandal, there were only two national dailies with 
Liberal leaning, the Morning Leader having merged with the Daily News in 1912, 
6 the first jOint edition appearing in May of that year. This left the News 
and the Daily Chronicle as the only national morning journals (this excludes, 
of course, the Manchester Guardian, which was felt at the time to be a 
7 provincial paper. ). The other most important or influential journals were 
the Westminster Gazette and the Nation. 
The Gazette was owned by a syndicate of Liberal sympathisers, under the 
B 
chairmanship of Sir Alfred Mond, a Liberal M.P., and edited by J.A. Spender. 
According to H.W. Massingham, editor of the Nation, the Gazette was the organ 
9 
of Liberal 'Ministerialism'. On the other hand, the Nation, whilst being 
recognised as a Liberal weekly, did not represent official party dogma. 
'Indeed there is little indication that Massingham ever 
aspired to speak with authority for the Liberal Party, 
no evidence whatsoever that he ever found himself doing 
so. Those at this time who knew Massingham best emphasised 
as his chief virtue and the· nature of his contribution, his 
independence from any faction, from any party'. 10 
120 •. 
Thus, if any attempt is to be made to assess the differing Liberal attitudes 
on Marconi, then a comparison of these two journals' approaches is a reasonable 
starting point. 
Both welcomed the news that a Select Committee might be appointed to inves-
tigate the contract after it had failed to be ratified in August 1912. The 
Nation was simply glad that the matter was to be fully dicussed, and at this 
11 
stage considered only the question of the merits of the contract. The Gazette 
was more concerned to explain the reasons why pressure for an investigation had 
been so great, and why it had included certain Liberals. 
'They have not been for or against any particular thing, 
but they have insisted that an understanding of this kind, 
which commits the country to very heavy payments towards 
work done by a private company, should receive full con-
sideration apart from the department immediately concerned. 
They have stood, that is to say, for the full control of 
the House of Commons. ,12 
Following the October debate, and the ministers' denials of involvement in 
English Marconi shares, the Gazette turned in triumph on the critics. 
'So far as the personal question is concerned, we have this 
wide campaign, the deliberate purpose of which has been to 
picture certain Ministers as making fortunes out of their 
knowledge of the Marconi agreement, and we have the declara-
tions - so definite and categorical as any statement could 
be - that not a single Minister used his knowledge to enrich 
himself by as much as a penny piece. These denials will, we 
think, carry conviction to any decent or honest mind. But 
the matter cannot end there. We have got to have at least 
an attempt to justify the original statements in evidence 
before the Committee, or we shall have to brand those who 
made these statements as more despicable than the paid 
bravo who stabs under cover of the mr k. ,13 
121. 
Essentially, Massingham agreed with this line. He described Lawson's article 
in the National Review as a mixture of fact and innuendo, with certain criti-
14 
cisms that should be openly discussed. The Nation made a clear distinction 
between rumours of corruption and the terms of the contract. Since no evi-
dence has been produced to support the various allegations, he accepted the 
ministers' denials, but was unhappy about the details of the contract itself.1S 
An article on 'Some Aspects of the Marconi Agreement' begged readers to look 
at the scientific evidence, rather than the more spicy allegations. 'The 
danger is that if the contract is ratified in its present form, a virtual 
16 
monopoly will be created.' 
However, as the Scandal developed and witnesses like Lawson and Maxse 
came before the Select Committee, even the Nation accepted that their accu-
sations against ministers ought to be answered first. 'These are questions 
of honour, and they ought to have precedence even of the important point as 
to whether the Marconi contract should stand or whether the state should set 
17 
up and manage wireless stations for itself.' Massingham claimed that 
journals like the National Review and The Outlook had one objective, 'to 
associate Cabinet Ministers, and especially Mr Lloyd George, with secret and 
therefore corrupt dealings in Marooni shares at the time of their inflation. ,IS 
Special mention was made of Leo Maxse for withholding evidence which was 
claimed could substantiate the rumours. Journalists, proclaimed Massingham, 
could not afford to take this stance. 'We write with no personal feeling, 
but we are convinced that if journalism creeps behind this kind of earthwork, 
19 its power is gone.' 
In similar vein, the Westminster Gazette declared that Maxse's plea of 
protecting his sources was not good enough. If what he hinted at was true, 
then ministers were guilty of gambling and corruption. 
'But we begin to think that some of these allegations and 
suspicions arise from a habit of using violent words which, 
from long use or abuse, have, in the minds of those who 
employ them, lost the plain meaning which other people 
attach to them. That is usually the nemesis of invective. ,20 
122. 
So far, there had been little divergence of opinion, except perhaps that the 
Nation expressed more forcefully doubts about the merits of the contract. 
However, this situation was to change with the Le Matin revelations. The 
Gazette, which has been described as a party organ, reported the trial proceed-
ings calmly and stated that there was nothing to worry about in the American 
transactions, which were perfectly legitimate. Apart from the name, 'the 
21 transactions would call for no comment on public ground.' The next day, 
having noted the reactions to the disclosures, there was a grudging admission 
that the ministers ought to have realised misconceptions would occur, and that 
it would have been better to disclose the dealings earlier. In spite of this, 
it still maintained that the new evidence was no grounds for the scandalous 
charges which had been levelled at the ministers. 
The Nation was far more critical. Whilst agreeing that Rufus Isaacs 
bought his shares after the contract had been signed, and that therefore the 
matter could not be classed as corruption, the journal came out strongly 
against the ministers' actions. ' ••• we are bound to record our view that a 
grievous error of judgement was committed when Sir Rufus Isaacs touched a 
share in a Marconi venture - in itself a legitimate and useful enterprise -
22 
and commended the transaction to his colleagues.' Isaacs' actions were 
declared to be a bad example; the purchases were seen as partially speculative 
and as indiscreet. It was claimed that he had taken an advantage over the 
ordinary investor and that the distinctions between the English and American 
Marconi companies were very blurred. The dealings should have been revealed 
earlier and critics had some justification for saying there had been a 
23 
'whitewash'. A couple of months later, the journal wondered publicly whether 
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Sir Rufus should not have resigned the previous autumn over the affair, 
suggesting that Lloyd George deserved some sympathy for the trouble which 
'fl' d h' 24 Isaacs had 1n 1cte on 1m. Massingham had long been an admirer of 
25 Lloyd George and it appears that he was upset by the setback to his career. 
Thus, the bulk of the journal's criticism was directed against Isaacs as 
instigator. Likewise, 'ALD', writing after the details of Liberal Party funds 
in Marconis had been disclosed, described popular feelings as '''Murray should 
26 be repudiated, Isaacs should resign, George should express regret'" He 
claimed that most Liberals were against Lloyd George's resignation and blamed 
Isaacs for originating the Scandal. Rather disappointingly, Isaacs was said 
to be a good lawyer but not a good politician. 
The Gazette continued its solid support for the Party in what must have 
been difficult circumstances. Its only real defence was to show Conservatives 
making great play of the affair, transforming a minor incident into a great 
indiscretion. The Chesterton case proved a useful diversion. The journal 
used the Tory displeasure at Smith and Carson's involvement to show how the 
opposition viewed the matter in partisan terms and praised the two lawyers for 
transcending this. 27 When Chesterton was found guilty, there was great 
rejoicing. It was claimed that people were surprised to find Chesterton had 
no evidence for his allegations and felt this wouJ;d now be an end to the 
28 
smear campaign. 
On the three reports produced by the Select Committee, there were more 
grounds for agreement between the two journals. Even the Gazette admitted 
that, apart from the obvious facts, the opinions and conclusions of all three 
29 
were based on party lines. The Nation favoured Spicer's version and felt 
30 
sorry that it had been mutilated into the official report ,whilst the 
Gazette accepted his verdict that it would have been wiser for ministers not 
to have invested in Marconis, but that, having done so, they should have 
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d li l ' 31 revealed their ea ngs ear ~er. On the Minority Report, there was also 
agreement. The Nation £elt it was too biased; although the Conservative 
front bench had been fai,r, 'elsewhere the spirit is much more open to criti-
32 
cism, both as to motive and accuracy of judgement.' The Gazette said much 
the same thing. 'The six members appear to have taken the facts and con-
sidered what remote and fanatical suspicions might attach to them in the 
33 
minds of morbidly partisan people.' 
In more general terms, however, there was still a wide gap in the journals' 
assessment of the Scandal. Whilst the Gazette continued to stress that the 
affair developed out of party animosity, claiming that the real scandal was 
34 
'the slander campaign that was so vigorously fomented by the Opposition' 
and that the country had nothing to fear from a complete display of the facts, 
its radical peer was less complacent. According to Havighurst, the editorial 
comments, which were rather condemnatory, were probably not those of 
Massingham, 'for its tone is at variance with statements for which he was 
35 
more directly responsible.' But although this particular editorial criti-
cised many aspects of the Scandal, the cover-up process, the party investment 
36 in American Marconis, the relationship between the two companies and so on, 
all of these items had been singled out previously in the journal. Whilst 
Havighurst claims that Massingham's attitude to Maxse's innuendoes would 
probably eliminate him from the authorship of this particular leader, the 
two roles of critic and defender were not, in the pages of the Nation, incom-
patible. This brief survey has shown a defence of the ministers against wild 
accusations and also severe criticism of the actual involvement. The article 
under consideration shows the trademark of the journal's approach, a surfeit 
37 
of blame for ~ufus Isaacs and sympathy for Lloyd George. In short, 
Havighurst's suggestion that Massingham did not write the piece seems rather 
at odds with. the evidence available. 
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The final pOint of comparison comes with the outcome o~ the June debate. 
As might be expected, the Gazette greeted the verdict with the blanket head-
line, 'Ministers Vindicated'. It blamed the party divisions and the vote on 
'the young bloods of the Tory Party', who saw 'further opportunities of 
exploiting this business, and were in no mind to accept a resolution which 
would have wound it up.' Its conclusion was that the public were tired of 
the affair and happy to see its end, particularly since 'all stain of dis-
38 honesty has been removed.' The Nation also regretted the partisanship of 
the Tories, but its verdict was more severe. The various points were 
reiterated but the journal's leader did praise the frankness of both ministers, 
particularly Lloyd George. It noted that all hint of corruption had been 
removed from the charges and asked that the Liberal Party should learn from 
39 the mistakes of the Scandal. A week later, the journal was calling on its 
readers to forget the Marconi affair. 
Thus, in these two journals, we can see evidence of Liberal unity, par-
ticularly against the more extreme attacks of Conservative-aligned journals 
like the National Review. There is also a fair degree of discrepancy in 
approach. The Gazette was principally part of the 'whitewash' campaign, 
although it admitted, as did the ministers, that errors of judgement had been 
made. The Nation was an independent journal and its editor," Massingham, 
'while generally moderate in his criticism, stood aside from the Liberal 
chorus which exculpated the members of the Cabinet associated with the 
40 
scandal.' Although the journal confronted the chief rumour-pedlars and 
challenged Conservative exploitation of the affair, it also suggested that 
Rufus Isaacs should resign. No doubt this led to Lloyd George's view of its 
41 
stance as 'treachery' , although he himself always received generous support 
and an expressed wish that he should survive. Radicalism should not be over-
thrown by Conservative manipulation of the situation; both agreed on that, 
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but there were obvious divergences as to how far genuine criticism should 
be shifted to achieve that end. 
The other Liberal journals exhibit similar tendencies, although less 
markedly so. Most followed the same pattern as the Westminster Gazette. 
The Daily News, owned by the Cadburys, staunch Liberals, and edited by 
A.G. Gardiner, acted as defence counsel for the ministers, although it was 
not averse in the early stages to suggesting that the terms of the contract 
might be bettered. Yet there were problems in such an approach, as 
~Gardiner found. 
'As editor of a prominent Liberal daily, it was no less 
incumbent on him to promote the party programme, even if 
there were ingredients to which he took exception and 
ministers with whom he regularly disagreed. With the 
revival of Tory opposition and the erosion of Liberal 
support in the country, there was the risk that criticism 
of official policy, however constructive or tempered, 
might be construed as an attack on the Government, whose 
existence was sometimes as precarious as that of the news-
papers on which it relied ••• Inevitably, he was caught 
in the crossfire between contributors and directors, or 
between journalists and ministers, among whom he attempted 
to negotiate compromises that would allow the Daily News 
to function and the Liberal Government to retain credit. ,42 
In the case of the Marconi Scandal, the journal and its editor were almost 
wholeheartedly behind the ministers. It was particularly vehement in its 
approach to the Witness. Chesterton's paper was continually criticising the 
increasingly capitalistic inclination of the press, particularly the concen-
43 tration of ownership which was a feature of the period. The acquisition 
44 
of the ~ by the Cadburys fell into this category. The Witness was 
scathing in its attacks on the 'Cocoa Press', a phrase used to describe not 
just the ownership of the paper but also the distortion of news which resulted. 
The claim was that wealthy proprietors were able to dictate what was to 
appear in the pages of these papers and it was an allegation levelled not 
4S just at the Cadburys but at other owners like the Harmsworths. By 
December 1912, a running battle had developed between the News and the Witness. 
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The ~ called for the prosecution of Chesterton and his colleagues for 
46 47 libel ; indeed, one issue reported that prosecutions were soon to follow. 
This led to accusations fu the Witness that information was being leaked to 
the paper about the order and date of witnesses who were to appear before the 
1 . 48 Se I~ct Comm::,ttee. It transpi~ed that, after some investigation, the details 
had been given quite freely to journalists and that 'leak' was the wrong 
49 description for this process. 
The ministers involved in the Scandal had reason to be grateful to 
Gardiner. Lloyd George in particular appreciated his support. Following his 
evidence to the Select Committee, he wrote to Gar~ner that he was now off 
to play golf, 
' ••• but I could not enjoy it without writing you to tell 
you how deeply I appreciate the warm and loyal friendship 
you have proved during the last few days. The more thor-
oughly this business is probed the cleaner and more 
straightforward the transaction will appear. At the same 
time, it has worried me a good deal. What compensated for 
all however is the fact that it has demonstrated to me that 
I have true friends whom I can always rely upon. 
P.S. The article you wrote was tip top. It was a triumph 
of tact and judgement.' 50 
Although the ~published a piece by Harold Spender which raised some 
doubts about Lloyd George's part in the affair, this was an oversight on 
51 Gardiner's part and he reassured Lloyd George of his support. He offered 
advice on the way the Chancellor should deal with the topic in his first major 
appearance after the June debate, telling him to stress 
' ••• the real motives of the attack, glancing lightly at 
the difficulties of investment for a Minister and at the 
Vulnerability of the enemy on the subject ••• the Chief 
object, it seems to me, is to establish in the mind of 
the country that the attack is not promoted by a concern 
for the standards of public conduct but by a desire to 
break you and through you the party and its policy. ,52 
Lloyd George also sought advice and support from other prominent Liberal 
journalists. He asked C.P. Scott of the GUardian about the line he should 
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take in the June debate speech and the editor offered some sound guidelines. 
' ••• About the Marconi business I write with even greater 
diffidence. There will, I imagine, be two Reports, a 
majority and a minority Report. Both must, one imagines, 
wholeheartedly acquit Ministers of all the grosser charges 
brought against them. But what reservations will the Minority 
make? A good deal depends on that. My own feeling would 
be for complete frankness and· an unreserved expression of 
regret for whatever you feel you have to regret. That you 
have regrets I know, because you have told me so, and these 
I think were not based solely on the fact that trouble had 
resulted to your colleagues and to the party. If you had 
thought more about it you wouldn't have done it, though 
every honest and impartial person would, I believe, acquit 
you of any sort of improper motive, and those who know you 
best will also know how little the desire of money-making 
enters into your composition. There has been an attempt to 
set up altogether new standards of conduct for Ministers in 
regard of their private investments, but probably most of 
us would admit that very speculative investments - that is, 
investments which are liable to very great and sudden changes 
of value - are not desirable for them, and the Marconis were 
of this kind. I believe that a simple and candid statement 
of this kind would meet with an immediate and cordial response 
both from the House and from the country. No man ever suffers 
from taking to himself even a little more blame than he des-
erves, and I believe that all soreness and all reproach would 
be swiftly wiped out. Perhaps I ought to apologise for saying 
all this, but I hope I may claim the privilege of friendship 
and I will take it for just what it is worth ••• ,53 
The Guardian was another Liberal paper which expressed its full support 
for the ministers, whilst leaving itself free to debate the merits of the 
contract. Indeed, a series of articles by an engineering correspondent at 
the beginning of October 1912 was highly critical, as the opposition was quick 
54 to point out. But its Liberal attachment was too strong to prevent any 
serious lapse of support, and Conservative attacks served only to strengthen 
this. Scott was, as mentioned above, a firm friend to Lloyd George throughout 
his career, even when he had moved away from his radical stance of the pre-war 
55 
era. Massingham, whose support of Lloyd George did not survive this change, 
is reputed to have remarked '''To me there are few spectacles more melancholy 
than that of dear old C.p. Scott drearily dredging in a foul pond for the soul 
S6 
ofLl. G.'" 
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Whilst Liberals criticised Conservative journals for being partisan, 
its own press was guilty of the same fault, One Radical Sunday journal, 
Reynold's Newspaper, is ample illustration of this point, On Le Matin, it 
was said of the ministers~ transactions: 'No suspicion attached to them, of 
course, as the deal was not in the Marconi Company which had the contract, 
but in an American Company, and even that deal'only took place long after the 
57 
contract was signed.' The headlines for the report on the ministers' 
appearance before the Select Committee were 'Charges Refuted Ministers 
Defend their impugned Honour : Marconi Allegations : Sir Rufus Isaacs and 
Lloyd George Sweep Away Slanders', whilst T.P. O'Connor, the Nationalist M.P. 
for the Scotland Constituency in Liverpool and long-time champion of 
58 Radicalism, described the questioning of the pair as ' ••• one of the most 
degrading and disgusting exhibitions of the malignity, cruelty and reckless-
59 
ness of party passion the world has ever seen.' There were continuaL 
references to the squalid carping of the Conservatives, who were seen to be 
hunting for the scalp of Lloyd George. The Welsh Chancellor found himself 
being defended to an unrealistic and almost sickening extent. Referring to 
his divulgence of a small unearned income of about £400 a year, purely for 
retirement purposes, the journal gushed 'This intimate revalation will increase 
the love and respect of the people for a man who has never forgotten the 
people from whom he has sprung. ,60 
After the June debate, O'Connor reflected on the outcome. the 
Marconi bombshell has gone off into a damp squib1 and though some gutter 
journalists and baser types of Tory speakers still splutter about the scandal, 
61 it is dead and can't be resurrected.' On the actual debate, he felt that 
the whole thing could have been concluded m the first day, had it not been 
for the party feeling and the 'ever-growing sense of indignation amongst the 
, 62 
young bloods of the Tory party at their long exclUsion from office.' Thus, 
----.-.---"-~------
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the blame for the whole controversy was lifted from the ministers and the 
party and placed squarely on the shoulders of the opposition. 
This brief discussion has shown that, whilst there was a basic solidarity 
in the Liberal press, there were genuine doubts about the Marconi contract and 
various expressions of regret at the actions of the ministers in purchasing 
American Marconi shares. Since the nature of their involvement was clearly a 
threat to the continuation of the Liberal government, most journals were anxious 
to paper over the cracks in the Liberal facade for survival purposes. But 
the Scandal did create differences of opinion and uneasiness in the party, 
and this was reflected to some extent in the press coverage. We must now ask 
ourselves whether the Conservative journals were in a position, or had the 
desire, to exploit these differences. 
The first point which must be made is that the term 'Unionist press' is a very 
loose category which includes journals of considerably varied outlooks. Whilst 
we may say that the Liberal press showed differing stances on the Scandal and 
these were reflections of divisions within the party, this seems an exaggeration 
63 
when compared with its opposite numbers. Perhaps the numerical superiority, 
in readership and of journals, helps to explain the numerous differences of the 
'Unionist press', a term whose significance is only for guidance. To establish 
any pattern, a more analytical approach is needed. 
For this purpose, it would be impractical to consider all the journals. 
It is hoped that a representative sample will indicate the patterns of thought 
on Marconi. The most influential morning daily, in the narrow, parliamentary 
sense of the word, was The Times. There were more right-wing dailies, like 
the MOrning Post, which, at this time, had taken on the task of restoring 
Conservatism to the Conservatives, as did weeklies like the Spectator and 
The Outlook. Of the evening papers, the Pall Mall Gazette had the least 
circulation but was particularly involved in the Scandal, whilst of the 
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64 financial journals, the FinanclalNews took a definite interest in events. 
Amongst the Sundays,the Referee gives a Popular' view of the affair. This 
selection is. not, of course, a ba,lanced one, since it ignores. the more 
highly circulated journals like the Daily Mail and the ·Daily Express.65 
What it does represent is a cross-section of Conservative attitudes to the 
Scandal. 
There were, of course, many expressions of hostility to the contract in 
the Conservative press. The National Review will be studied in detail in a 
later chapter; its companion, The Outlook, deserves some attention. Both 
journals had a common bond in that they used material produced by W.R. Lawson 
and, it might be added, both were susceptible to the use of anti-semitism in 
their pages. The Outlook was undoubtedly a Conservative paper. The proprietor 
was walter Guinness, Conservative M.P. for BUry St Edmonds and the editor was 
Edwin Oliver. Lawson was employed by the journal principally to write on 
66 the political aspects of the Stock Exchange and finance. To many of those 
involved in and following events of the S~andal, it was The Outlook and Lawson 
who first drew attention to the affair. The journal had, in the early months 
of 1912, published articles by Sir Charles Bright on the advantages of cable 
communication,67 and Lawson had noted the speculative nature of Marconi shares.68 
Although its discussion of the contract did not begin until July, a letter 
from 'M. INST. C.E., Athenaeum Club, Pall Mall', which appeared in the 
27 April edition, gives some idea of the rumours which had begun to develop 
and also indicates how a conspiracy theory, based on the Jewish identity of 
certain characters in the negotlations, could develop. 
'In connection with what you very pertinently describe as 
"the sudden zeal of the Ministers for an Imperial wireless 
service", it has to be remembered that the managing director 
of the Marconi Company is brother to the Attorney-General, 
while both the gentlemen, as well as the Postmaster-General, 
are members of a race who have ever been pre-eminent in that 
description of finance of which the present boom in 
M~rconi shares is a specimen. The contract that the 
Government have entered into with the Marconi Company 
in connection with this scheme requires explanation, 
having regard to the extraordinary extent to which it 
is favourable to the company. It is surprising that 
the matter has not already been probed in Parliament. 
It certainly ought to be.' 
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According to the editor, Oliver, he encouraged Lawson to begin an investi-
gation into the contract in May 1912, mainly because there had been no dis-
69 
cussi'on of the deal in the press or in parliament. This led to a series of 
articles by Lawson, beginning on 20 July. Whilst there was a great deal of 
valid criticism in these pieces, Lawson also attempted to create an atmosphere 
of mystery and intrigue, with various suggestions which no doubt emanated from 
the rumours in circulation at that time. Indeed, his first article was called 
'The Mystery of the Marconi Contract' and included some of the anti-semitic 
ideas noted in the above letter. 'The Marconi Company has from its birth been 
a child of darkness. Its finance has been of the most chequered and erratic 
sort. Its relations with certain Ministers have not always been purely offi-
cial or political.' Lawson also noted the Jewish connection. 'Here we have 
two financiers of the same nationality pitted against each other, with a third 
in the background acting perhaps as mutual friend. If expedition and equity 
could be looked for anywhere, it was surely in such a combination of business 
70 
and political talent.' As Oliver was forced ruefully to concede, there was 
71 
a definite air of racialism in these early articles. Oliver himself stated 
that a journalist was entitled to make use of the fact that both Samuel and 
Godfrey Isaacs were Jews, if it influenced their political dealings, which 
72 by implication he felt it did. So, in spite of the journal's legitimate 
role of critic, based on substantial points of contention voiced by M.Ps and 
73 
other journals, and Lawson's statement that the 'personal aspects' of the 
affair could be left till last, since the contr~ctcould be condemned without 
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thi.s additional dimension,74 the st:raightfo:rwa:r:d critichms were littered 
wi th insinuations that favourable terms had been given because of the Jewish 
and family links. 
Following the October debate, the journal kept up a barrage of comment 
on the contract and on the proceedings of the Select Committee, which kept 
the issue in the limelight. Because of its persistence, and no doubt its 
opposition to the Liberal party and the ministers, Lawson was the first journ-
alist to appear before the Committee and he found himself harassed at great 
length by the Liberal members. His examination was spaced over seven days 
and his writings analysed in great detail, At one stage, Falconer declared 
that he was going to test every statement Lawson had made - 'he is the 
gentleman who has stirred all this up.,75 
The outcome of this marathon was that Lawson was made to withdraw many 
of his insinuations about ministers' involvement in profiteering and the use 
of undue influence. His points about the terms and the nature of the contract 
were debated fiercely and at great length. The result was a stalemate since 
these details were still being disputed by many other experts. To many 
Liberal journals and certainly the Liberals on. the Committee, Lawson was felt 
to have 'collapsed'. As a result, the proprietor and editor of the journal 
were called on to explain why Lawson had been allowed to publish these unstib-
stantiated pieces. Both Guinness and Oliver stood up for Lawson, defencing his 
general thesis, although admitting that his choice of phrase was sometimes 
injudicious. 
A rather different complexion was put on the matter when the ministers 
confessed to the American Marconi deal during the Le Matin trial. An editorial 
in The Outlook claimed that the new evidence showed previous statements to 
76 have been true 'in substance and in fact' and that all the accusations 'of 
mud-slinging; of prostituting the standard of English journalism; of venting 
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our mqlice without exposing ,ourselves to the risk of q suit fo~ libel' 
should now be withdrawn. 
The outlook's qttitude to the ministers was varied. It reflected the 
great hostility held by many Conservatives for Lloyd George, in that it deemed 
him more guilty than Rufus. Isaacs. This was in spite of its inclination 
towards qnti-semitism, or perhqps because of it. Isaacs was less culpable 
because he had always been open about his affinity (si:c) for business, law, 
affairs of the world - 'He comes of a race and of a family which have made 
finance their principal interest in life.,77 However, the fact that he comm-
itted 'a blazing indiscretion' by taking information from his brother could 
not be ignored. 
'As an indiscretion it might have been dismissed but for 
three circumstances: (1) that he did not frankly admit 
the fact; (2) that he inflicted a gross injustice upon 
witnesses before the Committee by this concealment; (3) 
that he is being judged by a standard of conduct his 
party and colleagues established for others. ,78 
In spite of this, his lapse was less important than that of Lloyd George. 
The Chancellor was an obvious target, in view of his previous attitude to 
unearned increment, the rich and the Stock Exchange, and the journal saved 
its most biting sarcasm for an open letter, addressed to him. 
'In your 1909 Budget speeches you dwelt pathetically on the 
humanity and poverty of the poor - which you fancied you 
were the first to discover - as a companion picture to the 
iniquities of the rich. Little did the simple working-men 
of England imagine how intensely human you, great soul, 
could be; how fascinated you might become with a little 
flutter, just like an ordinary, common, or garden, punter. ,79 
Lloyd George was certainly stung by such comments and, in the censure debate, 
made sure that the role of The Outlook'in the Scandal was known. 
'And this is the paper, this is the editor, this is the policy' 
which stated the whole of thi.s examination [HON. MEMBERS: "NO"] 
Yes. I:t was the very first J?aper that ever published a line 
upon it, and if anybody doubts tha,t he ha,d better see what the 
confederates of the hone Gentleman say about it - Mr Maxse, 
Mr Chesterton, Mr Loe Strachey, the three gentlemen who have 
'been working this together • .aO 
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In more general terms, The Outlook's critique of the Select Committee 
reports and of the June debate were typical of many Conservative journals. 
The Falconer version was attacked for the whitewash effect. 
'But if Mess. Falconer, Booth and Company think that any 
weight will be attached to their finding at this stage, 
they must be singularly out of touch with public senti-
ment. Their unjustified absolution will do more to 
prejudice their patrons than any guarded criticism could 
have done.' 81 
The Minority Report, naturally enough, came in for praise, although it was 
felt that its tone 'errs on the side of generosity when the benefit of the 
doubt can be given.' For the coming debate, the majority verdict could not be 
accepted. Some degree of censure must be applied. 'This is a question of 
importance far transcending the reputation of any Cabinet Ministers, and we 
rely on the deep-seated instincts of the British people to reassert the urgent 
82 
necessity of the strictest standards in public life.' 
Speaking for the general public, Lawson expressed distaste at the result 
of the debate and yet again referred to the part he and The Outlook had played 
in bringing the Scandal to light. Had it not been for this campaign, Isaacs 
and Lloyd George might still have escaped detection. 'Now the country and the 
world know them as they really are and as they were in one of the most agonis-
83 Ing moments of our national history.' 
Long after the debate, The Outlook continued using the Scandal to make 
political points. It was the combinat~on of Jews and financial scandal, 
allied to Liberal indiscretion, which caught the eye of The Outlook. We shall 
deal with the journal's approach to the Jewish question later in this chapter, 
for the moment it is sufficient to note that contributors to the paper included 
84 85 86 O'Donnell , Arnold White and Joseph Banister , as three renowned anti-
semites. Their association with a Conservative journal is indicative of its 
attitude on the topiC. Was it representative of the Conservative press? 
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Lloyd George referred, ~n the June debate, to the three conspirators, 
Maxse, Chesterton and strachey. Chesterton and Maxse will be studied in later 
chapters. The third, St Lee Strachey, editor of the Spectator, is also deser-
ving of some attention. The journal was a solid Tory weekly, the most success-
87 ful of the period. It had, however, a particular Conservative line to 
follow. Indeed, during the 1906 election campaign, Strachey had been so 
committed to the idea of Free Trade that he advised electors to vote Liberal 
88 for the cause. 
This appeared to have been forgotten by the time of the Scandal, for the 
Spectator heartily opposed Liberal philosophy. Following the October debate, 
it suggested that ministers had brought trouble on themselves by delaying their 
denials. It recognised its own partisanship and called for censure from a 
Liberal paper like the westminster Gazette or the Guardian, which had so far 
89 been silent. On the contract itself, Strachey was opposed to the creation 
of a monopoly, but happy to allow an agreement with the Marconi Company provided 
90 the way was left open for other wireless groups. Its main point about the 
rumours of corruption was that they had been allowed to develop for so long. 
Strachey made great play of his journal's role in the Kynoch affair in 1900, 
when it reproached Chamberlain for a lack of delicacy in his business affairs. 
'It is not enough for Ministers to be free from corruption. They must not 
91 through carelessness give opportunity for scandal.' The journal continually 
contrasted its own involvement in Kynoch with the Liberal press's lack of 
criticism. Strachey admitted that, in 1900, Conservatives (himself excepted) 
had used a 'whitewash' approach, just as Liberals were now dOing, but felt his 
own stand now gave hi.m the freedom to ~ttack any ministerial corruption in 
the Scandal. 
When Lawson's evidence had been heard by the Select Committee, the journal 
92 
was upset by his breakdown a,nd by the fact that ~t had given him publicity. 
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Attempts were made to absolve itself from Lawson's wilder charges, but it 
still maintained that a thorough investigation was needed, Strachey was not 
involved in a 'no holds barred' contest with the Liberals. The Spectator 
dissociated itself from the libels of The Eye-witness, which it called 'dis-
gusting' and 'untrue', and, since it was an important journal read by important 
people, begged the ministers to sue.93 It greeted the news of the Isaacs-
Chesterton action with delight94 and felt that Chesterton had escaped lightly. 
'There is no surer way of disgusting Englishmen than to make criticism ten 
95 times stronger than the facts warrant.' Strachey refused to publish a 
letter from W.N. Moyers in the journal because it attacked Lloyd George so 
fiercely as to be vindictive.96 
Therefore, in discussing the Spectator's position as Conservative critic, 
we must bear in mind its own moderation, as well as its freedom. This was 
apparent after the Le Matin trial. It maintained, as it had done consistently, 
that there was no corruption, but a distinct lack of delicacy. Once more, the 
Kynoch debate was brought up and Lloyd George faced with his own words of 
criticism against Chamberlain. Rufus Isaacs·was censured for not being candid 
97 in October 1912. The follOWing week, yet again using Kynoch, Strachey called 
on the Cabinet to admit that the actions of the ministers had been wrong. 
He particularly mentioned Haldane, McKenna and Burns, who had all been to the 
fore in the attacks on Chamberlain. Their speeches on that occasion were 
quoted, including one by Burns, who said that the British parliament was 
special because it was not under certain influences, such as that of 'the 
chosen people'. In a footnote, Str.a.chey said his journal was opposed to 
anti-semitism and felt Burns should not have said this, but that it could 
not be edited out in case there were accusations of publishing selective 
quot.ations. 98 Thus, whilst making its point, the journal could also score 
marks against the Liberals. 
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That Strachey saw himself to the fore of the Conservative attack was 
clear from his correspondence with Bonar Law. Shortly after th~ 'L~ Matin 
trial, he was arranging a meeting with his leader to discuss the affair. He 
promised to send the draft of a resolution for a censure debate, which would 
challenge both the ministers and those who had alleged corruption. 'I 
suppose party feeling will sweep away every other consideration, but the 
better type of Liberal ought, if it was proposed, to vote for it. At any rate 
he could not call it vindictive. ,99 The resolution which he proposed was -
'That this House while condemning as false the charges and 
suggestions of corruption brought against the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and the Attorney-General and other Mini-
sters, regrets that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Attorney-General should have engaged in Stock Exchange 
transactions inconsistent with the delicacy and discretion 
which should be observed by Ministers in their private 
financial business, and should thus have given cause for 
the growth of suspicions injurious to the public interest.' 100 
Thus, Strachey was attempting to influence events both through the medium of 
the Spectator and by personal contact. 
Up to the date of the censure debate in June, the journal kept up a 
constant flow of information and comment. It was an opportunity to attack 
the Liberal government and Lloyd George in particular. Great play was made 
of the fact that he did not have the money to pay for his shares, since this 
101 
could be truly called speculation. Many of the letters received and pub-
lished by the journal were criticpl of the Chancellor and his fellow ministers. 
strachey took delight in pointing to the strains imposed on the Liberal party 
by the affair, showing how any suggestions of regret about the actions had 
to be clamped down on, for, if it was to survive the Scandal, unity in defence 
was vital. Any discord would force the ministers to resign, a course of 
action that Strachey felt was the only honourable one, But, as early as May, 
he was predicting a party vote which would absolve the guilty men and create 
102 the evil precedent of pretending that nothing was wrong. 
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Strachey's prediction was fulfilled in the sense that the Liberal and Nation-
alist majority held together over the matter and defeated opposition censure att-
empts. The Majority Report was seen to have taken the wildest accusations and 
answered them, thus making the real offences seem trivial, which the Spectator 
concluded was an admission of guilt in itself. The Minority Report was 'moderate 
and judicial', a far better basis for ministerial regret. The censure debate was 
a regrettable performance. Strachey had attempted again to influence the Con-
servative Party's approach to the debate by writing to The Times with a suggested 
line of attack on any attempt to protect the ministers. 
'Whatever may be the terms of the motion or of the amendments, the 
real question which the House of Commons will have to answer 
is this - "May Ministers in the future, without fear of cen-
sure, do what was done by the Attorney-General, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and Lord Hurray?" 
It is said that the Liberal leaders, with Mr Asquith and 
Sir Edward Grey as their spokesmen, mean to use arguments and 
to adopt a tone in defence of the three Ministers which will 
in effect supply the answer "Yes" to this question. But will 
such argument be sincere? Will they be founded on a candid 
personal belief, or will they be founded on kindliness, 
expediency, and opportunism? There is a sure way to test the 
sincerity of the defence. It is to ask those Liberal leaders 
who defend the action of the three Ministers this question -
"\olill you say that in similar circumstances (assuming you 
desired to make an investment) you would have acted as the 
three Ministers acted?'" 103 
He also wrote to Bonar Law, drawing attention to this letter and asking that the 
debate should bring denials of any further ministerial investment in Marconis 
(and of any investments by Select Committee members) or else it should be 
104 
adjourned. 
In spite of these activities, the Liberal motion was passed. Strachey 
regretted the low standard of conduct established by this action and lamented 
that Bonar Law's amendment was not accepted. 'As things are, it has become a 
public duty to work for a reversal of the precendent as to Ministerial conduct 
105 
established by the unhappy, nay disastrous, vote on Thursday.' He was as good 
as his word and the journal continued to campaign against the ministers and against 
the new Marconi contract, calling it 'unbusinesslike and unsound,.l06 It 
140. 
demanded a Royal Commission to inquire into and set up rules to govern ministers' 
1 ff ' 107 private financia a a~rs. It pursued Rufus Isaacs in his appointment as 
Lord Chief Justice and continually challenged Lloyd George for his hypocrisy. 
Nor was the journal content to let the Scandal disappear with the coming 
of war in 1914. We have already seen how Powell and the Financial News contin-
ued a campaign well after this date. It is obvious from Strachey's papers that 
he too was recognised as an influential figure in these attacks. Much of the 
108 information on these later campaigns comes from this source. The letter 
from Powell to Bonar Law with the various charges against Rufus Isaacs referred 
to above came from the Strachey Papers, in a file of letters from Lord Cecil 
109 Manners. A protest meeting which Manners had called was abandoned for lack 
110 
of public support but Strachey was obviously seen as a sympathiser, hence 
his receipt of the material. Indeed, Strachey condemned the lack of support, 
hoped that Powell would publish all his evidence and promised that the Spectator 
and the Morning Post would calIon Isaacs to deny the accusations. He was, 
however, less enthusiastic about Manners' later charges that Isaacs had acted 
with enemy aliens as a lawyer during the war and carried this influence into 
III parliament. 
Strachey also received information from the 'Society for Uphp~ding Political 
112 Honour', organised by F.D.Fowler. Whilst Strachey sympathised with the gen-
113 
eral attack on Isaacs, which mentioned that Marconis were still remembered, 
he was less happy when Fowler wrote to the Attorney-General about the possible 
prosecution of Godfrey Isaacs for perjury in the Hobhouse case, and replied in 
114 
very general terms, asking for his involvement to be kept secret. Another 
correspondent at this time was J.W. Hamilton, the ex-employee of the Marconi 
115 
company who carried out a long campaign against the firm. When it became 
clear that Hamilton was, by now, more concerned with the details of the 
American Marconi share 'swindle', Strachey replied that his particular interest 
116 
was with the role of Rufus Isaacs. Isaacs seems to have been his selected 
---- -----,----
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victim and, from the evidence, it is obvious that Strachey and the Spectator 
were focal points for much of the hostility which followed Isaacs' career. 
The Morning Post also held strong views on the Scandal. It can be best 
described as a right-wing Conservative journal, reflecting back-bench opinion 
rather than acting as a Shadow Cabinet spokesman. There is a particular reason 
for studying this journal's approach to the Scandal, because of the involvement 
of Jewish politicians, and it is known that the Post was especially hostile to 
Jews in the period during and after the First World War. Its publicity for the 
117 infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion in 1920 suggests that its belief 
in the Jewish conspiracy theory might extend back into the pre-war period. 
Cohn has pointed out that certain events of the war, and particularly the Russ-
ian Revolution, were turning points, not just for the ~, but for general 
opinion. 'The Morning Post recognizes quite clearly that tales which before 
118 the war would have been dismissed with a shrug find believers now.' Quoting 
from the journal, he emphasizes this point. 
, "The war had produced a complete change of mentality, because 
we have had concrete proof of close connections between rebell-
ion in Ireland, trouble in Egypt, disaffection in India, revolution 
in Russia, to mention only a few of the disorders brought about by 
Germany ••• Behind the scenes was a 'formidable sect' using the 
Germans for their own ends instead of being used by them, and when 
Germany fell and German money disappeared, the conspiracy still 
went on unimpeded." ,119 
Certainly, the Post's treatment of the Scandal shows little of this racial 
theory, which would seem to confirm Cohn's thesis. However, its stance is im-
portant because of its political approach. It acted as a vehicle for Archer-Shee's 
120 121 
criticisms and gave publicity to the t-1arconi rivals, poulsen. Yet, in the 
early stages, the Post was by no means convinced of any scandal. The October 
debate was reassuring enough for the journal to conclude that all suspicion of 
corruption had been removed by the ministers' statements and it hoped to hear 
no more of this aspect of the question. Samuel was deemed to have made out 'a 
very able case' for the existing contract, although there was still the fear 
122 
that a monopoly might be created. 
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Its interest was rekindled by the Le t£tin evidence. That Isaacs had 
123 bought shares was 'a grievous error of judgement', although not corruption. 
When Isaacs explained his dealings more fully before the Select Committee, his 
error was seen to have been compounded. It was clear that he had been given 
an advantage by his brother and was therefore under obligation to him. 
Furthermore, these deals had been done before a contract had been agreed, only 
a tender accepted. There was little difference, according to the Post, between 
the English and American companies. Since Isaacs sold some of his shares a 
short time after their purchase, his dealings must be seen as speculation. 
Of these errors, the most serious one was the obligation he had placed himself 
under. 
-And we think this cannot be defended upon any reasonable ground. 
We do not suggest there was any motive of corruption either 
upon one side or the other. What we do say is that if this 
transaction is accepted by the Government and Parliament as 
right and proper, then there is no longer any safeguard against 
corruption in the future.,12~ 
Resignation was originally suggested as the only honest action for the 
ministers, but this was not pressed to its ultimate. By the time of the June 
debate, the Post was troubled by the bad publicity the Scandal was creating and 
was prepared to accept an expression of regret by the ministers, ' ••• for no 
one can look forward with anything but dislike to the prospect of a long party 
fight upon a question which is even now lowering the tone of Parliament and 
party life.,125 The journal made great play of the judgement that the Scandal 
was a departure from former high standards of behaviour. 'And let us put to 
ourselves this simple test: Would Mr BALFOUR, would Sir EDWARD GREY, would 
Mr GLADSTONE, would Sir ROBERT PEEL have engaged in these transactions? We 
th ld h h d thi t do with them. ,126 Thi 'ld ' know that ey wou ave a no ng 0 s Go en Age 
theme is one we shall return to in later chapters. 
The outcome of the censure debate did not please the journal. 'It seems 
to us that by their vote last night the majority of the House of Commons 
affirmed the principle that Ministers may, 1f they are not found out, accept 
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a financial favour from a would-be Government contractor_,127 This decision, 
it claimed, meant that the topic could not be dropped and so, like the 
Spectator, it had a duty to pursue those involved, which it duly did up to the 
war. It reminded the ministers, and perhaps its own supporters, that the 
Conservative party had been generous in its approach. When Rufus Isaacs was 
speaking to his Reading constituents about the malicious campaign directed 
against him, the Morning Post suggested he remember the kindness shown by the 
Opposition. If it had called the dealings corrupt, he would have had no def-
ence. If the journal had had its way, the ministers would have been out of 
office. 'We have said that in our opinion the Ministers concerned ought to 
have resigned, and thereby relieved their colleagues from an almost intoler-
128 
able position.' It was obviously disenchanted with the official Qpposition 
approach. Earlier, the journal had urged strong condemnation of the dealings, 
othQ'vwise there would be a suspicion of Front Bench collusion. 'We live in 
an age when the value and very foundations of popular government are being 
questioned, when critics say that Parliament is an organised sham, and that 
129 the two parties are close corporations inspired by common and selfish interests.' 
The ~ obviously favoured the line taken by A.J. Salvidge, Chairman of 
the National Unionist Council, in a speech at Liverpool. 'In his opinion, 
the whole Marconi affair was one of the most disgraceful episodes that had ever 
occurred in the political life of the country, and any weakness in the Opposi-
k ld b .. 1 ,130 tion attac wou e cr~m~na • Yet two months earlier, one of its corres-
pondents had written - 'In view of the many disclosures which the Marconi 
Inquiry elicits from day to day, one may perhaps be permitted to offer a word 
of congratulation on the restraint and moderation which have been exercised 
131 by the Unionist Party.' Once again, this illustrated the dilemma of the 
Conservatives and the role of a challenging Conservative journal, anxious to 
pursue a vigorous Opposition campaign in the face of apparent indifference 
from the party leadership. 
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These three journals, The Outlook, the Spectator and the Morning Post, 
were by no means the only ones to pursue such a pa~tlsan line. Less well 
known papers, like Our Flag, published by the National Unionist Association, 
which exploited the Scandal for all it was worth, and "The "Throne, which casti-
gated Unionist Central Office for its 'lack of virility' in dealing with the 
affair. 'If it had not been for one or two private members and independent 
publicists, the quibblings and evasions of Ministers would have been forgotten 
by now, if indeed, they had ever come to light.,132 Mention should also be 
made of the Financial News, edited by Powell, which also called for the 
resignation of the ministers. 133 But the more 'reputable' Conservative press 
was conspicuously less partisan. It made political capital out of the Scandal 
but to a lesser extent than its more detached colleagues. 
For example, the Pall Mall Gazette, although prominent in the later stages 
of the affair, refused to be drawn into the gossip and rumour-spreading in 
1912 and early 1913. Following Maxse's evidence to the Select Committee, its 
leader said that the journal had refused to touch the 
' ••• campaign of suspicion against Ministers. Tnere was 
a cloud of conjecture and imputation. There was not a 
tittle of definite evidence suggesting the possibility of 
proof. We therefore ignored the charges. In any similar 
situation involving the personal honour of public men we 
shall always taken the same line.,134 
Even after Le l4atin, it wrote 'There is no foundation in the facts disclosed in 
yeaterday's libel action for an attack upon the integrity of any of the three 
Ministers concerned', although it expressed 'very grave regret' at the error of 
judgement in purchasing the shares. 
'We reserve our fuller comments upon the Marconi investigation 
and all the issues connected with it until the Committee has 
concluded its labours : but though Mr LLOYD GEORGE and Sir 
RUFUS ISAACS are political opponents, we rejOice that the1 have cleared the moral air by their action of yesterday.' 35 
Although the journal became more critical as time went on, its initial reaction 
to the affair tended to cushion the impact of its words. 
Perhaps the most significant leniency was that of The Times, arguably the 
145. 
most influential journal of all. Whilst it had strong COnservative links, 
it was a newspaper of importance to politicians of Liberal and Conservative 
leanings. A.G. Gardiner expressed a widely-held opinion that the correspondence 
columns of the journal were 'in the nature of a public trust which should be 
administered not in order to fortify the views expressed in the leader columns, 
but as a general clearing house of public opinion. ,136 The need to receive 
favourable coverage, however, frequently extended beyond the correspondence 
columns. The actions of Liberal politicians in wooing the journal make this 
137 
apparent. 
Although The Times was generally regarded as a Conservative journal, its 
policy still depended very much on the whim of its owner, Lord Northcliffe 
(Alfred Harmsworth). From a variety of sources, it is obvious that his personal 
intervention was directly responsible for the journal's attitude to the Scandal. 
For instance, it has been suggested that Lloyd George's 'cultivation' of 
Northcliffe, showing him budget proposals and the like, helped to ease matters. 
'This flattery paid off during the Marconi affair of 1912-13, when Northcliffe 
138 held back from the general Conservative attack on Lloyd George.' Certainly 
the journal had no part in the gossip of 1912. Archer-Shee had some letters 
139 published, one putting forward 'The Case for an Inquiry' , but there was very 
little editorial comment or discussion until the Le Matin case. 
There were other influences at work on Northcliffe. His brother, Harold, 
was a prominent Liberal having bought his way to prominence and been rewarded 
140 
with a baronetcy. 'Alfred's willingness to help Harold's career is the most 
likely explanation of the part he played, or failed to play, in ••• the Marconi 
ff i ,141 a a r. Harold certainly seems to have persuaded Northc1iffe to pander to 
certain Liberals. For instance, he had stressed the importance of the friend-
ship of Rufus Isaacs, who had acted for Northcliffe in certain law cases. 
'In a letter to Northc1iffe dated 8 November 1910, he asked his 
brother to let Isaac's sister, Madame Keyzer, to contribute 
notes on art and the theatre to the Mail. Isaacs, he pointed 
out, was tipped as Lord Chancellor; it was politic to cultivate 
146. 
such a man by doing him a favour for the sister - he was a 
Jew, and a favour for one Jew in a family was a favour for all.,142 
Harold repeated these sentiments when the Le Matin case was about to be heard. 
'I know that you have always thought it judicious and prudent 
to help Rufus Isaacs, if the occasion arose. The occasion is 
now here. Isaacs has never asked us to do anything for him. 
In your interests I consider you should help him now. The Times 
and the Daily Mail can kill at its birth any effort that may be 
made by misrepresentation and calumny to raise an agitation 
which may compel him to resign office. I know the thing will 
seem ridiculous trumpery to you, and it is, except for the fact 
that Isaacs is destined for high judicial office. All that is 
wanted is a soft pedal in The Times and Daily Mail.,143 
This letter certainly suggests that Harold Harmsworth was aware of the ministers' 
share dealings, and must have been informed by one of them, possibly in the hope 
that he would exercise just such influence as he did. 
Similar persuasion was used by Winston Churchill, who, immediately it was 
known that the ministers were to use the trial to make disclosures, contacted 
Northcliffe and asked him to play down the matter, assuring him that nothing 
144 
reprehensible had been done. His explanation seems to have been accepted by 
Northcliffe. The Times leader following the case declared that the ministers had 
been cleared. 'We are of opinion that more delicacy might have been shown by the 
Ministers involved in the selection of their investments. But mere lack of judge-
ment is a very different thing from the monstrous offences that have been imputed 
t th ,145 oem. The leader was written by Northcliffe himself, who disapproved of 
146 
the original, deeming it libellous, and 'patched one together' • Dawson, the 
editor, with whom Northcliffe had already quarrelled over the affair, was on 
holiday and the proprietor was able to force the acting editor to accept the new 
version.147 It may be that the libel referred to by Northcliffe was a statement 
that the Le Matin trial had been arranged by the ministers, for Donaldson says 
148 Northcliffe wrote to the acting editor reproving him for this suggestion. 
A COnservative M.P., John Baird, complained that a piece written by Harold Nicholson 
about the uneasiness of Liberal members over the Marconi revelations was not 
149 printed , which seems to indicate Northcliffe's influence again. 
He did not particularly relish the attitude he took at this stage. 
'An undated letter to Dawson says that attacks on Isaacs 
and his colleagues would "involve me in directly critical 
relations with highly placed personal friends for which I 
know neither you nor I care a twopenny dam (sic)." The 
meaning is confused; is Northc1iffe half apo1ogising for 
his restraint? In another letter to Dawson, dated 
7 May 1913, Northc1iffe said he had no intention of 
"being associated with an ascription of grave impudence 
as roguery." A reference to Lloyd George and Isaacs as 
"a Welsh solicitor and Jew barrister" may be taken, as a 
sign of the irritation he felt with them below the surface.,150 
147. 
He made his position quite clear to Churchill. Complaining that 'Your Marconi 
friends stage manage their affairs most damnably', he went on to say that the 
painfully slow process of disclosures made people think there was something 
in the Scandal, 'although I personally, as I had your word for it that there is 
not, know there is not.,lSl 
Both Isaacs and Lloyd George were grateful for Northc1iffe's restraint; 
152 Isaacs was particularly satisfied with the 20 March leader. They wrote letters 
153 
of thanks to the proprietor, praising his generosity. Northcliffe replied to 
both. To Lloyd George, he wrote 
'I adopted my line about this Marconi business because five 
minutes lucid explanation showed me that it was the fairest 
one. Moreover, I am neither a rabid party man nor an anti-
Semite. I was particularly glad to do so, in as much as I 
feel that you will now know that I am not personally hostile 
to you, as was twice suggested last year, by mutual friends.' 154 
In his reply to Isaacs, Northc1iffe was more personal. 'No one who knows your 
record in the City or at the Bar and your care of your innumerable kinsmen could 
feel that you had shown anything more than a lack of foresight in this business.,lSS 
In spite of his. sympathetic approach, as we have seen, Northc1iffe was dis-
stressed by the somewhat deceitful nature of the transactions and the cover-up. 
The further revelations of Elibank's investments and his business trip to South 
America disconcerted the press baron. He became less enthusiastic about playing 
down the affair. 
'His (Murray's) absence gives the impression, probably quite 
erroneous, that there is what newspapers call "a big story" 
behind the whole of this matter, and I have no intention of 
letting my journals remain silent on his abstention. 
I have made some bad bungles myself, but the stage manage-
ment of this business beats any record of mine.,156 
148. 
Connnent in The Times became more hostile, although never reaching the heights 
(depths?) of some of its colleagues. By June, in direct contrast to its earlier 
leader on Le natin, it was stated that the American purchases were the basis 
157 
of the rumours. The journal condemned the reticence of Elibank and the 
158 party 'whitewash' of Booth and Falconer. It was critical of the majority 
report; if it had included some expression of regret as had certain Liberal 
159 journals, it would have been more acceptable. After the censure debate, a 
leader sununed up The Times' thoughts on the Scandal. It was unfortunate that 
the matter should have been decided by a party vote but it did not totally 
condemn the ministers' actions. There was no wish to see Isaacs or Lloyd George 
forced into resignation. 'After the present severe lesson there is reason to 
160 hope that they will be far more useful public servants than before.' 
Whilst these criticisms were certainly harsher than before and relations 
161 between Northcliffe and the Liberal politicians, particularly Lloyd George, 
deteriorated somewhat, The Times' connnents were reasonably subdued. Northcliffe's 
intervention still had some effect. To what extent he was influenced in this 
by his brother's desire for a peerage is debatable. Ferris claims it was the 
over-riding reason. The diligence appears to have been rewarded, for Harold 
162 became Lord Rothermere in January 1914. A suggestion was made in Justice, 
the British Socialist Party journal, that Northcliffe let the ministers off 
lightly because if he had not done so, 'The whole history of how Mr Harmsworth 
163 
obtained his peerage will be disclosed to the world.' Whatever the circum-
stances, it meant that a very influential journal, which could have been used 
against the Liberals, was, for a long time, friendly, and then later only mildly 
censorious. 
Turning from the Conservative press to the journals of the political left, 
we find less concern with the careful balance of the parliamentary system. There 
was one exception, the official Labour journal, the Daily Citizen, which followed 
the rather uncomfortable line of the parliamentary party in the affair. Others 
were less reticent. The Daily Herald, which described itself as 'The Labour 
Daily Newspaper', was an independent journal, whose chairman, George Lansbury 
M.P., had been verbally attacked by Lloyd George in the October debate for 
referring to the rumours of ministerial speculation and suggesting that an 
164 investigation was vital. According to his biographer, Lansbury had, at the 
149. 
time, anonymous letters giving 'a pretty accurate account of what had occurred', 
but, as Lansbury wrote twenty years later, "'1 hadn't the courage and I haven't 
165 
even now, to use anonymous letters'" Lansbury had praised the part played 
166 by the Herald in delaying the ratification of the agreement in August and 
167 
we have already seen how the Paulsen group were in touch with him at this stage. 
The journal tried to influence Labour M.Rs to break away from the capitalist 
parties and initiate an investigation. It made accusations of corruption against 
the Liberal politicians, stating quite clearly that they were the most likely to 
benefit from the 'inside information on the contract,168 and, like Lansbury, 
was dubious about the ministers' denials. It reported the debate with the head-
169 line 'The House of Pretence'. Criticism of the contract continued, as did a 
belief that corruption had been proved. When the Le Matin trial provided some 
evidence, the journal seized on it; 'what we say is that if these particular 
Ministers are allowed to retain office, then the dear British people deserve 
170 them.' G.K. Chesterton, who had just resigned from the Daily News, brought 
171 his journalistic skills into play. Lloyd George was one of the first to suffer. 
In an 'Open Letter', Chesterton referred to his idea of the Chancellor's popular 
image. 
'You have become a horrible transformation scene, at which the 
gallery hisses and even the pit is perplexed: a Puritan turned 
gambler; a revolutionist turned strike-breaker; the satirist of 
Rothschild become the sychophant of Isaacs; the denouncer of 
Beit become the decorator of Albu; the exposer of Kynochs become 
the husher-up of Marconis. 
It is indeed unlucky for you that your earlier strokes and 
later surrenders were often connected with the same topics. 
You did good service when you pointed out to an angry public 
that South African Jews were stealing the sword of England. 
Would you not have done even better service if you had pointed 
out that a Liberal Cabinet ought not to make one of those Jews 
a nobleman for stealing it?,172 
150. 
On the Isaacs v. Chesterton case, the Herald felt that it was the government, 
rather than Cecil Chesterton, that was to be tried. 'Incidentally the official 
Labour Group, through its subservience to the Government and its unbroken silence 
over the Marconi gamble, is also on its trial.,173 The outcome of the case was 
greeted as a defeat for the government and victory for Chesterton. There was no 
doubt that he had libelled Godfrey Isaacs but they dared not send him to prison. 
'The Marconi Scandal will undoubtedly kill the Government, and Cecil Chesterton 
has the enviable honour of being one of the chief executioners. ,174 
This was not to be and the Herald was upset by the events that followed 
the libel case. Its leader on the majority report was full of incomprehension; 
175 how could such a blatant 'whitewash' be put forward.' The first day of the 
censure debate confirmed its worst fears and the final verdict on 'The Farce at 
St Stephen's' was a gloomy one. 
'Collusion between the "great" parties is manifest in the 
whole affair. Officialism on one side is much the same 
as officialism on the other side. All the leaders and 
protagonists are playing the same game. British party 
politics all round is shown to be fraud and humbug ••• 
It was evident at an early stage that the "great" 
debate would be a great farce. The mild-mannered official 
Tory motion knocked the stuffing out of it straight away. 
The roaring lions subsided, and showed that blood was the 
last thing in the world they desired. The cheerful gamblers 
had an easy task.' 176 
Thus, the journal, showing disenchantment with the Labour Party in 
parliament, was a leading protagonist in the Scandal, using it to attack ruling 
class corruption and also to confirm the theory of capitalist collusion in party 
177 politics, which included those Labour members tied to the Lib/Lab alliance. 
Two other papers, the New Age and the New Statesman, spoke for the less 
parliamentary-conscious socialists of Fabian inclinations. The New Age, edited 
by Alfred orage, was initially a Fabian journal when bought in 1907, but it 
178 turned to guild socialism in the years immediately before the war. It was 
essentially because of this change that Shaw and Webb founded the New Statesman 
in 1913, with Clifford Sharp, a director and contributor for the New Age, as 
its editor.179 
151. 
It has already been shown that Orage saw the Scandal as of no consequence 
180 to 'real' politics. In October 1912, following the Marconi debate, the New Age 
claimed that there was 'little pUblic value' in investigating corruption -
people had a 'self-preservative instinct' that members of parliament were exempt 
from that kind of skullduggery. 
, ••• it is therefore our business less to criticise, expose and 
punish individual politicians than to abolish a system the main-
tenance of which will shortly only be possible by the public 
employment of narrow-minded and corrupt scoundrels. To the main-
tenance of the wage system, in fact, long after it has become 
immoral to the best minds of the community, we may certainly attri-
bute the corruption now taking place in political life.,IBI 
In spite of this professed unconcern with the Scandal and most things 
parliamentary, a point continually made in its pages, the New Age did give some 
space to discussion of the affair. On hearing the details of Rufus Isaacs' 
investments in American Marconi, an article stated that 'the evidence so far 
disclosed by the Marconi Committee acquits Sir Rufus Isaacs, in our opinion, of 
corruption, only, however, to convict him of being and having been a cunning fool.,lB2 
The journal was very critical of the abuse of power that the ministers had displayed. 
'They have treated the public as if we had no concern even in a 
public matter; as if their dealings in shares, which for all 
we knew were British Marconis, were as private to them as their 
motors. Well, they are not; and now, let us hope, they know 
it. But the least punishment that can be allowed for the insol-
ent blunder the three Ministers have made is to relieve them of 
offices manifestly beyond their appreciation of public manners.' 183 
In June, there was a good deal of speculation on the outcome of the Isaacs-
Chesterton case, the Select Committee reports and the parliamentary debate. If 
resignations were to occur, then not only Isaacs and Lloyd George, but also Asquith 
and, indeed, the whole Cabinet, must go. Yet the New Age did state that, in its 
opinion, the Unionists were not ready for office. 'It is a pity Lord Robert Cecil 
should be without a party of courage enough to follow him or the Unionist party 
lB4 
without a leader with courage enough to agree with him.' 
The point about total Liberal commitment either to survival or to resignation 
was made again the following week. It was felt that the Liberal party would not 
l52~ 
destroy itself for what was, after all, simply another occurrence of corrupt 
practice in a doomed system of government. Therefore, any vote in debate would 
be a vote of confidence in the government as a whole, not of individuals. 'That 
also should prove a further humiliation of the two Ministers thus shielded by a 
185 
reputation greater than they have lost.' 'Notes of the Week' following the 
debate expressed satisfaction with the outcome, in that any other course would 
have forced the resignation of Isaacs and Lloyd George. In spite of this, the 
journal was still aware of the general decline in parliamentary governments. 
'We acquit them, it is true, of corruption, but we convict them nevertheless of 
186 being corrupt.' 
The New statesman appeared in April 1913 and its first edition contained an 
187 
article on the Marconi affair written by Shaw. Its general tone was fairly 
light-hearted but it ended on a serious note. 
'For ourselvei, if you ask us should a Cabinet Minister hold 
shares in commercial concerns, we reply: of course not. And 
if you ask us further how a Cabinet Minister is to provide for 
his family and his old age except by commercial investments, 
we reply that we do not know, and neither does he. That is one 
of Commercialism's little ironies, and one of the reasons why 
we are out to get rid of Commercialism. ,ISS 
The article set the tone of the journal's Marconi coverage. Very little material 
on the topic appeared, but it is possible to see the pattern of its attitude. 
Whilst blaming the ministers for the creation of a scandal, it felt that there 
had been no corruption: ••• never in any country at any time has there been 
so great and so damaging a scandal affecting the credit of a Government, which 
189 has depended on so slight a basis of anything that can be called "corruption".' 
The ministers' actions were called indiscreet and indelicate and 'utterly wanting 
190 in frankness (and even in common sense) I , but since they were not corrupt, 
there ought to be an end to the affair. 
'What the nation has now to do is, first, to recall Ministers 
and members somewhat sternly to their duty. The most important 
thing that is happening this week - the most pregnant with weal 
or woe to tens of thousands of our fellow-citizens - is not the 
silly gossip of Westminister, but the great strike and lockout 
in the Midlands, where some fi ve-and-twenty thousand fam:Uies 
are starving under their employers' eyes in order t~ get - ye 
Gods! - a minimum wage of twelve shillings a week for women and 
twenty-three for men.,191 
153. 
The journal of the British Socialist Party, JUstice, took the Scandal more 
seriously and used it ruthlessly for political attacks on both major parties. 
Of the October 1912 debate, it wrote:-
'The indignant protests of the members of the Government implicated 
would have been amusing had the matter in hand not been of so 
serious a character. Of course the Tories, while condemning the 
transaction from a business point of view, were quite willing to 
exonerate those responsible from any imputations upon their per-
sonal honour or integrity. Probably they thought it would be too 
much of a case of the pot calling the kettle black to do otherwise.' 192 
Justice deemed the ministers guilty of dealing in shares, even before the facts 
were fully known. Consequently, whilst it condemned the revelations of Le Matin, 
it was not 50 shocked or surprised as other journals. It was more surprised at 
the reactions, which it found to be remarkably similar. 'TOry and Liberal journals 
both mean the same thing. That is obvious. The Marconi Scandal is knocking a 
193 hole in a good many cherished beliefs.' On the parliamentary outcome of the 
Scandal, there was little new to say, except that the process of whitewash had 
been carried out without any opposition. 'Topical Tattle' saw the affair as the 
194 inevitable result of capitalism, which summed up the journal's approach. 
Before moving on to a consideration of the racial assumptions and bias which 
contributed to the press coverage of the affair, a few words on the most promin-
ent 'independent' journals is needed. That section of the press devoted to 
financial affairs and the Stock Exchange was, by and large, muted in its approach 
to the Scandal. With the exception of the Financial News, which was described 
as 'a technical journal sacrificing its reputation in its own line to its zeal 
195 for party politics' ,these journals limited themselves to the price of Marconi 
shares and a few comments on the merits of the contract and the ministers' 
involvement. Most of the comments were matter-of-fact. For exqmple, the 
Investors' Monthly Manual summarised the dealings as 
, ••• , generally regarded as indiscreet, but, unfortunately -
both before and after the actual facts were publicly stated -
they were made the subject of the most virulent and unfounded 
charges of corruption against the ministers in question. 
Fortunately, some of the chief authors of these accusations 
were brought to book or completely recanted, but the affair 
remains as a discreditable chapter in the history of British 
political controversy.' 196 
This was virtually the full extent of the journal's comments on the Scandal 
aspect of the affair. 
The Investors' Review, a more politically inclined journal, at one stage 
referring to itself as 'an old so-called philosophical "Radical",197, showed 
154. 
the same bias towards these values rather than rumours. Despite alarm over the 
wild speculation in Marconi shares, the journal held no brief for the various alle-
gations of corruption. 'Abundant insinuations have been flying about, and abun-
dant grounds for suspicion may exist, but the Parliamentary heads of departments 
were never in the gamble, and the attacks made upon the Attorney-General were 
198 
ruffianly in their ferocity and unscrupulousness.' Indeed, it felt that its 
faith in government officials was confirmed by Lawson's collapse in the Select 
Committee; ' ••• slowly, but methodically and with the deadliness of fate, the 
humbug of the entire outburst and the nature of the partisan or pocket inspira-
199 
tion behind it was evident.' This belief was maintained until the Le Matin 
trial. 
Even then, there was an attempt to justify their stand, claiming that too 
much had been made of the affair, purely from political motives, and that the 
200 persecution ought to cease. By the time of the debate, however,:It. had come 
to accept some of the points made against the ministers' transactions, which 
were called 'eminently improper and devoid of principle.' The journal supported 
Lord Robert Cecil's report as the one most suitable to the occasion. 'It puts 
in their right place the ravings of the anti-semitic and more or less demented 
Press, and at the same time passes a just and measured censure upon what the 
201 Ministers implicated actually did that was wrong.' 
155. 
Two other journals associated with finance, albeit in a less formal sense 
of the word, were Horatio Bottomley's John Bull and the Radically-inclined Truth, 
once edited by Henry Labouchere, the man who had advised Lloyd George to 
, f ,. th h ff' 202 Go or Joe 1n e Kynoc a a1r. Both journals had a deserved reputation 
203 for the exposure of financial scandals ,and yet, from their coverage of the 
Scandal, it is clear they had no part in the 'exposure' of ministers. This may 
be explained by their sympathy for a Liberal government, but it would be wrong 
204 to say they were Liberal journals. 
Bottomley's journal was first interested in Marconi because of the rising 
share prices early in 1912 but had no truck with the rumours. Following the 
October debate, it was delighted to record that the only scandal 'consisted of 
205 the poisoned slander of lying tongues.' In an open letter to Lawson, 
Bottomley was scornful of his approach to journalism. 
, ••• The truth is, you flung so much dirt about without caring 
where or how it stuck, and your eyes got so filled up with the 
splashes, that you weren't able to see even the nose on your 
face. The who1e'- muck-heap is now tumbled over, my dear chap, 
and the general opinion is that you are buried under it. If 
you should emerge alive, for, goodness' sake be rather more 
careful of other people's reputations if you have any regard 
for your own.,Z06 
On the investment by Rufus Isaacs, the journal was surprisingly lenient. 
'No doubt Sir Rufus Isaacs will be taunted with not having dis-
closed to the House of Commons a purely private, personal 
transaction, in no way connected with the issue in question, 
but we hope he will tell the House to mind its own business -
a piece of advice it surely needs. But as regards Mr Lloyd George -
well, it is a bit awkward for the People's Tribune to explain 
a little deal in the sordid stock of a monopolist company. 
But he will manage it all right.' 20 7 
Bo ttomley made no secret 0 f his associ a tion with the I saacs family. Rufus's 
uncle, Sir Henry Isaacs, then Lord Mayor of London, had become chairman of 
Bottomley's Hansard Union in 1886, largely due to a £2000 payment to Rufus's 
208 father, Joseph, who persuaded Sir Henry to give the company this standing. 
Bottomley based his faith in Rufus Isaacs' innocence on personal knowledge. 
'I knew him when he was a struggling Junior at the bar. 
I dined with him, at his father1s table, the day he, got 
his "red bag" - from the late Sir John Lawson Walton. 
He sat at rrr:I side during the dark days of the Hansard Union 
trouble - and he acted as rrr:I counsel in many a case. 
And, knowing him as I do, I say that a more scrupulously, 
punctiliously honourable man never sat in Parliament. 12n9 
This statement gives more idea of why the journal took such a low-key view of 
the affair than any assessment of its political or racial bias. Although the 
Scandal was described as 'one of the final nails in the coffin of the Party 
210 System' and Bottomley used the matter to promote his own idea of a Business 
Government, it was hardly at the expense of the individuals concerned in the 
Liberal government. 
Similarly, Truth had a sympathetic approach to the Scandal, which again 
seemed strange for a journal so concerned with financial investigations. The 
additional factor of Jewishness was one which, again, ought to have heightened 
Truth's interest, as we shall see below, but in the Marconi Scandal it played 
no part. Here, political bias may have been the all-important factor. Both 
156. 
Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel had come in for praise in the months immediately 
211 prior to the development of the rwnours and coverage was limited to the share 
prices until the appearance of Lawson's National Review article in october 1912. 
After consideration, the journal stated that Lawson's case was based on the 
relationship between Godfrey and Rufus Isaacs. 'That is the one solid fact on 
212 
which Mr Lawson builds up a huge superstructure of malignant suggestions.' 
Whilst there may have been some med t in his arguments about the terms of the 
contract, his political motives were clearly suspect. 
Truth had no time for the other Conservative journalists like Maxse and 
213 Oliver of-the Outlook. Its support for the ministers continued even after 
the LeMatin case and it continued to criticise the Conservative approach. 
There was even agreement with the Booth/Falconer cover-up procedure; each 
member of the Select Committee was entitled to 'collect his own scandal without 
disclosing to his neighbour where the bones were buried.' 214 Although there 
157. 
had been extensive treatment of the affair, the journal did try to place it in 
perspective. 
'The purity of public administration is of pressing import-
ance to all of us. As, however, it does not appear that 
there is any charge of corrupt intentions in the whole of 
the reports of the Marconi Committee, the public interest 
in this affair seems to be merely that of spectators looking 
at a game ••• The fault of Mr Lloyd George and his two erring 
colleagues seems to have been that they did a very foolish 
thing - foolish simply because it gave a ,handle to their 
enemies if it came out, and it was bound to come out sooner 
or later. The people who have most cause to complain of 
them for that are their innocent colleagues and their followers 
in Parliament and the country.,215 
Thus, in a journal obsessed at the time with Jewish money-lending, there was 
virtually unqualified support for Jewish politicians involved in doubtful share 
dealings. The most sensible explanation is that Truth can only be classified 
as an 'independent' journal in the sense that it had no direct links with the 
Liberal party. Its vilification of the Conservatives made its Radical stance 
quite obvious. This does pose, however, some interesting points about the poli-
tical use of anti-semitism, which will, ,be examined later. 
To summarise this section, two quotations from Punch, perhaps a truly 
independent journal, show the extremes expressed by Conservatives and Liberals 
in their true perspective. A mock advertisement defused the fro things of the 
contract's critics. 'READY SHORTLY ~ "The Marconi Affair in a Nutshell", by 
216 Messrs GARVIN and MAXSE, 968 pages, f 01. ' 
Liberals, there was a short but pithy verse. 
The Marconi Report 
"More whitewash I" said the FALCONER, 
Doing the Party trick; 
"Throw it about in bucketfuls; 
On the intransigence of the 
Some of it's bound to stick." 
'''Very poor art I" the public cried; 
"You're laid it on too thick I ,2 17 
These two items satirise the extreme political stances adopted by the journals 
of both sides. They do not, however, refer to the particular aspect of the 
coverage of the Scandal which is crucial to this study. The fact that Jewish 
158. 
politicians were involved g~ve ample scope for the use ~d expression of 
certain anti-se~tic attitudes and it is in the press coverage of the aff~ir 
that we can most easily discern these views. 
The importance of anti-semitism in the propagation of the Scandal has been 
noted earlier. The part played by the press in this aspect of the affair was 
a very significant one. As the first edition of the New Statesman pointed out, 
prejudice had been systematically used. 
'First it was supposed that Cabinet Ministers are speculating 
in Marconis; that they have relatives who are speculating 
in Marconis; that they are Jews; that their relatives are 
Jews; that the Jewish race exists only to speculate in 
Marconis; and, by implication, that no Englishman could, 
without a dastardly betrayal of his country, soil his hands 
with a Marconi share certificate. A frantic campaign of 
horror and vituperation followed. The National Review and 
The New Witness promptly set about the task of cleaning the 
Augean stable. The intolerable notion that a member of the 
Government could h~ve a financial interest in anything was 
repudiated. Mr Herbert Samuel, being a Jew, was despoiled of 
his "Mister", and became simply Samuel, like the Old Testament 
hero, but in a less complimentary sense. England represented 
as bound hand and foot in the power of a gang of unscrupulous 
and corrupt financial adventurers.,218 
It has been claimed that editors and journalists of the time had certain 
common features and shared attitudes. Koss has described these in some detail 
and includes anti-se~tism as one of the features, although it is an impress-
ionistic survey and lacks any definition of what constitutes anti-semitism -
'This sentiment was as always prevalent among those who aspired to social 
station; it was usually purposeless and sometimes sportive, as when his 
colleagues referred to Edwin Montagu as "the Assyrian" '0 Amongst those deemed 
to exhibit such a tendency was Geoffrey Robinson and Lord Northcliffe of 
The Times, together with. two better known and recorded deprecators of Jews, 
Leo Maxse and Arnold White. Maxse, Koss suggests, 'saw the Radical Party 
disseminating "Hewbrew influences" through Parliament, the press, financial and 
social circles', whilst White 'cited two "classes" of Jews: "Those who are as 
loy~l to this country ~s were the Huguenots after the ReVocation of the Edict 
of Nantes, and those who remain cosmopolitan, indifferent or hostile, secretly, 
219 towards England." t . 
159. 
Ada Chesterton revealed a more personal and intimate view of the minds 
of those working in and around Fleet Street. Referring to the social life 
amongst journalists, she noted that those from the Daily Telegraph, a journal 
owned and edited by Jews, did not mingle as freely as the others. 'We had a 
legend that they kept away from Gentile companionship for fear they should be 
the selected victims of the ritual murder which the Anti-Semites insisted was 
220 
annually perpetrated in the darker recesses of the foundry.' 
Since anti-semitism in the context of the Marconi Scandal could be used 
only by opponents of the Liberal government, or of capitalist government in 
general, it is to be found in extremist conservative journals and in the left 
wing press. The National Review certainly belongs to the first category; the 
Witness is a harder paper to classify, showing tinges of both conservatism and 
radicalism. Both will be dealt with in separate chapters. Of the other 
journals which exhibited hostility to Jews, the first general observation to be 
made is that they all did so in a similar manner, using the conventional stereo-
types and usual range of accusations. 
The Outlook, and Lawson in particular, made use of these stereotypes to 
show the Jew as financier and conspirator against the 'British way of life.' 
221 Godfrey Isaacs was described as 'a bold financier of the chosen race' and on 
the more general conspiratorial issue, Lawson attempted to suggest that the 
Marconi Company was a Jewish-dominated organisation, both at management and 
shareholder level. Noting that a majority of shares were held by foreigners, 
he added - 'Another striking peculiarity is that when an English holding does 
occur it is generally in a Jewish name. There are hundreds of these, including 
Kaffir magnates, Jewish bankers, financiers and members of the Stock Exchange.,222 
Without producing any firm evidence, Lawson built up a conspiracy based on 
the Jewish relationship of some of the leading figures. His criticisms of the 
technical merits were hidden by these suggestions. As a letter in the Financial 
~ put it, 
'In the debate on the third reading of the Home Rule Bill 
Mr F.E. Smith very rightly deprecated any disparaging 
insinuation in regard to gentlemen who happened to be of 
Jewish parentage; and in reading the article written by 
Mr Lawson in your Friday's issue I could not but regret 
to find this same animosity prevailing to such an extent 
as to make one almost wonder if that was the sole object 
of his writing at all;,223 
160. 
Lawson's contributions in The Outlook were not the only evidence of its anti-
Jewish feeling. The journal frequently published letters from Joseph Banister, 
a renowned anti-semite, and had no qualms about warning of the dangers of 
Jewish power in Britain. An article entitled 'The Triumph of Jewish Racialism ' 
spoke of the ever-increasing Jewish population. 'Today in England alone, the 
Israelites lead the Bar, the India Office, the Post Office, monopolise finance, 
224 influence the Press, rule the stage. 1 Thus, Lawson's racial inclinations, 
whether intrinsic or simply assumed for effect, certainly fitted the pattern 
of the Outlook's thinking. 
Other writers of anti-semitic reputation also contributed to the right-wing 
journals. Arnold White wrote in The Throne on the Scandal and related incidents. 
His dislike of the Liberal government, both on political and racial grounds, 
was made apparent in an article on IThe Cosmopolitan Financier'. Noting the 
links between the Liberal Party, the party of the rich, and several foreign-
born millionaires of Jewish descent, White pointed to the political consequences. 
'Even in domestic affairs there is an unpleasant impression 
abroad that finance is not always clean. The British tax-
payer has been "had" in the telephone deal by the brilliant 
Semitic statesmen who draw pay as Postmaster-General and 
Attorney-General. The public is not allowed to know the 
truth about the transactions that are carried on in its name. ,225 
Given this approach, it is hardly surprising to find that, in the journal's 
discussion of a National Review article on the Scandal, a Jewish connection was 
stressed. IThe General Manager of the Marconi Company is a brother of Sir Rufus 
Isaacs. Mr Herbert Samuel, another Hebrew, is the Postmaster-General. I 226 Much 
of its later coverage was based on this simple fact. One of its most consistent 
themes was the domination of the government and the Liberal party by wealthy 
161. 
Jews, and their manipulation of events to suit themselves rather than the 
British people. The journal's support for 'The COnullittee of Inquiry into the 
227 Radical Plutocracy' , the backbench Conservatives' answer to the Land Campaign 
investigations of the Liberals, ShO\,lS this. it is gratifying to find 
the rank and file of the Unionist Party determined to get to the bottom of the 
cant, hypocrisy and corruption by which this alien element has debauched one 
228 
of the great historic parties of the State.' The Scandal was simply one 
facet of this Jewish attempt to dominate politics for selfish reasons and as 
such it was treated in this stereotyped way229 - Jewish financiers exploiting 
British Liberalism. 
230 White also wrote under the pen-name 'Vanoc' in the Referee. He was able 
to comment much more fully on the Marconi affair in this journal. At first, 
he appeared to reject the conspiracy theory; in July 1912, he protested that 
his opposition to the contract was based not on the relationship between 
Godfrey and Rufus Isaacs, but on the fact that 'public interests do not seem to 
231 have been adequately safeguarded.' Less than two months later, his attitude 
towards the contract had hardened. 
'Nobody can imagine a healthy House of Commons permitting the 
fixing up of the Marconi deal which is to hand over to a 
multitude of polyglot cosmopolitans and foreigners the 
financial control of the means of communication by which the 
fate of the Empire will stand or fall in times of war. 1232 
White's writing on this particular topiC fitted into his general view of Jewish 
power in Britain. For example, he saw a protest petition to the Russian govern-
233 
ment about the blood ritual accusation against Jews (Beiliss in particular) 
as a symbol of Jewish domination. 
'It is absolutely certain that an overwhelming majority of the 
signatories to this protest know nothing whatever at first 
hand about blood ritual. The desire to stand well with the 
powerful, wealthy, and highly organised Jewish community was 
enough to secure the eager adhesion of the majority of people 
who were asked to sign the protest.,234 
It must be assumed that the Referee found his remarks agreeable, since it took 
no steps to sever his connections with the paper. 
162. 
These journals and personalities represent part of a general Conservative 
attack on a Liberal measure and so anti-semitism could be used against Jewish 
politicians involved in the Scandal. These political figures also had opponents 
on the left. A comparison of arguments reveals some interesting and significant 
features. The Daily Herald used reasonably similar imagery as its right wing 
opponents. Whilst there were few outright references to the Scandal as a Jewish 
ramp, the basis of its criticisms was made clear in an article on another aspect 
235 
of the Jews - 'foreignness'. 
'We do not care two straws what a man's nationality may be when 
we are discussing public, or even private affairs. But, 
nevertheless, it is a fact that wealthy Jews dominate this and 
practically every other European country which has any claim to 
commercial eminence. And it is also a fact that these same 
Jews frequently use their wealth in ways which are not conducive 
to the happiness and well-being of the working classes.,236 
The reader was frequently given clues as to how Jews assumed their dominant 
positions and the Marconi contract was one blatant example. The most vivid 
explanations were in the cartoons of Will Dyson. Rufus and Godfrey Isaacs, along 
with Herbert Samuel, were pictured as caricatures of a Jewish stereotype, winking 
237 
and tapping their noses as a signal of some secret arrangement. In another, 
the two figures, escaping with the concessions, and hidden from the public's view 
by the 'mountain' of the Select Committee inquiry, have distinct Jewish carica-
ture features. The caption stated 'The Gentlemen of a somewhat vaguely Semitic 
cast of countenance in the foreground ~·the left are evidently merely symbolic 
238 
representations and not particular individuals.' 
In spite of its obvious animus against Jews, the journal rejected charges of 
anti-Semitism in the same way that the Witness did. 
'If Sir Rufus Isaacs is criticised it is now the trick of the 
more foolish Liberal papers to call the criticism anti-Semitism. 
We should never have remembered that Rufus Isaacs (or Herbert 
Samuel for that matter) was a Jew had we searched our memories 
for any protest made by him against alliance with Russia, the 
country which places special restrictions on the lives and live-
lihoods of its Jewish citizens, or had we in connection with any 
question where Jews are concerned looked for his representation 
of Jewish interests in Parliament. That it is anti-Semitic to 
to criticise a Jew who is also Postmaster-General or Attorney-
General is an absurd doctrine. The Welsh do not call criticism 
'of Lloyd George anti-Welshism; and it is a fact that George has 
been called a Welsh attorney far more often than Samuel and 
Isaacs have been called Jews. At the present day the rich of all 
nations are denationalised, and with no nation is this more true 
than with the Jews. • •• we say once and for all that if Sir Rufus 
Isaacs and Mr Herbert Samuel and other Jews do not want to be 
criticised they should at least avoid any public position. ,239 
This concept of the Jews and the British as separate nationalities and the 
refusal to accept that it was not the attacks in themselves, but their nature, 
Which constituted anti-Semitism, were typical of the Chesterton/Belloc school 
240 
of thought. 
Justice also provided more examples of left-wing attitudes to Jews. The 
163. 
SOF, under H.M. Hyndman's leadership, had an inclination towards 'rich-Jew' anti-
semitism, and Justice tended to reflect this attitude~241 Perhaps the most 
celebrated (notorious ?) outbursts were during the Boer War, when 'Hyndman 
editorialized at length about "the Jews' War on the Transvaal" ,242 'Even at a 
time when anti-semitism was not uncommon in left-wing political circles, Hyndman 
243 gave much offence.' Anti-~ewish sentiments were still to be found in the pages 
of the journal during the period of the Scandal and so, whilst it might comment 
on the debilitating effect of the Witness's anti-semitism on the merits of its 
244 legitimate criticism of the contract, Justice was guilty of the same error of 
judgement., There were speculations about the relationship between Wertheim and 
Gompertz, the Dutch firm, Messrs Samuel 1 Montagu and Co. and Herbert Samuel, the 
implication being they were all Jews and therefore suspected of some kind of 
245 
conspiracy. Its defence against accusations of anti-semitism, couched in 
similar terms as that of the Daily Herald, did, however, seem less hypocritical. 246 
It may be that the amalgamation of the SDF into the British Socialist Party 
moderated the approach of Justice to the topiC. We might also look at person-
247 
alities involved, for whilst Hyndman continued his anti-Jewish inclinations, . 
he was no longer the leading party figure. Similarly, the editor of Justice, . 
Harry Quelch, whom Kendall notes as fairly hostile to certain Jews as late as 
164. 
248 1911, was ill during the period of the Scandal and died shortly afterwards. 
This suggests that the vague expressions of a Jewish conspiracy theory owe less 
to the general policy and approach of the journal and the party than to the 
particular hostility of individuals like Hyndman and Quelch. 
Clearly, then, there was a framework of varying degrees of anti-semitism 
in British journalism at this time, which meant that the Scandal would be given 
publicity. Because it fitted into a certain popular conception of how Jews 
were behaving, this was inevitable. The few examples given above illustrate 
this. However, there were two journals whose anti-semitism stood out, The Eye-
Witness and the National Review, and these deserve more detailed study. In 
this way, a picture of the language of pre-war anti-semitism can be built up, 
one that can be compared and contrasted with that of later years. 
165. 
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CHAPTERS 
BELLOC, CHESTERTON 1\ND THE EYE-WITNESS 
The journal that was most pre-occupied with the Harconi Scandal was 
The Eye-Witness. This made its first appearance on 22 June 1911, for the stated 
1 purpose of revealing and opposing corruption in government circles. The 
editor of the journal was Hilaire Belloc, who until 1910 had been a Liberal M.P., 
but for various reasons, chief among which was his dislike of party politics at 
that time, now vehemently apposed the British parliamentary system. Indeed, 
in 1911, Belloc, along with Cecil Chesterton, produced the damning indictment 
called The Party System •. The journal was largely financed by Charles Granville, 
'one of those strange venturers who now and again break into the newspaper world. 
He had little experience but blithely sponsored Belloc's idea for a weekly 
2 
review, which proved a brilliant literary and political success.' 
The first edition of the journal gave some clear indication of its political 
intentions. 'Junius', who was to be the author of many 'Open Letters' in sub-
3 
sequent issues, drew the attention of this new King to the sale of honours by 
the Liberal government. This was to be a consistent theme in the Witness. There 
",ere two other major articles of political significance, which help to explain 
the foundation of such a journal. The first condemned the vast majority of the 
press as 'subsidised'; the 'Cocoa Press' as it became known after G.K. Chesterton's 
4 
attack on the Cadbury consortium. Wealthy proprietors could decide what news 
was to be printed to suit their own particular interests. Thus, a 'free press' 
was a vital necessity in such a situation, and the Witness was an attempt to 
provide this service. The second article was a direct attack on the Insurance 
Act of 1911, for this Act contained the essence of many of the things towards 
which Belloc, Granville and the Chestertons were Violently hostile. 
It was alleged that the Act involved collusion between big business and the 
177. 
government. People like Cadbury', the R,othschilds and the Sassoons (note 
alrea,dy the Jewish na,mesl had .agl:'eed to. back this scheme of; Lloyd George -s as 
a way of; regimenting their workers and of; extracting money from them. In 
return for the financial support that the parliamentary parties received from 
these wealthy businessmen, both Libera,ls and Tories favoured this legislation 
thus allowing the monopoly capitalists to further increase their profits by 
the blatant measure of deducting money from the wages of the working classes. 
Furthermore, the journal offered an opportunity for Belloc and those with 
similar political convictions to expound their own particular philosophy of 
'distributivism'. Briefly, this was a response to 'state capitalism', what 
Belloc called in his 1912 study, 'The Servile State'. It sought the redistri-
5 bution of property and a return to peasant proprietorship. Holton has 
identified distributivism, and the publication of its ideas in the Daily Herald, 
as a significant element of the unrest in the years before 1914, showing how 
support for its philosophy came from 'dissidents within the Labour Movement-. 
He points to the exchange of writers and of ideas between the Herald and the 
Witness, which suggests both journals had a basic commitment to the politics 
6 
of distributivism at this time. 
Even if we accept that there was a definite political basis for The Eye-
Witness, it should not be forgotten that it also had a certain degree of literary 
and artistic merit. The first two editions alone carried stylistic articles 
by Wells, Belloc, Wilfred Blunt and G.K. Chesterton, to name but a few. In this 
sense, The Eye-Witness was very like the New Age, which was edited by Alfred 
orage. 7 Although the latter was essentially political, Orage believed that it 
ought to be judged by the standard of the contributors, and he succeeded in 
having many of the more famous literary figures of the era writing pieces for 
his periodical. • "One used to write to The NewAgen, Belloc later recalled, 
'simply because one knew it to be the only paper in which the truth with regard 
to our corrupt policies, or indeed with regard to any powerful evil, could be 
told." • 8 
178. 
Belloc might well have desc~ibed the Witness in similar vein; indeed it 
boasted this claim regulady in its columns. Dudley BarkeX', in his recent 
study of G.K. Chesterton, remarked on the high literary standards of the 
Witness, but added that ' ••• such contributions were only the ornament to the 
paper, not its purpose, which was to continue the attack launched by The Party 
System on the Parliamentary parties, to expose corruption, and to oppose 
9 
measures which seemed to Belloc to limit the freedom of the individual.' 
It is difficult to assess accurately the journal's circulation and 
influence. 10 Descriptions of its circulation as 'exceptional for its age' 
mean very little in an era of heavily subsidised journalism. The nearest 
definite figures come from a dubious source, the Witness itself, at the height 
11 
of the Marconi publicity. Belloc's biographer claimed that it was, by the 
12 
end of 1912, the second-largest-selling weekly, the first being the Spectator. 
Assessments of its influence are also subjective. It was sold openly, for 
Herbert Samuel himself bought a copy at King's Cross Station. Donaldson claims 
13 that 'in a small but influential circle of intellectuals it was widely read' 
14 
and the Spectator described it as an important paper read by important people. 
It certainly reached members of the Cabinet, since John Burns, President of 
the Local Government Board, distributed it to his colleagues, 'amongst whom 
he encountered stiff resistance from Mr Herbert samuel.,lS Although Asquith 
16 
considered it to be uninfluential and unimportant, the journal was clearly 
of some significance, largely because of its controversial nature. 
This factor was the most important one in allowing the Harconi Scandal to 
have such an impact. As Barker says, 'Cecil Chesterton was looking greedily 
for a scandal to oppose, as the surest way of drawing attention to the new 
paper and increasing its circulation. He picked the most notorious of those 
17 years, the Marconi Scandal.' It was felt that publicity was the best way 
-of destroying the political corruption of the time, and this was the course 
advocated by Belloc and Chesterton in The Party System. 
'The first need is exposure. To tell a particular truth with 
regard to a particular piece of corruption is of course danger-
ous in the extreme; the rash ma,n who might be tempted to employ 
this weapon would find himself bankrupted or in prison, and 
probably both. But the general nature of the unpleasant thing 
can be drilled into the public by books, articles and speeches •• 18 
179. 
Certainly the Scandal had all the elements mentioned above that made it 
deserving of the attention of the Witness. It also contained one other factor 
not yet dealt with; some of the politicians and businessmen accused of 
corruption were Jewish. The attitude-towards Jews displayed by the Witness 
and especially by individuals like Belloc and Cecil Chesterton is of vital 
importance in considering its treatment of the Scandal. 
Belloc's reputation as an anti-semite has been noted in many recent works. 
When Cox and Dyson drew attention to various 'imaginative writers' who 
exhibited what they call fascist tendencies in the pre-1914 period, they named 
19 Be110c as the chief proponent of anti-semitism. Christopher Sykes' study of 
Nancy Astor claims that it was Belloc who taught her 'real' anti-semitism, 
although she had a grounding in the 'mild and unpleasant prejudice' which 
20 Sykes describes as 'very common' in the English upper classes at that time. 
Although he provides little evidence in his book for these statements, he has 
used the private papers of Nancy Astor, which contain letters between herself 
and Belloc for these years immediately before the Great War. These contain 
remarks about the Marconi Scandal and some general comments about Jews domina-
21 
ting society - 'No one has the courage to defend his country against them' -
as well as some snide references to 'Yids'. However, before accepting Sykes' 
specific conclusions, one would need rather more evidence than seems to be 
available. 
There is, however, a great deal of contemporary material to show that 
Belloc was regarded as being hostile to the Jews, The Jewish community, or at 
least that section represented by the Jewish Chronicle, recognised Belloc's 
hostility but saw it as part of a general growth of anti-semitism in Britain. 
180. 
For example, 'Mento:r~, a ;regula:r: columnist, in a discussion of the high 
aspirations that Jews had held for their freedom and safety in England, 
referred to various events in the history of the Anglo-Jewish community, such 
as Disraeli·s apPOintment as Prime Minister, which seemed to confirm their 
beliefs of acceptance and security, but he then turned to certain occurrences. 
in the last few years. 
'From the high water ma:r:k of the incidents to which I have 
referred, we come down in latter years to the restriction 
of alien immigration and the thunderings of Mr Arnold White, 
to the frothing against Jews of Mr Hilaire Belloc, to the 
impertinent onslaught of Sir James Barr, and the philosophic 
antics of Mr G.K. Chesterton. Deeper we descent to the out-
break against Jews in Limerick, and the still more serious 
outbreak against Jews in South Wales. Now to-day we realise 
how vain and futile was our boast of former days.122 
Other contemporaries also made references to Belloc's anti-semitism. In a 
review of his work, The Servile State, it was stated that the author was 
23 famous for his hostility to Jews, whilst a satirical piece in the New Age 
on Belloc also dealt with this aspect of his character. 24 
Indeed, few who have studied Belloc's writing in any detail would refute 
the fact that he held views hostile to the Jews. Even his biographer, 
Speaight, who was generally sympathetic towards his subject, admitted II had, 
of course, to meet the charges of Belloc's anti-semitism. The charge was not 
unfounded. A man cannot spread abroad amusing and insulting verses about 
Sir Alfred Mond and Sir Herbert Samuel and then be surprised that people 
25 
think he is anti-Semitic.' 
Cecil Chesterton's views reflected those of Belloc, as will be seen in the 
account that follows. Two excerpts from The Chestertons, a sentimental 
recollection by Cecil's wife, suggest that he had fOrmulated a similar type of 
anti-semitism to Belloc's, long before The Eye-Witness was produced. The 
first concerns the question of the many penniless tobacconists in Kensington 
High street, which arose during a debate with his elder brother some time in 
the early years of the century. Cecil was arguing against the existence of 
181. 
such destitute t~ade?men, claim~n9, ~As to~ the tobacconists, there are 
only f~ve, and one of them belongs to the firm of Salmon and Gluckstein, a 
26 
combination which suggests many things, but hardly sorrow at small earnings.' 
The second instance was when Cecil became secretary of the Anti-Puritan 
League, founded by Hubert Bland of the Sunday Chronicle. 'Herbert Samuel 
as Home Secretary was already try~ng to pass the measure which ultimately 
forced children to wait outside licensed premises instead of accompanying 
their parents inside. Samuel called it a much-needed change in the habits 
of ~ people. "Which people?" Cecil asked. ,27 
These two examples are sufficient to suggest that Chesterton had certain 
hostile views towards the Jews, He somehow felt that to be a Jewish business-
man, even a tobacconist, was to be wealthy; that is there was some kind of 
mystical relationship that allowed Jews to succeed in their enterprises. 
The explanation was suitably vague. He was also determined that, in the case 
of Samuel, whatever else the Jew might be in legal terms, he could never be 
anyth~ng but a de facto alien. This was a constant position, as can be seen 
from an account of a public meeting during the war between Chesterton, 
Bernard Shaw, H.M. Hyndman, the veteran socialist and Israel Zangwill, the 
'father' of Zionism. Declaring that he regarded Zangwill not as an Englishman 
but as a Jew, Chesterton stressed that the Jews were a different nation and 
that he wished them to return to Palestine. '''Being a separate nation they 
28 had no claim to enjoy equal rights in other countries".' This theme of 
the alien Jew was constantly hammered home in the pages of the Witness. 
29 To show that The Eye-Witness began life as an anti .... semitic journal, 
and did not just develop this trait because some of the Marconi ministers were 
Jewish, it is necessa~ to study this particular aspect of its contents from 
its inception. As early as the second issue, the pattern was made fairly 
clear. An unsigned comment, presumably by the editor, Belloc, who wrote much 
of the mate~ial tor the initial editions, discussed recent writings on the 
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immorality of war. One of the authors mentioned was called Bloch, which 
provoked the following reaction ••• 'Bloch, as his name implies, was a 
30 
moneylender somewhere in the East of Europe.' No direct mention was made 
of his religion but the association of what appears to be a Jewish name and 
money-lending is an exaggerated example of the Shylock stereotype; the 
31 implication being that to be a Jew is to be a money-lender. As David Lodge 
has pointed out, this was the keynote of the 'Chesterbelloc, variety of 
anti-semitism. 
'To Chesterton and Belloc, nineteenth century capitalism was 
essentially usury and the fact that Jews (most notably the 
Rothschild familyl were prominent in the field of high finance 
was evidence that capitalism was essentially alien to Christian 
culture. Much (though not all) of their "anti~semitism" 
consisted of identifying Jewry with the evils of modern 
capitalism. ' 32 
33 Perhaps the case of Stinie Morrison illustrates this point. Morrison 
was a Jew, found guilty of the murder of Leon Beron, another Jew. At first, 
the sentence was death but this was commuted to life imprisonment. There was 
some degree of doubt about the evidence given by certain witnesses, enough for 
it to be suggested that Stein, which was Harrison's real name, was probably an 
accessory to the murder, but did not actually commit the deed. However, the 
Witness seized on the change of heart shown by the Home Secretary as proof of 
Stein's innocence. If he was not guilty, then why had he still be given a 
life sentence? The answer, according to the Witness, was that his imprisonment 
was a warning by the British government to 'immigrants of his kind'. At this 
particular time, the press was full of headlines about 'criminal aliens' as 
a result of the Sidney Street siege, and the xenophobia developing out of this 
was being used to discourage East European immigration, much of which was 
Jewish. 
Yet, in supporting Morrison, there was a certain element of self-righteous-
ness in the pages of the Witness. It was as if he was being supported in spite 
of being a Jew and the Witness was using the issue as a defence against accusa-
tions of anti-semitism, which it appeared to define as hostility to all 
Jews. 
'Will not some of those who have reproached us with Anti-
Semitism take up the case of this man who is kept, so far 
as we can understand, solely because he is a foreign Jew, 
in a living hell on an indictment every point of which has 
now broken down?,34 
However, even in its championing of Morrison, the Witness showed its 
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stereotyped thinking on Jews. Whilst proclaiming his innocence, it accepted 
the adjective 'undesirable' when applied to aliens 'of his kind'. It was 
this vaguely patronising attitude which stands out in the articles on Morrison. 
The government did not understand the character or the culture of the immigrant 
and had therefore reacted harshly in order to discourage the repetition of 
such acts as the Houndsditch murders and to dissuade potential immigrants., 
since they were seen as the cause of such incidents. The Witness appears to 
have been claiming that only it fully appreCiated the significance of the 
murder. We have already seen that both Belloc and Cecil Chesterton went to 
great lengths to establish the irreconcilable alien nature of the Jew. In 
this instance, the suggestion was that Morrison could not be condemned by the 
society in which he lived, because his value system was totally different. 
This line of argument enabled Belloc to suggest that the Jews in Britain should 
have separate laws and courts as part of the recognition of their alien status. 
In addition, Cecil Chesterton was able to use the case to attack wealthy 
Jews. By contrasting Morrison's treatment with that of Dreyfus, who received 
35 
'all that the resources of the Hebrew money power could do for him,' 
Chesterton was able to conjure up the vision of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy 
again. 
Whilst the Witness was ready to defend, with certain qualifications, 
Morrison, who was poor, it showed no mercy to wealthy Jews. Within two weeks 
of its first report on the murder case, it was attacking the influence of 
the cosmopolitan Jewish financier. Mention was made of the Roths chi Ids and 
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the influence that the family was alleged to have over the Portuguese 
monarchy, which influence the writer w~s pleased to note was 'now happily lost.,36 
In that same issue, the spotlight also came to bear upon the British government 
and the power that certain Jewish politicians held in th~t body. This was to 
become another constant theme of the journal, with special reference to the 
Marconi Scandal and the Indian Silver question •. However, in this particular 
case, it was the impending purchase of the National Telephone Company by the 
Post Office that produced the comment. 
'The very important question of the national purchase of the 
Telephone Service is now before the country, and it is the 
duty of each patriot to see that the nation gets full measure. 
We cannot say that the gentlemen in charge of the negotiations -
Nathan and Samuel - inspire us with much confidence, they are 
not appointed by the public and their collocation is significant.,37 
This last statement was left unexplained, the explanation being apparently 
self-evident. It is fairly representative of the Witness's style, insinuation 
and appeal to a stereotype which it felt readers would identify as reality. 
The reader was allowed to indulge his own fantasies, but in an obviously 
channelled direction. 
The international nature of this Jewish influence could be detected in all 
corners of the world. On 17 August 1911, the paper looked at the states of 
Egypt and South Africa. The cost of administering the Egyptian lands was very 
expensive for the British government and loans had to be raised for this purpose. 
Repayment of the loans was only a small fraction of the total costs •••• 'The 
rest goes to the money-lenders : most of them are of foreign origin and 
citizenship, 38 very largely Parisian Jews.' As for South Africa, mention was 
made of the fact that the Jewish mine-owners, who had forced Britain into the 
Boer War, had never paid any compensation to the government, although the 
39 Witness alleged that they had promised to pay thirty million pounds. 
In other issues, there was criticism of Jewish moneylenders as the men 'behind' 
40 
absentee landlords in ~reland and therefore the cause of the 'Irish problem', 
whilst the~e were conti.nual ~eferences to the exploitation of India by 
41 Jewish capitalists. 
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This particular hostility to the ~ich Jew was very apparent in an editorial 
comment by Belloc on the anti-Jewish riots in South Wales in August 1911. 42 
In attempting to analyse the reasons for the outbreaks of violence, he wrote: 
'The anti-Jewish riots in Wales are a significant accompaniment 
of the stir of real movement in the democracy of England which 
we have seen of late. Anyone acquainted with the populace of 
this country might have prophesied that when the democracy moved 
at all it would move against a certain type of Jew. In East London, 
where the materials are most explosive, only the heavy hand of the 
police prevents continual outbreaks. To attack Jews as Jews would 
be flagrantly unjust; nevertheless it is an unfortunate but 
unquestionable fact that everywhere a sort of Jew presents himself 
to the publiC view, not only as an oppressor of the poor, but, 
what is much more intolerable, an alien oppressor - an oppressor 
incapable of even understanding the feelings of those he opp~esses. 
That impossibility of understanding is the real root of anti-
semitism and many worse things. To pelt and hustle Jews is no 
remedy, but still less is it a remedy - nay, it is an aggravation -
to try to ignore therlsunderstanding or plaster it over with vague 
platitudes. To treat justly an alien people, settled for centuries 
among men of wholly different traditions and ideals, is at best a 
most difficult problem. It is not made easier by pretending that 
it is not there.,43 
What Belloc isolated as the principal explanation for the riots was not 
merely the exploitation of the poor by the rich but by the alien rich. The 
concentration was upon the 'fact' that the Jew could not, and never would, be 
'British' and Belloc is suggesting that it was this additional element which 
intensified the natural reaction of the exploited. Once more, we see the stress 
on the Jew as alien in the pages of the Witness and, as we shall see, it is a 
key factor in most of the anti-Jewish feeling of the period. 
It appears that these riots promPted a se~ies of articles on the "Jewish 
Question' in the Witness over the following two months. These articles are 
significant, in that a close reading shows them to be practically identical in 
44 
style, content and format to Belloc's later work,The Jews, published in 1922. 
This should serve to produce a serious re-evaluation of Belloc's post-war 
writing on this topiC. Klein, in her study of The Jews, makes no reference to 
these articles and is content to see Belloc's book as simply the product of the 
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, 45 post-w~r per~od. Similarly, Skidelsky, in his biography of Mosley, refers 
to The Jews as a 'Catholic View of the Jewish impact on European life, and 
particularly the Jewish ~nfluence on the Russian Revolution. ,46 These articles 
in the Witness suggest, however, that all Belloc had done in 1922 was bring 
his study up to date by making references to the Bolshevik Revolution; the 
basic contents had already been published in 1911 and the patterns of thought 
were established by that date. In this particular case, both Klein and 
Skidelsky would seem to have ~gnored this pre-war period and under-estimated 
the impact and formulation of anti-semitic ideas in these years, a general 
oversight which this thesis attempts to remedy. 
This brief analysis of the contents of the Witness has shown, by a few 
examples chosen to illustrate a far greater depth of material, the anti-Jewish 
feelings expressed in its pages. Jewish influence was seen at work in every 
facet of British life, and, indeed, in most other countries. However, this 
viewpoint did not go unchallenged. M.D. Eder, who was later to become President 
of the British Zionist Federation, wrote to the Witness, ostensibly on eugenics, 
but added a postcript. 
'The reasons I have given explain why I write to you, although 
I must add, with regret, that I must now count you as definitely 
hostile towards my race. Week after week you have nothing but 
some indignant notice about the Jews - not only about rich and 
therefore bad Jews, as I once hoped to see your case.,47 
The editor's reply to this accusation was 'Why should he think the only 
paper which has dealt with the problems of his race to be its enemy?' Again 
this was to become a standard line of defence, that the Witness was openly 
discussing the 'Jewish Quest~on' and simply showing its awareness of a problem 
that others refused to acknowledge existed. 
Others accused the journal of anti-semitism. George Lansbury in the 
Daily Herald spoke of personal attacks that made specific reference to 
nationality, especially the Jewish nationality (sic). The defence offered in 
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this case by the Witness was even le::;s convinc~ng. Fi~stly, there was a flat 
denial that the paper had ever been anti-Jewish. Then there was a list of 
those who, it was claimed, had profited from the South African war, from the 
Prudential Insurance Company (which was held to have made·millions from the 
new Insurance Act) and from the Marconi dealings. All the names appeared to 
be Jewish, and the Witness addressed Lansbury triumphantly - 'if he can 
believe that all this is one amazing coincidence, well, we do not know what 
48 to say to him I , 
On 19 December, 'Junius' mentioned the charge of anti-semitism that had 
been levelled against the journal. 
'I have not the smallest ill-will towards Jews collectively or 
individually. I admire the great qualities of the many men of 
genius whom in various departments of art and life the Jewish 
race has produced. I number many members of that race among 
my personal friends; and am always glad to number more. 
Never in my life have I written a word which implied either a 
dislike of Jews as such, or a desire to see them treated opp-
ressively. Never, moreover, so far as I know, has anything 
capable of being candidly construed as bearing such an inter-
pretation appeared in this paper.' 
Having given this blanket denial, 'Junius' went on to give his explanation 
of why the Witness was being accused of anti-semitism. 
'It so happens that during our attacks upon the gross corruption 
which is eating into the heart of our politics we are compelled 
to mention certain names which are especially associated with 
certain very bad instances of such corruption. And it so happens 
that several of these names are Jewish. Thus an impression is 
easily created that we are constantly assailing Jewish politicians 
and financiers on account of their race or religion. But really 
it is not our fault. You simply cannot discuss and expose the 
evils which are more and more infesting our politics without 
continually mentioning such names as Samuel and Isaacs, 
Rothschild and Sassoon, Abrahams and Schuster.,~9 
Here again we come up against the problem of what constitutes anti-
semitism. The journal suggested the question revolved around its contention 
that certain rich Jews were corrupt and that in discussing corruption, these 
Jews had to be mentioned. Thus, there was no element of prejudice involved. 
To the historian, however, the problem lies on a different plane. The 
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concern is to analyse the natu~e ot, and the assumptions behind, the hostility 
towards these wealthy Jews and the language used to express such feelings. 
Since the Witness considered these Jews as legitimate targets, deserving of 
any kind of criticism, the attacks could not be deemed anti-semitic. The 
historian is, however, concerned with how the attacks were constituted. 
One of the features of the journal's aroused sympathy with the mass of 
the Jewish people was the claim that the Witness made a clear distinction 
between them and the minority of wealthy, corrupt politiCians and financiers. 
'\Vhen we draw attention to the tricks and shufflings of men like Isaacs and 
Samuel - whom we have never dreamed of depicting as typical of their race -
50 
we are called Anti-Semites.' Yet, as has been shown above, the constant 
assertion about the 'tricks and shufflings' of this minority was that they 
were prompted by their Jewish characteristics. Thus, it would seem that this 
attitude fulfils the classic definition of anti-semitism as an element of 
ethnic prejudice which ascribes 'general qualities to groups, irrespective of -
and, indeed, often in defiance of - manifest differences between one member 
51 
and another.' The views of Belloc and Chesterton were that there was some-
thing about the Jew which produced the Marconi Scandal, and their consequent 
statement that Isaacs and Samuel were not typical of the Jew seems strangely 
at odds with the approach of the Witness to the various 'scandals'. It is 
this essential inconsistency which casts doubts on the quality and sincerity 
of their defence. 
The review of Ignatius Balla's book, The Romance of the Rothschilds, 
illustrates clearly the sentiments that are deserving of such a definition. 
Firstly, the title was criticised as inappropriate - 'we can see little romance 
in vultures feasting safely on carrion, with however much carrion they may gorge 
themselves.' The final paragraph of the review was a full-blooded denunciation 
of the family. 
'When the Rothschilds were made Barons of the Empire and were 
asked (God save us!) to choose a coat-of-arms they thought, 
Mr Balla tells us, l'of combining the arms of Hesse, England, 
and Austria, and addi,ng a fi,ve-fingered hand" - stretching 
over them and getting its nails into them, one presumes. 
That was in their early days : they might have added the 
armorial bearing of many other gallant nations at a later 
date. It seems a pity that thi,s picturesque design was 
subsequently abandoned. It might have served to remind the 
world that there are certain hands that offend and should be 
cut off.' 52 
This led to further accusations against the Witness. As a letter from 
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'ISRAELITE' protested; 'In what way are Rothschild and Sassoon worse than their 
Christian fellow-financiers? It seems their nationality is their greatest 
53 
crime. ' 
The Witness's defence might also have been more convincing if its hostile 
references had been limited to articles dealing with wealthy Jews in politics 
and finance. However, it saw the Jewish influence in all corners of SOCiety, 
in some cases the comments being incredibly contrived. When news of Captain 
Scott's death at the North Pole reached England, the Witness, along with every 
other journal of the time, paid tribute to his courage. But the Witness went 
further, contrasting the bravery and adventure of this man with the 'alien evils' 
54 that were 'stifling and poisoning~ Britain. 
S5 Even the sports columnist, John S. Sheridan, alias 'Delf' , could be found 
criticising the Jews, He referred to the football ground owners and team 
managers as 'semitic organisers of exhibitions drawing thousands in gate-money' • 
Clearly he was opposed to the development of the game into an entertainment 
business, thus leading to the explOitation and swindles of other capitalistic 
enterprises. The Jews were, he alleged, to the fore in taking advantage of this 
56 
new source of revenue. On another occasion, the object of his ridicule was 
the transfer system, which control players' destinies at a whim - usually the 
57 whi~ of 'the Semitic financier who (behind the scenesl runs the show.' This 
new morality was such that Herbert Samuel would have no difficulty in becoming 
a successful football manager. Samuel also came under attack over the British 
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trials for the Olympic Games. Appa,rent1y the winner of the marathon entered 
the stadium as it was being announced that he was still a mile away from the 
ground. 'Another tribute to the eff;iciency of Mr Samuel's electric service', 
59 
scoffed 'De1f.' 
There ought to be some qualification, however, about the degree of anti-
semitism expressed in the pages of the Witness. For one year, Be110c was sole 
editor, that is, from June 1911 to June 1912. His place was then taken by 
Cecil Chesterton and it seems that the expressions of hostility towards the 
Jew became more marked after this date. This is not to make any kind of direct 
comparison between Belloc and Chesterton as to their relative degrees of anti-
semitism. Such an exercise would have little value, since the sources are all 
written ones and need to be seen within their context. The reader cannot tell 
whether statements are an accurate reflection of the full extent of the writer's 
hostility. There is evidence, for example, to suggest that Be1loc was con-
strained in the exposition of his anti-Jewish feeling when writing in the 
Witness. He was convinced that he had a rational solution to the 'Jewish 
Question' and was aware that extremely hostile references to Jews would detract 
from any value that his ideas contained. Thus, in October 1913, he wrote to 
Maurice Baring, 'But just because these matters so nearly verge upon violent 
emotions, it is essential to avoid anything like the suspicion of fanaticism. 
It destroys all one's case ~nd weakens all one's efforts . .. . Be1loc's 
anti-semitism wi.l1 be discussed more fully later: in this study, but it is 
interesting to note that Oswald Mosley put forward the same kind of criterion 
against the use of anti-semitic language in the development of ideas. 'Mere 
abuse we forbid ••• LIt] is bad propaganda, and alienates public sympathy.,GO 
It is sufficient at this stage to note the definite increase in hostile 
references to the Jews from June 1912, when Be110c resigned as editor. Many of 
the references, as we shall see, appear in connection with the Marconi Scandal. 
There is no doubt that Chesterton became obsessed by the affair, and by the 
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general tee ling that Jews were actinc;r ~n a way which was opposed to the 
general good of: the British people. In this, he echoed many of Belloc's 
sentiments, as one would expect from co-authors. ~arker describes their 
61 
relationship as 'a kinship of minds'. If: one looks at the account of the 
Marconi campaign written by Chesterton's wife, the degree of their involvement 
is obvious. However, as Frances Donaldson suggests, Chesterton was perhaps 
less restrained than Belloc. 'If Belloc's feeling against the Jews was 
instinctive and under some control, Chesterton's was open and vicious, and he 
shared with Belloc the peculiarity that the Jews were never far from his 
62 
thoughts. ' 
Brocard Sewell, a sympathetic biographer, suggests that, of the' trimnvirate 
(the Chestertons and Be110c), Cecil was the most vehemently opposed to the 
Jews. One might question Sewell's criteria for assessing anti-semitism; for 
instance he cites Gilbert Chesterton and Be110c's • sympathy' with Zionism as 
63 
an indication of their compassionate attempt to solve the Jewish problem. 
It may be more historically accurate to compare this 'sympathy' with the cries 
for repatriation of immigrants ,in the 1960s and 70s. But, although Sewell goes 
to some lengths to soften the charges of anti-semitism, suggesting that Cecil 
was sincere in his denials of prejudice (sic) and pointing out his support for 
poor Jews like Stinie Morrison (the defence Chesterton himself used), the 
writer is forced to concede that Chesterton's lan9Uage WaS 'excessive even by 
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the standards of the early nineteen-hundreds.' 
Chesterton's willingness to use his hostility as a journalistic weapon 
against corruption is reflected 1n the pages of The Eye-Witness and The New 
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Witness, as the paper became known after October 1912. Certainly there were 
circumstances which allowed the expression of anti-semitism to occur more 
often, mainly the fact that • scandals' such as Marconi and Indian Silver developed. 
There was also the fact that Chesterton himself came under the influence of 
someone even more outspoken in his opposition to Jews. That man was 
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Hugh O'Donnell, a former Irish Nationalist M.P. and co-founder of the 
National Democratic League in 1899, who had lived in various European countries 
after leaving parliamentary politics in 1883.66 
O'Donnell appears to have been one of those many secondary figures of 
literature and politics whose names are sparingly recorded in the annals of 
history, but whose influence is often important. According to Chesterton, 
Frank Hugh O'Donnell 'played so brilliant a part in the Parliaments of the 
seventies and eighties'. that it was a journalistic scoop to have him write 
for the Witness. According to Be110c, O'Donnell was a liability. 
' ••• the detestation of the Jewish cosmopolitan influence, 
especially through finance, is one thing, and one may be 
right or wrong in feeling that detestation or in the degree 
to which one admits it; but mere anti-semitism and a mere 
attack on a Jew because he is a Jew is quite another matter, 
and I told him (Chesterton) repeatedly that I thought the 
things he allowed O'Donnell to publish were unwise and 
deplorable. ' 
He went on to say that the tone of the Witness now exhibited such a racial 
antipathy that it could not be ignored. 'This is just what O'Donnell's letters 
have done and many other passages unsigned in which the national term 'Jew' 
has been used simply as a term of abuse, much as Lower-Middle-class Americans 
67 
will use the term "lush".' 
O'Donnell's first communication with The Eye-Witness was as a result of 
some correspondence with The Times, whose columns had contained some discussion 
about the treatment of Jews in Russia. O'Donnell was prompted to write to 
The Times, expressing his views on the subject, which The Times 'politely 
68 declined to publish' The letter began 
'At a moment when the enormous influx of an Asiatic race into 
England, and their increasing monopoly of the capital, housing 
and feeding of the country form the main and growing cause of 
the social unrest, Messrs Alexander and Montefiore publish in 
your columns a lengthy condemnation of the means used by the 
Russian Government to prevent the Russian middle classes and a 
peasantry from being reduced to the condition which has long 
prevailed in Poland and which is becoming dominant here.,69 
The main purpose of his letter was to deny that religious intolerance was the 
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cause of this reaction; 'no more than in the exclusion of the Asiatic races 
70 from the united states, Canada and Australia.' The legislation in Russia 
was 'against a dangerous race - a race a,bsolutely ruinous to European peoples; 
and if the Jews were to call themselves Protestants or Muhammedans, and 
become such, while maintaining their racial and economic organisation and 
pursuits, it would be equally necessary to protect the European against the 
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racial enemy.' 
O'Donnell then considered the situation in England, 
' ••• with Asiatic names on every prominent position, or with sly 
aliases which conceal, for a purpose, the Asiatic invader behind 
the mast •• , The myriads of English families who used to live as 
keepers of tobacco-shops, tea-shops, etc., are simply swept out of 
existence by the innumerable branches of a vast confederacy of 
Asiatics, financed by the gains of the Stock Exchanges of Europe, 
where the current capital of Christendom is subtilised (sic) 
into the business reserve of universal Jewry.' 72 
He went on to expound the other monopolies which he felt the Jew held in 
England, and then concluded. 
'You let in five hundred thousand superlatively skilful Asiatic 
aliens during the last generation : all parasites on English trade 
and labour, all taking the bread out of English mouths. They will 
be one million soon, or are already, under numberless disguises. 
And labouring England starves and revolts and will tear down 
the constitution I ,73 
One can understand why The Times was reluctant to publish such a letter. 
O'Donnell, therefore, sent it to the Witness in an attempt to show that this 
reluctance was a refusal to recognise the truth. As he wrote to Belloc -
'Honestly I think you ought to let the matter be known to your readers, as 
74 your "Eye" claims to see things as they are.' 
Whilst Belloc reproduced O'Donnell's letter to The Times, it is clear from 
his editorial comments that he was not in agreement with O'Donnell. 
'We do not agree with out correspondent that the exclusion of the 
Jewish race is either possible or desirable. We do agree, as a 
series of articles recently published in these columns show, that 
a public recognition of that race and a reaction against the 
cowardice which forbids such recognition is essential to the wel-
fare not only of Europeans but of the Jewish colony which lives 
in, but is not of, Europe and is nOwhere more powerful than in 
this country. We ca,nnot agree that the rise in prices, or indeed 
any other social phenomenon of our' time, ha.s· any relation to an 
imagined Jewish Conspira,cy. The friction between the two races 
is just as severe when the Jew is poor as when he is rich, If-
as we believe - the presence of that race amidst our own is 
inevitable, it has a clear and inalienable title to a just status, 
and our conviction is that such a status can only be assured by 
recognition, registration, and separate laws. The alternative, 
sooner or later, is cruelty and violence,,75 
From this, it is likely that Belloc would not have employed O'Donnell as a 
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weekly columnist, O'Donnell's views on the -Jewish Question' are clear from 
the letter, and it can only be concluded that whoever agreed to his joining 
the journal wished those views to be put forward. 
O'Donnell was given space for a rej oinder to Belloc' s cornmen ts • He 
rightly stated that his original letter had contained no reference to the 
exclusion of the Jews. As he remarked, 'I only stated facts. I suggested no 
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remedy.' On the question of his holding a conspiracy theory, as Belloc seems 
to have alleged, he strongly denied this. 'I am not even aware that the Jews 
are accused of conspiracy, The Jews are not a conspiracy, They are an alien 
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race.' On Belloc's own solution to the 'Jewish Question'; recognition, 
registration and segregation, he pOinted out the formidable difficulties. 
'By the way, will you permit me to point out that your sugges-
tions of meeting the Jew by registration, segregation and 
elimination have been exactly antiCipated by the Jew in every 
country which he succeeds in dominating, In France and Italy, 
for example, every representative of the old European civilisa-
tion, whose prominence is feared by the Jew, is the object of a 
universal and Argus-eyed inquisition, marking down, boycotting, 
exclusion from public functions, injury in commerce and trade, 
denunciation by all manner of organs, and ultimate sequestra-
tion from politics, trade, art, science, letters, the drama. 
There are hundreds of thousands of representatives of European 
civilisation in several modern countries who know that they are 
registered, marked down, tabooed, reduced to helplessness and 
poverty, solely through the vast organisation controlled by the 
Jew.,78 
In conclusion, O'Donnell apologised for the lengthy correspondence. 
'I have taken some of your valuable space, But the subject deserves all the 
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space in England.' Once again, the editorial comment revealed Belloc's 
dislike of O'Donnell's Views, 'We are sorry if we have misrepresented our 
correspondent and hope th~t this letter will make his position clear. It 
is not ours.' It must be concluded that responsibility for O'Donnell's 
permanent connection with the Witrtess lies not with Be110c, but with 
Cecil Chesterton, since his writing did not appear regularly till after 
Be1loc's departure from the editorship. 
O'Donnell's writings in the Witness began on 16 January 1913 with a 
letter headed • The Rarity of Jewish Corruption in England.' In this, he 
expressed the opinion that recent articles were somewhat misguided. 
'You hint, in fact, occasionally that there are corrupt Jews, 
and that a corrupt Jew is a dangerous person to the public 
weal. Now 1 hold, and I am convinced that all England will 
come to accept this view, that it 1s not Jewish C'orruption -
if that exists ... but Jewish Perfection which is the danger, 
and the appalling increasing danger, of the Jewish action and 
development in this country of England which is so rapidly on 
its way to be a transp1~nted and magnified Ghetto-ridden, 
Ghetto-eaten West Poland. 
It is, I maintain, distinctly unfair to criticise the 
Great Alien Tribe on such grounds as unpatriorism, immorality, 
rapacity, inveracity, lack of European civilisation, in a word, 
when they exist entirely outside of European civilisation, 
when they have no origin ;1,n European civilisation, no love of 
European civilisation,nothing but aversion and contempt for 
European civilication.' 
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After attacking various Jewish 'ramps' such as the opium monopoly, he apolo-
gised for seeming to judge them by European standards, and called for a 
careful examination of the 'facts'. 
'Here we have a vast tribal OX'9anisation of Asiatic heathens, 
devoted to gain and domination according to ideas which you 
can read in the Pentateuch, alien to our beliefs, alien to 
ou~ codes, alien to our very humanity. No Jew holds thatal 
men are e~ual. He knows that all men are inexpressibly 
inferior to the Jew.' 
A second letter appeared the following week from the same source, 
recounting the story that the Rothschild family had made vast fortunes from 
the Battle Of Waterloo. It was cl~imed that they had received prior knowledge 
of Wellington's victory and used the information to purchase a great deal of 
stock in the depressed London market, which was still ignorant of the triumph. 
As a result, they made huge profits by selling when the news arrived and the 
market rose. ~s O'Donnell phrased ~t, 
t ••• the London Rothschilds traded on the depression and 
despair of the English people in the hour of England's 
blackest anxiety, and then reaped an enormous harvest of 
shekels at the expense of the unfortunate Englishm~n who 
had been deluded into selling their property for a song to 
the wiley organiser of valuable intelligence, and who, 
though seated in London, had organised (mediately} from 
Frankfurt-am-Rhein.'SO 
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Once more, however, O'Donnell emphasised that the Rothschilds ought not to be 
reprimanded for their action. 
'~s I observed last week, the business morality of Asiatic 
heathens is necessarily as irreconcilable with European 
principles as, let us say, the harem arrangements of a 
sultan of Israel or Judah with the domestic morality of a 
European family. And it wQuld be utterly unfair to expect 
them to feel one pulse of the sentiment which is second 
life to a Newman or Wilberforce, a Vicar of Wakefield or a 
Colonel Newcome.,SI 
This letter also contained references to facets of Jewish life and cultuDe 
that O'Donnell clearly disliked. He made mention of the 'enormous immigration 
of Asiatic parasites.' He also referred to the historical incident in 
London where, in 1650, certain Jews from Spain and Portugal fled to escape the 
Inquisition. They attended mass at the chapel of the Portuguese Ambassador, 
'himself a Crypto-Jew' 
'You know that mere Irish Catholics, for instance, outfaced 
every form of ruthless proscription rather than call themselves 
anything but Catholics; that French Huguenots suffered every 
extremity of proscription ~nd confisc~tion ~~ther than hide 
the creed of Calvin and Coligny. Quite otherwise with the Jew. 
~ccording to his own chronicles, in the Standard, for example, 
false pretences on the holiest matters fits him like his own 
ga;r;ment. ' 82 
O'Donnell's letters provoked some reaction. The letter from 'ISRAELITE' 
previously referred to,83 was in direct reply to the accusations reproduced 
above. But in spite of this reaction, (or perhaps because of it?), on 
6 February, the following announcement appeared in The New Witness. 'The 
Editor feels great satisfaction in having been able to induce Nr Frank Hugh 
O'Donnell, who played so brilliant a part in the Parliaments of the seventies 
and eighties, to contribute a series of articles, which must needs be of 
84 
notable historic interest.\ 
His first article gave a clearer indication of O'Donnell's political 
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stance, and suggested that he was using the Jews as a scapegoat for his own 
discontent. 
'Speaking for myself, I have often felt absolutely appalled 
at the degradation of public life of every sort which met me 
on every hand on my return after a prolonged residence in 
continental countries. It was really a hideous picture, where 
the prominent features were the domination of the Jew, the 
servility of the Englishman, the cosmopolitanism and brigading 
of the Press, the decay of citizenship, the spread of officialism, 
the suppression of opinion, the descent of Parliament, the ram-
pant insolence of wealth in its coarsest manifestations, the 
growing enslavement and skilful misdirection of labour, the 
disregard towards womanhood, the infectious habit of state 
pauperism, the general discouragement of individual initiative 
and personal dignity.' 
Clearly O'Donnell felt himself in a situation that was greatly to his distaste. 
The reasons for the crisis which he felt England was facing were left 
unexplained; indeed he seems to have had little idea of why standards had 
so declined. He was therefore content to place the blame for this moral 
degeneration onto the Jews. This was quite blatantly expressed in this 
article, since after listing the faults of the 'new' SOCiety, he continued -
'I suppose that hardly an Englishman in ten realises that 
there were practically no Jews a generation ago, though they 
are on top of us allover the place today ••• there were no 
Oriental battalions on the front and back benches of both 
parties, no gigantic Jew trusts eating up every kind of shop 
and business which were the especial patrimony of the English 
middle class. Within the very first few days of one of my 
revisits I passed through street after street where every tea-
shop, every tobacconist was Jew, Jew. I met everywhere the 
careering vehicles of a Jew announcing himself in big letters 
that he was everything special to his Majesty. In a turn round 
Wimbledon way I found the exile from Jordan was sending his 
baker carts through the suburbs ••• London was getting like a 
Polish town, with its middle class being eaten up, and the Jew 
shop and the Jew pub the only sort in the place. My excellent 
solicitor, an old City man, said: lIyou cannot sell a business 
without paying blackmail to the Jew. There is hardly a firm 
in the City but has to take a Jew partner or a Jew mortgagee 
squat in the back parlour. And look at all these morning and 
evening papers. The London Press is simply shekels and cocoa. II , 
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O'Donnell went on to desc~ibe how ce~tain t~ades, such as cabinet-making 
and tailoring were under the control of the Jew, and how they ran the businesses 
dealing in fruit and vegetables and fish. As for accommodation, 'Hundreds 
and thousands of Englishmen must pay their weekly rents to the hordes of Jews 
who have bought up or run up the loding houses of English labour. Just as in 
Lodtz and Kovno.' He then turned to the question of Jewish influence in 
parliament. 
'The walls and furniture and the attitudes of the honourable ones 
had not altered mUCh; but in everything else what a revolution, 
not sublime! The Jew Kings were come, but the Parliament of 
England was gone. I was pointed out a Jew King of opium, and a 
Jew King of railways, and a Jew King of petrol, and a Jew King of 
silver, and a Jew King of soap, and a Jew King of salt and soda 
and nickel; while lesser Princes and Powers of the Oriental 
Immigration showed their swarthy profiles in equal distribution of 
patronage among the subjugated natives. I heard that they ran 
India, exploited China, corresponded with Hechts and Erlangers and 
camondes and Schiffs and Guggenheims, etc., etc., in three or four 
continents, advised the monarchy on law and justice, held what is 
called abroad the :.1inistry of Posts, Telegraphs, and Ways of 
Communication. Why, why did not Mr Speaker wear the robe of the 
Grand Rabbinate? The tribe had recently induced those Christians 
to spend £230,000 and tens of thousands of Christian lives in order 
to secure its African mines and investments. Canaan-on-Thames was, 
indeed, a Promised Land.'SS 
In spite of the disclaimer referred to previously (p.l94), these sentences 
suggest a belief in a Jewish conspiracy; one very similar to that described 
in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, although perhaps not in the sophisticated 
language of that wo~k. 
The sort of hostility that O'Donnell held for the Jews provoked, as well 
as angry reaction, a definite sympathy, A letter from 'DEL CREDERE', who 
described himself as an Englishman living in Munich, showed his approval of the 
material appearing in the Witness, He felt that England was being overrun by 
scots, Welsh, Irish and Jews - 'especially the most objectionable class of Jews, 
those who are ashamed of being known as Jews, and try to hide their Israelite 
noses under a good Scots family name.' He then went on to give examples of 
this, and to point out that these Jews dominated English life. 'And not only 
do these Israelites figure as o~ rulers in the government, but we find most 
86 
walks o:f; l;l.,:f;e ;in:f;ested with the~.' 
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This is simply one example ot; the support given by readers of the journal 
and Chesterton seems to have made no attempt to censor any of 0' IXmnell' s 
material on this particular subject, despite Belloc's warnings. It must be 
concluded that Chesterton and his associates were in sympathy with O'Donnell's 
sentiments (or, failing that, saw that his writing sold sufficient copy to 
make it desirable to retain him.} 
The next chapter will show, in some detail, O'Donnell's attitudes to the 
Marconi Scandal. But it should be noted here that he saw the affair simply as 
part of the pernicious Jewish influence running throughout the world. He 
maintained a continuity of thought on this subject that was remarkable. On 
~ January 1914, his article referred to the Jews as 'wreckers of European 
Civilisation' • 
'Taking hold of the two factors of industrial life, Capital and 
Labour, the Judaeans reconstructed the sphere of Capital so as 
to reduce the working world to wage-slavery, and revolutionised 
the sphere of Labour in order to perpetuate the War of Classes 
for the supreme benefit of Judaean Capitalism dominant in the 
Slaver State and the servile Proletariate ••• By its instinct 
as a rodent, as well as by its experience as a parasite for 
twenty centuries, the Judaean Race - always invariably and 
necessarily - must corrode the Historical Entity of a European 
or Asiatic nation before it can penetrate, corrupt, and dominate.' 
This formulation of a conspiracy theory was even more blatantly developed 
in July 1914. 
'Everywhere, in the United States, in England, in the British 
Empire, in India, in South Africa, enormous confederations of 
Judaean promoters and directors lead and control a cosmopolitan 
strategy for acquiring and exploiting every possible source of wealth 
or prosperity throughout the world •• The Dernburgs, the Rothschilds, 
the Sassoons, the Samuels, the Isaacs, form the General Staff, 
conduct the operations, and absorb the bulk of the profits ••• 
The New Jerusalem grows and grows by what it feeds on and what it 
spares not. We call this the Judaean victory. "Le Juif Roi de 
L'Epoque". '87 
Therefore, to summarise the relationship between the Witness and anti-
semitism before moving on to look at the specific example of the Marconi 
Scandal, it is of interest to note certain trends. First, we have established 
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that the ~t~-semitic outlook o~ the journal w~s present from its inception, 
and that the scandal was only part of a much wider campaign against Jews, 
and in particular, against Jewish wealth and power. In this context, it 
might be added that attacks on Rufus Isaacs, Herbert Samuel and other Jewish 
politicians whose names became linked with financial scandals, had begun long 
before rumours of corruption in connection with the Marconi contract became 
widespread. 
In dealing with the actual language of anti-semitism, it is important to 
note the frequency of use of words such as 'foreign' and 'alien' applied to 
these Jewish financiers and politicians. This use would appear to have a 
definite psychological importance, giving some indication of the personality 
88 
of those using such language in this particular context. More specifically, 
the use of the term 'Oriental", when applied to a person of the Jewish faith, 
whilst no doubt being part of the general xenophobic hostility of the era, 
may also have a special relationship to the 'Yellow Peril' threat that so 
often appears in Edwardian writing. Donald Read described it as 'a persistent 
89 Edwardian bogey' • It may well be that in stressing the Oriental background 
of the Jewish 'race', the Witness was playing on this fe~ of the 'Yellow 
Peril'. This would have been simply another way of gaining support for their 
cause by appealing to this fear. If this hypothesis has same truth, then it 
would present some new insights into the language of anti-semitism in this 
90 particular period. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE WITNESS AND THE MARCONI SCANDAL 
The coverage of the Marconi Scandal in the Witness should be considered in 
the context of the previous chapter's remarks about the nature of the journal. 
The SCandal contained elements of alleged corruption in high places, a subject 
which the Witness was obviously willing to pursue, given its attitude to the 
political system of that time, and the additional feature of Jewish involvement. 
Again, the previous chapter has indicated quite clearly the antagonism which the 
journal held towards Jews and the stereotypes which were employed in this hostility. 
The fact that Jews were involved in the Scandal fitted into the patterns of 
thought about Jews as presented in the pages of the Witness and it would not be 
unreasonable to expect to find this angle of the affair being emphasised. 
The material used to illustrate the various points is only a fraction of the 
total coverage given by the journal. Since the factual criticisms of the con-
tract i.e. were the terms good or bad, was it given to the best system and so on, 
have been dealt with earlier, this chapter will touch only briefly on this aspect. 
Its main role will be to illustrate the way that the Witness used the Scandal to 
advance its anti-semitic viewpoint. The correspondence columns of the journal 
show that there were supporters for this anti-semitic line of approach, whilst 
its circulation guaranteed that these views would be heard, if not nation-wide, 
at least in 'a small but influential and important circle.' This would make the 
Witness an important factor in the development of hostility against the Jews in 
1 
this period. 
The Marconi coverage" began in a seemingly uneventful way, as it did in most 
other journals, in the financial columns. On 4 January 1912, the City editor 
noted that Marconi wireless shares were much in demand, and as successive weeks 
,4 
passed, he continued to follow their progress, at first without any explanation 
of the share movement. 'Marconi wireless shares are experiencing a period of 
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unparalleled strength', 'Marconi wireless shares have again been active', 
4 
'Marconi wireless have lost none of their virility' 'In the Industrial section 
Marconi wireless shares have continued their upward march, being now not far 
off the £5 quotation predicted for them in the market.'S 
The first word of explanation came on 15 February, and its manner suggested 
that the impending Government contract was fairly common knowledge.6 'In the 
Industrial market Marconi Wireless shares had a set back in profit-taking sales, 
but have since regained their perkiness. I learn that there is every prospect 
of the deal with the Postmaster-General going through.,7 The Witness published 
details of the initial agreement between the Post Office and the Marconi Company 
as soon as it had been made. The information came presumably from the Company's 
press release, since the Government made no announcement nor did it give any 
details of the terms at this stage in the proceedings. At this point, there was 
no hostility towards the Company in the pages of the journal, and no hint that 
anything untoward had occurred in the negotiations, or that the Company had 
been favourably looked on in any way. Indeed, the City editor seemed to have 
the greatest confidence in wireless as an expanding industry and one worthy of 
investment. Speculation began to develop about the extent of the Marconi Company's 
business interests. Rumours of a potential agreement between the Canadian Marconi 
Company and the Canadian government created a minor 'boom' in Canadian Marconi 
8 
shares. The trip to the United States by Commandatore Marconi and Godfrey Isaacs 
led to wild speculation about agreements with the United States Government. 9 
It was a period of rumour, counter-rumour, speculation and outright gambling, 
and it appears that this began to create some misgivings about the nature of 
Marconi business dealings. At first, it was the tremendous rise in the price of 
the Company's shares which attracted attention. As we have seen earlier, the 
climax of the share 'boom' was in April 1912, and shortly before the peak, the 
Witness was warning readers of the dangers of purely speculative buying. On 
18 April, it was noted that although the price of the English shares had touched 
£10, there w~s no indic~tion of wh~t price they would eventually settle at. 
The lack of factual information at this stage is abundantly clear. 
'With regard to Marconis, there can be little question that the 
American Company is very much desirous of getting control of 
the English concern, and the amazing advance in the price of 
the shares this year can unquestionably be largely attributed 
to buying from the other side, though, of course, the rise is 
also due to speculative and investment purchases at home.· lO 
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As is now known, almost the opposite was true. The English Company almost 
certainly owned most of the American concern, however violently the Ministers 
involved in the Scandal tried to establish the independence of the American 
Marconi Company. Again, this illustrates the kind of muddled thinking which 
prejudices consideration of the developments in the affair. 
That the share 'boom' had been artificially created by prof! teers, as 
opposed to investors, became increasingly apparent to the City editor, and his 
comments became more bitter: •••• that speculative favourite, the Marconi group, 
at one time rallied on covering purchases by bears who were fearsome of being 
caught short on shares, but latterly the shares have fluctuated a great deal, 
11 
and renewed liquidation has caused a drop to under 7.' In spite of this, 
however, he still had enough confidence in the venture to advice that 'at their 
present price, Marconis are a good purchase for those who can, independent of 
12 
all speculative considerations, pay for them and lock them up as an investment.' 
The first real indication of anything unusual came in June 1912. • Marconis 
have been quiet and now that the special settlement in the American shares has 
been fixed for 20th inst. speculation here will probably be of a restrained kind, 
13 
as serious trouble is apprehended in certain quarters.' This point was not 
elaborated, and little mention was made of Marconis for the next month or so. 
The most likely explanation of the 'trouble' would seem to be the appearance of 
the English Company's annual report later in June, which created much disappoint-
ment by announcing a dividend of two shillings in the pound, rather less than 
had been anticipated by the shareholders. 
The Marconi affair did not appear again in the pages of the Witness until 
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1 August, but it was a significant reappearance. It was in this edition that 
the name of Rufus Isaacs was linked to the Marconi Company. Rufus had already 
14 been the target of criticism in the journal , and this particular issue also 
mentioned the fact that his brother, Godfrey Isaacs, was Chairman of the English 
Marconi Company. There were some fairly innocuous comments about their relation-
ship and the fact that the Isaacs family was familiar in London and Parisian 
financial circles. This was obviously meant to convey some indication of their 
Jewishness and their cosmopolitan, i.e. international and therefore unpatriotic, 
nature. However, nothing specific was alleged against either of the brothers 
or anyone else connected with the negotiation of the agreement, which was due to 
come before parliament for ratification in a few days. 
After the decision to refer the circumstances of the contract to a Select 
Committee investigation, the Witness produced some evidence of the position it 
was to adopt consistently for the next year or so. It pledged that it would 
stand firm against the acceptance of the agreement between the Company and the 
government, and later in the edition, produced an article which set out its own 
version of the truth, coining the phrase 'The Marconi Scandal' 
'What progress is the Marconi Scandal making? We ask the question 
merely from curiosity and under no illusion as to the inevitable 
end of the affair. Everybody knows the record of Isaacs and his 
father, and his uncle, and in general of the whole family. Isaacs' 
brother is Chairman of the Marconi Company, it has therefore been 
secretly arranged between Isaacs and Samuel that the British people 
shall give the Marconi Company a very large sum of money through 
the agency of the said Samuel, and for the benefit of the said 
Isaacs. InCidentally the monopoly that is about to be granted to 
Isaacs No.2, through the ardent charity of Isaacs No. 1 and his 
colleague the Postmaster-General, is a monopoly involving anti-
quated methods, the refusal of competing tenders far cheaper and 
far more efficient, and the saddling of this country with corruptly 
purchased goods, which happen also to be inferior goods. But this 
thing will go through presumably as inevitably as Samuel's own 
career was sold to him, or rather to his family, as inevitably as 
the Telephone ramp went through, and as inevitably as the £500 a 
day for the Titanic inquiry will be paid to Isaacs No. l"'also out 
of our pockets. Exposure does not stop this kind of thing. No 
honest man in Parliament will have the courage to stop it, and for 
the great majority of men in the House of Commons, who, sit there 
with the object of becoming richer through political life, 
it would be madness to quarrel with the whips of either party 
(who have been previously acquainted with the job), unless 
the objector had some large financial interest to serve 
opposed to that of the Brothers Isaacs.' 
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Another reason why the contract would succeed, according to the writer, was the 
absence of any effective method of punishing those guilty of such offences. 
Whilst acknowledging that corruption of this kind was rife in most capitalist 
countries, and that imprisonment was often not a possible deterrent (sic), 
it was felt that public opinion played an important role in keeping down the 
number of offences. However, in Britain, public opinion had ceased to be a 
discouragement and those involved in the corruption continued to be held as 
highly respected men, at least by their peers. 
'That is the nerve of the whole matter. That is the symptom of 
the disease which is showing itself in twenty other forms upon 
the skin of modern England. That is why even the populace to 
whom all information on public affairs is carefully forbidden, 
have developed an uneasy contempt for their rulers.' 
The writer then went on to make a general point about the consequent moral decay 
which had arisen as a result of this general acceptance of 'public theft and 
knavery'. To conclude, there was a short paragraph, which was clearly actionable. 
'At the beginning of 1911 the shares of the Company stood at l4s. 
By the end of that year, doubtless after an intimation had been 
conveyed from Herbert Samuel, Cabinet Minister, through his 
colleague Isaacs to Isaacs' brother, of the intention of the 
Government, their value multiplied by nearly five, standing at 
close to 70s. Between January and March 1912, they rose to just 
under loos, which would be about their natural price, supposing 
the abominable scandal of this contract to be allowed to stand. 
After this price had been reached the news was deliberately allowed 
to leak out and the stock was forced up to a fictitious value. 
At the end of April they stood at E9. Then, of course, they sagged, 
just as was intended. 
We repeat that in other countries people who act in this fashion 
are driven from public life.,15 
This article encapsulates many of the themes of the Scandal which the Witness 
was to use in later editions. The first point of note is that it is remarkably 
unrestrained. The writer, and one presumes it to be Cecil Chesterton, since he 
claimed at a later date to have written all the material on the Marconi Scandal, 
at least from June 1912,16 made definite accusations. Statements like 'it has 
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therefore been secretly arranged', 'the whips of either party (who have been 
previously acquainted with the job)' and so on, were open to a libel action, 
as the Ministers involved had no doubt. 
The standard accounts of the Scandal show that, in fact, Herbert Samuel 
and Rufus Isaacs did contemplate suing the journal over this article.17 
Samuel came across a copy of the journal on a bookstand at King's Cross 
station, and immediately wrote to Isaacs, who was on holiday at Marienbad, 
enclosing the offending paper. 18 Isaacs telegraphed his receipt of the package, 
and wrote a letter two days later with his views on the article. Samuel's letter 
had suggested that there were certain grounds for containing the natural impulse 
to sue. The first was that the circulation of the paper was small and its 
income minimal. 'Secondly it would not be a good thing for the Jewish community 
for the first two Jews who have entered a British Cabinet to be enmeshed in an 
affair of this kind; and thirdly, one does not wish to soil one's hands with 
19 the thing.' 
Isaacs' letter in reply showed that he was upset by the article in the 
Witness; 'its malevolence and prejudice were so marked that only the most 
20 blinded partisan could be led to believe the statements. He defended his 
actions, saying that he had not bought the shares until after the contract had 
been announced and was therefore innocent of any wrongdoing. However, on reflec-
tion, he felt that there was little point in suing, but had informed Asquith 
of the matter and awaited his decision. 2l A week later, Isaacs telegraphed 
Samuel that he had heard from 'the chief' and that he agreed there was no point 
22 in bringing an action against the Witness. 
to the point. 
Asquith's letter was short and 
'I have read carefully the scurrilous rubbish, and I am clearly 
of opinion that you should take no notice of it. Samuel gives 
some excellent reasons in his letter. I suspect the Eye Witness 
has a very meagre circulation. I notice only one page of adver-
tisements and that occupied by books of Belloc's publishers. 
Prosecution would secure notoriety, which might yield subscribers. ,? 3 
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Only one standard account, that of Hyde, goes on to show that Godfrey 
Isaacs, the managing director of the Marconi Company, also became involved in 
the potential libel suit. The article, of course, also referred to his part 
in the 'conspiracy'. Godfrey Isaacs appears to have entered the scene rather 
late, the first information on his intention being a letter to Samuel, dated 
24 27 August 1912, stating that he was ready to take criminal proceedings. 
This seems to have upset the politicians' plans not to attract attention. 
Samuel obviously contacted Rufus Isaacs about this letter, since Rufus sent a 
telegram to the Postmaster-General, saying that he would be in Paris the next 
day. 'Meeting brother there. Discountenance his proceeding. 25 Will wire you.' 
Two days later, Isaacs was able to reassure his colleague - 'Definitely decided 
26 take no step. He agrees our views'. A letter from Godfrey to Samuel confirmed 
27 that decision. It is surprising that most current works, including that of 
Donaldson, who describes Godfrey as a 'natural litigant', should omit this 
further development in the Witness saga, particularly since Godfrey went on to 
sue Cecil Chesterton for libel the following year. 
One further significant 'feature of this episode, particularly relevant to 
the consideration of the anti-semitic coverage by the Witness, is involved in 
Samuel's letter to Rufus Isaacs on B August. It shows Samuel's awareness of 
both his and Rufus Isaacs' status within the Jewish community and as represen-
tatives of that community in English society in general. He was clearly 
conscious of his Jewishness and at times reluctant to advertise it. When giving 
evidence before the Select COmmittee, he read out his letter to Isaacs but 
omitted the reference to the fact that they, as Jews, ought not to become 
involved in a scandal. 
'There is one sentence which is not strictly relevant and which 
I would rather not read but I will hand it to the Committee and 
I will mark it for them to see, and I think they will understand 
the reason why I do not wish to read it. It does not cast any 
reflection on anybody in any way.,28 
It is obvious that Samuel was aware of the situation, in that his being a Jew 
214. 
exposed both himself and Rufus Isaacs to anti-semitic attack. A financial 
scandal involving Jews allowed the language of anti-semitism a great deal of 
scope, and an inviting target. 
This 8 August article in the Witness. ~arked the escalation of its anti-
semitic campaign as far as the Scandal was concerned. No evidence was produced 
to reinforce the various allegations; it can only be supposed that the family 
connection between the Isaacs brothers and the fact that both they and Herbert 
Samuel were Jewish were sufficient to convince the authors of the authenticity 
of the rumours, on which the article was based. Although there was no blatant 
expression of anti-semitism, it is apparent that the writer is applying an 
as-yet undefined theory of Jewish conspiracy. Reference to the corruption of 
the Isaacs family could equally well have applied to a Gentile family, yet the 
assumption is that Jews combine together naturally in pursuit of huge profits. 
Gentiles are not classified under this stereotype in the journal. 
Thus, in 'The Marconi Scandal', we can see the elements of the anti-semitic 
coverage emerging. The general theory of a Jewish conspiracy has been noted. 
The stereotyped references to Jews, particularly in their relationship to finance 
and alleged secret dealings are also mentioned. The corruption which it is 
claimed that the Marconi Scandal represents is described as 'the disease which 
1s showing itself in twenty other forms upon the skin of modern England.' 
29 This 1s a well-documented line of anti-semitic jargon, used in many situations. 
In addition, as part of the general theory of Jewish conspiracy and corruption, 
the article mentions other 'scandals' that Jewish politicians had been involved 
in; the later notes on the 'Indian Silver' affair will show that the same 
themes were used to describe these other alleged incidents of financial corruption. 
It would be profitable, therefore, to see how some of these themes are developed 
in the Witness's coverage of the Marconi Scandal. 
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The general allegation of most importance was that certain Jews had 
conspired together to make money at the expense of the British taxpayer. 
Referring to those who were operating this 'apa11ing scandal' as 'a particularly 
30 low and nasty gang', Chesterton sought to explain the occurrence of the 
affair in terms which went far beyond the immediate circumstances. 
'Now, to tell the full truth about disasters of this kind when 
a commonwealth has sunk to the stage in which they occur needs 
far more than the mere statement of the scandal itself. To 
understand how such a thing could have happened upon English 
soil and through the actions of men who, whatever their origin, 
occupy places in an English Executive, it would be necessary 
to tell one hundred other truths relative to this particular 
truth. One would have to go into the story of the Samuels, of 
the pawnbroker's shop in Liverpool, of the moneylending business 
in London, of the financing of the politicians from this obscure 
and hidden corner. One would also have to tell the story of the 
Isaacs family in full.,31 
Even at this early date, the reader is left with very little doubt about 
Chesterton's intentions of pursuing an anti-semitic campaign against Isaacs 
and Samuel, using a conspiracy theory. This was used in such libellous 
statements as 
'Samuel, in the presence of several competitors, privately favoured 
with his patronage the Company run by Isaacs' brother and secretly 
negotiated with it a contract so very advantageous to the chosen -
shall we say people? - that the shares went up from 14s to 100s 
They now stand at about 110s.,32 
Frequently the conspiracy was widened to include various groups of Jewish 
'sympathisers', which often meant most politicians. By November 1912, 
Chesterton seemed convinced that the contract between the Company and the 
government could not survive. Advising all holders of Marconi shares to sell 
immediately, he added 
' ••• frankly, we do not believe it possible after what has now 
come out, for all the politicians combined to put through so 
monstrous a ramp successfully. The Marconi Company, its 
contract, and all the politicians concerned in the arrangement 
of that contract, are already judged and condemned by honest 
men throughout the country.' 33 
In similar vein, after Chesterton had been found guilty of libel in the 
case brought by Godfrey Isaacs, the City editor of the Witness enlarged the net 
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of conspiracy to encompass the whole of the Liberal party. He alleged that 
they were all in the trig' which was being put through for the benefit of the 
34 Marconi company and its friends. At a later date, the Liberals, now being 
called the 'Marconi Party' were referred to as 'the 'combination of George and 
35 his hangers-on and the Jews and their hangers on.' 
The 'discovery' of other financial scandals also contributed to the 
build-up of a Jewish conspiracy. Attempting a 'state of play' summary at the 
end of November 1912, Chesterton claimed that ' ••• it is quite impossible for 
a weekly, it would be difficult for a daily, it would not be too easy for an 
hourly paper to keep pace with the scandals - few enough when compared with 
, 36 
the many that are concealed - which force themselves upon the public eye. 
He went further and attributed the latest 'scandals' to the fact that Jews were 
in positions of authority. 'Faced with such facts, what man in his senses can 
believe that the various Isaacses, Samuels and Schusters are really in complete 
37 ignorance of each other's operations.' 
The following week, he was making clear his intentions towards thiD r~.oo 
of Jewish corruption. He promised to attempt, whenever possible, to drive out 
these evil influences, although this might be an impossible task. Targets 
mentioned were Rufus Isaacs, whom Chesterton hoped to prevent becoming a judge, 
and 'the various Samuels'. The article concluded with the words 'The politicians 
are found out.' Since, throughout the diatribe, he referred only to Jewish 
politicians, and to incidents involving Jews, it is clear that the phrase 
'of Jewish birth' could be added to any reference to 'politicians'. 
As another example of the conspiracy theory, the incident of Messrs. Wertheim 
and Gompertz is important. 38 As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Gerald Montagu, 
a banker and close relation of Herbert Samuel, had allowed his name to be used 
in the purchase of some Marconi shares by the Amsterdam firm for an undisclosed 
client. When a list of shareholders was published in the Financial News, 
Montagu's name was noted with interest. The explanation given by Montagu, and 
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the production of letters to corroborate his statement, was not enough for 
the Witness. It demanded a much fuller explanation. 'If anyone supposes that 
Messrs Wertheim and Gompertz' ·bad English will· satisfy them he does not under-
stand the English people - which perhaps the Samuels can hardly be expected to 
do.,39 The Witness also wanted to know whether Wertheim and Gompertz were 
connected with the 'group of Amsterdam Jews (who) were especially prominent 
40 in boosting Marconis during the boom.' The following week, the Witness 
attributed the recent check in the falling price of Marconi shares to 
'systematic buying; and those who bought were the same Amsterdam Jews who 
created the original boom and whom we now know to be in close touch with the 
41 Samuel family through the mysterious Wertheim and Gompertz.' 
This statement is an outstanding example of how rumours and snippets of 
information could be fitted together to create a scandal. Only the previous 
week, these statements about 'Amsterdam Jews' had been couched in much more 
moderate terms. They had been 'prominent in boosting Marconis during the boom.' 
Now they were held directly responsible for creating the boom. Also, in that 
earlier edition, the relationship with the Samuels was in some doubt. 'Were 
Messrs Wertheim and Gompertz in any way connected with that group? (i.e. the 
Amsterdam Jews). And what was the relationship between that group and the 
Samuel group in London? 42 These are two questions for the Committee to press.' 
A week later, the Witness was presenting the Committee with the solution to 
these questions, although it gave no evidence which cast fresh light on the 
question. It was very useful, however, to be able to make these assertions, 
since they fitted neatly into the scheme of Jewish 'clannishness' and the secret 
dealings associated with the Witness's ideas of the cosmopolitan world of 
Jewish finance. Here was a clear case of facts being manufactured and twisted 
to fit the stereotype. 
The other important incident which enabled the Jewish conspiracy theory 
43 to be propounded at great length was the Ministers' action against Le Matin. 
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The main conclusion of the journal was that the case had been carefully 
arranged by the politicians involved, in order to allow themselves an oppor-
tunity to explain their dealings, without fear of cross-examination. It 
would also perhaps have allowed them to make partial statements of the truth, 
leaving out the more unpleasant aspects of their involvement (which, it was 
assumed, existed). The journal involved, Le Matin, was discredited in some 
detail. 
'(1) Le Matin is not a national journal but represents cos-
mopolitan financial interests of a type with which we are 
only too familiar in this country; (2) Le Matin is the one 
'French' paper which has had connections with the Harmsworth 
Trust; (3) The allegations made in Le Matin bear no resem-
blance to what has been said in this paper, or, for that 
matter, to what has been freely said in the genuine and 
characteristic French Press, which has4xigourous1y discussed 
the truth about the Marconi business.' 
The writer might almost have added, 'Reader, draw your own conclusions.' 
The allegations, implied or otherwise, continued and involved not only 
Cecil Chesterton. O'Donnell's contribution on the Jewish editor of Le Matin, 
Stephen Lausanne, contained even franker language. This editor was called 
'the Jew of Jews'; his paper 'the Jew financial organ of Jew financial 
organs.' The insinuation was clear, that there was some pre-arranged plan 
by the ministers to use the pages of Le Matin to clear the air, when it seemed 
impossible to hide their secret any more. 'Decidedly, the penitent David 
could not have offered a more convenient "leg-up" to Jonathan.' As evidence 
for his claim, O'Donnell quoted the Standard of 19 March 1913. 'The action 
is undefended, and in political circles is construed as having been brought 
for the sole purpose of vindicating the character of Sir Rufus Isaacs immediately 
prior to his elevation to the position of Lord Chief Justice.' O'Donnell 
remarked that there was 'no more philo-Judaean organ in the London Press upon 
every question connected with the enterprising cosmopolitans', and therefore 
45 the remarks must be true, if even the Standard could exercise such cynicism. 
O'Donnell's view of the Jewish conspiracy was even more vivid than that of 
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Cecil Chesterton and, 1f anything, took a world-wide approach. When the 
original contract had lapsed, and news of fresh negotiations was made known, 
O'Donnell warned that another Judaean 'boom' was likely if such a contract 
were signed. 'Does not the British taxpayer emphatically prefer to pay for 
his own British Government wireless system, instead of paying Scharkstein 
and Schtinkstein to work our electrical agency in connection with the Judaean 
46 Financial-Intelligence Departments round the globe?' His estimate of 
the profits made from the share booms in English and American Marconis and 
the 'swindle' of Indian silver, which he put together as parts of a vast 
organised strike against the British people, was in the region of seventeen or 
eighteen million pounds. 'Such are the enormous sums which have enriched 
the Gold Thugs of Judaea in our midst ••• was there ever such a gambling-hell 
47 
as these omnivorous aliens are making of the British Empire?' 
An essential element of this conspiracy theory was the belief that Jews 
acted in certain ways, particularly in relation to financial matters. This 
stereotyping helped to convince the writers that their overall view of the 
matter corresponded to reality. We have already seen this above - the image 
of the Jew as a swindler, a moneylender, the Shylock image. One of the most 
vivid examples of the Jewish moneylender must be in a poem entitled 'Le 
Bon Juif Sans Merci.' 
'0 what can ail thee, Minister, 
Alone and palely lOitering? 
The House has risen long ago 
And no bells ring. 
o what can ail thee, Minister, 
So haggard and so woe-begon? 
The Speaker long has left the chair 
The Session's done. 
I see on thy dishonoured brow 
Anguish and fear like fever dew, 
And in thy hands a faded cheque, 
Dishonoured too. 
I met a gentleman last night, 
His eyes were closed when he smiled, 
His nose was big, his face was dark, 
His voice was mild. 
He found me what I needed most, 
Not honey wild or manna-dew 
But a most handsome cheque against 
My I.O.U. 
He took me home with him to dine 
And, as I feasted well content 
And indolent - he made me sign 
A document. 
And then he lulled me to sleep 
And then I dreamed - ah woe betide 
The latest dream that e'er I dreamed 
By the Thames side. 
I saw pale debtors, share-holders 
Watch-pledgers - death pale were they all 
They said: "-- --* 
Hath thee in thrall!" 
And that is why I soujourn here, 
Alone and palely lOitering, 
Though the House rose at four o'clock 
And no bells ring. 
K. 
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* 
48 Names omitted at the request of the printers' 
"' 
Here, we have the traditional Shylo~ian Jew, with particular attention being 
paid to the physical features of what is believed to be a typical Jewish 
appearance - Armenian nose, dark complexion, narrow eyes, quiet voice. 
This stereotype appeared frequently in the pages of the journal. For example, 
O'Donnell took great delight in repeating the description, from the journal 
Truth, of the 'Caledonian Super-Jew', alias James Falconer, one of the two 
Liberal M.Ps on the Select Committee who were given prior information about 
49 Rufus Isaacs' share dealing. Although there is no reason whatsoever to 
suggest that Falconer was Jewish, O'Donnell found him guilty by association. 
'Mr Falconer is a Scotsman. He is even a writer to the Signet. But this 
does not alter the fact that he has Abraham's beard, Isaacs' nose, Jacob's 
subtlety, Job's patience, Solomon's smile, and the delusive meekness of 
50 M:>ses. ' 
O'Donnell was particularly fond of applying a stereotyped view of Jewish 
involvement in secret dealings, especially associated with finance. In an 
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attack on Rufus Isaacs, he attributed the Marconi affair purely and simply to 
the fact that Isaacs was a Jew. 
'Beyond all possibility of a doubt, Rufus Isaacs - of a 
notorious Jew financial family, insolvent member of the 
Stock Exchange, skilful commercial lawyer, knowing every 
turn of company law practice - was the planning brain and 
the crafty will in the whole transaction ••• The mean 
treachery of the Isaacs person is, of course, manifest. 
But that is of less moment. Isaacs had it in his blood 
and tribe ••• Israel like the leopard, changes his habits 
but not his spots.,51 
This is a consistently exhibited view of the Jewish race, which goes well beyond 
the dislike of certain behavioural traits attributed to Jews in general. It 
is not merely a general ascription of qualities but a formal assertion of 
inherent and derogatory characteristics, displaying a deep-seated racial anti-
pathy. As such, it represents a rather rare form of anti-semitism, one hardly 
ever displayed in Edwardian England. It would be more familiar in the context 
of certain German writings of the 1930s. In this respect, O'Donnell is an 
important figure in the history of British anti-semitism and the fact that he 
was so closely linked with the witness reinforces the journal's significance. 
Another prominent feature of its anti-semitic attack was the constant 
emphasis on the alien nature of the Jew. This is apparent in what has been 
seen as the launching point of the Witness's campaign, the 8 August article on 
'The Marconi Scandal'. Even at that early stage, the Isaacs brothers and 
Samuel were seen as 'outsiders'. Cecil Chesterton made the point that these 
three combined 'that the British people shall give the Marconi Company a very 
large sum of money'. The emphasis is on 'British people', the implication 
being that Jews do not belong to this category, whatever their place of birth 
and citizenship. This thesis is the backbone of the thinking exhibited by 
Belloc and Chesterton on the Jewish-Gentile conflict. 
Chesterton's influence in this matter is important. The alien nature of the 
Jew was no more vividly described than in a piece by 'Junius' in the series 
'For the Defence' - articles in the form of a lawyer's decence plea on 
behalf of his client. 
'My Lord, - It is my duty to-day to place before you the 
case for the Right Honourable Samuel M.P., His Majesty's 
Postmaster General, who is accused of various offences, 
against the policy and morals of the nation in whose 
territory he has taken up residence.' 
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This theme continued throughout the 'lawyer's' defence. For example - 'like 
that other eminent recipient of public money (a reference to Rufus Isaacs) 
he is not of our blood or tradition and Owes no real allegiance to the 
52 foreign state which has very unwisely hired him to serve it.' 
This lack of patriotism was also applied to the other Jewish 'conspirators'. 
Godfrey Isaacs was an easy target, since, during the negotiations with the 
Post Office, who seemed rather reluctant to conclude a bargain, he had made 
vague threats about the possibility of selling the Marconi system to Germany if 
the British government was not interested. When this was revealed by Sir 
Alexander King, the chief negotiator for the Post Office, in his evidence to 
the Select Committee, the Witness was quick to criticise, because it emphasised 
53 the point that even native born Jews felt no obligation to England. Again, 
a patronising air was adopted; 
simply part of their make-up. 
the Jews cannot help being unpatriotic, it was 
54 
'Mr Isaacs is not of our blood.' 
Godfrey Isaacs' empathy with Germany was also noted much later on in the 
campaign, when he and Commendatore Marconi went to Berlin for negotiations of 
an undisclosed nature. The old fears of the system being sold to the Germans 
and the possibility of intercepted messages were revived, and Isaacs' previous 
55 threats were recalled. This was used to establish that the man had neither 
scruples nor patriotiC feeling, and the implication was that the reason for this 
was his Jewishness. When war broke out in 1914, there was an increased aware-
ness of 'German Jews' and enemy aliens in general, and the Witness played a 
leading part in a campaign against such individuals, although it should be 
stressed that the emphasis of this hostility, in most cases, was on 'German' 
56 
rather than 'Jew'. Godfrey Isaacs was caught up in the allegations, mainly 
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because official German news waS being d;ispensed in England through the medium 
of the Marconi, system. The Wi.tness published the following warning to Isaacs. 
'Seeing that "patriotism" was the plea on the strength of which 
the Marconi Company was allowed to obtain a monopoly of wire-
less telegraphy throughout our dominions, as well as to help 
itself liberally to public money, this close connection with the 
enemy hardly seems reassuring. Would it not be wise for Mr 
Godfrey Isaacs in his capacity of British patriot ••• to make 
himself and his company a little less prominent in this matter?,57 
His brother, Rufus Isaacs, was also attacked as an alien, again on the 
grounds that Jews could never be true citizens. In Isaacs' case, or rather in 
O'Donnell's case, for it was O'Donnell who produced the following examples, the 
implication was that the Jew could never become a citizen of any state. Early 
in 1913, rumours began to spread about the possibility of Isaacs being made 
Lord Chief Justice, the usual procedure for the Attorney-General. O'Donnell was 
. 58 
very much against this promotion, as was the Witness. His view was that Isaacs 
had a 'special disqualification' which ought to prevent his appointment to this 
office. Jews, he maintained, had 
' ••• a racial tendency to extremes and exaggerations as well as 
to an imperfect sense of public duty. The proverb 'Either 
Terrorist or Parasite' has long been accepted as a summary of 
this Judaean attribute. Sedition has no such furious emissaries. 
Despotism has no more subtle sattelites.,59 
His conclusion was blunt. 'We may make allowances for an Asiatic mentality; 
but can we call it a qualification for Lord Chief Justice of the Realm.,60 
Whilst many other journals opposed Isaacs' promotion on the grounds of his 
involvement in the Scandal, only the Witness used this additional racial objection. 
This last quotation introduces another of the elements of anti-semitism of 
the Witness, and one that is closely related to the 'alien Jew' claim. 
Frequently, the most significant way of labelling the Jew as 'foreign' was to 
use the words 'Asiatic' or 'Oriental'. The deeper significance of these terms 
has already been suggested; that the use of 'Asiatic' association has connections 
with the 'Yellow Peril' scare of Edwardian England. The attempt to put forward 
these views is best illustrated by one of O'Donnell's attacks on Sir Rufus Isaacs; 
this one after Isaa.cs had g1. ven evidence to the Select Conuni ttee • 
"I observed Sir Rufus Isaacs in his ordeal with interest. Though 
set against the sinister influence of his co-racialists in the 
degeneration of European civilisation in our day, I knew, in the 
first place, that the worst that had been said against the Marconi 
gamble was lighter than thistledown compared to what had been 
deserved by a hundred other enterprises of the new Jewry, which 
began with the poisoning of the French Revolution, and which 
did not end with the Young Turk Lodges at Salonika or the deeds 
of the Jew Prefect of the Accroupis at Vend~me. Secondly, let 
me say frankly, I quite accept Sir Rufus Isaacs as a true wit-
ness in declaring that nothing he has done in the ~~rconi gamble 
violated in the slightest degree his standards of right and wrong. 
Besides, I knew the terrible strain upon the subtle, ambitious, 
exotic man of this bolt which had fallen upon him out of space, 
when he had no idea of the slightest danger, and when every son 
and daughter of the old Asiatic race was proudly, passionately, 
anticipating in feverish visions the glorious realisation of 
that dream, that rapture of Israel, the triumphant ascent to the 
wonderful, the unprecedented, dignity, never before approached 
by a child of Abraham, the Lord Chief Justiceship of Englandl 
As I looked in the keen, saturnine, dark-skinned face, and 
followed the furtive glances of the dark-gleaming eyes which 
could be soft as a woman's and harder than a hawk's, as I 
marked the strong, restless hands, the resolute calm which could 
not hide the fierce emotion, I mused upon deep proverbs and strange 
interpositions of the unknown. It is a fine race, is the Judaean. 
And oh! the pity and the pitilessness of it all. 
Certainly Sir Rufus Isaacs was not like a European witness. 
Whether he crouched over the table, as if half to spring, or 
raised himself erect in mute defiance, or swept out an arm to 
clear off every aspersion, or slapped the board with quivering 
hand, or now spoke in deep tones of appeal, and again in high 
notes of compressed anger, here was no stolid Anglo-Saxon, but a 
nature more akin to dark Sheiks with tumultuous impulses hidden 
under the white or striped burnous or to tireless traders in 
strange goods, watching for custom with avid eyes out of stalls 
in close bazaars.,6i 
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There is no doubt about the attempt to show Isaacs as an alien, because 
he was a Jew; a member of the 'old Asiatic race' and 'akin to dark Sheiks'. 
By evoking a strange and somehow sinister image, the writer was able to convey 
his views on the subject with much more effect. When QlDonnell remarked on 
the 'rigging' of the Select Committee, he used the same technique. 'Phew! 
the thing is too odorous for anywhere but the dirtiest ghetto in Damascus or 
62 
a British Ministry under the Party System.' Alepp ••• or 
The most common victim of this 'Oriental' label was Herbert Samuel. 
Again, its use was part of the general attempt to show that Samuel was an alien, 
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unable to accept or understand the British way of life. When it became 
apparent that negotiations between the Post Office and the Marconi Company 
for a new contract had been taking place in the early summer of 1913 whilst 
the Select Committee was still investigating the circumstances surrounding the 
first agreement, the Witness was outraged. Mr Samuel should be informed that 
'Europeans will not stand for this sort of thing.,63 In succeeding editions 
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of the journal, Samuel was described as an 'insolent Oriental' ,the 
65 66 
'Oriental Postmaster', 'that undistinguished Asiatic' and 'the Oriental, 
67 
whose creed was fashioned in the days when slavery was accepted on men.' 
During discussions about the possibility of postmen working longer hours. 
the Witness was prompted to comment about the inability of Samuel's Oriental 
• 
mind to gauge the Western character, i.e. to see that postmen did not want 
68 to work longer hours. All these references seem to suggest a systematic 
attempt to convey the idea of the alien Jew. 
This approach prompted others of similar inclination to voice their ideas. 
Felix Elderly wrote to the journal, criticising the attitude of J.L. Garvin, 
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editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, towards the Ministers. Elderly's criticism 
was not, however, out of any sympathy for the Isaacs family. 'God made all 
70 
creatures after their kind, and the Isaacs kind is not of our race or creed.' 
71 Similarly, the theme of the 'Asiatic' Jew was taken up by E.S.P. Haynes. 
He had a letter published in the Witness, describing Samuel as having 'all 
72 
the haughtiness of an Oriental potentate.' 
O'Donnell was even able to extend this line of criticism to include non-
Jews, who seemed to be 'acting like Jews'. At one pOint, he considered that, 
out of the trio of Lloyd George, Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel, Lloyd George 
was the most despicable. [It should be noted that this position of honour did 
fluctuate between the three during the campaign)'. The reason for this was 
that Lloyd George was 'a European who stooped to do that dirty trick against 
his countrymen, and co-civilised, in order to promote the robbing boom of a 
73 
pack of Asiatic bandits.' 
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Following from this description of Jews as aliens, lacking in the essential 
qualities of patriotism and sense of duty, the Witness subsequently attacked 
the political influence of Jews who held positions of power. Often it was 
believed that these particular Jews were able to hold office because the two 
major political parties were dependent on Jewish finance, and therefore had to 
reward certain of their number. Thus, the power-structure was such that it 
allowed men like Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel to become influential ministers, 
and abuse their authority with no real fear of recrimination. Their actions 
could not be censured for fear of losing the financial support of the Jewish 
millionaires who provided the political parties with their only means of 
survival.74 This state of affairs was self-destructive, warned the Witness. 
'The truth which is perfectly clear in facts such as these 
is that an appalling scandal, the like of which can hardly 
be paralleled of recent years in the history of any rival 
nation, has been inflicted upon our public life by a parti-
cularly low and nasty gang: and the further truth is that 
if we do not get rid of these men and if we have not the 
political vitality to chastise them and to expel them and 
to prevent a recurrence of their tricks, nothing in our 
public life is safe. ,75 
The corruption of the party system of government, which produced this 
effect, was brought to the public's attention in subsequent issues. One of the 
factors which they identified as a cause of this corruption was the sale of 
peerages, a trade that was to become even more infamous after the First World 
76 War. It was alleged that Lord Swaythling, the uncle of Herbert Samuel, had 
purchased his peerage and had subsequently used his influence to have his 
nephew and his son, Edwin Montagu, placed on the Liberal Front Bench. 77 Again, 
this action had a sinister purpose. It was not simply for these men to receive 
the large salaries which went with their position, but in order that they might 
use their offices to gain bigger and better rewards. With regard to Herbert 
Samuel, 'Junius' decided that 'Lord Swaythling's intention must have been that 
his nephew should use his position in order to obtain certain indirect benefits, 
that he should work in with this or that financial interest and share profits 
78 
with this or that raider of the public Treasury.' 
The themes of The Party System were expounded at great length. Whilst 
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many of the references were general in their accusations, it does appear that 
often the element of corruption is identified as Jewish. In the following 
example, which illustrates the theoretical base of the allegations against the 
political structure, the Jewish influence is singled out as being the most 
contemptible. The writer begins by pointing out that party intrigue is now 
the rule rather than the exception. 
'We know that they sell peerages, that they s~ll places on 
the Front Bench, that they sell policies. We know that a 
rich financier, though an alien and an unsavoury one at that, 
can get hold of a politician just as he gets hold of a 14ce-
horse, and back him for the sake of what he hopes to get later 
on. We know that a group of rich men can, by judicious expen-
diture of money, get any Government to propose a particular 
measure which favours their personal interests and prevent any 
opposition from effectively resisting it ••• And seeing all 
this, we cannot but feel it to be a little ridiculous when 
professional politicians exclaim at the hard-heartedness of 
those who are capable of suspecting their immaculate honour.,79 
Whilst this quotation was couched in moderate language, the same point 
could be made in a much less restrained way by the journal. 
'It is bad enough that alien moneylenders should be allowed to 
buy not only historic titles once held in honour by Europeans, 
but permanent and harsh legislative power in a great European 
nation; but it is intolerable that we should have their progeny 
swarming allover our administrative departments and behaving 
in the way that the Samuels behave.,aO 
O'Donnell was clearly in sympathy with the identification of the Jew as 
the contaminating force in British political life. He totally rejected the 
proposal that the salaries of public officials ought to be raised in order to 
~ 
avoid the temptation of becoming involved in an offer such as Marconi. 'Sir 
lkey Moses and Mr Pecksniff Chadband may infect English public life. They do 
not constitute it. A sanitary operation is required; but the English part of 
81 English public life is still fairly sound.' O'Donnell's summary of the 
political corruption of the period, as exemplified by the Marconi Scandal, was 
that it consisted of an alliance between the cosmopolitan Jewish money-power 
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and the 'Party System'. 'We need not trouble about the matter being Marconis. 
The same thing would be done tomorrow to hide any other Judaeo-Liberal 
swindle.' 82 
This last remark came from an article entitled 'The Need for Clean 
Government', which served as an introduction to the political movement 
launched as a result of the Marconi Scandal by the Witness and its supporters. 
The National League for Clean Government brought anti-semitism into playas 
a political force, and it was an important bridging movement in the history 
of such political groups in Britain. There are studies of the fascist move-
ments of the 1920s and 305 and of the British Brothers' League in the early 
19OOs. The absence of any work on the period between these two suggests that 
there was no activity and this is a false impression. Only when the gaps have 
been filled can the developments of the later period be fully explained and 
the League is a vital component in the history of anti-semitism in these 
years. 
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CRAPrER 7 
THE NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR CLEAN GOVERNMENT 
One notable result of the Marconi Scandal was the creation of the 
National League for Clean Government. The incentive for the establishment 
of this pressure group, or more correctly, shared attitudes group,1 came from 
the publicity aroused by The New Witness over the Marconi affair. Apart 
from the League's superficial aim of opposing 'parliamentary corruption', it 
also had strong views on the sources of this evil - the Jewish influence in 
England. Indeed, the corruption most frequently referred to involved Jewish 
politicians since the campaign was based chiefly on the Marconi Scandal and 
its siblings, Indian Silver and the purchase of honours by wealthy Jewish 
plutocrats. The birth of the League is very much tied up with the cam-
paigning of the Witness, which has alrea~ been seen to be the focus of much 
anti-Jewish opinion. The people concerned with the propaganda of the League 
were those involved in writing for the Witness, the obvious example being the 
triumvirate of Belloc and the two Chesterton brothers. It would be no exag-
geration to say that the League was the political off-shoot of the journal. 2 
This is not to s~ that the League was violently and overtly anti-
semitic. As described earlier, Belloc and Gilbert Chesterton were aware of 
the levels of social acceptability in the degree of anti-semitic expression, 
and were careful not to fall into the more violent abuse that could be used 
against the Jews. 3 Thus, in the League's propaganda, there are few examples 
of openly-expressed hostility. It is the association of the League with the 
Witness, whose attitude was anti-semitic, which suggests the conclusion. In 
addition, the people connected with the League were open to charges of anti-
semitic beliefs. Hugh O'Donnell was one of the League's main speakers and 
an official of the Organising Committee. Cecil Chesterton was another of 
the principal speakers. Other important adherents were Rowland Hunt, a 
Conservative M.P., and Vivian Carter, editor of the Bystander. 
on politics were given at a League meeting on 8 December 1913. 
Hunt's vi ews 
'Politics have become a profession for obtaining appointments, 
Honours and well-paid jobs, and I am sure you all agree with 
me, we want it altered. The old-fashioned member who has 
done his duty to his country for many years has nothing like 
the Honours or the influence wielded by the new plutocrat who 
has just bought an estate. We are really in danger of being 
ruled by alien votes and foreign gold. The aliens and 
foreign plutocrats are driving out British blood. (Applause).4 
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This particular 'patriotic' theme is one which featured very strongly in 
the anti-Jewish attitudes of the Witness and its circle. It illustrates an 
ethnocentric hostility to Jews which can be traced back to the nineteenth 
century and the views of critics like Goldwin Smith. 5 Hunt had been active 
during the Scandal, asking embarrassing questions of the Prime Minister and 
following on from that, he spent his parliamentary time decrying the 
operation of the Aliens Act. He maintained that the administration of the 
Act made it easier for aliens to enter the country and that it was a known 
fact they worked for less wages and under worse conditions than the native 
population, hence cheapening the value of labour and taking jobs previously 
held by Britons. 6 
Vivian Carter had given his opinions on the Jewish QQestion in a series 
of articles in the Witness, 'What shall we do with our Jews?,7 His ideas 
were very much in line with the Witness's attitude - that Jews should be 
Jews and conspicuous as such. He was anxious for Jews to have ~ewish 
names, so that people might be able to tell they were dealing with a 
different 'nationality', as he called it. Carter was also in favour of 
clearly defining Jewish areas in London and other big towns. The theme of 
his article was for distinct and separate identity to be imposed; the 
ghetto and the yellow star policy of earlier and later dates.8 
Thus, many of those associated with the organisation of the Clean 
Government League were part of the anti-semitic circle of literary, 
journalistic and political figures. Leo Maxse, editor of the National 
Review, spoke in glowing terms of the need for such a movement as the 
League.9 Indeed, it might be said that some of the momentum for 'Clean 
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Government' came from Maxse. As early as March 1913, the National Review 
had begun a series called 'The Fight for Clean Government', featuring the 
Marconi Scandal. Maxse's view of politics was similar to that of the Witness, 
and he was undoubtedly anti-semitic. 10 Is it, therefore, justifiable to call 
the League anti-semitic, given that many of its founders and adherents were 
themselves hostile to Jews? 
Admittedly, part of the campaign was, on the surface, purely political. 
It could be described as a destructive philosophy, in that it consisted 
chiefly of opposition to the Liberal government. Of course, this disenchant-
ment had occurred for many of the members of the League long before its found-
ation. G.K. Chesterton's opposition to Liberal corruption was apparent as 
early as 1907. He defended H.C. Lea, a Radical backbencher, who had written 
to The Times denouncing 'jobbery and title-mongering' in the government. 
This led A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, to refuse to publish 
Chesterton's column on the subject, because it sympathised with Lea's attack 
on Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal Prime Minister. 11 Chesterton's 1907 cam-
paign on behalf of Lea presaged his subsequent rampages against ministers who 
trafficked in Marconi shares, who sold peerages, and who otherwise perpetuated 
12 • the dreaded 'party system'. Belloc himself was the Liberal M.P. for South 
Salford from 1906 until the December 1910 election, when he did not stand. 
The reason for this was largely due to disillusionment with the Liberal party, 
again over the question of the party system and all it implied. Indeed, 
Belloc had never really been a Liberal 'party' man, and had fought the January 
1910 election without official support, and felt that he could no longer stand 
as a Liberal candidate, as did his constituency party.13 Thus, it could be 
argued that the fight for 'Clean Government' was based on this political stance 
of disenchantment with the Liberal government. 
There is, however, another dimension to this question. Corruption, as 
seen in the party system, was synonymous with Jewish influence. The sale of 
peerages was annoying, because it seemed to be alien financiers who were being 
made peers. It was in return for their financial support that they received 
the honours, and therefore, to some extent, the Liberal Party was dependent 
on 'Jewish money'. Obviously, this was a sphere of politics which was open 
to criticism, but the League seems to have concentrated solely on the Jewish 
element. David Low, the cartoonist, attended one of their early meetings. 
·'The occasion had been a public meeting at Chelsea Town Hall to 
expose the sale of honours and the corruption of the House of 
Lords. There was a full house, naturally, since there was in 
these subjects much matter for exposure. It did not see the 
light on that occasion. Nobo~ came down to cases and all the 1 
audience got was vague anti-semitism, which I found ver,y irritating'. 4 
With this background, it is not hard to realise why the Marconi Scandal was 
so important to the League. It represented the ultimate achievement of this 
Jewish influence; politicians and businessmen combining to make profits for 
themselves at the expense of the British public. The fact that the Scandal 
was the impetus for the League does suggest that a strong element of anti-
semitism was inherent in its programme. 
The League arose as a direct result of the campaigning on certain 
issues by the New Witness. Initially, the plan was to hold a series of ~ 
Witness conferences, hoping that they would become a weekly event. 15 .The 
first meeting was planned for 27 June 1913; the speaker was to be Hugh 
O'Donnel116 and his subject 'The Meaning of the Marconi Scandal'. Gilbert 
Chesterton was to chair the meeting. For supporters of the movement, this 
meeting was a triumph. The hall had been too small to hold all those who 
wished to hear O'Donnell, and the Witness promised that a bigger hall would be 
booked for the next conference, when G.K. Chesterton was to speak on 'Why he is 
not an official Liberal,.17 O'Donnell's speech was reported in the Witness, 
and it proved to be a regurgitation of points he had made in his previous 
journal articles. It is significant that the first point was to defend him-
self and the Witness against charges of anti-semitism. O'Donnell maintained 
that what the Witness condemned was corruption, not race or religion. 'When 
you catch an English pickpocket, he does not quote his Church membership. 
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When you catch a Jewish pickpocket, what right has he to scream out: '~ou are 
attacking my holy religion". ,18 Here is yet another example of O'Donnell's 
racial belief that there was a clear distinction between an Englishman and a 
Jew; a distinction which could not be overcome. 
At this first meeting, a resolution was passed to set up an organisation 
to boost the Witness campaigns. The journal was delighted. 
'We need hardly say that the resolution passed last week with much 
enthusiasm in favour of a non-party association to fight for clean 
government has our warmest approval, and we hope that the efforts 
which are being made to carr,y it into practice will meet with the 
success they certainly deserve,.19 
There was a meeting of those interested in forming this association before the 
next conference. This clearly resulted in some policy decisions, for, in two 
weeks' time, the following announcement appeared. 'A meeting of members, and 
those interested in the League for Clean Government, formed in accordance with 
the resolution carried at THE NEW WITNESS Conference on June 21th, will be 
held on Friday, July 25th, at 7.30 in the small Essex Hall,.20 Invitations 
for forms of application were invited, and soon an advertisement appeared 
weekly in the Witness. 21 It read:-
'The National League for Clean Government. 
This organisation has now been constituted, and will shortly issue 
its statement of Principles and Objects. All those joining or 
helping the League are invited to send their names to the Hon. 
Sec., c/o The New Witness, 20 & 21 Essex Street, Strand, W.C. • 
After the usual lapse of interest in business and politics during the 
summer months, when London lost its business population to the holid~ resorts, 
involvement in the League began aga~n in October. The Witness published an 
appeal by the Secretar,y for readers to join the organisation and to encourage 
others to subscribe. The Secretar,y, H. Vernon Casey, appealed for a national 
society. 
'We want to form branches of the League in ever,y constituency and 
especially in the constituencies now represented by men prominently 
associated with notorious instances of corruption; the work of 
these branches will be to distribute literature in the form of 
letters and pamphlets which are now in course of preparation to 
hold meetings, and to support candidates, whom it is hoped that the 
League would place in the field'.22 
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He listed those who had expressed their sympathy with the League, amongst whom 
were several bishops, Sir James Barr,23 Oliver Locker-Lampson24 and F.W. 
25 Jowett M.P. The objects of the League were also made clear. 
, 1 • 
2. 
3. 
The exposure, punishment, and prevention of corruption and 
jobbery in legislation and the public services. 
The establishment of a Free Parliament emancipated from the 
domination of the Caucus and the Party Funds. 
The restoration to the House of Commons of its control over 
the executive and National Finance'. 26 
These points were later elaborated in a letter to the Witness on 30 October 
'1. To reform the Party system of Government. 
2. To secure and maintain the freedom of Parliament. 
3. To provide the electors with an opportunity to select their 
Parliamentary candidates without the control of a Caucus. 
4. To demand purity of Government and to expose and punish 
political corruption. 
5. To prevent the sale of honours. 
6. To secure adequate Parliamentary control over the 
National expenditure'. 
This letter also gave an idea of the increasing support for the League. The 
signatories included, in addition to Barr, Jowett and O'Donnell, Thomas Burt 
M.P.,28 Lord Auckland,29 G.K. Chesterton, Rowland Hunt and Arnold White. 30 
The Witness itself, whilst anxious to support the League, also made it 
clear that it was an independent association. 
'In a word, the League will be in no way bound to the special 
and pretty well defined principles upon which this paper has 
been from the first consistently conducted, but only to the 
single principle that there is urgent need of cleansing our 
politics from that corruption which is soaking them more and 
more, and which, if not speedily expelled, must weaken and at 
last destroy our country'.31 
In that same article, the writer attempted to analyse the nature of the 
corruption which existed in government. The chief cause was, as he saw it, 
(and one suspects that Cecil Chesterton, as editor, was the author), the con-
trol of politics by 'The Money Power'. The Indian Empire had already been 
brought to near-destruction 'by the action of alien money-lenders'. Attention 
was brought to bear on the Insurance Act, which had been 'purchased by cer-
tain specified plutocratic interests',32 and on the Marconi Scandal and the 
pending promotion of Rufus Isaacs to Lord Chief Justice. Reference was also 
made to the Indian Silver affair. In fact, every issue dealt with referred 
in some w~ to Jews in office, and associated corruption. 
Hugh O'Donnell, just announced as Chairman of the Committee for the 
League, had a four page article on Unclean Government in the same edition, 
and there was no doubt about his conception of the problem. 
'Granted that a Free and Representative Parliament could work 
great good for the popular welfare, you have still to get it 
first. The problem of Clean Government underlies all other 
problems. Today is the reign of the Judaean, simply because 
the Jew finds eveywhere material for his activity and willing 
flunkies for his tips and his ground floor prices. No larva 
can thrive and multiply except in the soil or the sediment 
which is its suitable environment'.33 
O'Donnell condemned Rufus Isaacs for his part in the Marconi Scandal, 'but 
that is of less moment. Isaacs has it in his blood and tribe'. Similarly, 
when he criticised Herbert Samuel, he explained why the Postmaster-General was 
corrupt - 'the Judaean must act according to his Tribe. He cannot act 
otherwise' • There were many other examples of the Jewish influence in lead-
ing to 'Unclean Government' and since O'Donnell held a responsible position 
in the League, it must be presumed that many of its supporters were in accord 
with his sentiments. It might be said that, at the least, they were anti-
semitic in a passive sense, by having an official with the beliefs that 
O'Donnell held. This very point was made by A.H.M. Robertson in a letter to 
Justice, the journal of the British Socialist Party. He noted that O'Donnell 
was a speaker at League meetings, but despises his attitude. The articles in 
the Witness were called 'the most atrocious, scurrilous and malevolent out-
pourings of anti-semitism that have ever been offered to English readers', and 
he noted with disgust that O'Donnell accepted the accusation of ritual murder 
which had recently received publicity in the Beiliss case. 34 Robertson hoped 
that all socialists and Jews would ask:-
' ••• whether the lecturer's ideas of "Clean Government" include 
the hounding from the country of everyone who is guilty of the 
crime of being of Jewish blood or creed, and how it is that a 
sworn fomenter of such cruel and bloodthirsty hatred between 
races dares to come and expound "Clean Government" to an 
audience of decent Socialist and internationalist workers,.35 
Most members of the League must have been aware of O'Donnell's views, 
through the Witness articles and his speeches. Supporting this particular 
demand for Clean Government, which implied removal of Jewish officials and 
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their lackeys (as Lloyd George was frequently described), they must therefore 
be seen as supporting a movement which had a definite base of anti-semitism. 
Effective political action by the League was sparked off by the promotion 
of Isaacs to Lord Chief Justice. Although there had been rumours that Isaacs 
was to be opposed by an independent Reform candidate, an accountant well-
respected in the City, at the next election, a move supported by the Witness,36 
nothing concrete seems to have come from this. Now, there was an obvious 
determination that a Liberal should not be returned in Isaacs' former constitu-
ency of Reading. A government that promoted the kind of corruption typified by 
the Marconi Scandal, and then rewarded the participants, could not be allowed to 
continue. 'They know that every honest man in the three kingdoms is spitting 
in their faces; and they do not care,.37 Thus, the principal objective of the 
League was to destroy or at least to hamper the Liberal Party in office. An 
appeal was launched for funds to carry out a campaign exposing the corruption. 
Whilst speakers and the main League organisation were to go to Reading, pamphlets 
were also to be distributed at Keighley, where there was also a by-election. 
Since the organisation was only able to concentrate on one constituency at a 
time, Reading, which was Isaacs' home, was taken as the obvious choice. 38 
There were three candidates at Reading; Captain Lealie Wilson (Unionist), 
G.P. Gooch (Liberal) and J.P. Butler (Socialist). Wilson had the advantage of 
having contested the seat before, and of 'cultivating' the constituency since 
1910, whilst Gooch, a former Liberal M.P. for Bath, was a new-comer. The 
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nomination of a third candidate, Butler, the London organiser of the British 
Socialist Party, meant that the Liberal candidate would have an even harder 
task than usual to maintain Rufus Isaacs' ~ather slender majority.39 Thus, 
the League had a relatively easy task in trying to defeat the Liberal candi-
date, since it could well be argued that, even without their intervention, he 
would have lost the seat. The main issues of the campaign seem to have been 
the Irish Question and the Insurance Act. The victory of the Unionist was 
described as fA Blow for Home Rule,40 and most journals agreed that the 
merits or otherwise of this question had been central to the campaign.41 
Gooch also found that many of the pressure groups which came to Reading 
seeking to publicise their causes were against him. The Anti-Vaccinationists 
were annoyed because he would not support them, and they threatened to run 
their own candidate.42 Many of the women's suffragists were determined to 
attack the government over its failure to agree to votes for women, although 
the N.U.W.S. simply distributed its propaganda and did not campaign for any 
of the candidates. 43 The National Workmen's Council said that the working 
classes ought to vote for the Tory Party, because it would provide more 
employment, and also more food by taxing imports. 44 The fact that Gooch was 
a prohibitionist meant that the Reading Licensed Trade Victuallers' 
Association issued a handbill to brewery shareholders urging them to vote for 
the Conservative candidate. 45 He also appears to have lost many Jewish voters 
who previously would have been strongly behind their co-religionist, Isaacs. 46 
No manifesto had been issued by the leaders of the Jewish community, as had 
been done in previous elections, and the local paper records that the Jews 
were left with a 'free vote'. Some indication as to how they might have voted 
was given in the report that Mr Solomon Joel and Mr Percy Cohen, President of 
the local synagogue, actively supported Captain Wilson. 47 All in all, it 
appears to have been a very active campaign which in itself suggests a 
reaction against the government. The Times of 1 November 1913 listed twelve 
sets of canvassers who had called at the homes of Reading electors; Unionists, 
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Liberals, Socialists, Home Rulers, anti-Home Rulers, anti-Socialists, 
Suffragists, anti-Suffragists, Tanff Reformers, Free Traders, and those for and 
against Welsh disestablishment. 
The Clean Government League, then, was simply one of the many groups cam-
paigning in Reading. 
'To the babel of tongues of contending organisations in the streets 
of Reading, another has been added by the appearance of representa-
tives of the "Clean Government" League. Mr Cecil Chesterton 
addressed a large crowd in the Butts, and other speakers who are to 
supplement his efforts against the Government include Mr G.K. 
Chesterton and Mr H. Belloc'.48 
This was, in fact, the only reference that the Reading Mercury gave to the 
League's campaign. Indeed, press coverage in general of the League's acti-
vities was very scant, and makes it difficult to assess its impact with any 
objectivity. The Times of 30 October noted that 'The Clean Government League 
is the latest organisat on to invade the town. League offices have been 
secured, and literature is being distributed broadcast', but made very little 
of the subsequent campaigning. The most exhaustive accounts are to be found 
in the pages of The New Witness, the main propaganda organ for the organi-
sation. 49 Its view of the meetings in Reading suggests that there should have 
been massive press coverage for the League's activities. The nightly open-air 
meetings were described as 'larger and more enthusiastic than those of any of 
the candidates·. 50 One massive indoor meeting, on the Thursday before the 
poll, had 'an attentive and sympathetic audience which must have numbered close 
51 
on 2,000'. Speakers at this included both Chestertons and O'Donnell. 
reason for this lack of coverage was, as the Witness claimed, censorship:-
'It is an astounding illustration of the Press boycott which was 
organised against us on both sides that this meeting was not 
supported in a single paper. No one could possibly believe that 
when a man so prominent before the public as Mr G.K. Chesterton 
addresses a very large and crowded public meeting in the middle of 
a by-election, that meeting having been thoroughly advertised by 
posters and leaflets several d~s beforehand, and especially when 
he devotes his speech to brilliant and vigorous attack upon the 
political party with which he was once associated, there can be 52 
anything but deliberate conspiracy in the refusal to report it'. 
The 
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This claim m~ not be so preposterous, or self-opinionated, as it might seem. 
Chesterton and Belloc were to suffer this kind of censorship in later years at 
the hands of Beaverbrook. 53 Even before the First World War, they were 
notorious for their attacks on the Party system, on the 'Party Press', and on 
the domination of the medium by a few wealthy individuals. The pages of the 
Witness are full of such sentiments. It would not be beyond the bounds of 
possibility that that same press would feel rather reluctant to publicise its 
critics' work, claiming that it went beyond the bounds of 'good taste'. A 
process of this kind was, in fact, taking place during the election; a 
'selective publicity'. The Reading Mercury, which clearly supported Captain 
Wilson, and was full of political comment from the Morning Post and the D~ily 
Telegraph, did not mention once the campaign of the Socialist candidate, 
Butler. 
However, there may be another reason for this Press boycott. It could 
be that they were unwilling to be associated with the League's campaign, since 
it was tainted with anti-semitism. The Witness often boasted that it was the 
only journal to pay attention to the 'Jewish Problem',54 and that no other 
paper dared to venture opinions on the subject. The League~.s campaign, as 
far as can be determined, was based almost solely on the charges of corruption 
arising from the Marconi Scandal. As already described, the elements of anti-
semitism in this affair are quite clear and it was clearly this approach which 
the League used to attack the Liberal government and its candidate, Gooch. 
'To judge from their printed matter this body intends during the 
week, with the help of Mr Belloc, Mr G.K. Chesterton, and a 
gramophone, to draw some morals from the Marconi affair, which 55 
otherwise would not have been exploited at all in this campaignl. 
It was unfortunate, or rather fortunate for the League, that the Liberal 
and Conservative candidates had agreed not to mention the Marconi affair during 
the election campaign. This pl~ed into the hands of the Clean Government 
men, who could point out their claim of party collusion and show that politics 
was a phoney war. As O.K. Chesterton claimed 'When the Tory candidate at 
Reading openly agrees never to say "Marconi" - then the cat is out of the bag 
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for ever'. 56 
The justification for this pact of silence was that the inhabitants of 
Reading would resent any censure of their former member of parliament. Indeed, 
Gooch, the Liberal candidate, claimed that Isaacs was 'too popular in Reading 
for his opponents to make use of the recent Marconi Scandal, even had they 
desired to do so,.51 However, the action disgusted the Witness. 58 
'The activities of the Clean Government League at the by-
election have at any rate succeeded in exposing this piece 
of hypocrisy ••• it is found by practical experience that 
nothing is more favourably received than a taunt directed 
against Isaacs and his accomplices. The vehemence with 
which the crowd cheered a speaker who said that an ordinar,v 
man who did what Isaacs had done would, if he stood in the 
dock, be convicted of corruption, and that "therefore they 
put him, not in the dock, but on the Bench", would have 
made an end of that illusion for ever if it had ever been 
anything but an excuse for a private deal'.58 
Maxse was also indignant about the compact but felt that it had been 
destroyed 
'because the people insisted on hearing about every aspect of 
Marconis - Unionist ,speakers responded to the demand and the 
spiri ted campaign of the "League for Clean Government" under 
the auspices of the New Witness supplied a much felt want and 
was an important factor in producing-results which astonished,.. 
all conventional politicians on the declaration of the poll,.bO 
The Socialist campaign, which Maxse claimed benefitted from these 
Marconi exposures, did use the affair in its meetings. Thomas Kennedy, 
, 
Butler's election agent, admitted that it had played a part in their 6uccess,61 
and H.M. HYndman, addressing an audience at one of Butler's meetings, claimed 
that 'the most significant thing about the two capitalist.candidates is their 
remarkable agreement not to mention Marconi', and then went on to score poli-
tical points from the details of the affair. 62 Against these claims, we must 
set the report from the Times, which recorded that attacks on Isaacs were 
greeted with 'angr,v cries',63 and the possibility that Reading was perhaps not 
the most likely constituency to accept anti-Jewish propaganda. As a staunch 
Liberal paper put it: 
'Nor has Reading shown any prejudice against the Jewish race 
and religion. Not twenty years before Sir Rufus was first 
chosen for Reading he had a forerunner, both as lawyer and 
Jew, in Sir Francis Goldsmid, K.C., the first Jew to attain 
to the dignity of silk; and to him the constituency faith-
fully adhered during many years till he retired,.64 
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However, the Witness felt no compunction to follow this particular line. In 
greeting the Conservative victor,y, it wrote of Isaacs' successor ••• 'He 
differs from the late member for Reading in being an Englishman, and, so far 
as we know, privately an honourable man,.65 The. journal, as spokesman for 
the League, was unrepentant about the anti-Liberal campaign and felt that it 
had been justified. 
'The compact which we were primarily out to fight emerged in 
a somewhat damaged condition. The candidate indeed managed 
to keep silent on the issue about which everyone in the con-
stituency was talking, but it was continually on the lips of 66 
his supporters and made constant appearances at his meetings'. 
Some indication of the tone of the League's campaign was given by 
O'Donnell's article in the Witness shortly after the election. It also shows 
why other journals might be reluctant to publicise the campaign, for it showed 
O'Donnell at his most vehement, spouting his own version of a Jewish conspiracy 
theory. 
'At the big meeting of the Clean Government League in the Corn 
Exchange at Reading, there came an organised band of Liberal 
rowdies to interrupt and rott.r .. · Their success in the line was 
not great. They made the vast majority of the meeting more 
unanimous. That was all. The reason why I mention the piti-
ful creatures is this. They were led by a sallow Jew boy who 
boasted that he was a clerk "in the office of the Samuels". 
That band of Liberal hooligans commanded by a semi-civilised 
Jew boy1 Even in its rowdyism, our official Liberalism must 
take its orders from the Undesirable Alien,.61 
Describing interrupters of meetings as Jews was also done by Cowley, the 
League secretary, at a later date (see p~53), and it has interesting parallels 
with the procedure of the British Union of Fascists. There are several 
recorded occasions on which Mosley and other speakers, without any obvious 
evidence, identified (and vilified) hecklers as Jews. 68 
O'Donnell went on to link this particular incident (which is not referred 
to by any other journal) to the alleged Jewish control of the Liberal Party. 
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'I do not explain, I only observe the curious fact that con-
temporary Liberalism appears to acknowledge its inferiority 
to the Judaean Asiatic in so many respects. It asks the 
Judaean to direct its justice, as well as its share market, 
its posts and telegraphs, as well as its Cocao Press, its 
Secretaryships of India as well as its Silver deals,.69 
From here, he went on to express the view that England was 'the natural pasture 
and the destined prey of the closely-knit, intensely organised, concurrently 
rapacious alien tribe, which is the predatoEY race of histoEY for two 
thousand years,.10 In his view, it was only a matter of time before the Jew 
swamped England, in influence if not in numbers. He was particularly con-
cerned about the effect of this on the government of India. 
'The Jew has no claims whatever to be admitted to circles of 
Government from which Indian princes and statesmen are 
excluded. He is not a European, and never can be. He is 
associated with occupations hostile to the public interest 
and allied with demoralisation and rapacity. NUmerically, 
he is an insignificant handful. SOCially he is an outsider, 
to put the matter as gently as possible; and he is also an 
outsider by reason of his Racial Separatism which is a con-
federation against Mankind'.11 
Thus, in one article, O'Donnell begins with the League campaign and shows 
how it can be linked in with his own anti-semitic attitudes and stereotypes. 
Since O'Donnell was an important figure in the Clean Government Campaign, it 
is hard to imagine that its supporters did not echo his sentiments to some 
degree. Certainly O'Donnell was able to use the organisation as a vehicle 
for his prejudices. Presumably, other members did the same. 
The next target for the League was the by-election at South Lanark 
'where there is, we believe, a very good chance of unseating another nominee,.12 
The following week, the Witness reported that committee rooms had been opened 
in Lanark and that pamphlets were being distributed. A lengthy quot e from the 
Glasgow Herald's account of a meeting of the Unionist candidate was given to 
show that the League was already making an impact. The meeting was held at 
Lanark Auction Market, and the Herald report was from the 18 November edition. 
'Another heckler asked tif the candidate regarded "gambling" by 
members of the Government in "Marconis" as most corrupt t and 
if he agreed "that a Government of that sort should be driven 
out of public life ". 
The candidate replied that he was sorry that the question had 
been asked. He had his own views as to the high standard that 
ought to be observed in public life, but personally he had 
never mentioned that transaction on the public platform. 
(Hear, hear) He thought it was a matter of which the electors 
would form their own judgment without him making that a reason 
for his party getting into office. He did not wish to treat 
it as a party hack question. (Applause) 
Replying later to the same heckler, the candidate said that in 
principle it was wrong for a member of the Government to take a 
financial tip under the circumstances indicated by his 
questioner. 
The Heckler: Why do you refuse to deal with this question? 
Have you a compact with the Liberals not to touch that subject? 
The Candidate: I have not. 
The Heckler: Well, they have in some other constituencies,.73 
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The Witness ended its record of the conversation there, but the Glasgow Herald 
continued for a few more lines, showing that the heckler m~ well have been a 
League 'import'. 
'The Candidate: Are you an elector in this constituency? 
The Heckler: " No, I am not. 
The Candidate: Well, I am not surprised then'. 
The first major meeting of the League was held in Carluke Town Hall, on 
22 November. The Witness described the audience as 'sympathetic', and said 
that Mr Kehrhahn, the organiser of the Lanark campaign, 'was heard in perfect 
silence as he arraigned the present Government and showed how unworthy it, or 
any supporter of it in Parliament, was to the votes of honest men, be they 
Liberal, Conservative or Socialist,.74 The silence was presumably mentioned 
to suggest that Kehrhahn had the support of his audience. A somewhat different 
light, however, is cast on the proceedings by the local reporter. 
'The Clean Government League are conducting a campaign throughout 
the South Lanark constituency, and the first meeting under their 
auspices was held in the Carluke Town Hall on Saturday night. 
There was a very small attendance, the audience not being more 
"than one hundred. Mr C. Clifford presided. The meeting was 
addressed by Mr F.L. Kehrhahn, who explained that the League and 
its officials were out to attack corruption in public life. 
The League had issued five questions to be put to each of the 
three candidates who were now seeking the support of the South 
Lanark electors. 
Mr J. Stephens, an ex-Liberal candidate for a Scottish 
Constituency, also addressed the meeting, dealing 
principally with the Marconi Scandal. 
Mr J. Territt, of the Gasworkers' Union, said it was little 
use nationalising the mines and railways if our state' 
departments were to continue to be dens of privilege and 
patronage, where men obtained position by backstairs methods. 
The latter speaker had a number of questions addressed to him 
at the close'. 75 
In spite of this rather poor start, the League maintained its own 
enthusiasm, promising one or two meetings every evening until the election, 
although, as in Reading, no more press reports appeared to confirm that these 
meetings did take place. Yet, on 4 December, the Witness repeated that the 
campaign had been going well, and that meetings had been held every day and 
night. 'All these meetings have been eminently successful. A Scotch 
audience is not emotionally applausive as are audiences further south, but it 
listens as no Southern audience listens - and it thinks'. The main item of 
cheer was the answers provided by the Unionist candidate, William Watson, to 
the five questions posed by the League on 'Clean Government'. The Witness 
said that he had answered the questions fully and promptly ('predictably' 
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might have been a better word, since he was canvassing for votes and unlikely 
to say that he was not in favour of 'Clean Government') and, on the basis of 
his replies, recommended him to the electorate. 'We think that on his answers 
Mr Watson is entitled to be regarded as a worthy candidate whom it becomes 
honest men to support'. 
The National Review was also pleased with the Unionist candidate. 
'It so happens that at South Lanark Mr Watson, the Unionist 
candidate and present Member, though evading the Marconi 
Scandal, replied to the questions of the "National League 
for Clean Government" in a manner so satisfactory as to 
ensure his replies being boycotted by many Party journals 
on both sides, as this is the sort of thing calculated to 
upset their applecar.t. We reproduce textually from the 
New Witness the questions and answers which s~ak for them-
selves. Mr Watson's answers are admirable'.76 
Once again, as at Reading, the League's campaign was based on the events 
and outcome of the Marconi Scandal. There does not appear to have been a 
compact between candidates similar to the one at Reading, merely a reluctance 
to discuss the subject. It is interesting, however, to find Captain Wilson, 
the Reading victor, who agreed to such a treaty, having no hesitation in 
referring to the scandal in another constituency. Addressing a meeting at 
Carluke, he drew attention to Lloyd George's new proposals for land reform: 
'The Chancellor of the Exchequer had evidently found out that the landlords 
did not get as much out of the land as might be made out of Marconis. 
(Laughter),.77 
As in Reading, there were three candidates, Liberal, Unionist and Labour. 
Obviously the Labour intervention weighed heavily against the Liberal who was 
tr,ying to retain his party's grip on the seat. And, as in Reading, there 
were the independent movements trying to attract attention, as was the 
League. 78 The National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies and the Women's 
Social and Political Union campaigned, each in their own styles, for votes for 
women. 79 The Young Scots also conducted a campaign; indeed, they attacked 
Gibb, the Labour candidate, who had said that Scottish independence was not a 
major issue at that time. 80 Thus, the League's activities must be placed in 
this context of 'outside' pressure. 
The victory of the Conservative candidat~81 was greeted as a triumph for 
the Clean Government League, as was the large number of votes gained by the 
Labour Party. Since both Conservative and Labour candidates had answered the 
'Five Questions' on Clean Government satisfactorily, they were declared to be 
opposed to parliamentary corruption. Morton, the Liberal, who had not 
answered, was labelled as pro-corruption, particularly since he was a supporter 
of the Government 'which has been caught in acts of corruption not once or 
twice, or three times, but again and again ever since it has been in office,.82 
The campaign was. neatly summed up by the leader in the Witness. 
point of view of Clean Government we m~ therefore consider the result to work 
out as follows. 
vote was 4,006. 
The Anti-Corruptionist vote was 5,931. 
Majority against corruption, 1,925,.83 
The Corruptionist 
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There was little doubt in the minds of the Witness staff that the League 
had been the crucial factor in gaining victor,y for Watson. As they described 
it, 
t ••• the energetic intervention of the Clean Government League 
was undoubtedly the direct determining cause to which the return 
of Mr Watson must be ascribed. . We do not say this in any mood 
of idle boasting. We are only recording the deliberate opinion 
of those best qualified to judge, men on the spot entirely 
unconnected with the League and in Bome cases antagonistic to 
its propaganda. We are also recording our own observations. 
Those who took part in the fight at South Lanark had no kind of 
doubt as to the impression that we made. Conversions were 
effected under our eyes. Men came to our meeting to cheer for 
George and remained to learn the truth about him and cheer no 
more. Elector after elector personally assured our speakers 
that they had intended to vote for the "Liberal" candidate but 
that having heard the full stor,y of its record they would no 
longer do so. It was obvious from the first that the miners 
and ploughmen of Lanark had never been told any part of the 
truth about the Marconi Scandal, the Indian Silver Scandal, the 
corrupt purchase of peerages and places on the Front Bench, and 
the Cat's Meat Contract for the feeding of our soldiers. When 
they did hear the stor,y of these things told plainly and without 
embroider,y, the effect was visibly overwhelming. Beyond any 
question what we had to tell them changed more votes than the 
250 which were necessar,y to prevent the advocate of corruption 
from being returned,.84 
Just how accurate this statement was is difficult to assess. As at Reading, 
the press suggested that Home Rule was the main electoral issue and Watson 
certainly laid great emphasis on this in his campaign.85 If this is the 
case, then the Witness was clearly overemphasising the impact of the League 
on the election result. 
After two 'successes', the League continued its propaganda with renewed 
vigour. On 8 Januar,y 1914, there was a public debate under its auspices 
between Cecil Chesterton and Sir Henr,y Seton-Karr86 on 'The Party System'. 
A motion 'that the Party system is useless, dangerous, and ought to be 
abolished', moved by Cecil Chesterton, was carried~. ££U.81 The following 
week, a letter from the League Secretar,y, Vernon Carey, appeared in the 
Witness. He asked readers in sympathy with the League's aims to help form 
provincial branches. The objective was to have a branch in ever,y electoral 
area. HOwever, campaigning in crucial by-elections also continued. 
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The next venture, Bethnal Green, where Charles Masterman was standing, 
was something of a personal vendetta by the Witness staff and followers, who 
had, for years, taken every opportunity of attacking their former colleague. 
It stemmed from the early years of the century, when Masterman was a young 
journalist on the staff of the Daily News, with G.K. Chesterton, Belloc and 
Mas singham. Masterman entered parliament as a Liberal in 1903, and rapidly 
gained promotion under Asquith's leadership.88 Chesterton and Belloc felt 
that he had sacrificed his principles for the sake of office, and continually 
criticised him in their writing.89 They also hounded him at by-elections. 
At Bethnal Green in 1911, there were examples of this activity, which 
Masterman's wife described. 
'The Suffragettes, Mr Belloc and the Social Democratic Federation 
in queer combination, had a committee room, which issued leaflets 
on prostitution and venereal disease, for which evils they 
appeared to regard the LiQeral Candidate as personally responsible, 
and a complicated genealogical tree intended to show that I was 
related to Lord Rothschild, and that all politicians for a 0 
hundred years were related to each other and to Lord Rothschild,.9 
Here again is an example of the political use of anti-semitism by Belloc and 
his supporters. 
When Masterman was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, he had to 
resign his seat and stand for re-election. Unfortunately for him, he was 
defeated by twenty-six votes; a defeat which he attributed to the massive 
personality campaign directed against him. However, he saw the source of 
this campaign as Lord Northcliffe, the press magnate, who had deemed him 
responsible for the twin evils of the Finance Bill, which destroyed the House 
of Lords, and of the Insurance Act. 91 The Witness's version of the defeat 
did not refer to Northcliffe, but described how the League had influenced 
fifty-seven votes that turned the balance against Masterman. These fifty-
seven votes belonged to nominal Liberals, whom the League had persuaded on 
polling d~ to vote against corruption i.e. against Masterman. 'If those 
fifty-seven had voted for Masterman, he would have been elected by a majority 
of thirty-three. So that, apart from those who m~ have been influenced by 
our speeches and leaflets, we can definitely claim a sufficient number of 
92 
converts to turn the scale'. In addition to this canvass, the League 
claimed to have distributed 110,000 leaflets, and held many meetings. This 
was seen as their finest achievement to date. 
'The defeat of Mr Masterman at Bethnal Green is a great victory 
for clean government. It not only removes from Parliament a 
member who has in an unusually cynical fashion betrayed his 
constituents and sold his convictions for "a career" - that is, 
for money; it not only unseats the Minister who (after George) 
has most prominently associated himself with the odious and 
corruptly obtained Insurance Act; but it can be distinctly 
proved that, but for the intervention of the Clean Government 
League, the narrow majority by which Mr Masterman was defeated 
would have been a majority the other w~. What was a matter 
of reasonable conjecture in other recent contests is here a 
matter of certainty ••• '.93 
other targets around this time were by-elections at Leith and Poplar. 
The Leith vacancy arose because of the appointment of its M.P., Ronald Munro-
Ferguson, as Governor-General of Australia. As alrea~ stated, Ferguson was 
one of three Liberal members who voted against the Government in the Marconi 
debate, and there was some suspicion in the Witness that hie appointment was 
simply a way of removing one of the thorns in the side of the parliamentary 
Liberal party. Thus, it was decided that 'Leith and the burghs, Portobello 
and Musselburgh, which are allied with it, are places where exposition of the 
Marconi, diseased meat, and other corruptions will have their full effect,.94 
As for Poplar, the Witness carried a paragraph on Mr Kerr Clark, the 
Conservative candidate, who had told the Morning Post that he was basing his 
campaign on Clean Government. 
'''I do not care", he is reported to have said, "if' it means raking 
up the whole of the Marconi Scandal again. I have talked about 
it on the platform and I shall talk about it again •••• If 
revelations similar to those of the Marconi scandals had been 
made in England thirty years ago the Government whose members had 
been implicated in them would have been swept from power never 
to return again'" .95 
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Later on in the year, Masterman was again under attack from the League, 
when he sought re-admittance to the House by contesting the by-election at 
Ipswich. The League proclaimed in the Witness that it intended to oppose him 
and appealed for funds. 96 Once more, Masterman lost the contest,91 and the 
League's new secretary, cowley,98 had much to say about the result. 
'I may s~ that we were by no means the only anti-Mastermanite 
Association in the town. From the W.S.P.U., who influenced 
no votes, to Miss Margaret Douglas's Insurance Tax Resisters' 
Association - which influenced a great many - the streets of 
Ipswich swarmed with workers. Sixty Ulstermen walked about 
anxious for fights - and frequently finding them. Clerical 
individuals mounted upon tubs to address indifferent crowds upon 
the iniquity of disestablishment in Wales. Dishevelled suffra-
gettes were hurried to the police station by the officers of the 
law, pursued by hotting hordes of shuffling hooligans. A 
fierce-eyed and grey-bearded person, said to be ex-Inspector Syme, 
held forth in the Comhill upon the iniquities of the Metropolitan 
Folice. Free Trade and Tariff Reform bellowed against one another 
in the Butter Market. All these persons doubtless performed good 
service in ensuring Mr Masterman's defeat,.99 
Masterman himself said that he was denounced at Ipswich 'by an extra-
ordinary array of opponents for his work at the Home Office and more parti-
1 h ' 't' 'th ' ,100 H' 'f d 'b d th cular y ~s assoc~a ~on w~ ~nsurance. ~s w~ e escr~ e e oppo-
sition as 'the usual circle of Northcliffe, Belloc and Kensit,.101 As far 
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as Masterman was concerned, the chief problem raised at the election was that 
of the Liberal Party's relationship to 'labour'. 
'Had a command been issued and obeyed for labour to support me at 
Ipswich I should easily have got in. But some voted for Scurr 
and many, I am told, voted Tory - out of revenge for N.E. 
Derbyshire. I think an understanding with them is equally 
imperative and impossible,.102 , 
However, the League and particularly Cowley, claimed that it was its 
campaign, on one single issue, which produced the anti-Masterman vote. 
Twenty-five thousand leaflets were distributed; indeed the contents of these 
leaflets were so strong that there seems to have been some trouble finding a 
printer willing to undertake the task. The League also held meetings, at 
which Cecil Chesterton was a prominent speaker. It is interesting that 
Cowley's report contained a description of an event very similar to the one 
O'Donnell described at Reading. 
'An attempt was made upon one occasion to break us up by the 
interruptions of a hired Jew, obviously primed with information 
from the Liberal headquarters: but as the interrupter was 
subsequently attacked by the audience and forced to confess 
that he had been employed by money for the purpose, he got 
little for his pains. The plainly organised nature of his 
attack - which was supported by a gang - showed the fear of 
our attacks which prevailed among the Liberals,.103 
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Cowley is another example of an individual, holding office in the League, not 
only identifying the Jewish element in the Liberal party but also suggesting 
that it was a corrupting influence. The leading article in the Witness 
described the Liberal party - 'the Marconi Party' of corruption - as 'formed 
by the combination of George and his hangers-on with the Jews and their 
104 hangers-on' • 
Ipswich was the League's fourth "victory", the other three being Reading, 
Lanark and Bethnal Green, and an appeal was made yet again for funds to expand 
their campaign. The plan was not to fight more elections, but to continue 
the policy of choosing constituencies where victory i.e. defeat of the Liberal 
candidate, was feasible. More fUnds were needed to 'appear in greater force, 
and to exact that recognition from the official parties and the official press 
which will not otherwise be accorded us,. 105 
Meetings of the League continued, usually addressed by Cecil Chesterton 
and Belloc. The subject usually revolved around the Marconi Scandal. On 
27 June, Chesterton spoke of the sale of peerages and front bench places, and 
then proceeded to give' a full account of the Scandal, asking his audience if 
they liked 'this sort of unsavouriness,106 in politics. Belloc was the next 
speaker, deploring the raising of Isaacs to the office of Lord Chief Justice 
and talking about the lack of criticism of this kind of corruption. Again, 
Cowley, reporting the meeting, drew attention to the lack of press coverage, 
with only the Morning Post mentioning the speeches of such notable personalities 
as Chesterton and Belloc. 107 At this particular meeting, future policy was 
discussed. It was agreed that 'the work of exposure' ought to continue, but 
that there could be no question of putting candidates up for parliament. It 
would prove too costly, far beyond the means of the League. Thus, it was only 
through continued publicity that the aims of the League and of 'Clean 
Government' could be pursued. 
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It was at this meeting also that a 'highly important incident' occurred. 
o tOM K 0 108 k d f th dO of th M S~r Rober Mu~r ac enz~e as e, rom e au lence, 1 e inisters 
attacked by Chesterton were to have the chance of prosecuting for libel the 
perpetrators of any charges. Chesterton immediately responded by writing 
and signing a statement of the charges he made against the ministers. Copies 
of this statement were made available to anyone sending a stamped envelope to 
the editor of the Witness. Chesterton seemed highly delighted the following 
week when neither Lord Reading nor Lloyd George had replied to the charges. 
At another meeting of the League, on 11 July, Chesterton repeated his state-
ment and claimed that 'we sent numerous copies of the actual challenge to 
o 0 ,109 
lnqu~rers • In the event of no reply, it was hoped that a question would 
be asked in the House, possibly by Rowland Hunt. This does not appear to 
have been done, and the League'e activities rather faded away with the coming 
of war in August 1914. 
They did not, however, cease altogether. G.C. Heseltine has recorded 
that he attended a meeting of the Clean Government League early in 1918, when 
the scope of the organisation seems to have adapted itself to changing circum-
stances, although holding on to old favourites. Heseltine described the 
objectives of the League in 1918 as ' ••• to attack political corruption (as 
exposed by the Marconi affair and the sale of honours by Lloyd George's party), 
to restore personal liberties abrogated by the War, to obtain the repeal of 
oppressive Acts, to secure the rights of small nationalities and the protection 
110 
of private property'. 
On 11 April 1918, the League for Clean Government became The New Witness 
League, with Gilbert Chesterton as its first president. Chesterton had taken 
over as editor of the Witness after his brother joined the army in 1916 (he 
subsequently died in 1918), and this change of name appears to have been no 
more than a rationalisation of the close links which already existed between 
the journal and the League. The journal encountered financial problems; 
Chesterton was continually subsidising it and finally its end came in May 1923. 
Naturally the League also died with the demise of the journal. 111 However, 
it was not the end of political and journalistic campaigning. The last 
editions of the Witness promised a new journal, edited by Chesterton, and 
this began to appear on a regular basis, in March 1925, as G.K.'s :vJeekly.112 
The journal became the vehicle for Chesterton's political philoso~, now 
labelled distinctively as Distributivism. 113 
a.K.'s Weekly suffered from the same financial problems as its pre-
decessor. It was never a viable concern, and in 1926, the deputy editor, 
W.R. Titterton, 'proposed that an appeal should be made to the readers for 
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contributions to a fighting fund and that a league be constituted to save the 
paper' • 114 Shortly after this, the Distributist League was formed, having 
as its direct antecedent the Clean Government League. 
There appear to be obvious differences between the 'Clean Government' move-
ment and the Distributist League. One might, for instance, see a progression 
from a negative approach, a reaction against something without suggesting an 
alternative, to Distributivism, a positive if somewhat anachronistic answer to 
the problems of industrial society.11 5 However, to present such a clear-cut 
transition would be a gross simplification. The essential concept of 
Distributivism, the distribution of property, appears before the Great War. 
G.K. Chesterton's What's Wrong with the World, (1909), posed just such a 
solution. 116 FUndamentally, Distributivism was in existence long before the 
Distributist League. It was preached in the Independent Political Association, 
the Clean Government League and The New Witness League in the period before 
1920. In that sense, the various organisations are all part of one movement. 
A common theme for these groups was a belief in a 'Golden Age'. This 
became a continual preoccupation of the Chesterbelloc and was particularly 
evident in pre-war England. 'One finds everywhere in llliwardian writing the 
sense of disturbing change, and the essential Edwardian mood is sombre - a 
feeling of nostalgia for what has gone, and of apprehension for what is to 
come -
, 117 
• •• • 
Be110c and Cecil Chesterton illustrate this feeling in 
The Party §ystem. 
'Though we have no histor,y, and be unable to compare the modern 
wretchedness with the happiness of the past, yet mere instinct 
and the common conscience of man must, unless he is positively 
blinded by vanity I teach him that something is ver,r ill with 
England to-day' .118 
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One extreme example of the results of such a belief was the Conservative 
politician, George Wyndham, who was described in 1911 as being 'an 
uncompromising partisan and an advocate of the most extreme courses. He was 
shocked and angered at what he regarded as the degradation of England by 
Jews, foreigners and Liberals in general,.119 One of the essential ingredients 
of anti-semitism in Britain in this period seems to have been such a view of 
. t 120 SOC1e y. A concept of a 'Golden Age' and a conviction that the Jews 
could be blamed for destroying that era appear ver,y evidently in the writings 
of O'Donnell. Using the Jews as scapegoats, he could explain the changing 
world. 
Having said that the political views of the pre-war years and of the 
1920s and 30s are essentially the same, the question about the part played 
by anti-semitism must also be asked. More work needs to be done before any 
conclusions can be reached about the Distributivist League and its attitude 
to Jews. One opinion on G.K. Chesterton sees him mellowing in the 1920s -
'a new tolerance ••• is extended towards the Jews, who for the first time are 
represented in something like a favourable light' - which provides a launching 
pad but little e1se. 121 Did the Distributivists use the same kind of 
language and imager,y in attaching monopoly capitalism in the 1920s and 30s as 
the Clean Government League did in the 1910s1 The answer lies in future 
research. A study of the Distributivist reaction to the fascist movements of 
the 1930s would be revealing, one w~ or the other. 
We now must ask what is the signifioance of the League for Clean 
Government. Its inspiration, as has already been noted, was the Marooni 
Scandal. Its connections with the New Witness, an anti-semitic journal, are 
beyond dispute. Its own tendency to anti-semitism has been illustrated, 
both in its campaigning and in the personnel attracted to the movement. 
Can it therefore be claimed that the League was a fore-runner of the Fascist 
movements of the 1930s, at least in its use of anti-semitism as a political 
weapon? This would, I feel, be an over-simplified claim, relying ag~in on 
hindsight, a dubious historical methodology. 
a natural progression of thought and action. 
Similarities need not prove 
However, similarities do 
exist and possibly it is the historian's task simply to point to these and 
leave the reader to his own conclusions. 
The League served as a focus for three strands of anti-semitism, 
although the distinctions between these categories were often blurred and 
sentiments expressed sometimes cannot be clearly placed under one particular 
heading. First, as alre~ identified, was the ethnocentric 'Britain for 
the British' viewpoint. Second, there was a distinct element of racial 
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hostility, as exhibited by O'Donnell and described in the preceding chapters. 
Finally, the formulation of a conspiracy theor,y is evident - Jews are 
manipulating finance, dominating politics and destroying the old order. A 
fuller discussion of the nature of anti-semitism in these pre-war years will 
be found in the concluding chapters of this work. For the moment, let it 
suffice to say that these three elements can also be found in other anti-
semitic writing, both before and after the Clean Government League. 
For example, 'Britain for the British' was a sloganusErriconsistently by 
fascist groups in the 1920s and 30s. The Britons, founded in 1919 by Henry 
Hamilton Beamish essentially as a propaganda and publishing society, had the 
motto 'Britain for Britons' and the objective of eradicating foreign influence 
from politics and industr,y.122 This meant, in effect, excluding Jews from all 
positions of authority. This compares with the Clean Government League's 
policy of demanding the removal of all Jews from government office. Similarly, 
one of the elements of reform in the programme of the British Fascists, formed 
in 1923, was that 'civil servants and parliamentary candidates would have to be 
of "British birth and race". , 123 In the 1930s, the British Fascists took 
on the outright fascist platform of the B.U.F. 'Jews and aliens would be 
barred from public posts, from voting and from "controlling" the financial, 
political, industrial and cultural interests of Great Britain,. 124 The 
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National Fascists, who broke aw~ from the British Fascists in 1924 to pursue 
'true Fascism' also had similar aims. They sought 'a governing executive of 
men of British birth and breeding with the will and power to govern,.125 
Skidels~ describes the early anti-semitism of the B.U.F. as having an 
'intensely nationalist "Britain-for-the-British" line',126 and it is recorded 
that Mosley called for a ban on Jews as officials and members of parliament. 121 
One can also distinguish similar approaches in the splinter groups of the 
B.U.F. The National Socialist League was conceived as a 'British national 
movement with British organisational methods,128 and an appeal at the end of 
William Joyce's book described the movement as 'the only 100% British 
organisation working with British people and British funds for the rebuilding 
of Britain in the modern way,.129 
Fitting these examples into a broader perspective, it is possible to 
point to earlier manifestations of a distorted jingoism in Goldwin Smith 
(see above) and in some of the writings of J.A. Hobson. 130 Recent work has 
also drawn attention to the connection between agitation against alien immi-
gration and 'a more general theme of jingoism' in the origins of the British 
131 Brothers' League. 
These few examples illustrate a particular emphasis of British anti-
semitism in a period of one hundred years and the place of the Clean Government 
League's propaganda in that history. The other strands, the racialist approach 
and the conspiracy theory are not so common and deserve more detailed attention. 
True racists are a rare occurrence, and therefore O'Donnell is in a special 
category, along with people like Joseph Banister. 132 Traces of a conspiracy 
theory can be found in the work of Hobson, who sees the Jew 'plotting to carve 
out one more area of the world in his ageless quest for universal domination' 133 , 
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but its real European impact comes essentially with the First World War and 
the Bolshevik Revolution. The League's role in establishing an atmosphere 
which allowed the Protocols to have such an impact is perhaps more significant 
. 1 b 1· d 134 than prev~ous y e ~eve • 
The importance of the League for Clean Government is that it seems to 
fit into a pattern, or rather into a continuity of groups and people in 
Britain who were prepared to use anti-semitism to achieve their political 
ends. In this sense, the League is a 'missing link', filling in a gap 
between the early 1900s and the 1920s. Indeed, this examination of its 
activities helps to establish that there was, in fact, a continuity of 
organisations using anti-semitism as a political tool. The Clean Government 
League, along with the British Brothers' League and The Britons, shows that 
political anti-semitism was not a unique product of the 1930s. 
The general purpose of this thesis is to establish that the conspira-
toria1 emphasis of British anti-semitism so apparent in the 1920s and 30s was 
conceived before 1914. This chapter's concern with the Clean Government 
League helps to reinforce such an argument. It also suggests that one can 
talk about a tradition of British anti-semitism, a theory by no means univer-
sally accepted or acceptable, and it indicates just what elements combine to 
make up such a tradition. 
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See Allen Potter, Organised Groups in British National Fblitics, 
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In this context, I think it important to note the close links between the 
political aspects of anti-semitism and the liberary movements. Benewick, 
op.cit., distinguishes between what he calls 'organised group activity', 
i.e. The British Union of Fascists, and the 'intellectual journalism of 
the Chesterton-Belloc circle' (p.41). The case of the League is 
significant, because it illustrates the artificial division that can be 
created by making such a distinction. Here is a concrete example of 
organised group activity arising directly from the intellectual 
journalism. 
For examples of the more extreme forms of anti-semi tic language used in 
the campaign against immigrants at the turn of the century, see Garrard, 
op.cit. 
The New Witness, 18 December 1913. Fear of Jewish influence in politics 
and in court circles was a continuous element of anti-semitic works around 
this time. See, for example, the introduction in Arnold White, ~ 
Modern Jew (London, 1899). 
See Colin Holmes, 'Goldwin Smith (1823-1910): a "Liberal" anti-semite', 
Patterns of Prejudice, Vol.6, No.5 (Sept.-Oct.1912), pp.25-30. 
See ParI. Debates, 5th series, Vol. 58, Col.2251. These arguments are 
simply those advanced in the 1880s and 90s against unlimited immigration 
and taken up by the British Brothers' League in the early years of the 
twentieth century. 
The New Witness, 25 September 1913. 
Carter had been censured by the Jewish Chronicle for some jokes at the 
expense of Jews which had appeared in the Bystander. The Chronicle 
produced the correspondence over the accusations of prejudice which it had 
levelled at Carter (see 19 September 1913 edition). It would seem to be 
this incident which prompted the Witness to seek a contribution from 
Carter for its series on the Jews, which led to his involvement with the 
League. 
The New Witness, 4 December 1913. 
See Chapter 8, 'Maxse and the National Review'. Work on a D.Phil. and 
book dealing with Maxse is currently being undertaken by Harold Snyder at 
Oxford University. 
Koss, A.G. Gardiner, op.cit., p.113. 
Ibid., p.114. 
-
Speaight, The Life of Hilaire Belloc, op.cit., pp.218-284. 
In December 1910, the seat was gained for the Conservatives by BeIloc's 
opponent in the January election, C.A. Montague-Barlow, turning a majority 
of 316 into a lOBS of 225 - practically all accounted for by the decline 
in the Liberal vote. See F.W.S. Craig, British ParliamentaEY Elections, 
1885-1918 (London, 1914), p.119. 
14. David Low, Autobiography (London, 1956), p.133. 
15. The New Witness, 19 June 1913. 
16. See chapters 4 and 5 for details of O'Donnell. 
17. The New Witness, 3 July 1913. 
18. ~. 
19. Ibid. 
20. ~., 17 July 1913. 
21. The advertisement first appeared on 31 July, and then every week until 
October. 
22. The New Witness, 9 October 1913. 
23. Sir James Barr, b.1849 d.1938. Created 1905. According to Who Was Who 
he was a member of the Conservative Club. His political sympathies are 
clear from a letter he wrote to Bonar Law following the news of the 
ministers' involvement in Marconi. He complained of not believing the 
rumours but was now aghast at the truth. His attacks on Lloyd George 
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were particularly vehement, alleging that he had formed a limited liability 
comp~ to avoid death duties and his general complaint was that poli-
ticians here were worse than in America. (Barr to Bonar Law, 20 March 
1913, Bonar Law Papers, 29/2/30). Barr's profession was medicine; he 
was Consulting Physician at Liverpool Royal Infirmary and Vice-President 
of the B.M.A. His pronouncements against the Jews had been remarked upon 
by the Jewish Chronicle in 1912 and 1913, and the journal consistently 
categorised him with Balloc and Chesterton as leading anti-semites. 
24. Fbr the role played by Locker-Lampson, Tory M.P. for Huntingdon, in the 
Marconi Scandal, see Chapter 3. 
25. Labour M.P. for Bradford West. Jowett was one of the five Labour M.P.s 
who abstained from the Commons vote in June 1913 - his attitude was 'that 
the two Ministers had been guilty of indefensible transactions, but that 
the charge of corruption had been disproved. Accordingly, he abstained 
from voting on the Tory motion which did not acknowledge this'. (Fenner 
Brockway, Socialism over Sixt Years: The Life of Jowett of Bradford 
(1864-1944 London, 194 ,p.91. Jowett fought and won the 190 election 
without a Lib-Lab agreement, disliking intensely the Party system, which he 
felt was a game, and gradually moved aw~ from the official Labour line in 
parliament, feeling that the party had compromised too much (~., pp. 69, 
73, 107). This makes his link with the Clean Government League more 
intelligible. Whether or not he supported the anti-semitic undertones is 
hard to tell. His bitterness at the Indemnity Bill to relieve Sir Stuart 
Samuel of the penalties incurred during the 'Indian Silver Scandal' (see 
Chapter 9) was recorded in the Bradford Pioneer of August 1913 (quoted in 
Brockw~, p.79) but otherwise there are few, if any, clues about his 
attitude to Jews. 
26. The New Witness, 9 October 1913. 
27. This letter appears to have been sent to many local journals in an attempt 
to gain publicity and support. Fbr example, it appeared in the Stalybridge 
Reporter of 1 November 1913. 
• 28. Miners' leader and Lib-Lab M.P. for Morpeth from 1874 to 1918. He 
remained faithful to the,Liberal Party all his life, deploring the 
emergence of the I.L.P. He refused to sign the constitution of the 
Labour Party (see Bell~ and Saville, op.cit., pp.59-63, for biographical 
details). There seems no particular reason why he should side with an 
organisation such as the League. 
29. William Morton Eden, 5th baron. b.1859, d.1917. No recorded political 
activities or involvement with the League apart from this reference. 
30. See Chapter 4 for White's journalistic outbursts against the Jews at this 
time and Chapters 9 and 10 for his place in the history of British anti-
semitism. 
31. The New Witness. 9 October 1913. 
32. This attitude compares with a certain left-wing approach to the Insurance 
Act. It was claimed that it benefited certain Jewish interests; 
insurance companies obviously making profits from the new legislation. 
The Prudential Insurance Company was one specifically named. See, for 
example, the bold headlines of a Daily Herald article on 12 August 1912. 
33. 
34. 
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'THE PRUDENTI AL FLOT 
Sassoon = Rothschild Company - An Insurance Octopus' 
Fbr further details, see Chapters 9 and 10. 
The New Witness, 9 October 1913. 
See Chapters 9 and 10. 
Justice, 8 November 1913. O'Donnell was to address a meeting of the 
Hackney British Socialist Party, which prompted Robertson's protest. 
It m~ be that the Hackney branch delighted in having 'opposition' 
speakers I On 7 November, they were addressed by a Mr Temple of the 
Anti-Socialist Union on 'The Fallacies of Socialism'. On a more 
general note, Silberner's article, op.cit., and Garrard's book have 
suggested that not all socialists in this period were averse to a little 
anti-semitism •. 
The New Witness, 16 January 1913. 
Ibid., 23 October 1913. 
-
Ibid. , 
-
30 October 1913. 
39. Gooch attributed his downfall to this faotor. 'The unexpeoted emergence 
of a Labour Candidate at Reading destroyed any chances of my success. 
The strenuous contest lasted nearly a month and ended, as was expected, 
with a Conservative gain' (G.P. Gooch, Under Six Reigns (London, 1958), 
p.160). Note, however, that the Conservative candidate had a total 
majority over both Liberal and Socialist candidates. 
Brief details of Butler's political career, beginning as a local organiser 
of the Westminster branch of the SDF, can be found in Paul Thompson, 
Socialist Liberals and Labour: The Stru Ie for London 188 -1 1 
London, 19 7 , pp.19 , 204, 207, 291. 
40. Glasgow Herald, 10 November 1913. The result was Wilson 5144 
Gooch 4013 
Butler 1063 
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The Spectator described it as the major election issue, proclaiming that 
emissaries of the Irish Labour Party had been active against the Liberal 
candidate and that there were popular demonstrations in Dublin on the 
news of Gooch's defeat (15 November 1913). In the absence of further 
evidence, this source should be treated carefully. 
Reading MercuEY, 25 October 1913. There is some confusion on this point, 
since The Times of 23 October claimed that Gooch removed the threat of a 
fourth candidate by agreeing to support the anti-vaccinationists. This 
issue was of some importance in Reading; for instance, in 1898, the 
electorate had voted out of office the local Board of Guardians over the 
question of compulsory vaccination (see The Times, 23 October 1913). 
Reading MercuEY, 1 November 1913. The W.S.P.U. were active against the 
Liberal candidate (The Times, 28 October 1913). 
Reading MercuEY, 1 November 1913. 
The Times, 28 October 1913. 
For a discussion of the Jewish vote, see Chapters 9 and 10. 
Reading MercuEY, 1 November 1913. 
Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, quoted in ~. 
Other references can be found in Justice, 25 October, 8 and 15 November 
1913, mainly carrying details of Butler's campaign, and a letter from 
'X.Q.P.' in The Outlook, describing 'the success of Mr C. Chesterton's 
meetings at Reading last week, and the interest they evoked'. 
(22 November 1913). 
The New Witness, 6 November 1913. 
~., 13 November 1913. 
Ibid. 
-
This appears to have happened twice in the 1920s; firstly in 1922, when 
Bonar Law became Prime Minister and press attacks on him increased: 
'The New Witness, the organ of Belloc and Chesterton, was most 
scathing of all. It said outright that Law stood for corrup-
tion and plutocracy: "he represented that colonial commercialism 
of the Beaverbrook school that does not differ in the least ••• 
from the cosmopolitan commercialism of the Mond and Montagu 
school".' 
Tom Driberg, Beaverbrook (London, 1956), p.159. 
This upset Beaverbrook, who placed a ban on the mention of the ·names of 
Belloc and Chesterton by Daily Express reporters. 
The second incident, according to A.J.P. Tqylor, took place in 1927. 
Rothermere received a letter from Beaverbrook in March, with quotes from 
The New Witness and its successor, G.K.'s Weekly, which were directed 
against Beaverbrook. 
'All this stuff emanates from one source. 
I have given an order to the Express Newspapers that neither 
O.K. Chesterton nor Hilaire Belloc are to appear in the 
columns of those papers. They spend 80 much time in 
writing articles in abuse of me elsewhere, that I feel they 
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have not got time to do good work for the newspapers with 
which I am associated. 
In the "Evening Standard" Diary there was a perfect 
passion for mentioning the names of Chesterton and Belloc. 
I have out down the space allowed to advertising them. 
Now their names seldom appear. Besides, their journalism 
is so dull, and their statements are utterly unreliable'. 
Taylor, op.cit., p.229. 
See Chapter 5. 
The Times, 4 November 1913. 
Daily Herald, 8 November 1913. 
Gooch, op.cit., p.159. 
It was not alone in its dislike of the agreement. The National Review 
went as far as to attribute the bulk of the thousand votes gained by the 
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Sir Henry Seton-Karr was an old protagonist of the Chesterton/Belloc group, 
a similar debate having taken place between him and G.K. Chesterton under 
the auspices of the Independent Political Association, a forerunner of the 
League (Morning Bost, 24 Januar,r 1912). ' 
Seton-Karr was the Conservative MP for st Helens from 1885 to 1906, and 
a candidate for Berwickshire in 1910. He had some connection with the 
Marconi Scandal, being the author of a letter to The Times on 31 M~ 1913, 
asking for the Select Committee to cease the investigation into 
ministerial speculation and to concentrate on the issue of an 'All-Red 
Wireless Route'. He had previousl7 written to Bonar Law on the topic 
(29 May 1913, Bonar Law Papers, 29/4/27) decr,ring 'unscrupulous outside 
people who are tr,ring to crab the Marconi deal for their own selfish and 
unpatriotic ends'. 
However, Seton-Karr was not himself neutral. Both he and his wife, Jane, 
appear in the records of the English company as shareholders and, 
according to the 1923 pamphlet campaign against the company (see Chapter 1) 
Lady Jane was one of the friends and relatives who received American 
Marconi shares from Godfrey Isaacs in his bid to guarantee the successful 
launching of the new venture. In this case, La~ Jane received 2000 
shares. Thus, Seton-Karr's views must be seen in the context of his 
connections with the Marconi Company. 
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Cowley's inclination towards anti-semitism was revealed in a letter 
written to the New Age on the subject of intellectual 'fluidity' in 
ideals and values. 
'The origins of this disgusting phenomenon is hard to ascertain, 
but it has been found from time immemorial in the repulsive 
race of Jews, and has been the source alike of their facile 
half-successes and their ultimate impotence'. (13 November 1913). 
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MAXSE AND THE NATIONAL REVIEW 
Before turning to a more general consideration of the nature and implica-
tions of British anti-semitism before the First World War, it is appropriate 
to consider one other journal in depth. Perhaps the only serious rival to 
the Witness in terms of coverage of the Marconi Scandal was the National 
Review. There were certain points of similarity between the two journals 
both were outside what was generally held to be the mainstream of the British 
press, both opposed the Liberal government and both had similar views on many 
topics. 
1 The Review was the sounding board for its editor, Leo Maxse , who had 
been given the journal by his father in 1893, after illness had destroyed his 
original plans of being called to the Bar and of entering politics. Maxse was 
2 
'a diehard Tory closely connected with political circles at home and abroad' , 
but, by the time of the Scandal, he was dissatisfied with what he felt was 
the passive nature of the parliamentary party in opposition. He also criti-
cised the Unionist Press for not providing sufficient encouragement to the 
Party and blamed the 'radicalism' of the newspapers and journals for the 
3 general deviation from 'real' Conservatism. 
This situation has clear parallels with that of the Witness, most of 
whose staff had been Liberals but had deserted the Liberal Party for much the 
same reasons as Maxse despaired of the Conservatives. Maxse also opposed the 
'Party System', because collusion prevented true Conservative ideology being 
put into practice, and he disliked intensely the Party Press, which he felt 
was controlled by Jews, monopoly capitalists and 'wire-pullers'. The 
essence of many of his leading pieces in the Review was Germanophobia, he 
was obsessed with the idea that Germanic influences were at work in every 
4 facet of British life. This was virtually a life-time obsession; as early 
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as 1899, he had turned down an offer of the editorship of a great colonial 
newspaper, saying' "I must stay in England to warn people of the German 
5 danger." , • By the end of 1911, he saw and explained the moral decay of 
Britain as the result of its domination by 'Jews, Quakers, sentimentalists 
and cranks.' 6 
The quotation illustrates another of ~~xse's obsessions, that Jews were 
an essential ingredient of this alien influence, The Jew was more often than 
not working for Germany and for the submission of Britain to Teutonic power. 
'If the hateful truth may be told, there is a large and powerful 
international syndicate, with ramifications in every capital, 
including London and Paris, working chiefly through corrupt or 
cosmopolitan papers, inspired or controlled by that hateful 
figure the International Jew* - if we may use a word which 
shocks our esteemed contemporary, the Spectator. These inter-
nationalists, alias pro-Germans, demand that, in "the interests 
of peace", Europe shall pass unresistingly under the German 
yoke. 
*We shall always be careful to distinguish between the National 
Jew, who is a patriot, and the International Jew, who is a 
cosmopolitan and usually an enemy of England and a more or 
less avowed agent of Germany,,1 
This distinction between the two classes of Jews was made throughout the 
period under consideration, but whether it was applied with any logic or 
consistency is doubtful. until a certain Jew aroused the dislike of the 
editor, he was a patriot. However, Maxse did accept that there were many Jews 
272. 
who, even after the outbreak of war, were loyal to Britain. 8 Very few references 
to Jews working for Germany were specific and it is difficult to establish the 
9 
consistency of the application of 'good~ and 'bad' labels. 
According to Maxse, the main spheres of this Jewish influence were the 
journalistic and financial circles. He referred to the 'pro-German' papers 
as the 'Potsdam Press~, 
' ••• which knowingly, or unknowingly, is wirepulled in the 
interests of Germany and against the interests of this country 
largely thrOugh the instrumentality of cosmopolitan Jews who 
repay the excessive hospitality they enjoy here by, to use a 
well-known phrase, "working for The King of Prussia" ••• ,10 
This alleged Jewish domination and manipulation o£ the British press was 
constantly emphasised in phrases like 'heavy Hebrew control of several "British" 
,11 12 
newspapers, 'Hebrew press' and 'Hebrew journalists at the beck and call 
of German diplomats.' 13 
Here we can again see parallels with the Witness, which referred to the 
control o£ the press by a few individuals, although not always Jews. It should 
be noted that this cry of 'Jews control the media' appears to be a consistent 
theme of anti-semitic individuals and groups from the late nineteenth century 
onwards. Arnold White referred to the press as 'the product of Jewish brains 
14 
and capital to an extent quite out of proportion to their numerical importance.' 
whilst, in September 1975, John Tyndall o£ the National Front wrote of the 
'alien and cosmopolitan clique who control most of the media or propaganda in 
15 this country.' Because of its importance, this topic will be considered in 
detail in the following chapters. 
Maxse also regarded high finance as part of this German-Jew conspiracy. 
In the April 1912 edition of the Review, he wrote scathingly of 'cosmopolitan 
financiers domiciled in London in order to do "good work" for the Fatherland' 
and an article by 'Ignotus' entitled 'The Triple Entente and its Enemies', 
identified, amongst others, the enemies as cosmopolitan Jews and international 
financiers. Indeed, the wealthy Jew was seen as more dangerous than the poor 
one. 
'Much has been said, much has been written, about the pauper 
alien, and in many places he is a curse and a pest, but he is 
nothing like so dangerous to national well-being or to our 
national security as plutocratic aliens who divide their ener-
gies between maintaining a fiscal system which sweats the 
Englishman for the benefit of the foreigner and intriguing on 
behal£ o£ the beloved Fatherland, though curiously enough 
several o£ them have not even the excuse that they are o£ 
German origin. ,16 
The point is reinforced in other issues. A somewhat misleading headline, 
'Disloyal Jews', prefaced an attack once more on those Jews seen as enemies 
of the state. 
'A certain number of disloyal Jews who infest both parties 
are equally active in playing Germany's game by intriguing 
against the Triple Entente. We say this without a particle 
of Anti-Semitic prejudice, because the loyal Jews, who have 
unreservedly and without arriere pensee thrown in their lot 
with this country, constitute a valuable element in the 
community. But Great Britain would be infinitely richer in 
everything that is worth having if those other Jews, who are 
really little better than German spies, returned with their 
money-bags to the various countries they camefrom. 17 
Thus, the term 'German Jew' was not used essentially as a term of origin; 
rather it was an expression of their ultimate loyalty (or so Maxse believed). 
This was made abundantly clear after war had broken out in 1914, when Maxse 
was demanding much stricter control over the extent of Jewish influence in 
Britain. 
, "Never again"· must the International Jew, guided and governed 
by racial prediction and by financial interests of which we are 
ignorant, become a factor in British policy. He must either 
end his intrigues or change his domicile. If he can't learn 
wisdom there will arise an irrestible demand that all German 
Jews shall return to the various countries they came from.,IS 
This Jewish interest in finance filtered through into British politics. 
When Sir Ernest Cassel, the Jewish financier, accompanied Sir Edward Grey, 
the Foreign Secretary, on a trip to Germany, Maxse was indignant. Speaking 
for the 'man in the street', he declared that 'Englishmen prefer that their 
19 Government should keep clear of the Cosmopolitans of la haute finance'. 
Unfortunately, as far as Maxse was concerned, the ordina~ man's preference 
had become completely neglected. 'All decent, self-respecting men are 
thoroughly nauseated by the repulsive hypocrisies of a professedly de~ocratic 
------. 
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coalition which is largely financed by multi-millionaires of alien extraction', 
he wrote, and went on to complain about the links between politicians and the 
Hewbrew press, and the sale of honours, and corruption. The charges were 
extremely insulting, and very vague. But there was no doubt about Maxse's 
conviction concerning the source of Britain's sorry condition. 
'The deterioration of the standards of public life is the topic 
of the hour, and we can only hope that a relief from the present 
purgatory may be ·at hand, in spite of the Hebrew clutch upon 
the Radical Party, and the spread of Hebrew power and 
Hebrew ideals in Parliament, in the Press, finance and 
society. 121 
---- ~---------------------
Despite his declaration that there were many patriotic Jews, Maxse saw 
very little good in the Jew as such. 'The victory of Germany is for some 
22 
mysterious reason a desideratum of almost the entire Jewish race.' Since 
every aspect of British life had been affected by Jewish influence, there was 
a grave threat to the survival of the British people. But the Review also saw 
this alien menace at work in other countries. J.O.P. Bland, in an article 
called 'New York Revisited', referred to the growth of Jewish power in 
America. the growing numbers and racial solidarity of the Jews seem to 
create a vague uneasiness, foreshadowing the growth of an old problem on new 
il ,23 so • Mrs Donald Shaw, describing the Canadian 'problem' was more specific. 
'Now the Jew would provide no menace to Canada if Canada 
understood him or knew how to handle him, but she no more 
knows how to manage him than she knows how to manage the 
Oriental, the Doukhobor, or the Mormon ••• He finds himself, 
on his entry into Canada, only one degree less hated and 
despised than he is in the countries from which he has 
escaped ••• Is it to be wondered at if his ideals remain low, 
if his natural acquisitiveness takes a form repellent to the 
civilised sections of the community, if he sees little to 
admire in the ideals or the morals of a so-called Christian 
country?,21t 
The tone of this article suggests an inevitability about the clash of 
culture, and expressed no surprice at the antagonism displayed towards the Jew. 
His alien nature was emphasised and, as with the general coverage of the Jewish 
question in the Review, seems to be the crux of the problem of Jewish-Gentile 
relations. But the problem, having been identified, had to be explained in 
cautious terms. As noted in the chapter on the Witness, expressions of open 
hostility were still largely unacceptable in Edwardian society, at least in 
public. The dominant cultural patterns of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
25 
century Britain discouraged such utterances. 
Maxse was anxious to defend himself against charges of anti-semitism and 
frequently declared himself free of prejudice. Thus, in September 1914, after 
-- -- - -- ---~---------- --- -----------
asserting that most Jews seemed to $~de with Germany in the War, he went on 
to praise the many loyal Jews ~n England. This was emphasised the following 
month. 
'The Jews form a valuable and stable element in the community. 
We are richer by their presence. They set a fine example of 
industry, pertinacity and c~acity in many areas of activity, 
while their domestic virtues are altogethel1 admirable. There 
is no racial or religious prejudice against Jews in England 
and I' should regret if anything appearing in this Review 
should cause pain to a single Jew ~Jew.t26 
As with the writers in the Witness, Maxse's definition of anti-semitism 
was active hostility to all Jews. As long as one made exceptions and said nice 
things about certain Jews, one could not be anti-semitic, whatever language was 
used against 'bad' Jews. For example -
'As people bluntly put it in private conversation, "Considering 
how badly the Germans treat the Jews, and how generously we treat 
them, why should they almost always be working for Germany and 
against us." We have no quarrel with Jews and greatly admire 
many of them, whom we recognise as patriots with the best English-
men. Lord Rothschild, if not all his relations, is of this type, 
as the late Alfred Beit certainly was. But there are others who 
shall be nameless for the moment, though they could easily be 
named, who have constituted themselves a sort of advance guard of 
the Prussian Junker, and devote their energies, their talents, 
and their fortunes to furthering German aims at British expense.,27 
In an attack on Sir Edward Speyer, a wealthy Jewish financier, Maxse 
tried to make it clear that there was no element of anti-semitism behind the 
criticism. 'As we have said, we have no prejudice against Jews qua Jews, but 
we are not prepared to stand by and see this country eaten up by Jews of 
28 German proclivities.' When he did encounter accusations of being anti-
semitic, his reply was that he was simply pro-British, and therefore anti-
German. This was suffiCient to explain his attitude, since according to his 
own theory of the German-Jewish conspiracy, to be anti-German was to be anti-
Jewish, albeit in a secular, unprejudiced manner. 
'It is their politics and not their religion or their raCe that 
we resent. unlike many other extraneous elements in British 
civilisation they have not unreservedly thrown in their lot 
with us. If they have not remained Jews in religion, they have 
216. 
cerr~in1y. for nation~l and international purposes, remained 
German at heart.' 30 
It was a simple but essentially irrational defence. In the general atmosphere 
of spy scares and xenophobia of an approaching war, it may have appeared 
reasonable to many. However, Maxse was propounding his theory long before 
277. 
August 1914, as has been shown. He may have had some justification for suggest-
ing that certain Jews had some sympathy with Germany. There may well have been 
financiers whose business made them uneasy about a disruption of relations 
between Britain and Germany, and whose pacifist ideas arose as a result of 
economic motivation rather than moral conviction. The case of Sir Edgar Speyer, 
already referred to, is one which may be considered as being in this category. 
Speyer Brothers were bankers in London, Frankfurt and New York, and the firm did 
31 
seem rather more German-oriented during the war. There are, no doubt, other 
examples of pro-German international companies, whose operations extended to 
Britain, and who had certain financial influence in the City. But was Maxse 
justified in alleging that all German sympathy came from Jews, and that there 
was a conspiracy, intentional or otherwise, to destroy British confidence and 
security? His obsession with the topiC, and his continual emphasis on its 
Jewish aspects, suggests that he was step~ing beyond the bounds of rational 
expression. 
There were critics of Maxse's phraseology. H. Pereira Mendes, rtin1ster of 
the Spanish and Portugese Congregation in New York, compl~ined about comments 
in the January 1912 edition of the Review, which he felt contained 'remarks 
which are likely to create ill-feeling and promote prejudice where there is 
32 
cause for neither.' He added 'why this animus against the Jews? t'lhy impugn 
their patriotism, their loyalty, so unjustly?' The letter then set out rational 
arguments and information, in an attempt to correct the image created by Maxse, 
and concluded with a plea for 'justice, equality, liberty and toleration.' 
The Jewish Chronicle was also critical of the same edition, referring to the 
33 
writing as 'spiteful and foolish abuse'. 
Mendes had some justification for accusing Uaxse of promoting prejudice. 
~~ny of the letters received by the editor were in support of his ideology 
and may have come from correspondents encouraged by the publicity of these 
views in the journal. Maxse often justified his expressions of prejudice by 
278. 
putting them into the mouths of the general public, as if he were simply reflect-
ing their opinions. 'Even good-natured easygoing Englishmen immemorially 
accustomed to be trampled on by the least desirable aliens, are growing restive 
under the odious Hebrew domination which has operated exclusively in the 
34 interests of Germany and to the detriment of Great Britain.' Haxse was 
I 'l j ,35 something of a popu ist, be ieving in the excellence of ordinary men's udgement 
and that his was an accurate assessment of how they felt, hence his claim to speak 
36 for 'the man in the street.' In terms of influence, the correspondence which 
he received belies Donaldson's view that 'he was not taken very seriously by his 
37 
contemporaries.' , although the Liberal Nation described the Review as being 
38 
representative of the 'tea-table splutter of the golf-house and the club-room. '. 
The circulation figures, at the height of the Marconi publicity, approached 
39 20,000, a very reasonable distribution for a 2/6d (12~p) journal, comparable 
to those of the Spectator. 40 
Given his views of the British working man, Maxse may well have felt that 
since a large proportion of letters received contained anti-Jewish sentiments, 
a high percentage of the British people supported his attitude on the topic, an 
illogical assumption. Uany of the letters echoed the idea of a Jewish conspiracy. 
41 Theodore Rich, writing on the subject of the Swaythling Will, which provoked 
some controversy about Jewish 'clannishness', began with the usual disclaimer of 
prejudice, and then went on to abuse Jewish financiers, describing them as 'the 
42 financial pillars of the Radical party,' Another example of this attitude came 
from J.L. Garvin, editor of the Observer and the Pall r.1all Gazette. 43 He wrote 
to Maxse,agreeing with his opinions on Jewish influence in the Liberal Party -
with you, I think ;t.t 1s of the utmost importance to s~ how va,st is the 
wealth in the ha,nds of the cosmopolitan ndll~onaires of the Coalition,,44 
l~xse also received anonymous letters expressing hostility towards Jews and 
USing the stereotyped language of anti-semitism. 
'Bravo, Mr Leo fiaxse - I raise my hat to you as a Man in the 
Street, one who approves of a man who does what he considers 
to be his duty, justly and fearlessly - poor Lawson I'm afraid 
he was "got at" - "doped" - with liquid gold from some source. 
I and many other moderate Liberals in my Club think its time 
the viel (sic) that at present hides the financial (secret and 
otherwise) transactions of the Welshman George and the two Jews 
Samuel and Isaacs during the past 18 months should be torn c;n-
one side and the character of the political trio of Cabinet 
money grubbers exposed to the light of day and public opinion. 
What a revelation would come forth could the Bank Books, 
Cheque and Pass Books connected with all their Banking alcs 
of the three Shylocks mentioned ••• ,~ 
This letter from Tooting Liberal Club is a useful illustration of the kind 
of atmosphere engendered by the Marconi Scandal. There was political opposi-
tion to the particular Ministers involved and there was anti-semitic feeling, 
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both in the underlining of the word 'Jews' and in the use of the term 'Shylocks'. 
Added to this, we have a fairly dogmatic personality - his refusal to accept 
that Lawson had little evidence for his journalistic accusations and the alter-
native explanation of bribery, rather than recognition of the truth. 'A Man in 
the Street' seemed to recognise a kindred spirit in l-1axse and it would be hard 
to deny that they held certain shared assumptions in political and racial beliefs. 
On the subject of the Marconi Scandal, the National Review played the part 
of a campaigning journal. There was an obvious concern about the technical 
aspects of the contract and the terms agreed by both parties were heavily criti-
cised. The recognition of the danger in allowing such a contract to pass 
unnoticed seems to have originated in the publicity aroused by Lawson's articles 
in the Outlook. Maxse was anxious that this publicity be extended and, besides 
employing Lawson, gave space to other critics. A short article on the technical 
aspects of the contract by t1ajor Martin Archer-Shee M.P., the chief critic in 
46 the House of Commons, appeared in September 1912. Archer-Shee kept in contact 
with Maxse, writing after the October debate to repeat his criticisms about 
royalties (which he felt were too highl and the monopoly given by the terms of 
47 
the agreement. Other critics also aired their views in the pages of the 
Review. Leo Amery. another Conservative H.P., prominent in the attacks on the 
contract, offered his services after the Select Committee hearings, when the 
Scandal had lost much of its impact. 'I don't know if you want to keep pegging 
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away at Harconi but possibly you might find the enclosed speech worth publishing. 
48 I have at any rate spoken my mind pretty plainly about L.G.' Maxse clearly was 
interested in prolonging the campaign, because Amery wrote again a few days 
49 later, offering a title for his piece, and in August 1913, the article, 
with Amery's suggested headline, 'Saint Sebastian of Limehouse', appeared in 
50 the Review. 
Another important aspect of the campaigning nature of the coverage was 
Haxse's refusal to reveal his sources to the Select Committee. When asked if 
he would produce the names as evidence for his accusations of corruption, he 
used the journalistic prinCiple that an editor does not risk his credibility by 
such an action. Whether he had any names to give is not certain. However, he 
was supported in his stand by other journalists and editors. H.W. Wilson, editor 
of the Daily Mail, congratulated him on the fight, using language like 'It is 
good to see an Englishman who does not fear , . . .. , and he promised to have a 
51 
special article on the subject in the ~. Halter Guinness, TOry M.P. and 
owner of The Outlook, wrote with all· sorts of helpful advice on Maxse's possible 
fate and on the best course of action. 52 Others simply praised his courage. 
'It is now a question of whether a newspaper may be browbeat into subjection by 
a prejudiced body of politicians whose judicial abilities would be unequal to 
53 
an inquest on a drowned cat.' 'I wish all our people had only half your 
spirit and courage. 54 We'd have the rascals out in no time.' 
~~xse's refusal to reveal his sources led indirectly to many of the revela-
I 
I 
~ 
I 
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tions about the ~1arconi affair. It was a garbled version of his evidence before 
the Select Committee which appeared in Le Matin, and led to the libel suit 
brought by Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel against that journal. This case 
produced the statement from Rufus Isaacs about his purchase of American Marconi 
shares. Maxse's part in producing this evidence brought him praise from other 
crusading journalists. H.A. G~nne, editor of the strongly Tory Morning Post, 
had no doubt as to Maxse's importance in this matter. 
' ••• if it had not been for you I do not believe the thing would 
have come out at all, or if it had, it would have come out in a 
quite different way. In my opinion we have got them fairly by 
the back hair and it seems to me that it is left to you and me 
and the "Express" among this great Press of England, to fight 
the fight for purity and decency in political life.,55 
Being in such a prominent position in the crusade against Marconis, Maxse 
received many offers of advice and suggestions as to how to proceed with his 
campaign. 'A Man in the Street' from Tooting was only one example. Others, 
like Robert Campbell Scarlett, whose address was given as the Conservative Club, 
London, offered information. Scarlett had a list of the chief Marconi share-
holders, and described the main dealings as taking place in Ireland, France and 
56 Italy. Often, as in this case, the information was already well known (see 
the list of shareholders which appeared in the Financial News, 14 October 1912, 
produced by Lawson as evidence to the Select Committee). In other cases, the 
informer served a useful function. The following example was meant to show 
that Rufus Isaacs had in fact obtained his shares at an advantage, compared to 
the ordinary investor. It served its purpose adequately. 
'As one of the public, I gave an order several days before the 
17th, to one of the largest and most influential stockbrokers in 
the City, to secure me 100 American Marconis at lowest - and, I 
was only enabled on the 19 April to secure an attachment of 40 
shares, out of the 100 asked for - and which I had to pay £3~ -
There are, of course, many like myself, who only got a few 
shares allotted, and had to buy at a big premium, whereas, Sir 
Rufus Isaacs, Mr George and Co. were selling at a huge profit, 
and dividing "the sway" amongst themselves - without having had 
to put their hands in their pocket for a penny.' 57 
As mentioned before, attention was first focused in the Review on the 
technical aspects of the Harconi Contract. No doubt 1-1aXse was aware of the 
rumours of corrupt practice that were abroad, and also was anxious that some 
investigation should be carried out. Since other journals seemed reluctant to 
publicise, or were unaware of, the significance of such a favourable contract 
for the Harconi Company, Maxse felt additional responsibilities. He employed 
Lawson to write on the subject for the National Review. At first, Haxse's 
criticism had been rather vague, based on the premise that the Marconi Company 
Were being given preferential treatment, both in being offered the contract and 
in the negotiated terms. This was attributed to lack of business knowledge on 
the part of the Government, rather than to any deliberate conspiracy to defraud 
the national exchequer. However, some of Lawson's early articles in The Outlook 
were quoted, and these mentioned 'two financiers of the same nationality pitted 
against each other, with a third in the background acting perhaps as mutual 
58 friend.' Here, the Jews are clearly identified as belonging to a nation, 
obviously not British, or else there would be no point in using such a term. 
Since there was no criticism of the use of this term, it must be assumed that, 
in this context, it was fairly common. 
282. 
Lawson's dislike of the Marconi Company seemed to stem from four main points. 
First, it had a start on other competitors in the field of wireless telegraphy, 
'and it used that advantage with systematic selfishness'. Second, its operations 
were too secretive, and not even the Post Office knew exactly what progress was 
being made in its pioneer work. Third, the Company used its close and confiden-
tial relations with certain Government departments, the Post Office in particular, 
to its own advantage. Finally, the bulk of the shares were held by foreign or 
Irish holders. 'Numerically the Irish shareholders are predominant, but in 
financial power they must yield to the international section. What better 
breeding-ground than that could there be for share gambling, financial manoeuvr-
59 ing, political intrigue, and ugly rumours?' 
This last point is interesting, because attempts were often made at later 
28}. 
dates in the Scandal to discredit the Marconi Company because of its 'foreign' 
nature. l~ilst there is little doubt that the company had its headquarters in 
England, it did have several overseas concerns, and was indeed an international 
organisation. This was the natural result of being involved in communication 
systems throughout the world. But Maxse, along with others, was wary of 
internationalism, or cosmopolitanism, in wireless companies as in Jews, and 
called the Marconi Company a 'cosmopolitan Wireless Trust, comparatively use-
60 less in peace and potentially dangerous in war'. For the same reasons, he 
was unhappy about the financial backing of this company. 
' ••• what is the Marconi Company but a foreign company, and 
its largest shareholders, if the extraordinary transactions 
that have taken place abroad are bona fide and not the disguise 
which British politicians have adopted for purposes of specula-
tion, are foreigners and somewhat undesirable foreigners.,61 
The fact that these shareholders were foreign was enough to make them undesir-
able, particularly if the company was involved in an Empire Wireless chain. 
Maxse can have had no real insight into their moral qualities, but simply 
labelled them as undesirable because he had some kind of instinct. It was 
this instinctive reaction which produced the xenophobia which was so tied in 
to his dislike of the Jews. Foreign equals bad, and foreign is anything 
which did not conform to Maxse's standard of 'Britishness'. 
Lawson also played on the personal angle in much of his early coverage. 
He was convinced of the ministerial involvement that had been rumoured to be 
an integral part of the Marconi share boom. Lawson felt it was a 'sordid 
62 
story' similar to that of the South Sea Bubble. 'Ministers implicated in 
the South Sea Bubble were impeached and severely punished. What is to happen 
to Ministers who directly or indirectly may have been responsible for the 
63 Marconi Scandal?' He rejected the general acceptance of the Ministerial 
denials of shareholding in that Company which were made in the Commons on 
11 October 1912. 'The value of a denial is in the first place purely personal, 
and in the second place it must depend on the directness and completeness with 
which it is made. ,64 He clearly believed that Uinisters had invested in 
English Marconi shares, in spite of their protestations of innocence. It was, 
on the other hand, virtually impossible for him to prove his accusation. 
'Sufficient has. been said to show that a public man who wished to join in a 
Marconi or any similar gamble would be a very clumsy speculator if he bought 
or sold shares in his own name. The internal machinery of the Stock Exchange 
65 has been developed far beyond that prehistoric stage.' 
The personal attacks extended into his belief that there was some kind of 
conspiracy between the Post Office and the Marconi Company. The family ties 
between Godfrey Isaacs and Rufus Isaacs were continually emphasised, as was 
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the link with the Post Office, the Jewishness of the Postmaster General and the 
Company's Managing Director. To an anti-semite, who held definite views about 
the secrecy and clannishness of the Jews, the conspiracy was apparent. For 
Lawson, it was this Jewish relationship which gave him an objective to attack. 
Despite his legitimate complaints about terms of the contract and the award-
ing of such a monopoly, the most important factor in the Scandal, as far as 
Lawson was concerned, was the fact that Samuel, Godfrey and Rufus Isaacs were 
Jews. 
Maxse suported Lawson, even when the more wild claims that he made were 
destroyed by the Select Committee. On behalf of the Review, Maxse wrote 
'We have never pretended to be pioneers in this business but followed the 
66 Outlook and Ur W.R. Lawson, who has made the subject his own.' He referred 
67 
to 'the admirable and well-informed pen of Mr Lawson' and continued the 
defence long after Lawson had been discredited. Referring to the abuse that 
the journalist had been forced to endure in the Select Committee's cross-
examination, Maxse excused Lawson's rather inept attempts at justifying his 
writing. 'Many men admirable with their pens do not shine in the war of 
words at which parliamentarians are adept, just as many men who are clever 
68 
with their tongues are impotent with their pens.' 
There was 9, certain ambiguity about Maxse's support for Lawson, 1\t one 
point, he decla.red that the man should be judged solely on what he wrote in 
The Outlook and the Review. Lawson's 'sound instinct which prompted him to 
probe the Harconimystery' and the 'remarka,ble flaire\ with which he tackled 
69 the question would then be apparent. Yet Maxse was clearly aware of the 
dangers of relying on such unsubstantiated statements as those produced by 
Lawson. He was warned about the problem by Austen Chamberlain. 
'Lawson's evidence was very bad. I am told that the cross-
examination was not very skillful (sic), but it was 
sufficient to entirely break him down. 
If I may make a suggestion to you it is that in so far 
as relates to the personal position of Ministers it never 
can do any good to hint suspicions without definite proof 
or at least without clearly establishing facts which at any 
rate make a prima facie case for inquiry. I hope, therefore, 
that you will be very careful how you back Lawson's insinua-
tions for which he clearly had no proper basis.,7D 
Noticeably, Maxse's defence of Lawson begins to change. It rested not merely 
on the content of the articles but now stressed the service which they had 
performed in drawing attention to possible indiscretions. It was Lawson's 
'instinct' and ~laire' that were to be admired, not his accusations of corruption 
and conspiracy. 
Lawson's motives for criticising the contract may also have rested on 
another factor. As well as having technical and racial objections, he was a 
staunch opponent of the Liberal government. 1\ letter to Bonar Law revealed 
that there was a certain degree of political motivation in his opposition to 
the Marconi contract. He enclosed a copy of an article which was to appear in 
The Outlook on 12 october 1913 and stated that he had been asked to attend 
the House on the day of the debate, 11 October. If Law wished, he would be 
only too willing to give advice and information on the Scandal. As if to show 
his credentials, he added 'I have been a Conservative journalist for nearly 
71 
half a century'. Whatever the reason for initiating the investigation into 
the Marconi affair, Lawson had no doubt as to how it could be used against the 
Liberals. 
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The same pattern of thought can be applied to the National Review and 
Leo Maxse. The Review was a Conservative journal of the 'old school', very 
critical of the lack of unity and direction of the current opposition party. 
Nevertheless, its dislike of the Liberals was even greater, and it is no 
surprise to find that the Marconi Scandal was used frequently as a political 
weapon. Maxse's correspondence with various Conservative politicians and 
sympathisers makes it very clear where these political feelings led him during 
the campaign. Asaready shown, he was eager to give space to Archer-Shee and 
Amery on the subject and letters received show that he was in correspondence 
with other Conservative politicians on the topic of Marconi. Austen Chamberlain, 
Stanley Baldwin ('what a storyl There ought to be a pretty row at the share-
72 holders'meeting ), walter Guinness, Rupert Gwynne, the man behind the dis-
73 
closures in the Indian Silver affair, Rowland Hunt, the 'rebel' Tory M.P. 
74 
associated with the National League for Clean Government, and the various 
editors of Conservative newspapers such as the Daily Mail, Daily Express and 
Morning Post; all··these suggest that Maxse was part of a much broader and 
general Conservative attack although not necessarily instigated by the party 
itself. It was a similarity of thought that produced this opposition, not 
a determined party campaign. 
The Review, however, consistently denied that its opposition was due to 
political feeling of any kind, organised or unorganised. As evidence for this 
claim, it pointed out that certain Radical M.Ps like Sir Henry Norman and 
Sir George Croydon-Marks had been amongst the first to oppose the contract. 
Because they had done so, then the general opposition must have been based 
purely on the technical merits of the contract, not a simple desire to make 
political capital out of the issue. This rather absurd reasoning completely 
ignored the fact that Tory journals ,did simply use the affair as a weapon 
against the government. When M.Ps of both sides were critiCising the contract 
in the october debate, they all hastily declared that they did not subscribe 
to the wilder allegations of ministeri~l corru~tiont Sir George Croydon-Marks 
was one who took this line, suggesting that the scandalous charges had their 
origins somewhere in the Conservative party and press. The Revlew felt this 
was very unfair. 
'We would, however, remind Sir Croydon-Marks that these charges 
cannot be attributed to political prejudice, because they 
originated in a weekly paper, the Eye-Witness, which is under-
stood to be edited by a Liberal ex-member of Parliament, and 
they have been echoed and re-echoed in Labour organs which 
presumably support the coalition.,75 
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The Review was, in spite of this argument, equally guilty of distorting the 
evidence. No-one could realistically claim that Belloc and the Eye-Witness 
was on the side of the Liberal government. Indeed, the suggestion that the 
charges originated in the Witness ignores Lawson's earlier material in the 
Outlook. The charges, once formulated, or rather hinted at, were used by 
Conservative journals of lesser importance as an example of the Liberal abuse 
of power, something to be expected when the Conservative Party was out of office. 
Whilst the Review did not subscribe to the more obscure rumours, it nevertheless 
attempted to discredit the government. 
Conservative politicians were regarded as treating the affair in a detached 
manner, whereas the Liberals were intent on preserving their positions of 
authority, treating any criticism as political smear tactics. Thus, Lord Robert 
Cecil's opposition to the contract was described as noble because he was a 
76 
'high-minded, honourable man of rare and refreshing independence and courage.' 
He would not have been influenced by ~thinghe had readl indeed, he was 
unlikely to have seen the Review articles on the topiC of Marconi, since his 
political stance was 'poles apart' from that of the journal. Cecil was also 
described as 'impartial' because he had voted in favour of reporting Maxse to 
the Speaker of the House of Commons as a result of his refusal to reveal his 
sources of information to the Select Committee. However, Cecil may not have 
been as detached as Maxse tried to make out. In June 1913, he wrote to Maxse 
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asking for the original French text of theLe Matin article, which led to the 
ministerial revelations. He felt that it h~d been wrongly translated and that 
there was some debating point which could be used in the forthcoming confronta-
77 tion in the Commons over the Select Committee's report. 
A similar altruistic motive was attached to Bonar Law's desire for 
information from the Prime Minister after the Le Matin case. 
'The leader of the opposition, Hr Bonar Law, in no party spirit 
but as one of the responsible custodians of parliamentary 
honour, at the earliest possible moment asked the callous cyniC 
at the head of the Government whether he proposed to make any 
statement on Le Matin case, and doubtless encouraged by the 
attitude of the Hush-UP Press, Mr Asquith affected a surprise 
that any statement should be expected of him,78 
The scandal was also used by the Review to attack various individuals in the 
government. As well as Herbert Samuel, Rufus Isaacs and Lloyd George, the 
three most frequently rumoured to have been involved in conspiracy, Alec Murray, 
the former Chief Whip, and Asquith were frequent targets. Asquith was contin-
ua1ly referred to as the 'callous cynic', because he appeared to be involved 
in a 'cover-up' of the affair, but protested his innocence. In an article 
entitled 'The End of the Asquith Legend', Maxse referred to this seeming 
lack of concern about the morality of the situation. 
' ••• the administration of the callous cynic now at the head 
of affairs in this unfortunate country has not only lowered 
the whole tone of our public life, but is visibly relaxing 
the standards which were assumed, as a matter of course, to 
regulate the conduct of persons in high places, With a few 
more years of Asquithism the British Government will in many 
respects be indistinguishable from Tammany Hall. The energies 
of statesmen will be divided between Stock Exchan,e speculations 
and concealing these operations from the public.' 9 
The fact that Asquith knew of the American Marconis share dealings before 
they were generally made available as a result of the Le Hatin trial, and that 
he allowed his Ministers to make their limited denials of involvement in 
October 1912, was used to condemn the man. According to Maxse, Asquith was 
'officially and personally responsible for one of the worst gambles with the 
80 truth in the annals of the Mother of Parliaments.' When it became known 
that Murray had been investing Party funds in American Marconis, the condemna-
tion of the Asquith government was even stronger. 
'The name of Asquith will for all time be a byword in British 
history, unless as we may hope a merciful Providence buries 
itself in charitable oblivion. It is only under such as he 
that these things could happen. No one has lowered and dis-
honoured our public life like the present Prime Minister. 
If the worst example is set in the highest office what may 
we expect elsewhere. The unabashed bribery and corruption 
which is now becoming a part of our political system is the 
direct product of the Asquith regime. Bad as things may have 
been before his Premiership, they have been infinitely worse 
since. A man without conviction, or conscience, with nothing 
to commend him except the gift of educated gab is the right 
man to preside over the present cabal of needy, greedy, seedy 
adventurers, some of whom do the dirty work while the more 
respectable ones supply whatever reservoirs of whitewash may 
be required. There seems nothing of which an Asquith Govern-
ment is incapable, for the simple reason that there is nothing 
which an Asquith is not prepared to countenance.,81 
The basis of this attack was the events of the Scandal, yet the Review could 
insist at the same time that no political point was being sou~ht in the 
affair. This intrigue of Asquith was a blatant use of events for this very 
purpose. 
Lloyd George was also a favourite target of the Review. It was a fairly 
simple matter to score political points against a man who had denounced 
unearned income, and then been shown to be dabbling in share dealings of a 
dubious nature. Maxse took full advantage of the situation. Lloyd George's 
policies were unpalatable to many Tories, and ~1axse was simply one of many 
who took every possible opportunity of discrediting the 'Welsh 'Wizard'. 
In this particular case, it took the form of 'Destroying a Legend', or as 
Maxse preferred it, "Revealing the Myth'. He maintained that Lloyd George 
could no longer talk about unearned increment, the basis of his famous'Lime-
82 house speech, whithout being interrupted by cries of 'What about Marconis?' 
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In addition, Maxse was outraged by Lloyd George's protests about the criticisms 
he had had to suffer throughout the Scandal. Apart from the fact that 1be 
ordeal was self-inflicted, Maxse considered that the Chancellor had actually 
survived the affair quite well. 
'What t1r Lloyd George is re~lly suffering from is th~t he 
has been let off much too cheaply. In no civilised country 
in the world except Great Britain could he have remained 
Minister of Finance. However he continues to whine and snarl 
amidst the uproarious enthusiasm of the COcoa Brigade, and 
the cartoonist of the Westminster Gazette has depicted him as a 
martyr.,S3 
Yet as far as Maxse was concerned, Lloyd George was guilty of using inside 
knowledge to benefit his own pocket, he had been 'unable to resist the 
temptation of speculating in Marconi shares and snatching an unearned incre-
ment of several hundred pounds per day between April 17 and April 20 without 
B4 having to put up a single shilling.' So great was the dislike of Lloyd 
George and his role in the Scandal that Maxse singled him out for special 
attention. He addressed an anti-Lloyd George meeting shortly before Lloyd 
George was due to speak at Bedford, had copies of the Review distributed, 
and sent telegrams with some embarrassing questions on the eve of Lloyd 
George's appearance. 
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The anniversary of the October debate, when Lloyd George had so vehemently 
denounced the rumours of ministerial specul~tion in Marconi shares, was the 
spur for Maxse, who was determined to continue the publicity of the Scandal. 
Lloyd George was to speak at Bedford on 11 October 1913 and Maxse wrote to 
Lord AmpthillBS about the possibilities of a counter-meeting at Bedford. 
His idea was well received. 
'I heartily agree with your suggestion that we ought to take the 
wind out of Lloyd George's sails by hol~ng a Marconi meeting 
at Bedford just before he comes there, I had indeed thought of 
similar measures myself and I have been instructing the Junior 
Unionist Association of which I am President to hold meetings 
allover the country between the present time and the 11th october.'SS 
The chairman of the local Unionist Association, N.E. Prothero, welcomed 
B7 tt,axse's visit as an opportunity to 'slash the great imposter' and finally 
the date of 9 October was selected, with Robert Cecil or George Cave as 
BB 
additional speaker. Propaganda was to be distributed in the form of the 
october edition of the Review, provided free by Maxse and delivered by members 
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of Ampthill.s Junior Unionist Association • In this edition, Maxse had 
written an article enti.t1ed ~r;rorn Bogota to Bedi;ord·, (B09ata being a reference 
to Lord Murray's departure for South America on business during the period of 
the Marconi revelationsl, which began ~ 
'Mr Lloyd George's public services have been few and far between 
during the last year, and even his warmest admirers are somewhat 
perturbed by the spirit of procrastination and hesitancy which 
marks his movements. He was billed to burst the feudal system 
year ago, but on one pretext or another he has continually 
postponed this beneficent operation, though it is now positively 
asserted - unless of course, another war in the Balkans should 
intervene - that the great man will commence his:great wotk at 
Bedford on October 11, a day redolent of sinister memories, being 
the anniversary of that fatal Friday afternoon in the House of 
Commons when time alone compelled r1essrs Lloyd George and Co. to 
economise the truth about their Marconi ventures.,9 
The article asked several questions of Lloyd George. The two main points 
were first, whether Lloyd George was aware of Lord Murray's investment of 
Liberal Party funds in American Marconis 'during the negotiation of the Marconi 
contract with the Parent Company, which would subsequently require Parliamentary 
91 
ratification,' and second, whether he knew of the Party investment in Home 
Railway shares during the coal strike of March 1912, a recent discovery by the 
journal. This second point was important, since railway shares had dropped 
in value during the strike and, as ministers had been involved in the negotia-
tions, they would have had some knowledge of how soon it was likely to be 
before the strike ended and the share value rise again. Maxse was able to give 
details of contract notes for this order, a total of over twenty one thousand 
pounds of stock, although he could not say with certainty that the deal had 
been completed. To all appearances, cheques had been delivered to cover the 
costs, but there was a slight doubt, Nevertheless, the party's intentions 
were clear and this was sufficient to reveal the amoral objectives of the 
ex-Chief Whip, Lord Murray. 
In fact, such a deal had been concluded. Murray had purchases, in March 
1912, through his broker Fenner, about £21,000 of British railway shares for 
Liberal Party funds. This investment was used by Maxse during the House of 
1 
Lords Select Comm~ttee investigation into Lord Murray's activities during the 
Marconi Scandal, although the editor did back down somewhat, :refusing to say 
that the sinister motives outlined above were his. The Committee felt this a 
somewhat abject withdrawal; 'no other intelligible interpretation of the 
charge was offered.' Maxse's criticism was rejected outright. 'In fact, 
Lord Murray knew no more than the public knew about these negotiations, 
(between government, owners and miners K.L.) and bought in the ordinary way. 
92 There is no ground for any accusation on this head.' 
Little notice seems to have been taken of Maxse's charges at the time. 
The New Witness noted his comments but added that few other newspapers had 
93 done so. In spite of this, Maxse continued to use the purchase of these 
shares in his campaign against Lloyd George. During his Bedford speech on 
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9 October, he posed the two questions about Murray's activities again. These 
94 
were repeated in a letter to Lloyd George and also in a telegram on 11 October, 
95 
when Lloyd George was to speak in Bedford. All these items were reproduced 
in the November edition of the Review, with r·1axse' s expression of regret that 
Lloyd George had not answered the questions, although answers had not been 
expected. 
'It would not have mattered much what Mr Lloyd George replied 
because his memory is painfully defective, while his inaccuracy 
almost amounts to mental deficiency. He is terrified of plung-
ing further into the morass, as well he may be. Perhaps he is 
silent because he is conscious of the worthlessness of his own 
testimony. ,96 
Nor did Haxse's pursuit of Lloyd George end at Bedford. Indeed, as 
memories of the Scandal began to fade, so Maxse became more violent in his 
abuse of Lloyd George. Referring to the alleged decline in the popularity of 
the Chancellor, he claimed that the Sclndal would be a real barrier in his 
future career. His involvement in the affair had shown him to have 'the 
intellect of a rabbit.' 97 One writer, calling himself '1\ Simple Tory', used 
the Scandal as the focal point of a really bitter attack on Lloyd George 
entitled 'The Eclipse of Anania9~. 'His mental tortures were as truly self-
inflicted as the sufferings of the female lunatics who go on hunger-strike. 
98 His real misfortune was that he had been found out.' No amount of postur-
ing by Naxse could justify the claim that the Review did not use the affair 
in a party sense. Lloyd George certainly felt the impact of such an 
intensive campaign. In 1932, on hearing of the death of Maxse, he wrote to 
Frances Stevenson - 'You remember he was responsible for all that trouble 
about Marconi. If he suffered half as much pain as he then inflicted out of 
99 
sheer partisan spite - then I am sorry for him.' 
other Liberal politicians were also pursued for the contribution to the 
Scandal. Rufus Isaacs and Herbert Samuel were frequent targets, Isaacs for 
his share dealings and the disgrace which he subsequently brought to the 
office of Lord Chief Justice and Samuel, because it was his department, the 
Post Office, that had given the contract to the Marconi Company. The ex-
Chief Whip, Lord Murray, as has already been shown, displeased Naxse because 
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of his dealings in American Marconi shares, on his own behalf and with Liberal 
Party funds. There seemed to be something sinister about his resignation in 
August 1912, and his departure on business to South America. Whilst the other 
ministers were giving evidence to the Select Committee, Murray was in Bogota, 
Columbia and unable to answer questions. The Review, along with the Horning 
~, brought various charges about t<lurray's activities during the affair to 
the House of Lords Select Committee, which Murray had to face on his return. 
He was deemed by that body to have made several serious errors of judgement 
in relation to the purchase o~ Marconi shares for himself and for the Liberal 
Party but it was decided that his personal honour had not been impugned. As 
already described, Maxse's allegations about dealings in railway shares were 
dismissed, an action described in the Review as 'a regrettable precedent.' 
'In this case the amount was trifling, and it would be absurd 
to suggest that under any circumstances Ministers would allow 
such an investment to colour their conduct. At the same time 
we venture to think it would be a sound and salutary rule that 
under no circumstances should Party funds be invested by any 
member of the Government in stocks or shares likely to be 
affected by negotiations in which the Government were engaged.' 100 
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The dismissal of the railway shares question by the Select Committee appears to 
have marked the end of Haxse's campaign on this issue. It seems to have had 
little support, even on its initial publication, and only The New Witness 
consistently reported his remarks on the topic. The most likely explanation 
for this is that the publiC, tired of the Marconi affair, had little energy or 
enthusiasm for another share scandal. The response to Murray and railway 
stock, or rather the lack of response, indicates a decided disinterest. 
However, the seemingly tireless Maxse had yet more targets to aim at, 
using the Scandal as ammunition. The parliamentary Labour party found itself 
under siege for siding with the government during the affair. Speaking of the 
loss of public respect for parliament which had resulted from the Scandal, 
Maxse warned that the Labour Party was not exempt from the opprobrium. 
'But let no so-called "Labour" fondly imagine that it stands to 
gain through the loss of other parties, as no body of politi-
cians have accumulated more discredit than the "tame cats" of 
the Coalition, who ostensibly follow the lofty and inspiring 
guidance of that single-minded man of the people, Mr Ramsay 
l1acDonald, though most of them only ask to be allowed to do 
the needful required to keep Messrs Asquith and Co. in office.,IOI 
Later on, he referred to the Parliamentary Labour Party as 'the bond slave of 
102 the Radical Plutocracy, ,and attributed their support of the corrupt Liberal 
government to the fact that M.Ps had recently been paid a salary of £8 per week. 
The insinuation was that Labour members existed only for the money that they 
could make out of office. 'We shall only destroy Panama when Hembers of 
Parliament cease to be paid, and the House of Commons regains some fraction 
103 
of its former freedom.' 
Thus, it can be said that many of the attacks in the Review on the con-
tract and on those involved in the share dealings were based on political 
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grounds. There were, perhaps, genuine grievances about the details of the 
contract, but these became hidden in the myriad of political jibes and debat-
ing points which followed. But it must also be said that the welter of 
criticism directed against the Jewish officials, the two Isaacs brothers and 
Herbert Samuel, hardly ever descended to the petty anti-semitism, such as that 
produced in The Eye-Witness. However, having already described Maxse's 
attitude towards certain Jews, his arbitrary division into 'good"and 'bad', 
it is not surprising to find that a general anti-semitism crept into the 
journal's coverage of the affair. 
The essential factor in much of the unsubstantiated rumour surrounding the 
Scandal came from the fact that Godfrey Isaacs was Jewish, that he had a brother 
in the cabinet, and that the government minister in charge of negotiations with 
the Marconi Company was also Jewish. Hence, it was fertile ground for the 
development of a conspiracy theory, both in the narrowest sense of Isaacs and 
Samuel conniving together, and also in the wider context of 'the Jews' versus 
the British people. The constant harping on the theme of disloyal Jews, 
whilst conceding that some, perhaps most, were extremely patriotic, led Maxse 
to make some very inflammatory statements. 
'What have we done that we should be persecuted by the Jews? 
Do we persecute them? On the contrary, we seem to be stand-
ing by and allowing them to capture power after power in this 
country. They would appear to aim at an Imperium in imperio. 
They are not content with capturing international finance, 
except as a lever for fresh intrigue in internation relations, 
and they always give a casting vote for Germany.' 104 
Lawson was also a ;?rotagonist of the conspiracy theory. In his article for 
The outlook in July 1912, which was reproduced in the Review in September!OS 
he referred to 'two financiers of the same nationality' i.e, Godfrey Isaacs 
and Herbert Samuel, pitted against each other 'with a Third in the background' 
(Rufus Isaacs}, 'acting perhaps as mutual friend'. This relationship was 
always prominent in Lawson's campaign, and he was always careful to point 
out that Jews were involved. He used stereotyped language in referring to 
1 
these men; for example, ~n the quotation above, Godfrey Isaacs and 
Herbert Samuel are 'financiers~, although 'company director' and 'Government 
Minister' would have been more accurate labels. In a later article, when 
referring to Godfrey Isaacs' persistence in demanding substantial royalties 
for the use of f.~arconi equipment, he wrote 'Mr Isaacs, rather than forgo 
106 his pound of flesh on the royalties ••• ' Whilst this may have been 
simply a thoughtless use of metaphor, it was a rather unfortunate choice of 
words. It conjured up the Shylock image of the Jew and applied it to 
Godfrey Isaacs as part of the attack on the man. 
These hostile images were also used by Maxse. When Samuel decried the 
scandal mongers and those who believed the rumours about ministerial involve-
ment in corrupt dealings over the contract, Maxse challenged the attack. 'It 
is common form on the part of members of the present Government, who them-
selves live on poisoning the wells of public opinion and on fermenting class-
107 hatreds, to attribute every attack on themselves to political malice.' 
The use of the phrase 'poisoning the wells of public opinion' is an 
interesting one. The myth of the Jews as poisoners goes back to the twelfth 
century, when eighty six Jews were burned for allegedly plotting to poison 
108 Christians. In 1321, in France, it was rumoured that 
•••• Jews, in league with the king of Tunis and other infidel 
rulers, had conspired with the lepers to exterminate 
Christianity by poisoning wells with a secret formula (re-
ported to be composed of urine, herbs, human bloed, and a 
sacred hostl) revealed by the lepers under torture. The 
theme of a Jewish world conspiracy is born - six hundred 
years before the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.,109 
Similarly, the Black Death led to rumours of a similar nature. 
'The story that Jews in Spain had circulated the death-
dealing drug to poison the wells of all Christendom spread 
like wildfire. It was first believed in Southern France, 
where the entire Jewish population of a town was burned. 
From there the deathly trail led into Northern Spain, then 
to Switzerland, into Bavaria, up the Rhine, into Eastern 
Germany, and to Belgium, Poland and 1\ustria. ,110 
Rosenberg's study of the Jew in fiction shows how this traditional image was 
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passed on from one generation to another. 
'When the medieval and Renaissance Jew does not pose as a 
crucifier or mutilator, he frequently appears as poisoner. 
The who.le of Marlowe's Jew of Malta is presumably an echo 
of the accusation, widely circulated in the fourteenth cen-
tury, that the Jews had caused the Black Plague by poison-
ing the wells, though doubtless the old superstition of the 
Jewish witch-doctor contributed to his being cast in this 
role.' III 
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Norman Cohn has shown that this fantasy originated at the same time as 
the accusations of ritual murder began to develop and thus this accusation of 
112 poisoning the wells is solidly entrenched in the language of anti-semitism • 
Maxse's use of the metaphor is therefore blatantly anti-semitic, if the phrase 
was used deliberately to discredit the Jewish influences in the Liberal party. 
If it was simply a thoughtless use of a particular figure of speech, it gives 
some indication of how deeply these anti-semitic legends had become entrenched 
in everyday language. 
It has been shown that Maxse was making clear his dislike of the Jews in 
the Liberal government and elsewhere long before the ~~rconi Scandal erupted, 
but he continually insisted that his opposition was not due to any kind of 
anti-semitic feeling. 
'Lest we be thought to write with prejudice on such matters -
and we frankly confess to profoundly distrusting government 
by Isaacs, by Samuel, and by Montagu, not because they are 
Jews - for many Jews we have the greatest respect - but 
because they are bringing discredit on this country, which is 
falling more and more into the hands, not of the best Jews, 
who make admirable citizens, but of the type of Jew who regards 
the whole duty of man as consisting in scoring some material 
advantage ••• t 113 
He was able to write a month later that 'with every week that passes Mr Samuel's 
ineptitude becomes more conspicuous, and, taken in conjunction with con tem-
porary episodes, it is safe to say that government by Samuel, Isaacs and 
114 Montague is scotched, if not killed.' The conclusion must be that Isaacs, 
Samuel and Montagu were regarded as 'bad' Jews and so the general abuse directed 
at these so-called unpatriotic Jews applied to the three named above. Maxse 
could describe certain behaviour as 'a stroke of Semitic slimness. beyond 
115 praise', a reference to the use of F.E. Smith and Edward Carson as 
prosecuting counsel in the Le Matin case. This had meant that two of the most 
formidable political opponents of Isaacs and Samuel would be effectively 
silenced in any consequent parliamentary discussion of the affair, since it 
would have been 'contrary to the etiquette of the all-powerful Trade Union of 
the Law'. 116 Thus behaviour that I1axse found objectionable was attributed to 
the Jewishness of those who had carried out the action. 
One fact of the imagined Jewish conspiracy was the control of the media. 
Maxse was proud of the publicity that he gave to the Fcandal, because he felt 
it was important to provide people with the information. It was especially 
vital that the Review should carry out the task, because he believed that the 
traditional Tory press were incapable or unwilling to do so. In addition to 
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this feebleness, he felt that there was a general press boycott of the subject. 
This sentiment was frequently expressed in the Witness, and there is some 
117 
evidence to show that there was a basis for this supposition. l~xse began 
to refer to this section of the journals as 'The Hush-Up Press'. HoweVer, he 
saw more sinister implications in the boycott. 
'The policy of the Hush-Up Press, \'lhich is largely in the hands 
of Hebrews who are laying the foundations of an 
anti-Semitic movement, sought to divert attention from the 
delinquencies of Ministers to "the exhumation of a country 
gentleman" and other kindred topics; great credit is due to 
the Morning Post, the Daily Express, the Globe, and the 
Financial News, to mention only London papers, for their 
determined stand against the boycott. tllS 
Why so many journals took part in this boycott, Maxse was at a loss to say. 
He could not understand their attitude, but attempted to find some rational 
explanation. 
'In some cases no doubt personal friendship is a factor, and 
having been misled at the outset by some "friend at Court", 
who pledged himself that there was nothing whatsoever in these 
"Harconi rumours", amour propre prevented newspapers, which to 
some extent live on infallibility, from admitting having been 
misled. In other cases every public interest may be sacrificed 
to racial affinity.' 119 
This emphasised the control of the media that Jews held, and substantiated 
the 'P~tsda~ Press· remarks cited earlier in this chapter. Thus the Marconi 
Scandal dovetailed neatly, or could be squeezed to fit, into a general 
theory of the Jewish domination of the English press. 
In more general terms, the Marconi Scandal fitted into Maxse's concept 
of a Jewish conspiracy and this would explain why he gave the matter so much 
publicity. To him, it symbolised so many of the things that were wrong with 
Britain - moral decay, political pragmatism and social corruption. Maxse 
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seems to have seized on a conspiracy theory as a way of explaining this 
decline. By suggesting that a combination of radicals and Jews had brought 
about revolutionary and retrograde changes in Britain, he had an acceptable 
explanation of the causes of such change. In an impressionistic way, we can 
say that Maxse, in common with O'Donnell, the Chestertons and Belloc, saw the 
remedy of present evils as a return to the past. The late nineteenth century 
was conceived of as a kind of 'Golden Age' and they can hardly be described as 
optimistic about the potential of the twentieth century, at least on the 
evidence of its first few years. The decline of the present age was attributed 
to the sinister influences of some outside agency, in this case, as in many 
others throughout history, the Jews. It would seem that this explanation was 
accepted rather than attempt an analysis in a meaningful sense of the forces 
involved in the kind of social upheaval being experienced. To this extent, 
much of their anti-semitism can be explained in terms of a scapegoat theory. 
This suggestion, however, does not constitute a totally satisfactory study 
of the nature of anti-semitism in this period. It deals with hostility as a 
response to certain individual psychological needs. This is obViously an 
important element in any explanation but we need to know what forces help to 
shape those psychological needs. In short, we must be aware of the social, 
economic and political context within which individuals like Maxse developed. 
More specifically, we have to look at general attitudes to Jews and other 
minority groups in this period, with regard for any sub-cultures which exhibit 
Views opposed to the dominant patterns of thought. Only then can we begin to 
produce an overall view of British anti-semitism in this period and make 
conclusions about its origins and nature. It is to this wider study that we 
now turn. 
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CHAPTER 9 
A BACKGROUND OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND RACIAL STEREOTYPES 
Having established that the Marconi Scandal contains several elements of 
anti-semitism, it is vital to place this particular affair within a more general 
framework of attitudes towards Jews in this period, both in Britain and elsewhere. 
In order to produce any valid theory or explanation of the phenomenon of British 
anti-semitism, we must also make some comparative study of attitudes towards 
other minority groups. 
First of all, it should be established that the Marconi affair was not a 
single, isolated incident. Indeed, it was not even the only 'Jewish financial 
scandal' identified at this time by various critics. The fact that several poli-
ticians in high office were Jewish and that several national and international 
firms, particularly in the banking/Stock Exchange field had Jews at the highest 
managerial level meant that criticism of government contracts, negotiations or 
any other dealings with such firms exposed both politicians and company officials 
to charges of conspiracy similar to those put forward during the Scandal. Of 
course, this does present certain problems in deciding whether criticism was 
'objective' or merely anti-semitic. However, the working definition used in 
this study, as outlined in the introduction, refers to anti-semitism as the 
I hostility associated with the quality of being a Jew and careful examination of 
the context of remarks should allow the reasonable application of such a 
definition. 
The most significant and comprehensive scandal, comparable to Marconi, was 
the Indian Silver affair. 2 It concerned the purchase of silver on behalf of the 
Indian Government, a task usually undertaken by the India Office in consultation 
with the Bank of England. The main problem about this situation was the fact 
that this had become an expensive procedure, as J.M. Keynes explained in 1913. 
'The silver market is a very narrow one and can only be dealt 
in through the agency of one or other of a very small number 
of brokers. A ring of speculators lay waiting to force prices 
up as soon as the government should appear as a buyer. Apart 
from the brokers who acted for the ring, there was only one 
firm in a position to buy large quantities of silver with the 
secrecy which was necessary if the speculators were to be 
defeated.' 3 
308. 
That firm was Samuel Montagu and Company, and the stated reason for its involve-
ment in purchasing silver without prior consultation with the Bank of England 
was simply to attempt to prevent the kind of situation Keynes described above. 
Whilst it was generally conceded that such an agreement did save the government 
money, it also provided the firm of Samuel Montagu with a handsome profit in the 
form of brokerage fees (the National Review put the figure at £7000). This was 
unfortunate, in that there were certain personal relationships which casb some 
doubts on the motivation of the arrangement. 
Samuel Montagu and Company was headed by Lord Swaythling, who was father to 
Edwin Montagu, the Under-Secretary ~fState for India. Montagu's cousin, 
Sir Stuart Samuel, was Liberal M.P. for Whitechapel and a senior partner in the 
firm, as well as being the brother of Herbert Samuel, the Postmaster-General. 
In addition, other Jews were involved in the negotiations. The idea of the 
arrangement was proposed by the company to Sir Felix Schuster, chairman of the 
Finance Committee of the Council for India but also chairman of the Montagu's 
leading bankers, the National Provincial. Finally, negotiations on behalf of 
the India Office were conducted by the Assistant Under-Secretary, Lionel Abrahams, 
who was also Jewish. It was an extremely complicated pattern of relationships, 
involving both family ties and a common Jewish link, which provoked a predic-
4 
table reaction. 
The main opposition to the contract came from a Conservative M.P., 
Rupert Gwynne, who represented Eastbourne. In October 1912, he began to ask 
questions in the Commons about the nature of the agreement anq he was supported 
5 in this by the Morning Post, with which he had close contact. The parliamentary 
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questions came thick and fast, mostly from Gwynne, but other Conservative 1-1.P.s 
also joined in the quest for details. As information slowly became available, 
the press began to add its comments. Most of the leading Conservative journals 
noted the close relationship between members of Samuel Montagu and the India 
Office and expressed their dismay. In particular, The Outlook dwelt on the 
similarities between this matter and the Marconi Scandal • 
•••• the dealings of the present Ministry with the financial 
interests of India and their apparent subordination to racial 
and family considerations form a disquieting, a most disquieting, 
appendix to the peculiar features so widelI discussed in connec-
tion with the attempted t-tarconi monopoly.' 
Whilst avoiding the formulation of any specific charges, the journals referred 
7 to the 'unfortunate coincidence' of the relationships , and to a lack of delicacy, 
B 
rather than deliberate corruption. The Spectator went so far as to suggest that 
Samuel Montagu and Company give up its commission on the deal. 'By such an act 
of renunciation they would go far to rebut the accusation that members of the 
Jewish race are not sensitive upon the point of personal honour in public 
9 
affairs.' The same stereotype of Jewish clannishness and conspiracy that had 
been applied during the Marconi Scandal thus came into play in Indian Silver. 
Even John Bull, a journal which was usually sympathetic to the Liberals, 
criticised the government's approach. The use of the company had been unjusti-
10 fied and the lack of tact shown had meant loss of prestige. 
Bottomley's judgement, in this case, was quite sound. The deCision to use 
the company may technically have been the right one, but it left the government's 
critics a great deal of scope for attack. The Spectator summed it up precisely: 
the agreement probably saved money but at the expense of the government's 
reputation. ll Keynes felt that the India Office officials had a choice, to buy 
openly and pay the inflated price or to risk 'charges of venality from anyone 
who might have an interest in discrediting the government' by using Samuel 
Montagu and saving money. The decision to opt for the second alternative was, 
Keynes felt, made in a spirit of 'too great innocence, bred of long immunity 
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12 from charges of personal sc~dal.' The Royal Commission looking at the 
13 general question of Indian finance found no technical offence involved but 
suggested that the action had been politically naive. We think it advis-
able to call the attention of the Secretary of State to the importance of 
avoiding as far as possible all occasion for criticism of this nature, though 
14 it may be founded on prejudice and ignorance of the facts.' 
It was certainly true that the affair produced the expression of a stereo-
type of Jewish conspiracy, which was the basis of the assumption that the 
British people were being done a disservice by this secret arrangement. However, 
it was not a totally hostile image. One journal, Truth, suggested that such a 
conspiracy could work in favour of the public. 
'Anti-Semites of the Bellockian school, seeing names like Samuel, 
Montagu, and Schuster in print, conclude at once that here must 
be a foul conspiracy against the State. It seemed so obvious -
a great contract for silver placed by India not with the good old 
British Bank of England as heretofore, but with the firm of Montagu; 
the Under-Secretary for India himself a Montagu; a partner in the 
firm having a seat in the House, and his brother a seat in the 
Cabinet; the financial adviser to the India Office was, by a coin-
cidence, the firm's banker and another scion of an ancient stock. 
The whole affair was kept secret as the grave until it was exposed 
by a patriotic Conservative member. Was there ever a clearer case 
prima facie? Gentlemen, your verdict. 
It did not occur to the Anti-Semites that men can conspire not 
only against the State but also in favour of it. A family which 
has given three hostages to politics in the persons of a Cabinet 
Minister, an Under-Secretary, and a private member with a safe 
constituency would scarcely be so fatuous as to indulge in a vulgar 
intrigue to diddle the India Office. However easy might be that 
inviting enterprise, exposure would be certain and its consequences 
disastrous. It was a much shrewder notion to step in and prevent 
the poor old India Office being diddled by somebody else.,15 
But in spite of what may have been a very valid argument, the situation did 
create an impression of insensitivity. As the Spectator put it, there was 
16 
'An Appearance of Evil.' For those with certain preconceptions about Jews 
and finance, the facts of the agreement were suffiCient proof of corruption, 
just as they had been in Marconi. 
There was an added dimension to the Indian Silver affair. Sir Stuart 
Samuel found that, as a member of a firm which was under government contract 
311. 
(although it was claimed this had been merely an informal arrangement), he was 
liable to severe penalties for voting in the House whilst under such obligation. 
According to the constitutional procedure at that time, being a government 
contractor was a disqualification from being an M.P. There were complicated 
legal and procedural questions to be decided and, on 22 November 1912, after a 
Commons debate, a Select Committee was established to investigate the question 
17 
of Sir Stuart Samuel's resignation and/or disqualification. The recommendation 
of the Committee was that the matter should be decided by a Judicial Committee 
18 
of the Privy Council. Eventually, the findings of this committee, which were 
published in April 1913, decided that • "though no suggestion has been made of 
improper motive, the said Sir Stuart Samuel was disabled from sitting and voting 
19 in the House."· However, a by-election was hastily arranged, and on 30 April, 
Samuel was returned with a reduced majority to his old seat. There was a great 
deal of debate about the financial penalties which he might be subject to, as 
a result of his voting whilst under government contract, and an Indemnity Bill, 
which would have absolved him from such payment, met fierce Conservative 
20 
opposition. 
One final element in the scandal was a debate on Indian finance on 
13 February 1913. This took place as a result of a motion by Gwynne, who was 
demanding that a Select Committee investigate the affair and who used the 
debate to challenge the financial arrangement with the Company. He again 
described in detail the family relationships, as he had done earlier that month 
21 in an edition of Our Flag. The essence of the debate was the Liberal contention 
that commercial interests were the sole criteria for the arrangement, the 
Conservative criticism was that the matter looked very like •••• using patronage 
22 in order to help your political party, and to strengthen the political machine,' 
as Bonar Law put it, and so opened the way for real corruption. Asquith 
accepted that some general investigation should take place, suggested a Royal 
Commission, and this was sufficient to defeat Gwynne's motion, despite some 
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murmurings from the Tory back benches, led by Sir Hugh Cecil. In the press 
post-mortems, these party differences were rammed home. The Westminster Gazette, 
complaining about the suggestions of corruption, pointed to what it considered 
even worse developments: •••• these occasions have been used to beat up -
what happily has been unknown in this country till now - a purely racial 
23 prejudice against certain firms and individuals of untarnished character.' 
Conservative journals noted the secrecy of the transactions, particularly the 
lack of information which both Sir Stuart Samuel and Edwin Montagu claimed. 
'Better that a thousand "silver rings" should triumph than that these trans-
actions, with their secrecy and concealment from this person and the other, 
should be conducted under the benevolent auspices of the Secretary of State for 
24 India.' The Throne saw links between this affair and Marconi. 'What does 
strike us in the whole matter, however, is the extraordinary mixture of secrecy 
and confidence with which these Radical Semitic plutocrats treat their friends 
and relations and co-religionists'. Having detailed the various 'secrets', 
the writer concluded 'Wby not? It is a phase of Oriental ism which we must 
confess is quite beyond our somewhat crude Anglo-Saxon understanding.· 25 
Political attacks continued long after this debate, just as they did in 
the Marconi Scandal. The protagonists were often the same people. 
G.K. Chesterton savagely berated Rufus Isaacs and Stuart Samuel over the 
Indemnity Bill, which he felt allowed Samuel to escape his just deserts. The 
two were called aliens and anarchists, far more effective than the indiscrimin-
ate bomber, because they were destroying the essential framework of the 
26 
country, the law, by their manipulation and corruption. William Ramage Lawson 
also added his keen eye for a Jewish • ramp' to the debate, describing Indian 
Silver as yet another reason for dismissing 'our Jewish Methodist Cabinet.' 
Having established the 'Semitic bond of unity ••• which doubtless stimulated 
their cooperation', Lawson then ~pealed to the patriotism of his readers. 
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'Visible or invisible, the Semitic character of the coterie cannot 
very well be ignored. It need not however have excited a particle 
of Gentile resentment had it restricted itself to fair legitimate 
competition with Gentile rivals in business. Unfortunately for 
itself and the India Office, it did not do that. In its commercial 
zeal it poached on a very sacred preserve of British finance - to 
wit, the Bank of England.,27 
That Indian Silver added to the anti-Jewish feeling, or rather helped to 
rekindle it, cannot be doubted. The Investors'Review was certain of its 
contribution. 
'Coupled with the prominence given to Sir Rufus Isaacs' congratula-
tions by cable to his brother, the manager of the Marconi Co., the 
Samuel Montagu and Co. incident has strengthened much of the anti-
Semitic prejudices with which 'the country is in danger of being 
over-charged. "There is far too much Jew in the Government", says 
the discontented Anglo-Saxon, and he says it more and more openly 
and with more and more support and sympathy in consequence of such 
incidents as the secret employment of Messrs. Samuel Montagu and Co. 
- a most respectable and reputable Jewish firm, but nevertheless an 
intimate connection of the Under-Secretary of State for India ••• ,28 
The article concluded with a further claim that 'race prejudice' was 'finding 
expression in political circles of all colonies. Our good Jewish citizens 
should take note. They are in a minority still.' 
How valid was this claim? Was anti-semitism as widespread as this finan-
cial journal suggested, at least in its particular area of specialisation? 
Indian Silver and Marconi had elements on which anti-semites could draw and, 
using written sources as a guideline, it would certainly seem that attention 
was being continually directed upon the 'Jewish Question'. If the Witness 
could boast in 1912 of being the only journal to discuss the matter, then, by 
the following year, it had no justification for a similar claim. The examples 
cited in this study have shown the increasing discussion of the 'Jewish Question' 
and the journals show growing hostility towards Jews in these years before 
1914. 
Explanation for the increasing hostility began to stress certain factors, 
particularly the political involvement of some Jews. Thus, a South African 
correspondent, in discussing Zionism as a possible solution to the Jewish 
problem, wrote: 
'There can be no manner of doubt that far more feeling exists 
and far stronger criticism is being expressed in England today 
against the Jew than has been the case for the last fifty years. 
This is probably due to two leading causes - namely, (1) the 
active part being taken in Party politics by scions of the race, 
and (2) the constant influx and spread throughout Anglo-Saxondom 
of poor alien Jews from Eastern Europe. ,29 
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Even a friendly writer in the Financial News, in a profile of Rufus Isaacs, 
acknowledged that his career had an additional hurdle - 'He has always realised 
that he was in one respect handicapped for political success - that is to say, 
he had to fight the anti-Semitic prejudice which undoubtedly exists among us, 
30 though we may try to persuade ourselves that it is not there.' 
This growing reaction was recognised by a large section of the Jewish 
community. During the 1912 coal strike, the Jewish Chronicle warned Jews in 
South Wales that they especially 'have to put a special guard upon their actions 
when carrying on business in a centre of grave social turmoil, even though that 
business is of the most honourable character, and those who transact it remain 
31 
strictly within their undoubted rights.' Obviously, the riots of the previous 
32 
summer had had a profound impact. In the same edition, 'Mentor', a regular 
columnist, referred to the recent upsurge in anti-Jewish feeling. 'As 
Englishmen equally as Jews, we may resent those modern abnormalities -
Arnold White, Hilaire Belloc, Chesterton, and Barr are ready examples - who, in 
33 the name of England, preach retrograde doctrine on race approximation.' 
The same writer, referring to the agitation surrounding the Marconi and 
Indian Silver affairs, had no doubt that anti-semitism played a considerable 
part in the publicity. 
'The prejudice which is imparted by the constant iteration of 
the fact that these men are Jews it were absurd to suppose is 
to be obliterated by a fulsome declaration of love for Jews in 
general or this or that Jew in particular ••• This attempt to 
win favour in this country for anti-semitic prejudice by "hooding" 
it, must be exposed as a device worthy of no-one above the moral 
level of the perverters of our people. We resent it as a mani-
festation of anti-semitism in which Englishmen should be 
ashamed to indulge ••• We know, we Jews, but too well - how 
a spark of anti-Semitism, dropped in the lumber-room of liter-
ary dilettantism is likely quickly to find material inflamm-
able as tinder, which, burning slowly yet surely, will suddenly, 
when we are least prepared, burst into fiery flame.' 34 
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In short, the pages of the Jewish Chronicle for the years 1912-14 contain 
a great many statements of this kind, which reflect the community's growing 
fear of anti-Jewish feeling. There was some justification for this apprehension, 
since overt violence against Jews had occurred in 1911. Riots, directly mainly 
against Jewish shopkeepers and landlords, broke out in South Wales in August of 
that year. As Alderman has pointed out, anti-semitic violence was a very 
35 infrequent occurr~nce, at least on a large scale, and he has suggested that 
these riots were 'a graphic illustration of the role which Jewish communities 
36 traditionally playas scapegoats for economic ills and industrial unrest.' 
Alderman's attempts to explain why violence occurred and why the Jews were the 
object of attack fall short in that he simply catalogues possibilities. 
Religious bigotry, particularly of the Welsh Baptists, is said to have had some 
part to play in the general hostility towards Jews, and he gives other examples 
37 
of such outbursts. Similarly, drawing on other examples of racial animosity 
such as the anti-Irish feeling in South Wales in the nineteenth century and 
attacks on the Chinese in Cardiff in July 1911, he proposes a theory of 
'contempt for things alien', an attitude which arose largely as a result of 
38 industrialisation and subsequent immigration into the area. This latter 
explanation is impressionistic and, in the case of the hostility towards the 
Chinese, far more complex, as we shall see later in this chapter. However, 
Alderman's work is a pioneer study and one of'his suggestions, that there was 
a concept of the Jew which could be drawn upon in times of economic distress, 
is certainly worth pursuing. Oviously, if the Jew was to serve as a scapegoat 
during such periOds, there must be an image which was identifiable and usable. 
In the absence of oral evidence, we look to the media for evidence of such an 
image. 
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There appears to have been two consistent types of Jew represented in the 
pages of the Edwardian press, the financier and the alien, although these con-
cepts could and did overlap. The stereotype of Jews and financial involvement 
ranged from a crude presentation of a Shylock to a far more sophisticated view 
of their alleged business acumen. Clearly the historical relationship between 
Jews and profit played an important part in creating such an image, but financial 
scandals also served to enhance the less savoury aspects of the stereotype. 
Indeed, it might be argued that the concept helped to create the Marconi 
scandal, as was suggested earlier in this chapter. Scandal and stereotype were 
reinforcing agents for a fairly widespread attitude. 
Nearly all the imagery was derogatory, proclaiming or suggesting that 
unethical behaviour was involved. The traditional money-lender, a constant 
39 image in English literature, was usually depicted as exploiting the native 
population by extortionate rates of interest and by deceit. Moneylenders of 
this kind are almost always Jews, and the pages of Truth, a journal which we 
have already noted was friendly towards the Liberals and pointed out racial 
attacks by Conservatives during the Marconi and Indian Silver Scandals, con-
tained many such examples. 40 A short story, entitled 'Mrs Meredith's Flutter', 
contained the basic elements of the stereotype. 
Mrs Meredith, wife of a major in the Green Hussars, found that her addiction 
to bridge had led her into a debt of £100. Her husband detested gambling and 
so the lady was forced to seek an alternative method of repayment. An adver-
tisement by Solomon Isaacson, a money-lender, caught her-eye and she wrote, 
enquiring how and on what terms she might obtain a loan of £100. The reply 
from Isaacson was simply a £100 note. The terms were repayment of £160 within 
three months. On a trip to the races that day, Mr~ Meredith backed a winner 
with the £100 at odds of three to one, and so returned the note, saying that 
she had not asked for a loan, merely made inquiries. 
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However, she had signed her letters to Isaacson 'G. Meredith' in order 
not to prejudice her chances of obtaining a loan. Consequently the money-lender, 
on receiving back the Eloo, set off for Major Meredith's quarters at the barracks. 
The picture of Isaacson showed how unsavoury a character he was. First, he was 
described as having an 'oily smile'. When he mentioned to the major that he 
had received his letter, the author added 'Twisting his fat fingers in his 
watch-chain, he smiled deprecatingly.' When Major Meredith questioned him, 
'Solomon wiped his perspiring brow with a voluminous silk handkerchief.' When 
he explained to the major that the original note had been marked and so it was 
clear that it had been used and another substituted, the writer was at pains to 
point out the Jew's repulsiveness. 'Bending nearer, his fleshy lips almost 
reached the major's ear.' The sum total of the image was a Shylock seeking his 
proverbial pound of flesh, and contrived to look and seem as unpleasant as 
possible. 
Truth had a particular'dislike for money-lenders, conducting a campaign 
against those whom it was felt manipulated or tricked borrowers. An article 
41 
entitled 'The Benevolent Shylock' referred to Jewish money-ler.d~rs using 
aliases or trading under Anglo-Saxon names and all offering severe terms for 
repayment. There was obviously a serious objection to the use of aliases, for 
it led to proposed legislation. 42 Lord Newton, a Conservative peer, had similar 
strong views on this topiC. He bIOught an action against Lewis Levene, who had 
sent a money-lending circular to his daughter, a minor, and made great play of 
43 the fact that Levene traded as J. Harmsworth Ltd. Giving Newton its full 
support, Truth went on to expose other Jews who used similar devices. 
Newton introduced a Moneylenders Bi1lin the Lords in June 1913. In moving 
a second reading, he paid tribute to Truth's campaign and went on to note 'the 
tribe of usurers' and their use of aliases. All the examples he gave were of 
Jews changing their names. The object of the Bill was to ensure that money-
lenders revealed their true identity, as well as the trade name, on any adver-
tising material. As he put it, 'Moses and Aaron, trading as "Crewe and 
Landsdowne" (laughter), would be obliged to disclose their identity.·44 
Consequently, •••• it might possibly be of some small consolation to some 
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unfortunate young man paying 150 per cent, to discover that instead of paying it 
to a semitic p1ebean his debt was to some patrician of distinguished native 
45 lineage. (Laughter).' There is no doubt that it was the Jewish moneylender 
who was objected to, and that the trade was seen as a virtual Jewish monopoly. 
The significance of identifying Jews in this particular way was recognised 
by Halevy, who suggested that the 1900 Moneylenders Act, which imposed stricter 
controls over the trade, was the first symptom of what he describes as • modern' 
46 
anti-semitism. The implication was that this legislation waS designed speci-
fically to deal with the excesses of the Jews, or what was seen as a Jewish 
47 
monopoly. On the evidence of the motivation behind the 1913 bill, Halevy's 
theory about controls on moneylending being conceived in terms of controls on 
the Jews may have some validity. The fact that other speakers in the 1913 
48 debate, the Earl of Meath and the Marquess of Landsdowne, referred to 
moneylenders in similar fashion to Lord Newton, using the term '?ribe' as a 
49 
collective noun, indicates that • moneylender' and 'Jew' were seen to be 
practically synonymous. 
The Bill was passed in the Lords in July but was received unsympathetically 
in the Commons, no doubt due to the pressure on parliamentary time. Truth 
bemoaned its demise. 
'It is very lamentable that when hereditary legislators, in 
their position of greater freedom and less responsibility. 
evolve valuable non-contentious measures of this character, 
their labour should be in ruin. What is wanted is clearly 
another Parliament Act, under which Bills sent down by the 
Lords in two successive sessions, and not passed by the 
Commons, would receive the Royal Assent without further 
formality. I make a present of this suggestion to Lord 
Newton.· 50 
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However, it would seem that it was the particular issue, rather than reform of 
the constitution, which prompted this suggestion. 
Truth continued its campaign, despite this setback. Its Christmas 1913 
edition featured an item called 'Birds, Beasts and Fishes' - a children's 
51 first lesson in natural history. Most of the references were harmless puns; 
several had rather less innocent motives. The illustration of the Monkey was a 
young dandy signing a loan application for a moneylender with obvious Jewish 
caricatured features. The Shark was even more explicit. 
'The SHARK for prey prospecting goes, 
And flat fish are his game; 
He sports a good old Hebrew nose, 
A good old English name; 
Again, the illustration was of a cartoon Jew. 
The journal was not alone in its campaign. The outlook praised Lord Newton's 
Bill and supported his particular prediliction. 'We especially commend the 
52 
clause that will put a stop to the masquerading of Moses as Montmorency.' 
The obsession with this particular aspect of moneylending led Punch to satirise 
its more ridiculous adherents. Lord Newton had given the impression that all 
moneylenders had Christian names, whatever their religion, and so the story's 
writer was surprised to find an Aaron Breitstein in the trade. He was even more 
surprised to discover that his real name was John George Albion. '''But if 
that's your real name, " I replied, "you must be English, and indeed you look it; 
but how can an Englishman be a moneylender.' It's not done.'" The moneylender 
then explained that the change of name was to be one step ahead of the 'Scotchmen' 
53 
when Newton's Bill forced them to change back. 
This association of Jews with money was (and still is) deep-rooted in tradi-
tional values, as a writer in the New Statesman pointed out. 
'The legend of the wealth of the Jews has persisted so obstinately 
for centuries that there is little wonder that it is still accepted 
as a fact. It owes its origin to the prominent part they have 
played as traders in money in the past, whether as money-lenders, 
money-changers or financiers; and it has been strengthened in 
modern times by their predominance in commercial pursuits in 
western Europe, and their somewhat abnormal representation on 
the stock Exchanges. Two other phenomena have contributed to 
the popular delusion : the fabulous millions of the Rothschilds, 
which are made to cast a reflected splendour upon the entire 
race, and the frequent occurrence of moneyed Jews in the plays 
and novels of nearly every European literature, particularly 
English literature, whose pages have been lavishly strewn with 
Jewish gold from Shakespeare to Hilaire Belloc. It is probably 
this literary factor that is responsible for the first impression 
of Jewish wealth received in the Christian world. The mischief 
begins with the reading of The Merchant of Venice at school, where 
the plastiC minds of young children are impressed with the mis-
understood figure of Shylock crouching over his ducats. This 
impression grows into an obsession or prejudice which is difficult 
to eradicate, and its widespread currency is one of the prime 
causes of the envy and hostility to which the Jewish people is 
exposed.' 54 
320. 
Significantly, this quotation points out that the stereotype which is dominant 
in the British cultural tradition has a realistic basis in the economic role which 
the Jew fulfils. In other words, it is suggested that the Jew has a special 
relationship with finance and commerce, an historical association, which has lent 
itself to the perpetuation of the stereotype. This argument has recently been 
taken up by Edna Bonacicn, who sees the Jews in Europe as simply one example of 
55 
an ethnic or racial group acting out this role of 'middleman minority.' 
Briefly, Bonacidn's model stresses the sociologically important aspects of such 
a minority, especially the tendency towards liquidity occupations, and, as a 
result, the heavy concentration of these groups in areas like banking, credit 
and commerce. The particular hostility of the 'host' community is directed 
particularly against this monopoly aspect of the minority and the implied threats 
which these often strongly entrenched monopolies seem to pose to the majority 
society. What the New statesman writer has done is express rather well the way 
that such hostility becomes incorporated into the culture of the host society. 
Other aspects of the Jews' relationship with money were also emphasised and 
could be used to express distaste. Truth referred to the 'prevalence of the 
gambling evil in Jewry' and took note of a report in the Jewish Chronicle, which 
l' 
\ ' 
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called for an end to gambling dens in Jewish communities, threatening to expose 
details if these were not voluntarily disbanded. 56 Sha~ financial practice was 
associated with Jews. In a description of an ice-cream vendor, the Daily Citizen 
57 described the custom of giving short measures as the 'Hebraic tendency'. 
John Bull, a journal which championed the Jew on many occasions, found itself, 
perhaps unwittingly, in league with the Witness in certain of its jokes. Why 
did Isaac and Rebecca lose on the horses but not at cards? Answer - because 
58 they weren't able to shuffle horses. The assumption was that shuffling the 
cards allowed them to cheat and that this was a particularly Jewish trait (The 
Witness would not have entirely approved of this joke, for its sports editor 
maintained that Jews could manipulate horses as easily as cards). In addition, 
John Bull made fun of Jewish business dealings 
'Ikeyto Moses : I hear your varehouse vas burnt down last Vensday 
Moses (in a whisper) : No, Ikey, not last Vensday -~ Vensday.' 59 
The essential ingredient for the humour is that the two are Jewish - substitute 
Tom and Bill, change the language and it makes little sense.60 
The Jewish joke brings the question of the Jewish caricature into the realms 
of popular culture, something not easily discovered from the more elitist 
journalistic sources. One particular medium which gives an indication of the 
extent of this Jewish image is the music-hall. 
'Sir - There has been of late a growing tendency to caricature the 
Jew and to show him off in a most obnoxious light to his Gentile 
neighbours. The principal agents in this nefarious work have been, 
undoubtedly, the self-styled "Hebrew" character comedians.,61 
Particular emphasis on the Marconi Scandal's role in developing a stereotype is 
revealed in the autobiography of Rufus Isaacs' daughter-in-law, Eva. She tells 
of her reaction to the caricatures portrayed in a music-hall performance which 
she attended, and of the reply to this reaction by her future husband, 
Gerald Isaacs. He wrote: 
.1 
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: 
, "It makes me perfectly cold with anger to see the caricatures that 
are supposed to be everyday Jews, and the mere fact that no one has 
ever met such preposterous creatures among all the Jews that, know-
ingly or otherwise, one meets, seems to influence neither author, 
actor nor public with any sense of exaggeration or vulgarity ••• I 
wonder if I am particularly sensitive - or is it self-conscious? -
before such attacks; at least I know that ever since this Marconi 
affair commenced I have been neither to Music Hall nor to Musical 
Comedy, nor to any other place where Topical 'gags' are introduced, 
because I could not endure the crass brutality of the humour that 
dabbled light-heartedly in the struggles and sufferings of those 
who were nearest and dearest to me." ,62 
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There are many more examples which could be given. The importance is that 
there was a well-known background of Jewish financial stereotypes on which to 
63 build rumours of financial scandal, and by making out that Jews were involved 
in these affairs, preconceptions appeared to be justified and legitimised. Of 
course, there were elements of truth in the stereotypes, as in most stereotypes, 
but this merely served to add to the legitimisation process. 
The other most influential image of the Jew was the alien. As with the 
Shylock stereotype, this had many aspects. The most obvious targets were those 
Jews who were aliens in the technical sense of the word - either recent arrivals 
or those who had chosen not to take on British citizenship although they were 
eligible to do so. However, the implications of the Jew as alien go beyond 
this immediate definition. It was used to illustrate the belief that the 
Jew was an alien even if he was a British subject. In other words, there were 
vast cultural (and, it was sometimes argued, racial/biological) differences 
which prevented the Jew from becoming integrated into the 'British way of life.' 
Again, there is some basis for such a theory. The Jewish community did have a 
strong sense of separateness; it had its own identity, religion and culture 
which it sought to preserve. However, the stereotype became exaggerated to a 
far greater extent than the evidence warranted, as we have already seen in the 
chapters on the Witness and the National Review. 
First evidence of the difference between Jew and Englishman (as it was put) I , 
I 
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was usually noted in physical features. Although there is no evidence of a 
single Jewish type, the popular image was well-established. From appearance, it 
was deemed possible to deduce personality, as the Daily Citizen's description of 
Herbert Samuel showed. 
'He will go far undoubtedly, in spite of the prejudice that 
still exists against the race to which he very evidently belongs. 
But there is no man of that race who executes the prejudice less. 
The glossy black hair, the sallow oval face, the full lips, and 
the rather heavy but sensitive eyes suggest a personality such as 
Disraeli's in youth, but divorced from all the accessories of 
dandified extravagance. ,64 
In a similar way, Truth commented on Sir Stuart Samuel. 
'A typical son of his inscrutable race, Sir Stuart Samuel is swarthy 
of complexion, dark and lustrous of eye, and placid of mien, as if 
heavy-laden with the age-long patience of the East. He has the 
massive head and lofty brow, though not the beard, of his patriar-
chal uncle, the first Swaythling, and anyone could detech their kin-
ship, for the Montagu and Samuels are a single family, allied as 
closely as Quakers or the Rothschilds ••• They know the value of 
acting together as one class, however small its numbers ••• This is 
the impenetrable freemasonry which binds them together more compactly 
even than the class meeting of the Wesleyan Methodists. They con-
front the world with an impassive countenance and a smile, which is 
genial, without revealing anything.,6S 
Behind this 'foreign' image lay the implicit assumption that the Jew would 
always be different from the Briton.66 St Loe Strachey, writing in the Spectator, 
made this clear. A letter from C.T.B. Moss referred to a recent article by 
Lord Cromer on Disraeli. 
'What I cannot understand is why Lord Cromer should call him "This 
nimble-witted alien adventurer." Am I to understand thereby that 
every English Jew is "an alien" and "an adventurer"? Although 
Disraeli did not call himself a Jew he was as mUch a Jew as any 
of the most orthodox Jews. He was born in England of parents who 
had resided in England. If I have not misunderstood Lord Cromer's 
meaning, the question I would like to ask you is, when is a Jew 
not an alien?' 
strachey's reply was short but significant. 'It is clear from the context that 
what Lord Cromer meant was an adventurer of "alien" race, i.e. a man not of 
English blood. A Jew of British birth is of course no alien.,67 A Jew could 
be British but would always be of alien race. 
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Similarly, the New Age, referring to the three ministers involved in the 
1-1arconi affair, Isaacs, Samuel and Lloyd George, complained that they had need-
lessly prolonged the Scandal. 'An Englishman among them (and note that none of 
the three is English) would have explained and bedamned the matter forthwith in 
68 
october last.' The Outlook explained the reasoning behind this identification 
of the Jew as alien, in a discussion on the merits of Zionism, provoked by 
Israel Cohen's Jewish Life in Modern Times. 
'Mr Cohen refers to anti-semitism as if it were something 
unnatural, of either an inexplicable or basely mean origin; 
whereas it is a perfectly natural phenomenon arising from 
perfectly obvious causes, though it is often exploited for 
the vilest ends.' 
Referring to the strength of the Jewish faith, the reviewer claimed. 
'Unfortunately it is that very attachment to racial traditions 
that makes the Jews permanent aliens in the lands where they 
sojourn, and it is, we are convinced, to this racial exclusive-
ness that anti-Semitism is always and has always been primarily 
due. ' 
The only. solution was, therefore, miscegenation, if Jews wished to become truly 
accepted. 
'They make good citizens in all but that essential of true p~trio­
tism - the tie of blood. They are good parents and children. 
They have fine abilities. They are a charitable, a friendly, 
and a cheerful people. But until they realise that all that 
they give to the world is as nothing until they fearlessly give 
themselves, they will have watchful and suspicious enemies and 
will always be at the mercy of waves of actual dislike.' 
Only in a state of their own would their separatist nature be finally acceptable. 
'As it is, to speak of English Jews or French Jews is to our minds as explana-
tory as to speak of an English Frenchman or a French Englishman. They are with 
69 
us, but not of us, and must always be suspect.' 
One particular aspect of the alien Jew in Britain which could be played 
upon was the fact that many of the wealthier Anglo-Jewry had their origins in 
Germany (the Montagu family was one example). Given the national tensions 
between various European states at the time, and the resultant xenophobia of 
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the war, it is hardly surprising to find that things German were under suspicion. 
We have already seen that Jews were frequently labelled as supra-national and 
their commitment to Britain questioned. German origin was therefore an obvious 
manifestation of this view. 
Leo Maxse was probably the arch exponent of this philosophy, as the pages 
of the National Review have shown. He was not alone in his obsession. 
Christopher Hollis described the approach of G.K. Chesterton in these terms. 
'From the time of the Boer War onwards he and Belloc hardly ever 
mention a Jew in fact or fiction who is not described as a German 
Jew, and during the World War and after that war it is always 
spoken of as a Jewish interest to save Germany from final defeat 
or to put her back on her legs after her defeat. ,70 
Thus, to be German or Jewish was to be a targetl to be labelled a German Jew, 
even if a naturalised British sUbject, fulfilled completely the image of the 
71 
cosmopolitan alien, who would never have the same loyalties as the 'Englishman'. 
This link between Jews and Germans was not confined to Britain. European 
anti-semitic movements also used the imagery. Action Fran9aise, the French 
reactionary group, blamed both Jew and German for its country's decline. 
'The Jews are shown to be responsible for every political and social 
evil that exists in France. Even the declining birthrate is the 
work of a "traitre Juif", because Vagnet's divorce law was intro-
duced by a Jewl ••• whatever crimes the Jews have left undone have 
been perpetrated by the Germans insteadl Germany, it appears, is 
buying up all the mines of France, displacing French workmen and 
occupying all ,the points of strategic importance in the country. 
A short while ago a culminating horror was revealed in the shape of 
a girls' school where German engravings were given as prizes.,t2 
In an era of intense nationalism and xenophobia, anything less than enthu-
siasm for war was regarded with some suspicion. In Britain, Jews were prominent 
73 in the movement to prp,serve peace and cooperation with Germany, for reasons 
explained in Aronsfeld's article. Some argued because of the affection they 
still held for the land of their birth. Far more sought peace on the grounds 
that war would bring economic dislocation, since trade between the two countries 
was vital for their material well-being. There was also a moral argument, that, 
t I 
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for two countries seen as leading the march of progress, war was a threat to 
74 
civilisation. By adopting these attitudes, certain Jews laid themselves open 
to the charge of being at odds with British public opinion, or at least what 
was felt to be the 'man in the street's view'. The charge was certainly 
frequently used by Maxse and other journalists. 
The most obvious portrayal of the Jew as a foreigner was in the cartoon 
depictions. In order to show the Jew as different, the cartoonist can emphasise 
the distinctive and different physical features. Hence the hooked nose, the 
deep set eyes, the thick lips of the caricature which, in certain cases, 
corresponded to reality. A study of cartoons of Irishmen has suggested that 
physical appearance is a vital part of every stereotype and that physiognomy -
'The art cum science of judging character and temperament from the features of 
the head and face, the body, and the extremities' - was still common in the 
75 Victorian and Edwardian era. The evidence indicates that this process was 
being applied to Jews at the time of the Marconi Scandal. 
From the fact of Jewishness could be determined characteristics, usually 
described as typical of the race. However, since it was not a systematic process 
of categorisation, it was frequently contradictory, since vastly differing 
individuals were described as 'typical'. A.G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily 
~, was one of many who revealed this tendency. Of Rufus Isaacs, he wrote 
'He has the intellectual suppleness of the East, and something 
of the mystery of his race.· The Jewish mind at its best has 
an orbit outside the Western range, at its worst a depth below 
our lowest deep; the Jewish temperament is for us inscrutable. 
We are at home with all other minds, whether they be clothed in 
black skins or white, but the Jew, like the Japanese, is eternally 
alien to us. He moves in other spheres, he is motivated by 
springs to which we have no access. The soul of Spinoza, as he 
bends over his humble task of glass-cutting at the Hague, "s~ils 
beyond the baths of all the Western stars." Lasker, sitting over 
the chessboard, seems to dwell in the unexplored vastness outside 
our intellectual range. Shakespeare we grasp, but Isaiah has a 
vision that is not ours. Gladstone we understand, but who has 
fathomed the dark mystery that was called Disraeli?~76 
In the same volume, he wrote of Herbert Samuel: 
'There is nothing of the Oriental man of mystery about Mr Samue11 
••• He is the type of efficiency. There is no more industrious 
man in the Ministry, none whom you find more completely equipped 
in knowledge or in clear-cut, decisive opinion ••• 
In this enormous capacity for mastering the details of a 
subject, this enthusiasm for the letter, as it were, he is typical 
of his race. The genius of the Jew is the genius for taking infin-
ite pains. He may lack inspiration, but his power of application, 
his mastery of the letter, gives him a knowledge that is more potent 
than inspiration.,77 
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Gardiner perceived these two men as vastly different in personality and character, 
if not complete opposites, yet both derived their qualities from their Jewish-
ness. Arguably, this may have been the case, but to present them both as 
'typical of the race' made nonense of any consistent stereotype, which was, in 
effect, what Gardiner was attempting, possibly unconsciously, to apply. 
Another particular aspect of the alien image was the emphasis placed on 
the Asiatic origin of the Jews. Thus, the Witness, stressing Herbert Samuel's 
inability to comprehend the Englishman's mind, would call him the 'Oriental 
postmaster.' With a less offensive intention, Gardiner stressed the Oriental or 
AsiatiC element of the Jewish make-up. However, in the main, this identifica-
tion of the Jew with the East was used as an insult and to express the essential 
and irreconcilable difference felt to exist between Briton and Jew. To some 
extent, it was also used to indicate the moral superiority of Britain and the 
British over other countries and peoples, a feeling which we shall see was 
prevalent in the Edwardian era. 
As an example of the use of this Asiatic typing, we can cite the case of 
Amy Strachey, wife of St Loe, who was of Jewish origin. This allegedly gave 
her an 'un-English' appearance and she was mockingly called 'Oriental Amy' by 
79 Lytton Strachey and his brothers. Similarly, in Mr Fleight, a novel by 
Ford Maddox Hueffer, published in 1913, one of the characters was called 
79 Mr Bleischroeder and was Jewish, His manner and appearance were made to be 
as disreputable as possible and his rise to the House of Commons was by corrupt 
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means. He spoke with such a strong German accent that ' ••• once that rude man, 
Mr de Soissons, had interrupted one of Mr Bleischroeder's speeches to ask the 
Speaker whether the hone member was in order in addressing the House in an 
80 
unknown Oriental dialect.' That such a categorisation of the Jew as Asiatic 
was meant to be derogatory cannot be doubted. Later in this chapter, we shall 
consider attitudes to other racial minorities and a more detailed comparison 
can be made. 
What was seemingly a predominance of Jews in the Indian administration, a 
factor which helped create the Silver Scandal, was frequently attributed to the 
Jew's Asiatic origins. Edwin Montagu found himself the object of such thinking. 
Waley noted that frequently it was claimed Montagu's Jewish descent 'made him, 
81 
as an Oriental, fascinated by India.' John Maynard Keynes was one who felt 
this way. 'That he was an Oriental, equipped nevertheless, with the intellectual 
technique and atmosphere of the West, drew him naturally to the political prob-
lems of India, and allowed an instinctive, mutual sympathy between him and its 
82 peoples.' Montagu himself appears to have justified this belief to some 
extent by his own words and feelings. On offering himself to Asquith as the 
next Viceroy of India in 1915, he spoke of possible objections to his appointment. 
'Then there is the question of my race. That is the serious obstacle 
and it is one which you must balance against other considerations. 
It is an objection from the point of view of civil servants and per-
haps of soldiers. But their training teaches them to accept what 
comes and I have many friends among them. As regards the Indians 
I do not believe it to be an objection.,83 
Yet six months later, on being offered the Chief Secretaryship of Ireland, 
MOntagu rejected the office, saying that his race was a disqualifying factor 
for the position; he would have to deal with religious problems of a creed 
84 in which he did not believe. The fact that he would have to deal with 
similar situations in India was apparently not a disqualifying factor for 
positions associated with that country. 
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Thus, again, the stereotype appears to coincide to some degree with actual 
beliefs. But it is also indicative of the extent to which those anxious to 
press the categorisation had to go in order to justify their attitude. To 
describe Montagu, of all leading Jews of the period, as an Oriental was to 
stretch credibility. Montagu's family came to Britain from Germany in the 
mid-eighteenth century. Montagu himself always felt he was English and rejected 
85 the rigid Jewishness of his father, Lord Swaythling. His total opposition to 
Zionism was because he felt the Jews were'a religious community, not a nation, 
86 hence his own identity of a Jewish Englishman. Thus it would seem that 
Montagu fits uneasily into the rigid stereotype, although conforming to some of 
its conditions. An attitUde which regarded Montagu as a perpetual alien thus 
rejects certain contradictory evidence and would indicate not mere hostility 
towardS the man himself but a degree of prejudice, based on certain racial 
assumptions about Jews. 
Undoubtedly, when a Jew was seen to be pursuing his religious and cultural 
beliefs, it offered scope for his critics. In the period under consideration, 
the wills of three prominent Jews provoked just such a reaction. The first, 
that of Lord Swaythling, father of Edwin Montagu, declared that his heirs 
would be disinherited if they married non-Jews, which followed the orthodox 
Jewish teaching. The Nation criticised these provisions as an example of the 
87 dead trying to direct the lives of the living. This led G.K. Chesterton to 
make a typically double-edged reply. 
'Many Englishmen, and I am one of them, do seriously think that 
the international and largely secret powers of the great Jewish 
houses is a problem and a peril. To this, however, you are 
indifferent. You allow Jews to be monopolists and wire-pullers, 
war-makers and strife-breakers, buyers of national honours and 
sellers of national honour. The only thing you won't allow Jews 
to be is Jews.'SS 
A similar case was that of Sir Adolph Tuck, who died in 1912. A trust 
fund was established for his successors to the baronetcy, provided they were 
of the Jewish faith and married to 'approved' wives, any dispute to be settled 
89 by the Chief Rabbi. 
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The third will was left by Sir Edward Sassoon. Again, the debate began in 
the pages of the Nation. 'An Old Liberal' complained about the lack of gifts 
to British charities 'away from his Jewish connections' because of death duties. 
It is fair to point out that Sassoon left very little directly to any charities 
in his will, for two expressed reasons. First, he claimed that he had given a 
great deal to both Jewish and Gentile charities during his lifetime and second, 
he was making a protest against legacy duties, which he considered to be 
excessive. Yet the Nation's correspondent felt greatly upset by such a protest. 
'If anything were calculated to arouse an anti-Semitic feeling in England, it 
is the published will of Sir Edward Sassoon'. The writer mentioned Sassoon's 
AsiatiC origins, his association with the opium trade in India and the fact 
that only the tolerance of the Liberal Party had allowed him to become a free 
British citizen with full rights. He listed the benefits which had accrued 
from this. 
1) Jews in England owed everything they had to the Liberal Party 
2) The Liberals had put many Jews in high office 
3) Jews in England suffered less from taxation than in any other country 
4) They benefitted from the Insurance Act, being large shareholders in 
the insurance companies. 
'When cosmopolitan aliens enjoy the privileges of British hospitality, such as 
they find in no other land, their first duty is to accept cheerfully the laws 
under which their property increases, and their persons are protected.,gO 
The labour Daily Herald also used the issue. 
'We have absolutely no anti-semitic feeling. We do not care two 
straws what a man's nationality may be when we are discussing 
public, or even private affairs. But, nevertheless, it is a fact 
that wealthy Jews dominate this and practically every other 
European country which has any claim to commercial eminence. And 
it is also a fact that these same Jews frequently use their wealth 
in ways which are not conducive to the happiness and well-being of 
the working-classes.' 
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The article then referred to the letter in the Nation and mentioned Sassoon's 
profiting from the opium trade, which had been supported by British troops. 
Therefore, the will was seen as a slap in the face for the Liberal Party. 
'But what can the Liberals expect? They know that their party 
is run by funds subscribed by just such men as Sir Edward Sassoon 
and the Rothschilds and other cosmopolitan financiers who will 
pay both Liberals and Tories to pass laws which will insure the 
success of their financial operations.,91 
Thus, criticism of what was described as ungrateful and un-English behaviour 
was quickly turned into a political weapon, a lesson which was also put into 
practice during the Marconi Scandal. 
To gain a better understanding of the significance of such stereotyped 
attitudes towards the Jews in Edwardian Britain, it is important to examine 
the views on other minority groups at this time. Since a full comparative 
study would be deserving of another thesis, most of the detail in the following 
section is from secondary sources. One other proviso is that, so far, little 
work has been carried out in this field and therefore any conclusions must, by 
necessity, be tentative ones. These facts, however, do not mean that the 
exercise is a meaningless one and it does indicate the directions which future 
research should take. The wider spectrum of ideas concerning other minority 
groups also gives a much broader indication of Edwardian racial thought. 
Reference had already been made to the hostile imagery used against the 
Irish. curtis's study of Victorian caricatures has shown that the simianised 
92 
version of Paddy lasted well into the twentieth century and Jackson's 
general work also points to the existence of the stage Irishman as a twentieth 
93 
century stereotype, although perhaps not to the same degree as in earlier years. 
He describes cartoons depicting Irishmen as 'sly, simple, wild and reckless' 
. and reports of court cases involving Irishmen which mocked their brogue and the 
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humour of their remarks, but sees these as outlets for friction which were far 
94 less harmful than violence. Jackson maintains that these were factors which 
lessened the impact of the Irish on the 'host community' by the turn of the 
century. 
'Whatever differences still remained the fact that the Irish were 
British subjects assumed an increasing importance. The Irish, 
unlike the growing number of alien arrivals, had, after all, 
never been "foreigners" and this fact, together with the relative 
lack of language differences, obviated some of the major difficul-
ties of settlement.,95 
Similarly, Kevin O'Connor claims that the hostility of the 1840s and 50s 
96 had abated by the early years of the twentieth century but neither writer 
produces any real evidence to justify his statements. Indeed, both point to 
the continued manifestations of hostility in the 1920s. This was particularly 
strong in certain areas. In Scotland, Irish Catholics still faced bitter 
opposition. In 1923, a pamphlet entitled 'The Menace of the Irish Race to our 
Scottish Nationality' referred to Irish Catholics in much the same ways as we 
have seen Jews described in the pre-1914 period. It was claimed that the 
Catholics 'cannot be assimilated and absorbed into the Scottish race. They 
remain a people by themselves, segregated by reason of their race, their 
97 
customs, their traditions and above all, by their loyalty to their church.' 
It is also clear that the stereotype Irishman was still a popular image. 
Jackson quotes from a children's book of verse published in 1925. 
'The Irish child can dance a jig, 
And share its pillow with a pig, 
And when we ask for pie or meat 
The "pratie" he is glad to eat.,98 
Thus, the stereotypes and the religious bigotry were still in existence in the 
1920s, as, indeed, they are today. 
The less obvious emphasis on the Irish in the period under consideration, 
as revealed from a study of written sources, is rather puzzling. Home Rule was 
an extremely important political issue at this time and it might be expected 
that the fierce debate between pro- and anti-Home Rule factions would have 
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produced some kind of reaction. Is a study of written sources completely mis-
leading and an inadequate indication of attitudes? Can it be, as Jackson 
suggests, that for the time being, attention was directed, as a result of immi-
gration from Europe, onto the Jews? The current state of research allows 
neither contradiction nor confirmation. 
Attitudes towards ·blacks in the pre-war era were still largely dominated 
by the colonial experience rather than by the presence of blacks in Britain. 
99 Although there was a black population, it was 'miniscule and fragmented' 
and consisted chiefly of two groups, West Indians who had emigrated to seek 
better conditions and unemployed sailors, the latter being the majority of the 
settled blacks. Settlement patterns were based around the dockland slum 
districts of ports such as London, Cardiff, Liverpool, Bristol and Tyneside. 
Discrimination undoubtedly played a part in creating the unemployment amongst 
sailors and others seeking shore jobs. One West Indian, employed at Tilbury, 
was forced to leave when white dockers went on strike rather than work with 
him. 1OO Similarly, when war broke out, Walvin describes other examples of host-
ility and prejudice. The War Office resisted integration of blacks into white 
regiments, the Army Council opposed commissions for those 'who are not of 
unmixed European blood' and 2500 West Indians who volunteered for war service 
and specifically for combat duty, were formed into labour gangs. 'Even in war, 
the blacks were consigned to their age-old role of being the beast of burden 
101 for their white masters.' 
Kenneth Little has maintained that attitudes towards blacks were formulated 
by the particular colonial experiences of the British and that this lead to 
102 the ascription of inferior status. One can see an illustration of this 
experience in the views of Lord Edward Cecil, whose spell of office in Egypt 
equipped him to declare that all Egyptians were stupid and unworthy of his 
friendship, a result, Rose tells us, of the 'thoughtless xenophobia of the 
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Edwardian age.,l03 Racial stereotypes were freely adopted and are particularly 
noticeable in a semi-serious work of his, The Leisure of an Egyptian Official. 
'Egyptians were rogues or clowns, Frenchmen excitable and self-important, 
Germans arrogant and devious, Americans nasal and ponderous, Jews craven and 
104 
mercenary.' 
Even opponents of 'imperialism' had their own ideas of racial classification. 
J.A. Hobson's classic study, Imperialism, (1902), whilst claiming that Britain's 
colonial policy had been almost solely for quick profit with little regard for 
the well-being of the native population and little concern for their rights, 
did not oppose the white rule of coloured races and, stated in crude terms, 
there was still a 'general Edwardian assumption' that the white races were 
loS 
superior. 
This was very clearly illustrated by the reaction of W.S. Blunt, a contem-
porary of Belloc and the Chestertons, to a prize fight between a black and a 
white. 
'The result of this fight was a surprise to me. I had expected 
to see a gigantic black man subdued by the scientific persis-
tence and higher morale of his smaller white opponent, a 
triumph of white mind over black matter, but it turned out 
absolutely the reverse. It was the black man who wore the 
white down.' lOG 
Whilst the outcome was something of a shock to Blunt, important enough to 
be recorded in his diary, it cannot be taken to indicate that the assumption of 
white superiority was seriously being questioned at this time. The problem of 
'native rights' was, however, being taken rather more seriously, if only for 
pragmatic reasons. British whites did not outnumber the coloured populations 
of the Empire, nor indeed were the world proportions of white to coloured any 
different. The question of future black/white relations was under serious 
discussion. As G.P. Gooch, the Liberal historian wrote, 'The desire to 
preserve racial purity is common to the higher nations. Yet the wisdom of 
friendly co-operation between the higher and lower races becomes even more 
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apparent.' The Universal Races Congress of 1911, held in London, reflected 
108 
a growing awareness of the need for world harmony. Similarly, the journals 
of the day illustrate the interest in racial problems. One example, the 
Contemporary Review, a Liberal monthly, showed particular concern, with 
articles like 'A New Colour Bar' (with vague references to 'AsiatiC swarms') 
on the problems of India and the Straits colonies (August 1912), 'Black, Brown 
and White in South Africa' (March 1913) and 'Slavery in Anno Domini 1913' 
(August 1913). 
Press coverage also gives some indication of the 'popular' image of the 
black and of black/white relations. Here the imagery was more fanciful and 
detached from the problems of Empire, although it emphasised the assumptions 
of inferiority and the racial tensions which lay behind the discussion of 
'native rights'. The predominant theme was of sexual jealousy. Headlines 
tended to be of the provocative kind. 'Black Preacher and Brown Baby,109 
and 'Wakened by Black Man: Wife's Story of Unwelcome Bedroom Visitor: 
110 Thought it was Big Dog' were indicative of the only aspect of black/white 
relations given any degree of coverage. It was certainly an area of conflict. 
In a court case of alleged assault by two blacks on a white woman, when it was 
made known that she lived with one of the men, there were 'angry interruptions 
in court' and the Umpire described it as 'a case which revealed in a startling 
111 
wayan ugly aspect of the black peril.' 
The suicide of the wife of Jack Johnson, the black American heavyweight 
boxer, was seen as a cautionary tale (and as good copy). Ignoring the fact 
that it appears to have been public outrage which caused her so much pressure 
that she took her own life, many journals sought to draw a moral from the sad 
event. The Throne was particularly racialist (and sexist) in its coverage. 
It noted that Johnson was black 'and as such should be beyond the pale of 
intimacy with a white woman.' Naturally, his wife was regarded as an 'outcast' 
by whites because of her descent into the 'lower stratum'. 'Every marriage 
between a white woman and a coloured man, therefore, strikes a blow at the 
112 white rule of the world which has endured throughout the ages.' 
3~. 
That this particular perspective of the problem should be to the fore is 
consistent with the history of black/white relations in Britain. Following the 
war, in the summer of 1919, there was a series of race riots in London, Liverpool, 
Cardiff, Manchester, Barry, Newton and Hull. In a detailed study of the 
Liverpool violence, May and Cohen list four causes or explanations. 
'First a feeling of sexual competition ••• second, the concen-
trated and exposed nature of Black settlement in Liverpool -
Blacks being a readily identifiable minority; thirdly an 
explanation that saw the outbreak of the disturbances simply 
in terms of the exploitation by hooligan elements of the 
unsettled conditions of the times; finallY,competition for 
employment between the Black and white communities.' 113 
Dimmock also makes reference to the significance of sexual competition in 
114 the Liverpool riots and in those at Cardiff. Walvin, taking a broader but 
less well researched view of all the outbreaks of violence, concludes that sexual 
115 jealousy was 'an open element in the response of white mobs to the Negroes.' 
The Times reported that mixed marriages had provoked extremely hostile reactions 
and suggested that these provided provocation for attacks, particularly in times 
of economic distress. Indeed, a debate on the horrors of such intimacy took 
116 place in the paper as a result of the riots. 
Walvin draws the analogy between the fears of the eighteenth century planters 
and the rioters of 1919 and has suggested that sexual fears and resentment have 
been a constant factor in the development of white attitudes towards blacks. 
'Although difficult to prove, it would seem that interracial 
sexual relations and the hostile response towards them con-
stitute one of the most important ingredients in the slow 
germination of English racialism, from the sixteenth century 
to the twentieth. For long periods this sexual resentment 
remained inert and only came to the fore when economic and 
social distress projected the black community to the forefront 
of political contIOversy. This was particularly the case in 
the late eighteenth century. In 1919 on the other hand it was 
unemployment and postwar dislocation which brought about the 
revival of such resentment. Upon local Negroes a confused 
alliance of the unemployed, remnants from the armed forces 
and the fringe of urban criminal groups heaped their collective 
frustrations and tensions. Oddly enough, the most commonly 
heard complaint - black relations with white women - had nothing 
to do with the economic situation of the rioters. This resent-
ment was in fact not an articulated complaint but an inbred 
response. ,117 
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As Walvin maintains, it may have taken the particular conditions of 1919 
to produce such a violent reaction, but the evidence of 1912-14 shows how 
near the surface such hostility was. 
One further indication of the popular view of the black comes from the 
fiction of the period, which can provide useful evidence of contemporary 
racial attitudes. As Gina Mitchell suggests, 
'The nature of the genre demands that an autbor must, to a large 
extent, reflect mass attitudes if he is to appeal to a mass 
audience. Therefore it seems likely that such material might 
provide valuable insights into widely shared but rarely expressed 
reactions to an issue such as race.,lIS 
119 Whilst blacks featured very rarely in Victoria literature, by the First World 
War, a typology began to appear. John Buchan's treatment of blacks set them 
apart entirely from the white races. In Prester John, published in 1910, 
John Laputa is an 'educated Kaffir', who comes very close to hero qualities, 
but can never achieve ,them because, although intellectually equal, he is 
black. ' ••• the genetic inferiority bestowed by Buchan is implicity God-given 
120 
and permanent in its effects.' 
In the case of the black, similar processes were in action as those used 
against the Jews. There were stereotypes which existed on some quasi-biological 
and scientific arguments or assumptions, which assigned a degree of inevitab-
ility and permanence to the type. Jews would always be aliens and blacks would 
always be inferior. 
Another minority group which attracted the attention of the majority in 
Edwardian Britain was the Chinese. Again, little work has been published but 
121 May's thesis gives some indication of the nature of the relationship. He 
refers to the 'Yellow Peril' as 'an inchoate concept capable of diverse inter-
122 pretation' but, more specifically, suggests that by 1900 it had two 
tangible strands • 
•••• first, the direct threat to jobs and living space (not to 
mention "customs and morality") posed by Chinese emigration; 
second, the indirect danger to Western jobs via the threat to 
Western markets, domestic as well as foreign, posed by the 
potential industrialisation of China.' 123 
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The direct threat after 1900 would seem to have been limited to one or 
two particular areas of employment. The settlement of Chinese in Britain was 
124 
very similar to that of blacks, the original group being predominantly seamen. 
May draws attention to what appeared to have been an increasing number of 
Chinese sailors in British-registered ships in the early years of the century 
and records the grievances expressed against this development by individuals 
125 
and by the seamen's union, grievances mainly about undercutting of wages. 
We have already noted that, at the time of the riots against Jews in South Wales, 
the Chinese community in Cardiff was under attack and Chinese laundries in the 
126 
city damaged. Alderman's brief reference to these incidents fails to point 
out that this violence occurred during the seamen's strike of 1911 and as May's 
work stresses, this was a key factor in the attacks. There had been growing 
127 
resentment in South Wales against the use of Chinese seamen, and during the 
strike, Chinese were predominant in the instances of strike-breaking. The 
destruction of the Chinese laundries was, therefore, closely linked with the 
128 
strike and the economic competition posed by the Chinese. 
Apart from this specific incident, May indicates that relationships 
between the host community and the Chinese were fairly peaceful, apart from 
a few sporadic expressions of hostility. In a study of Liverpool, which 
probably had the single largest Chinese community in these years, he found 
little economic epmpetition, although the Trades Council in 1906-7 did express 
some fears of this possibility. Problems of opium consumption andgambllng 
were not considered serious by the police but the liaisons between Chinese 
males and white women revealed 'latent sensitivity' on the part of the white 
community.129 Dimmock's thesis presents evidence to confirm that there was 
130 general disquiet about such relationships in much the same way as there 
were objections to white women and black males. 
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May also refers to another aspect of the 'Yellow Peril' threat, the 
131 question of the employment of Chinese labour in South Africa. Other evi-
dence would suggest that this issue was important in the creation of a stereo-
type which could be described as hostile. The extent to which the Chinese 
Labour question played a part in the Liberals' 1906 election success has been 
132 illustrated by Somervell • Although Russell points out that it was by no 
133 
means the issue most discussed by candidates, it was a very popular theme 
for Liberals. 
'By the New Year pigtailed and manacled Chinamen were already 
as familiar in the streets and at Liberal meetings as big and 
little loaves, and whilst Lloyd George conjured up the vision 
of coolies imported on to the Welsh hills, the London-based 
Chinese Labour National Protest Committee swamped the capital 
with leaflets indicating that a Tory vote would mean Chinese 
immigration into London. When in Bermondsey Lord Percy and 
H.J.C. Cust attempted to link the trade depression with alien 
immigration and to claim that the Aliens Act was a great piece 
of legislation against unemployment they were met with cries of 
"rot" and "what about the Chinese?", and when Percy proceeded -
reasonably - to say that the Aliens Act had been designed to 
keep the Chinese~, a brawl ensued,.134 
Whatever the exact reasons for the Liberal victory in 1906, J.L. Garvin, in 
135 The Outlook, referred to the win as 'the triumph of yellow politics.' 
A brief glance at some of the journalistic comments for 1912-14 reveals 
the continued existence of the fears described by Russell, albeit in more 
abstract form. Since the immediate threat of a Chinese or Japanese invasion 
of Britain was no longer such an obvious danger (if it ever had been), it was 
mainly events in America which directed attention towards the 'Yellow Peril.' 
The implications of Chinese or Japanese immigration were spelt out: 'The 
yellow man can support life on a far smaller wage than a white rnan',136 and 
the restrictive legislation against 'Japs in california' was described as 
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'the right - because the natural - thing. East cannot understand west.,l37 
It was not only that the 'yellow man' was different, he was inferior. 
From The Throne's analysis, it is apparent that the 'Yellow Peril' threat 
was regarded not so much as an armed invasion encouraged by some hostile foreign 
power but on similar lines to the Jewish immigration of the late nineteenth 
century. An influx of poor Chinese, who could live cheaply, undercut wages, 
encourage 'sweating' and pose an economic threat to the British working man, 
this was the perception of the problem. One finds the same kind of arguments 
voiced about Irish immigrants earlier in the nineteenth century. 
There was also a belief that, culturally, the white and yellow races could 
not co-exist because there was no cornmon ground between them. This seems to 
have arisen partly from economic competition and fear and lay behind the 
approach adopted by J.A. Hobson in 1913, when he described the Chinese rather 
than the Jews as 'more nearly approaching the hypothetical "economic man" than 
138 
any other people in the world.' The Jewish Chronicle drew attention to the 
more widespread nature of such ideas, quoting an article in the North American 
Review by \'lilliam Trant on 'Jew and Chinaman : The Chinaman as "The Coming Jew".' 
This referred to the similarity in make-up of the two races, claiming that 
both were good businessmen and accumulators of money and that they both held 
the philosophy of wealth equals power. It was also suggested that, just as the 
139 Jews had succeeded in seizing power in America, so too would the 'yellow man.' 
Links between Jew and Oriental were stressed, both races being seen as a threat 
to the western world. 
The similarities between the abstract arguments used against both Jews 
and Chinese help to explain why anti-Jewish propagandists sought to label the 
'difference' displayed by the Jew as ·Oriental'. If it was accepted that there 
was a clash of values, that East and west should never meet, then including 
the Jew in this Eastern category was an extremely useful illustration of his 
alien status. 
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Reaction to Germans in the years before 1914 was obviously influenced by 
the build-up to the war and by the commercial rivalry which existed between the 
140 
two countries. One specific area of direct competition in Britain was in 
employment as clerks. A recent study by Anderson shows that, from the l870s 
onwards, the changing economic and social status of clerks and the subsequent 
concern this caused was frequently blamed on the influx of Germans into the 
141 
occupation. Complaints appear to have concentrated on the low wages allegedly 
paid to German clerks who, it was maintained, could live on less money than their 
British counterparts. There were also fears of unemployment. In 1887 an 
142 inquiry showed that in many London offices about 40\ of the clerks were foreign • 
Although Anderson suggests that after 1900 the threat had receded, due to a 
return to prosperity and a standstill in the percentage of foreign clerks 
employed, a cursory study of the financial journals for 1912-14 show that the 
issue was still being raised, although possibly it was then due to simple xeno-
phobia rather than direct competition. As with other minorities, it is suggested 
that scapegoating and stereotyping were used to create a German 'threat'. 
Anderson feels that British clerks, unable to understand fully the problems they 
were facing, accepted the 'half truths and mythology' of German competition as 
143 the cause of Britain's general, and their own particular, insecurity. 
From these studies, it is clear that other minorities found themselves 
classified and stereotyped, as did the Jews, and each group had an identifiable 
main stereotype. There were hostile reactions in a time of economic and social 
dislocation, when it seemed that these groups were in direct competition in 
employment and status. These attitudes can be found directed against all the 
minorities examined here, it is most apparent in Anderson's consideration of 
German clerks, but hostility towards Irish, blacks and Chinese was also partly 
due to economic competition. The other substantial element present was the 
fear of the introduction of an 'alien' culture or cultures into a British way 
of life. In the main, such views concerned the Chinese and the Jews. The 
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'Yellow Peril' was still largely a product of events abroad and journalistic 
rhetoric at home, as May has suggested (with the exception of a few specific 
areas and incidents). The cultural threat of the Jews was more readily identi-
fiable and, for some, was seen as already changing the fundamental nature of 
British society. In this sense, of all the minority groups, it was the Jew who 
was considered most dangerous. 
In addition to examining contemporary attitudes to other minorities in 
Britain, we should also place British anti-semitism in a wider perspective. 
Again, a conclusive comparative study is not possible within the confines of this 
thesis, but we can at least establish the relativity of British anti-semitism 
in contrast to the Jews' experience in other countries at this time. The four 
most important areas for such an approach are the U.S.A., Russia, France and 
Germany, since they represent the main areas of Jewish settlement by the early 
twentieth century. 
The history of anti-semitism in the United States produces some interesting 
parallels with that experienced in Britain. In the general restructuring of 
American society after the Civil War, the rise of some Jews in the economic and 
social hierarchy provoked some discrimination. As Higham describes it, 
' ••• a new stereotype of the Jews as rude, ostentatious parvenus 
took form, both distorting and reflecting their ambition and 
success. Through this stereotype, and the discriminations that 
accompanied it, a society vexed b1 its own assertiveness gave a general problem an ethnic focus.' 44 
Although the initial discrimination appears confined to social clubs and summer 
resorts, increasing immigration, with the subsequent disruption to American 
society, increased the problem. RestrictiVe practices began to operate in 
housing, education and employment towards the end of the century.145 As a 
reflection of growing discrimination, we can point to the formation in 1913 of 
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, a body constituted to counteract the 
146 
spread of such practices. 
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Newly arrived Jewish immdgrants faced objections from native Americans, 
couched in very similar language to that used against their co-religionists in 
147 148 Britain. 'Jew-baiting' was a regular occurrence and continuing immigra-
tion in the early years of the century appears to have produced the increasing 
demands for restriction, which became particularly strong after 1910, culmina-
149 ting in the post-war legislation. 
150 In addition to this 'social anti-semitism', so defined by Higham , there 
was also the development of a potentially more hostile attitude, political anti-
semitism. Most writers see the 'Populist Erap, the l890s, as crucial in the 
formulation of such views, the explanation being that the socio-economic crisis 
and nationalistic inclinations of these years focused on the Jew as the cause 
151 
of dislocation and discontent. A stereotype of the rich Jew 'entwined with 
152 international finance' was apparent, seemingly confirmed by the conspicuous 
153 
example of the Rothschi1ds. Despite economic recovery, this image seems to 
have been absorbed into certain aspects of American culture and helps to explain 
the publicity given to the Protocols in America after the War. Indeed, in the 
years immediately prior to 1914, there was an increase in the kinds of tensions 
experienced in the 1890s, producing a general growth of nativism directed at 
most minority groups. The tensions of a pre-war situation, the economic recess-
ion and depression of 1913-14, pressures of immigration combined to produce an 
uneasy society, which at times produced violence against minorities, including 
Jews, as the lynching of Leo Frank shows. 
Accused in 1913 of the murder of a fourteen year old girl in Atlanta, 
Georgia, and convicted on dubious evidence, Frank was sentenced to death, 
154 
reprieved by the state governor and then taken from prison by a mob and hanged. 
Higham suggests that Frank's fate indicates the re-emergence of the anti-semitism 
of the Gilded Age. 
'Many factors combined to draw the web of hatred around Frank's 
neck. He was a Northerner and an employer of labor, and earned 
a full share of mistrust on these grounds alone. As a Jew he 
inherited all the dislikes stirred up by the racist writers of 
the period, and also the murky suspicions about Jewish blood 
murders left over from agitation of American opinion by such a 
trumped-up charge in Russia a few years earlier. Finally, the 
indignation everywhere outside the state that followed Frank's 
conviction, and the ultimate commutation of the sentence by the 
governor, raised the suspiCion that justice was being frustrated 
through the intercession of powerful, hostile outsiders. Under 
skillful (sic) manipulation, these became the goads that prodded 
the mob into action.' 155 
We might justifiably describe Frank as the ultimate scapegoat. 
A closer examination of the years immediately before the War indicates 
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an increase in the kind of tensions which led to the atmosphere of the l890s. 
There was a general growth of nativism, an anti-Catholic, anti-radical reaction 
which encompassed most minority groups and displayed 'symptoms of hysteria and 
violence that has been rare or non-existent since the l890s.,156 Conditions 
allowed the re-emergence of the anti-semitism of the Gilded Age, as Higham 
shows. 
'In the last stages of the Frank case, anti-Semitism regained 
the fiercely nationalistic twist it had acquired briefly in 
the nineties; and it assumed also an explicitly racial tone 
••• Something bigger than a local episode was in the air, 
something nourished by all the forces of racial nationalism, 
distorted progressivism, and economic decline.' 157 
Thus, the early years of the twentieth century in the U.S.A. reveal a 
growing anti-semitism, based on similar stereotypes to those used in Britain. 
It is possible to identify, as Handlin does, the existence by 1914 of an 
American racial ideology, reinforced by contemporary sociology, which 'definitely 
marked certain ethnic groups, including the Jews, as inferior and unassimilable.,158 
Again, we note the similarity to the British experience, where certain elements 
of society also regarded the Jews as perpetual aliens. Discrimination and 
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violence were more frequent and widespread than in Britain, since the problems 
and tensions partly caused by immigration and social mobility were on a far 
greater scale. The acceptance of the Protocols after the War, however, illus-
trates the basic similarity to British anti-semitism, in that the imagery before 
1914 had prepared the ground for their relative success after 1918. 
Jews in Russia found that their position was deCisively changed in the 
l880s, when there was a marked increase in hostility by the Russian government 
and many of the Russian people. The accession of Alexander 111 in 1881 ushered 
in a period of reaction which lasted, in effect, until 1917 and was notable for 
an anti-semitism that was often violent. Jews became identified with 'things 
Western' and the government sought to sustain its popularity by a virulent and 
159 
openly anti-Jewish policy. The civil service was closed to Jews, as were 
academic posts, and it was difficult for them to enter the liberal professions. 
Quotas were imposed for admission to schools and universities and th~ regulations 
160 governing the Pale of Settlement made more stringent. More fundamentally, 
a series of pogroms began in 1881 and lasted intermittently until 1920. 161 
What is clear is that these outbursts of violence were by no means spontaneous -
'they demanded long-term planning, careful organisation, above all intensive 
agitation. Sometimes this work was carried out by the police, but sometimes 
162 private individuals - above all, unscrupulous journalists - took a hand.' 
COhn shows that it was through these agencies that the most infamous of Russian 
anti-semitic propaganda, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, were communicated. 
In addition, the traditional superstitions regarding the Jews were played upon, 
particularly the accusation of ritual murder. It was such an accusation by a 
fanatical newspaper editor which helped produce the Kishinev massacre in 1903, 
163 
where forty five Jews were killed and several hundred injured. 
In the period leading up to the First World War, overt violence declined. 
The pogroms of 1905-6, ~arge1y inspired by the government as an attempt to 
blame the Jews for the defeats in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and often 
164 
organised by the police, were the last on such a wide scale before 1914. 
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After 1906, it is suggested that the anti-semites turned away from the pogrom 
165 
and sought less violent means for the oppression of the Jews. 
Publication of the Protocols 166 in various forms continued, as did 
discrimination, and it is also in these years immediately prior to the War that 
we find the revival of the blood libel. In 1911, a conference of an association 
of nobles, demanding that Russia be rid of its Jews, had claimed once again 
167 that the Jews required Christian blood for their religious observances. 
Later that year, Mendel Beilis, a Jewish clerk in Kiev, was accused of the 
ritual murder of a Christian boy. The trial was eventually held in 1913 and 
Beilis was acquitted, although the claim that Jews carried out such actions was 
168 
still maintained. Evidence clearly indicates the intervention by police and 
the government and the attempt to use this isolated incident to discredit 
169 
all Jews. 
E~tinger suggests that the case of Beilis symbolised the struggle in Russia 
at that time; Beilis represented the forces of liberalism under attack from 
the reactionary government. It is clear that anti-semitism in Russia was used 
for such political ends, although its appeal lay in the superstitions and 
images of pre-racial hostility. The severity of the persecution can be seen by 
the numbers of Jews who emigrated from Russia, between 1898 and 1914, about 
170 
one and a quarter million left to seek new opportunities and new freedom. 
Some came to Britain, where the discrimination and hostility they experienced 
was undoubtedly less harsh. 
For the Jews of France, the twentieth century began still in the shadows 
of the Dreyfus affair. Although emancipation had came relatively early at the 
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end of the eighteenth century, France had, like most other European countries, 
a long history of anti-semitism and this legacy became apparent in the l880s, 
when the beginnings of a political movement, using hostility to the Jews, 
emerged. As in other countries, the target was often the alleged dominance and 
171 
corruption of wealthy Jews1 the theme of La France Jujve, published in 1886 
by Edouard Drumont, a leading anti-semitic writer, was the destruction of the 
172 
old France by the Jews. 
It was within this growing background of anti-semitism that the Dreyfus 
affair developed. Kedward suggests that there were several groups in France who 
sought to blame their problems upon the Jews. Social and economic tensions 
amongst the lower middle class and the lesser officers of the army found 
expression in anti-Jewish sentiments, indeed, it was in this area that Jewish 
competition for employment and status was most noticeable. There was also a 
degree of socialist anti-semitism, focusing, as in Britain, on the Rothschilds 
as the arch example of the Jew-capitalist. 'And finally, deriving from acute 
insecurity, political and religious attitudes and local tradition, was the 
anti-semitism of the Catholics and political conservatives whose interests had 
173 been undermined by the anticlerical legislation of the Republic.' These 
various sections of French society could all explain their own misfortunes in 
terms of the rise of the Jews. Thus the trial of Dreyfus provided the focal 
point for the expression of their various fears and their identification of the 
root cause as the Jews. 
Following the conviction of Dreyfus came the birth (or perhaps gradual 
evolution) of 'Action Franyaise' a right wing political organisation which was 
to use anti-semitism as one of the elements of its appeal. In addition, there 
were, from the Catholic Union Nationale, demands for the exclusion of Jews from 
public employment, calls for the withdrawal of citizenship and even for 
174 
explusion from France. It seemed to French Jews that freedoms thought to 
have been won during the era of enlightenment were now under attack. 
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Even after Dreyfus was eventually cleared in 1906, anti-semitism was still 
prominent amongst members of right wing movements like the Came lots du Roi and 
also in a profusion of anti-Jewish literature. According to Blumencranz's 
study, the main themes were Jewish conspiracy against the Christian world, the 
links between Jews and secret societies, Jewish spies during the Dreyfus period, 
Jewish terror, Jewish invasion and the accusation of ritual murder. 175 These 
allegations and fears are very similar to those found in Britain, all relating 
basically to the problem of Jewish power as seen in the activities of a few 
individuals. The scale of publication, however, appears to have had a wider 
base in France, drawing on the experience of the l890s and it had a political 
organisation ready and willing to use anti-semitism. Although the support for 
'Action Fran9aise' had declined in the years immediately before 1914, it 
survived to become a force again in the 1920s and 3Os, as Nolte's detailed study 
176 
shows. In political terms, although only the 'movement of a small minority,' 
it displayed a dimension of anti-semitism before 1914 which waS not fully 
experienced in Britain until the 1930s. 
Legal emancipation for Germany's Jews came later than that of France. 
The partial freedoms gained whilst the German states were under Napoleonic 
control had been followed by an anti-semitic reaction. However, with the 
gradual evolution of a middle class, at least partially committed to liberalism, 
Jews began to experience fewer barriers and their full civil rights were finally 
177 
achieved within the new German Reich in 1871. Yet along with emanCipation 
came further hostility as Jews entered the gentile world and began tO,compete 
within that social system. Undoubtedly part of the reaction consisted of 
'respectable anti-semitism', the familiar reaction against 'the insinuating 
178 presence of a money-making, money-centred clannish group', but it also 
contained a new element of 'modern' anti-semitism. Whilst there were many 
variations to this new hostility, the essence was the belief that the Jews had 
become the controllers of power in the modern Germany. 
' ••• Jews were not only despicable but mortally dangerous -
because Germans were peculiarly vulnerable to Jewish subver-
sion. From the beginning to the end of German anti-semitism 
was this paranoid fear of the power of the Jews: at first, 
they were depicted as the economic masters of the Germans, 
but gradually, and long before Hitler, there developed the 
myth that Jews had the power to destroy the German character, 
to corrupt Germans, economically, morally, eugenically, 
sexually.' 179 
With the economic collapse of 1873 came accusations that it had been 
349. 
engineered by the Jews, just as the economic problems in France were blamed on 
180 Jewish financiers. Groups hostile to the new German state, petit bourgeoisie, 
181 
conservatives and Catholics, began increasingly to identify the Jew as the 
focal point of their discontent. 'In the politics of cultural despair, a 
compound of nationalism, anti-modernity, and anticapitalism, the Jew was the 
182 
symbol of evil.' 
The anti-semitism took several forms. One was the increase of anti-semitic 
publications, notably that of Eugen Duehring, whose work, The Jewish Question, 
(1880), condemned the Jew in racial terms, introduCing the element of racism 
into anti-semitism and leading the way to a more virulent brand of hostility 
183 
against the Jews. There was also a growing political use of anti-semitism, 
184 first practiced by Adolf Stoecker's Christian Social Workers' Party. This 
activity came to a peak in the early 1890s, when the Conservatives, one of the 
major parties in centrolof the country, included in its 1892 programme a 
critique of the destructive Jewish influence over German national life and thus 
began to compete with the other smaller anti-semitic parties.· The 1893 Reichstag 
elections saw a considerable rise in the anti-semitic vote - 'For the first 
time the anti-semites had a sufficient number of seats in the Reichstag to 
185 
enable them to act as an independent parliamentary group.' Jews also suffered 
from discrimination, particularly exclusion from positions of authority. 
'Jewish officers were not promoted, the Ministry of Justice 
prevented the appointment of Jews to judicial positions, and 
the Ministry of Education did likewise with government teaching 
positions. The hostile attitude towards the Jews prevailing in 
academic circles precluded them from obtaining university posts.,ISG 
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In parliamentary terms, 1893 marked the peak of the anti-semites' success. 
The number of seats held was not a true indicator of their decline after this 
date, since in 1907 they held more than in 1893. More significant was the 
'shrinking membership in the fragmented parties, the growing dissatisfaction 
with German institutions evidenced by conventional anti-Semites, and their 
recognition that the purely anti-Semitic part of the program had become an 
187 
obstacle to election.' This should not, however, be taken as an indication 
188 
of a general decline in German anti-semitism. In the written form, it 
continued to be expressed throughout the country and began increasingly to 
take on a 'scientific' racialist element. Perhaps the culmination of this 
process was Chamberlain's Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, (1898), which 
189 
sawall history as the struggle between the Aryan and Jewish races. This 
influential (in intellectual terms) work sold many thousands of copies and 
Kaiser Wilhelm II is said to have proposed that it be included in the study 
190 programme of all officer cadets. Anti-semitism became deeply entrenched in 
the educational system, in the teaching, in the teachers and amongst students. 
practically all student groups were hostile to Jews after 1890 and excluded them 
191 from student SOCieties. Whilst political anti-semitism may have been in 
192 decline, both occupational and social exclusion generally increased. 
It has been suggested that German anti-semitism adopted a less harsh tone 
after 1900 and that there is little evidence of violence after this date. What 
was noticeable was the lack of contact between Jew and gentile and this would 
appear to signify the almost complete absorption into German society of hostility 
~3 towards Jews by the early years of the twentieth century. The publication in 
1910 of Sombart's The Jews and Capitalism, which was an assertion of the power-
ful role played by the Jews in the construction of the capitalist system, was 
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seized on by anti-semites such as Theodor Fritsch, who used it selectively to 
194 perpetrate the Shylock stereotype. There were even calls for state action 
against Jews - in 1912, Heinrich Class, leader of the Pan-German movement, 
195 
called for rigid isolation and double taxation. These few examples show 
clearly that although the immediate political value of anti-semitism was in 
decline by 1914, anti-semitism itself was certainly not diminished. The fear 
of the power of the Jews, outlined by Stern, as the core of such hostility is 
a familiar theme, since this chapter began with just such a study in the anti-
semitic tradition of Britain. 
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CHAPTER 9 FOOTNOTES 
1. See p. vii 
2. See Henry D'Avigdor-Goldsmid, 'The Little Marconi Case', History Today, 
Vol. 14, no. 4 , (April, 1964), pp. 283-6, for a brief account of 
the affair. This article is somewhat unhistorical in its approachl 
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CHAPTER 10 
RICH JEW, POOR JEW 
Whilst such an analysis of the Jewish image, and a comparative synthesis, 
is revealing of the various experiences of other minority groups and of other 
'host' communities, there is a further element in the study of anti-semitism 
which is perhaps more significant. It concerns the change of emphasis of the 
'Jewish Question' in Britain; a change which is of great relevance to post-war 
developments. Simply stated, it is the increasing concentration before 1914 on 
the rich Jew. No longer is the bulk of the hostility directed against immigra-
tion and against the poor Eastern European Jew, as it had been in the period 
leading up to the 1905 Aliens Act. This, no doubt, reflects the diminishing 
number of immigrants arriving in Britain after the Act~ but it also suggests 
that the nature of opposition to Jews was, in itself, taking on a new emphasis. 
With the continued integration of Jews into British society, and the 
progress of ce~tain of their number into the highest 'echelons of politics, 
trade and finance, the 'Jewish Question' was now far more frequently posed in 
terms of Jewish dominance or control of this industry, of that trade, of the 
media and of politics. Symbols of this Jewish power were, as in other Europeam 
countries and in the USA, the Rothschilds in particular and Jewish financiers 
in general. Eric Hobsbawm has suggested that much of the 'pervasive anti-semitism' 
of the period was a reaction to the increasing importance of German-Jewish 
2 financiers. Similarly, Cecil Roth pOinted to the 'Court Jews', the wealthy 
financiers linked with Edward VII, as both ~ol of Jewish success and also 
of the threat posed to the 'British way of life'. 
'Their prominence attracted not only attention, but also envy, 
and they gave the impression that Judaism and wealth were 
interchangeable terms. The English Anti-Semitism of the early 
20th century, of the Chesterton-Belloc school, had as its main 
target, and main justification, the Court Jews on the one hand 
and the South Africa millionaires on the other. To some extent 
the poor Jewish immigrant of the East End suffered and paid the 
price for the prominence enjoyed by his plutocratic co-
religionists in ~ayfair and the Court of St James.' 3 
As Roth indicates, the distinction between rich-Jew and poor-Jew anti-
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semitism is a semantic one, since anti-Jewish feeling was usually seen as being 
directed against all Jews. One only has to look at the fears of the established 
Anglo-Jewish community at the prospect of mass immigration and the subsequent 
hostility of the native population not only against the poor newcomers but also 
against themselves to appreciate the commonly-held view. 4 However, accepting the 
distinction as somewhat artificial in its end result, it is still possible to 
distinguish that the dominant strain of anti-semitism in the period immediately 
before 1914 was directed against wealthy and powerful Jews. 
This does not mean that poor-Jew hostility ceased to exist. Reactions against 
immigrants were still quite frequent and found their way into the pages of the 
press, particularly Conservative journals. The Outlook noted with some pleasure 
the campaign of the Morning Post against alien immigrants in July 1913,5 and 
also contained many references in its own pages. There was particular concern 
about emigration from Britain, and the replacement of 'fine British stock' with 
inferior goods. A traveller to the Orient, noting the number of emigrants to 
Australia, wrote: 
'The passengers, including myself, could not help remarking what 
a loss to our country such a fine-looking lot of young men must 
be, especially when we know that our silly alien laws admit the 
scum of Europe to take their place, degrade our country, spread 
anarchism, and eventually to become British citizens.,6 
Similar sentiments were expressed in The Throne, which spoke of sadness at the 
emigration, 'while, in exchange, we get the scum of Europe ••• in spite of the 
7 
agitation which took place after the Houndsditch murders.' Joseph Banister 
contributed his own thoughts on the subject, 
' ••• Thanks to the country being governed by the representatives of 
a party dependent on wealthy Jews for the bulk of its funds, the 
huge gaps made in our population by the emigration of the flower of 
our industrial and agricultural population are partly filled by 
aliens of such a notoriously undesirable character that no other 
country could be induced to receive them. 
~~en London has a daily Press controlled by Englishmen, rather 
than by Jews, Quakers, Americans, and denationalisedCelts, and 
which will attach as much importance to the interests of the British 
race as to the retention of Jewish advertisement patronage, it is 
possible that it will be anxious to promote the restriction of the 
undesirable alien influx, rather than to encourage the afflux of 
desirable Englishmen.'S 
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This kind of argument led to attacks upon aliens of all classes (hence the 
artificialty of rich-Jew/poor-Jew distinctions), as a letter from 'E.R.' showed. 
'These aliens come upon our rates and enter our hospitals often 
from the moment they land, and hatch plots against the rulers 
of countries which are our allies. Besides that they intermarry 
with our people and cause degeneration of the race. So-called 
English people will soon be nothing but mongrels~ but what out-
Herod's Herod is that questionable aliens under glorified names 
should be allowed to occupy seats in our House of Parliament.' 9 
Just as in the earlier debate over immigration, the danges of poor aliens 
creating a universal impression caused a reaction in the long-established 
immigrant community. George Raffalovich, a naturalised British subject, spoke 
of the 'alien adulteration of English urban areas' by the 'scum of the slums of 
Europe' but spoke of 'many worthy and useful naturalised British subjects, who 
wish they could do more for the country they re~ect and love, instead of merely 
witnessing with sorrow in their hearts the state of degradation of present-day 
politics.' Raffalovich's solution was similar to that proposed by some sections 
of the Anglo-Jewish community in previous years. 'Is there no possibility of the 
next conservative Cabinet bringing in a Bill to create two classes of naturali-
sation, or at least to establish severe tests as to the language, the knowledge 
10 
of history, the mental and physical health of the applicant?' 
Fear of anarchism and the alien had, of course, been given a great boost 
11 by the events leading up to the Sidney Street siege. This produced demands 
for the tightening of legislation against immigration and for increased powers 
against aliens, aims which found little success in the over-loaded parliament of 
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12 that time. Questions about the depo~tation of criminal aliens were a feature 
of the early part of 1912, with M.Ps like Viscount Wolmer and Sir J.D. Rees 
13 
anxious to know if poliCY was strict enough. James O'Grady, the Labour M.P. 
for Leeds, who had been an occasional advocate of restriction before 1906,14 
was still troubled by the threat of undercutting wages and prices which he felt 
immigration posed, particularly when a Russian tailor, Schaye Goldfied, appealed 
against deportation and was successful, one of the officials of the Immigration 
15 Board referring to the need for cheap labour. It was probably this concern 
which led O'Grady. to introduce a Bill 'To Amend the Aliens Act 1905' on 
16 1 May 1913. The Bill did not get beyond the first reading, suffering the same 
17 fate as similar Labour amendments in 1905 and 1906. In addition, Rowland Hunt, 
of Clean Government League fame, asked if aliens were still keeping down wages 
and creating unemployment, proceeding to make several political points about 
18 the Aliens Act. His dislike of aliens was not limited to rich ones. 
However, whilst there was continuing concern about poor immigrants, 
particularly Jews, and still a certain degree of hostility, the focus in 1911-
1914 was undoubtedly on the more wealthy alien, particularly the Jew. This was 
not, of course, a new phenomenon. Its particular appeal for socialists has been 
documented by Garrard, who suggests that anti-Jew anti-semitism did not, for 
19 
them, come 'wtihin the forbidden category of racialism at all', and he lists 
examples from William Cobbett in 1806 to the agitation surrounding the Boer War 
20 
and Jewish capitalists. As we have seen from Justice and the Daily Herald, 
this tendency still existed during the Marconi Scandal and its subsequent events. 
However, it would be a mistake to see rich-Jew anti-semitism as a monopoly of 
the left. From this case study, it has become apparent that hostility was 
expressed in Conservative journals with, if anything, more regularity and the 
general studies of the period make frequent references to the anti-semitism of 
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the Edwardian age, as reflected by the middle and upper classes, as a wide-
spread phenomenon. 
'Anti-semitism was common in the west End, of course, but it 
was not of a sort calculated to start a pogrom. It was 
expressed rather in a certain social snobbery, and in the 
literary tradition which embraced Melmotte in Trollope's 
The Way We Live Now and Svengaliin Du Maurier's Trilb~ 
(which has been called the first modern best seller).' 1 
Similarly, Bernard Bergonzi, seeking to place Belloc and G.K. Chesterton 
in their cultural context, wrote: 
' ••• in the years before the first world war anti-semitic atti-
tudes seem to have been" extraordinarily common both in literary 
circles and out of them. As Orwell once remarked, there have 
been very few English writers who were not in some degree anti-
semitic ••• ,22 
Whilst these descriptions are impressionistic rather than scientifically 
detailed, the implication, reinforced by this study, is that hostility towards 
23 Jews was on the increase in the years before the First World War. The 
pages of the Jewish Chronicle reflect the growing concern of Jews at this 
state of affairs. In addition, the concentration is on the successful Jew, 
who had, as it were, taken his place in society and had thus begun to compete 
within the existing social structure for whatever rewards might be available. 
This evident result of emancipation seems to have been the keynote of the 
increasing tension which was directed against these Jews. 
In discussing how this rich-Jew anti-semitism manifested itself, it seems 
important to consider two aspects. Firstly, in the light of the European 
experience, we must ask if the hostility was translated into discrimination. 
Here the evidence is extremely difficult to obtain. Obviously the petty 
social snobbery mentioned above had some impact but more serious dis crimina-
tion, with the sanction of some institution, was apparently largely absent 
from the Jewish experience in Britain in these years. There is the case of 
Lewis Namier, the historian, who found his application for a fellowship at 
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AllSouls, oxford, rejected because he was a Jew. The circumstances were 
described by A.F. Polla~d, who was himself present at the selection meeting. 
, liThe meeting on Friday. morning for the election of Fellows 
was lively and I was told the debate was the best on record, 
which perhaps I should not repeat as I had to take a consider-
able part in it. The lawyers could not conscientiously run a 
law candidate, so we had two for history. The best man by far 
in sheer intellect was a Balliolman of Polish-Jewish origin 
and I did my best for him, but the Warden and majority of 
Fellows shied at his race, and eventually we elected the two 
next best." ,2,+ 
A letter to the Jewish Chronicle from Woolfe Crammer would appear to confirm 
that Oxford and Cambridge did practise discrimination, particularly when 
25 Jewish candidates applied for scholastic posts. Other examples of discri-
mination are difficult to confirm. Dudley Barker records that some pieces 
written by G.K. Chesterton were rejected by F.Y. Eccles, editor of the left 
wing Liberal Speaker because he was convinced the handwriting was that of a 
Jew ('an odd sidelight on advanced radical thought at the turn of the 
26 
century') , whilst Robb's study notes that the Bethnal Green Board of 
Guardians were reported to have rejected the lowest tenders for milk and 
27 poultry contracts because they came from Jews. 
However, other evidence of discrimination is not immediately apparent 
and this is probably indicative of the particular nature of the liberal 
tradition in Britain, which generally made overt discrimination socially un-
acceptable. Yet the absence of discrimination on a wide scale is not necess-
arily a denial of the increase in hostility. 
' ••• as long as intergroup conflicts persist, there is nothing 
to prevent the existence or increase of prejudice toward the 
minority, even if the expression of that prejudice must be 
handled with care by majority group members in public situations. 
In psychological terms, prejudice may have an important compen-
satory function for majority group members. SOCially shared 
negative stereotypes about the minority group, which majority 
group members may express to one another, may function to release 
those frustrations and aggressions stemming from conflict that 
cannot be released in the form of discrimination.,28 
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It is important at this stage to estqblish that there was some kind of 
dominant cultural norm which prevented the escalation of hostility and the 
outbreak of violence against Jews (apart from the South Wales riots). 
Fishman, writing of the prevarications over restrictive legislation against 
immigrants in the 1880s and 90s, states: 
'It could be argued that public distaste (as expressed in press 
and Parliament) for anti-semitism in the form of pogr':lms and 
the current exposures of the Dreyfus case was influential in 
postponing laws against immigrants who were predOminantly Jews 
Even the most virulent working-class antagonists presented a 
superficial obeisance to the norms of tolerance and brotherhood 
which offset the possibility of a continental Judenherze.,29 
Garrard and others have similarly maintained that there was a social force, 
similar to ~wrdal's 'American Creed', which allowed prejudice but discounted 
30 discrimination and the overt expression of hostility. 
Allowing for those individuals and groups present in every generation who 
were not bound by the majority morality, what is apparent in the years before 
1914 is the erosion of the liberal tradition. Of course, its power was still 
very strong and prevented the translation of hostility into acts of violence 
against Jews. Parliamentary politics were, in the main, free from any out-
spoken criticism of Jews as such; indeed, there still appears to have been a 
31 
reluctance to discuss any question of racial significance. What can be 
detected are cracks in the facade, deeper and perhaps more significant than in 
the period of anti-alien agitation. Journals of political extremes, both 
right and left, show that there was a move away from the silence on racial 
issues and that debate was beginning. Publicists like Belloc and the 
Chestertons, journals like The Outlook and the National Review, were uneasy 
with the state of Edwardian society, albeit for different reasons and would 
appear to have been less influenced by the prescribed norms of 'acceptable' 
behaviour, that is, they adhered to a different set of social rules to the ones 
outlined above. Thus, they wrote what others would not put into words and 
thereby began to focus attention upon the 'Jewish Question',. an important 
stage in raising consciousness. 
'There is good reason to think that the creation of awareness 
is one of the main effects of the news media, whereas the 
formation of attitudes and opinions about issues would seem to 
result m~re from subsequent face-to-face communication with 
others than from media consumption ••• Newspapers make people 
aware of certain things, and suggest the degree of importance 
that different events and issues have by the amount and prom-
inence of coverage that they given them.' 32 
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In turn, this created the framework for the wider confirmation of beliefs, 
which, as suggested above, is an important function in the reinforcement of 
hostile attitudes. writing to The Outlook in agreement with an editorial 
comment, or with a letter published the previous week, was part of this process. 
The fact that it was a public expression of hostility, and that this was being 
done increasingly from about 1911 onwards, indicates that the 'British Creed' 
was under siege. 
As we have said, the increasing expression of hostile views was, in the 
main, now directed at the rich Jew, and it is the particular nature of these 
attitudes which is the second facet of rich-Jew anti-semitism. The basis of 
discontent seems to have been with the increasing involvement of Jews in 
various aspects of British life, in business, trade, finance, politics and 
social institutions. Whilst the number of Jews achieving visible success in 
any of these fields was limited, as it had been until emancipation, it seems 
that the degree of hostility was also limited. In a sense, there was no need 
for anti-semitism, since the Jews were not effective economic or social 
competitors. What hostility existed was mainly a comic stereotype and perhaps 
disparaging remarks about financial trickery. These conceptions of the Jew 
33 
were based less on reality than on tradition and mythology. With the 
removal of legal barriers during the nineteenth century, it became easier for 
Jews to move into professional circles and to become full citizens of the 
various European states in which they lived. In Britain, it was not merely 
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the destruction o~ those obstacles, but the development o~ political and econo-
mic thinking which encouraged those Jews who believed in the values of 'self-
help'. As Chaim Bermant put it: 
'Never before and never again was individualism so highly 
valued. Samuel Smiles' Self Help, published in 1859, was 
read as a supplement to the Bible, and its opening line, 
'God helps those who help themselves', was almost the credo 
o~ the age. No Jew needed the admonition of a Smiles to 
accept the idea. It is part of traditional Jewish teaching 
and confirmed by everything in Jewish experience. The 
Cousinhood were thus Smiles ian before Smiles and Victorian 
before Victoria ••• 
The nineteenth century, and we use the term loosely to 
include the years up to World War 1, was a time when the 
traditional Jewish virtues were the accepted English ones 
and to be a staunch Jew was to be a sound Englishman.' 34 
Bermant's model is too general and simplistic to be good history, but it 
does provide an explanation of the success of some of the Jewish middle and 
upper class in the Victorian and Edwardian eras. He goes on to say that the 
complacency of what appeared to be great achievements was shaken by the 
development at the end of the nineteenth century of anti-semitism in Germany, 
which, unlike anti-semitism in Eastern Europe, was directed against Jews of 
35 
the middle and upper classes. Whilst not accepting such a rigid distinction, 
one could note developments in France, the growth of Action Franiaise and the 
36 
writings of Drumont , which parallel the German experience. Certain Jews in 
France and Germany were achieving high social and economic standing, in simi-
lar fashion to those in Britain, and therefore, as Bermant pOints out, they 
became objects of a particular kind of hostility. 
Although British Jews took on the dominant values of their peer group, 
they were not necessarily accepted by its established members. Davidoff, 
writing o~ the Victorian era, states that, by accumulating wealth and 'adhering 
to the rules of etiquette and gentlemanly behaviour', Jews had been able to 
37 integrate into 'soc~ety', but they still faced a certain degree of hostility. 
often their efforts worked in reverse. 'The more like Christia.ns they became,. 
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the more mysterious, elusive and frightening they appeared.,38 
In addition to this social hostility, Jews also faced the reaction to 
their success in the world of work. Increasing opportunities for those with 
education and wealth provided some Jews with the chance to reach the heights 
in their chosen trade or profession. The changing economic and social system 
obviously did not benefit everyone and resentment could be channeled against 
39 the Jew as the symbol of the new order. Frequently, an individual's lack 
of control over his own destiny could be explained by the exaggerated claim 
of Jewish domination of this or that sphere of life. Thus, during the time of 
the Marconi Scandal, the Witness could publish a letter from an 'ANTI-SEMITE', 
asking 
'How much of the wealth and work of this country is now in 
the hands of the Jews? When there is not room enough and 
work enough for our own people why should we show hospitality 
to an alien race? 
Our country is really suffering from an invasion of the 
Jews ••• ,40 
The Daily Citizen, in a profile of Rufus Isaacs, hinted at what it saw as the 
root cause of anti-semitism. 
'Those who ought to know say that some of the high-placed Jews 
in England are apprehensive that an anti-Semitic movement 
may grow here as it has grown elsewhere when people realise 
how the strings of trade and commerce, not to mention politics, 
are pulled by Hebrew hands.' 41 
The emancipation of Jews, together with the general increase in opportun-
ities in business and the professions, appears, therefore, to have provided 
Jews with a ladder to success but also to have increased tension and resent-
ment rather than diminished it. It is this phenomenon which forms the back-
bone of Stern's recent study of anti-semitism in Germany in the last quarter 
42 
of the nineteenth centuryv By Edwardian times, the success of a few Jews 
had brought about in Britain a similar kind of anti-semitism to that experi-
enced slightly earlier in France and Germany, although on a less concentrated 
level. Poliakov points out that there were anti-semites of this kind in 
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Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century - 'But their writings 
did not create a political movement, or combat organisations or defence leagues, 
43 in other words, collective and organised panic.' What the years before the 
war do indicate, and this is why the Marconi Scandal is significant, is the 
escalation of this anti-semitic process. The creation of the National League 
for Clean Government indicates this increasing hostility, for it approaches 
the kind of political organisation referred to by Poliakov. The immediate 
motivation for this organisation, the Marconi Scandal, was a measure of the 
heights to which Jews had risen, in this case to Cabinet office, and also of 
the resentment and suspicion caused by this success. 
Just as the Dreyfus case in France in the l890s showed the extent of 
Jewish control of important offices in military and political terms, at least 
44 
to anti-semites and those who wished to find evidence of that nature ,so 
the Marconi Scandal and other events previously mentioned indicated the 
increasing influence of Jews in British politics and finance. An example from 
the correspondence columns of the Witness during the time of the Scandal 
indicates the general conclusions which could be made from the particular. A 
letter from 'H' pOinted to the link between emancipation and Jewish power. 
It attributed the disintegration of British politics to the involvement of 
the Jews and warned of the (unspecified) dangers to the English race. In fact, 
in vague terms, it attempted to explain the general decline of Britain's power 
4S 
as the result of the emancipation of the Jews • 
Politics was simply another area of Jewish influence by the time of the 
scandal. The combination of Jews in business and Jews in politics was, after 
all, the alliance which had been responsible for the Marconi affair. Again, 
emancipation, which allowed Jews to become involved in conventional politics 
to the full, seems to have increased tensions in this area. During the 
Scandal, the Jewish Chronicle pointed to the irony of success. 
'It is, in fact, open to argument that the promotion of our 
three coreligionists to office has actually given a distinct 
impetus to anti-Semitism in England. What was naturally 
regarded as the coping stone of the Jewish position is the 
stone chosen, as a missile, to be flung at our heads.,46 
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(Yet, a few months later, the Chronicle provided more ammunition by making 
some play of the fact that there were now 17 Jewish M.Ps, the highest number 
yet. 47) Incidents like the Marconi Scandal and the Indian Silver affair, 
when it appeared that Jewish politicians and financiers dominated the India 
Office, clearly drew attention to the general belief that Jews had undue 
influence in British politics. 
It is true that, in arithmetical terms, Jews were proportionally over 
represented in national politics. Although the Jewish population in 1911 was 
approximately half a per cent of the total population of Great Britain 
48 (250,000 out of 41,000,000) , Jews represented three per cent of all Conserva-
tive and Liberal candidates in the 1910 elections. 49 A total of 17 M.Ps, 
whilst apparently not excessive, could, however, be taken as an indication 
of growing Jewish political power. 
Together with this apparent manifestation of political power, there was 
an increasing interest in the Jewish 'vote'. Although the number of Jewish 
electors in 1910 was only 25,000, they did make up significant voting groups 
50 in certain areas, particularly in London, Manchester, Leeds and Glasgow. 
In some constituencies, the Jewish vote was seen as a critical factor in 
winning or losing the election. Very few historical studies of the pattern 
of such a vote, or even of its existence, have been made, as recent research 
51 has shown. Alderman has suggested that the Jewish establishment of the 
present day has a vision of an Anglo-Jewish community 'totally integrated with 
the existing political structure.,S2 i.e. that there is not, and never has 
been, a 'Jewish vote' in the sense of a singularity of interest. However, 
his own research leaves him to conclude that this vision 'remains stubbornly 
S3 
unfulfilled', and he traces the pattern of Jews in British politics from 
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emancipation times. Whilst suggesting that, by the turn of the century, 
leading Jewish figures were Conservatives (in 1900 there were seven 
Conservative M.Ps and two Liberals), he estimates that the bulk of Jewish 
voters remained Liberal.54 
They became even more firmly of this conviction as a consequence of the 
agitation surrounding legislation against immigration and the Aliens Act of 
1905 passed by a Conservative government. This had the effect of turning not 
only Jewish voters but other 'erstwhile Unionist 55 opinion' towards the 
Liberals, a situation which was exploited by the 56 party. Indeed, Garrard 
--,-~ "-
puts forward the theory that there was a Chang~ of attitude by the Jewish 
elite, turning to purely sectional interests, and that appeals by Jews for a 
57 Jewish vote were not condemned outright, as they had been in earlier years. 
Thus, the claims that Jews were as divided politically as the rest of the 
population do not seem to have been true. 
Jewish votes came to be described as a solid bloc, usually aligned with 
the Liberals. Thus, Lord Derby, in a letter of condolence to Bonar Law on 
his defeat in N.W. Manchester in the December 1910 election, wrote ' "I try 
to think of anything we left undone - but can only come to the conclusion 
that large as was your majority in the thinking and business part of the 
f " ,58 ~ - the majority in the foreign Jew quarter was too strong or us. 
Since it was N.W. Manchester in 1908 which represented perhaps the peak of 
59 
concerted Jewish action on behalf of a Liberal candidate, it is hardly 
surprising that Jewish electors were considered so important in this 
particular constituency. 
Attempts were made to woo the Jewish vote away from Liberals, even in 
the 1906 election campaign, when the Conservative Party discouraged candi-
dates from playing on the immigration question and dissociated itself from 
the British Brothers' League. Jewish Conservative candidates were put up in 
60 
some East End constituencies. After 1906, there were still Conservative 
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attempts to ga~n the votes of Jews, with particular support coming from 
leading Jewish Conservatives such as Lord Rothschild. A by-election in 
August 1912 at N.W. Manchester revealed a serious campaign by the Conserva-
tive candidate, Sir John Randles, who saw the possibility of using the 
apparently forgotten Liberal promise of a reduction in the naturalisation 
61 fees. Local figures, like Nathan Laski, a J.P., also stressed this failure, 
62 
and urged Jews to vote against the government. Yet Laski had been one of 
the key figures in launching Winston Churchill as Liberal candidate in the 
constituency in 1904.63 N.W. Manchester in 1912 probably represents a 
changing mood amongst its Jewish voters; Clarke suggests that some wealthier 
64 Jews were forsaking the loyalty of the ghetto. However, it was a marginal 
seat and, as such, vulnerable to the kind of swing experienced by the Liberal 
government after 1911. There is not sufficient evidence to say that 
Conservatives had captured the Jewish vote. As Alderman has written, in the 
absence of poll books, no definitive statements can be made. 
other attempts were made to forge links between Conservatives and Jews. 
One very determined effort came at Whitechape1, in the election following 
Sir Stuart Samuel's resignation over the Indian Silver contract.65 Samuel's 
opponent, Monteagle Browne, conducted a very vigorous campaign. At his 
adoption meeting, he stressed his mission. 
'He would be greatly disappointed if his Jewish friends did 
not abide by the promises they had given. From his conversa-
tions with them, he knew that they were absolutely antagonistic 
to the programme of the Liberal party. "Let them vote for the 
p:>licy, and not for the man", he continued.' 66 
At another meeting, he emphasised the importance he had laid on gaining Jewish 
support. 'Apo1ogising to his Christian friends for not having seem more of 
them, Captain Browne said he had been engaged in the enemy's camp. The 
result was that he was on most friendly terms with the Jewish people and his 
67 
opponents. ' 
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His efforts were hindered by Sir Stuart Samuel's claim that the charges 
against him (and also the events of the Marconi Scandal) were the result of 
anti-semitism. Judicious use of this accusation by the Liberal press was 
68 
seen as a Liberal method of safeguarding its Jewish vote , and provoked 
strong Conservative reaction. 
'Sir Stuart Samuel will have lost any sympathy to which as a 
private member he may have been entitled by his attempt to 
utilise the Marconi and India Office revelations as an 
electioneering dodge. He has been trying to persuade the 
Jewish electors of Whitechapel that these exposures of 
ministerial shortcomings have been inspired by anti-Semitism. 
A more unscrupulous distortion of the truth could not have 
been perpetrated. Mr Lloyd George is not a Jew, and he has 
come in for the severest criticism of all. Lord Murray is 
not of the Chosen People, and he has not escaped censure. 
The fact that two Semitic families are mainly concerned is 
merely incidental. It is certainly not a point upon which 
a member of one of those families should lay emphasis.,69 
There were also left wing critics. The Daily Herald wrote: 'So far as the 
honour of Jews depends on this election, they should oppose Sir Stuart Samuel. 
Neither Sir Stuart Samuel nor Sir Rufus Isaacs has improved the reputation of 
70 Jews. ' 
This campaign reopened the discussion on the role of 'Jewish politics'. 
The pages of the Jewish Chronicle were filled with differing viewpoints. 
One approach to the topic was typified by R.M. Sebag-Montefiore, who, 
denying the absence of real anti-semitism in Britain, claimed that Samuel was 
'playing with fire'. By describing his opponents as anti-semitic, he could 
well influence them in that direction. Jewish politics should be divorced 
71 from Party Politics. The opposing view was put by R. Abeles. Declaring 
that the by-election had been 'an extraordinary one, taking place at a time 
when "anti-Semitism" if not exactly rampant, was in the air', he suggested 
that many Jews had felt the need to close ranks and abstain from voting, 
if they could not bring themselves to vote for Samuel's politics. His defeat 
would have been a blow for the Jewish community at a time when 'charges of 
corruption are made broadcast against Jewish men who have attained positions 
72 in the state.' 
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The election also brought to the attention of Gentiles the possibility of 
a 'Jewish vote'. Talk of appealing to just such a vote, estimated to be about 
a thousand strong, was a constant factor in the journalistic coverage of the 
campaign. What was ignored was the fact that there was an Irish vote of about 
73 the same strength. Given the alleged significance of the Irish question in 
national politics, and the fact that Monteagle Browne, the Conservative candidate, 
was Irish, it might have been expected that the Irish vote would have been one 
to fight over. Yet, it appears to have been overlooked completely in the 
scramble for Jewish votes. 
In a more general vein, the fact that Jews appeared to be committed almost 
exclusively to the Liberal Party, with a few notable exceptions, also began to 
create resentment amongst Conservatives. The Outlook, referring to the meeting 
at the National Liberal Club to celebrate the exoneration of the Liberal mini-
sters involved in the Marconi Scandal, predicted, 'There will be much religious 
exultation in that tabernacle of undefiled Radicalism. Perhaps Mr Falconer 
74 himself will perform the office of Chief Rabbi and will do the anointing.' 
More specifically, Sir George Younger, Conservative M.P. for Ayr, in an article 
on the various bribes offered by the Liberals at by-elections to win over 
specific groups of voters, noted how the Jewish vote had been wooed at N.W. 
Manchester in 1908, and how the promises, particularly relating to naturalisa-
75 tion fees, had not been fulfilled. He also gave the impression of Conserva-
tive annoyance at such misguided loyalty. Therefore, it is apparent that the 
Jewish vote was becoming a political battle-field, publiCised and hotly disputed. 
This made a contribution to the 'Jewish power' arguments and fears, since 
the publicity concerning such a bloc vote merely added to the impression of 
Jewish clannishness. It might also be claimed that it was an indication of the 
Jews' lack of patriotism and the failure to integrate into British SOCiety. 
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In addition, because of the strong identification of Jews with Liberalism, 
attacks upon Jews could become attacks upon 'the system', the establishment, 
conventional politics and the like. Corrupt Jews were a symbol of a corrupt 
system. 
The attempt at explaining why there should be a particular escalation of 
anti-semitic feeling before 1914 has been channeled, by the available evidence, 
towards social and economic explanations. Without dismissing the psychological 
functions of individual inclination towards racial animosity, ,as, for example, 
76 MandIe uses in his study of the British Union of Fascists , it should be noted 
that there are problems in the use of a discipline whose concepts are designed 
77 basically for face-to-face contact. From the sources studied in this thesis, 
we can look at the particular nature of the anti-semitism of the period under 
78 
consideration and ask what it can tell us about SOCiety at that time. 
A close consideration suggests that a great deal of the agitation about 
the Jews can be attributed to the discontent of the time. From the general 
history of the pre-war years, we are aware of the social tensions of the period. 
As Marwick pOints out, 'what was happening after 1910 was that an essentially 
undemocratic fabric, which had not been sufficiently adapted and modified in 
preceding years, was now subject to intense strain from forces of democracy, 
79 
nationalism and economic discontent. I Indeed, these pressures were already 
bringing about changes in the social and economic structures of society, with 
the inevitable dislocation of those whose status lay within the confines of the 
old order. The consequences of change were dramatic and added to the tension, 
as a contemporary observer noted. 
'Here again the psychological effect of all those changes is not 
sufficiently realised. The bitterness created by dispossession 
of ancient rights and privileges, the disdain of new, raw 
recruits filling vacated possessions, the bumptiousness and self-
satisfaction of the newly arrived - these and many other compli- I 
cated reactions create an unsatisfactory, irritated, inflamed 
atmosphere. I 80 
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More specifically, the Scandal drew attention to some of the problems of 
the changing situation. 
'The Marconi affair appeared to many a portent of the decadence 
of a new plutocratic generation, where old standards of integrity 
had decayed and "monopoly capitalism" was squeezing out the "small 
investor". Lackeys of this exploitive system were politicians like 
Lloyd George and Isaacs, without "bottom"; Unionist opinion 
naturally interpreted the affair as a manifestation of Liberal 
political corruption in the widest sense. tSl 
This quotation illustrates why the particular link of financial scandal and Jews 
was so important. It has been a consistent facet of the study of modern anti-
semitism that the Jew was the scapegoat for the discontent of those whose lives 
were disturbed by the new social structures which were developing in the nine-
teenth century. With emancipation .. and partial integration, the Jew became 
closely identified with the modern world, the values of which clashed with 
82 those of the discontented. In the nineteenth century, it was those groups 
who were most threatened by modernity; the clergy and, often, the landed 
83 
aristocracy, were initially caught up in this kind of anti-semitism. The 
threatening doctrines - socialism, liberalism, democracy, secularism -
could be identified as part of a Jewish plot, because Jews did adopt or support 
these creeds intheir quest for acceptance and equal opportunity. Thus did 
anti-semitism take on its political implications. 'From now on anti-semitism 
was to be deliberately whipped up by ultra-conservative politiCians and 
84 publicists, in their struggle against the progressives.' 
By the time of this particular study, it was no longer simply the British 
clergy and members of the aristocracy whose status and authority was being 
threatened. The previous quotation suggests that many conservatives, working-, 
middle- and upper-class, felt themselves under pressure from technological, 
economic and social change. Thus, there was a harking-back to the past, a 
desire to point out the differing standards of the present era and to compare 
them unfavourably with some vision of a previous 'Golden Age'. The Scandal 
was used by some Conservative writers as a symbol of all that was wrong with 
300. 
political life at that moment. Would the 9reat politicians of the past have 
behaved in such a manner? 'What would have been thought of Peel, Gladstone, 
Stafford-Northcote or Goschen under similar circumstances? Disraeli would 
have been greeted with a Radical shriek that would have 'gone down with his 
85 
name to posterity.' Similarly, F.e. Eden, in the Spectator, wrote that the 
sad aspect of the affair was that the various charges had been believed. In 
. 86 
the old days, they would have been dismissed as impossible. One obviously 
alien influence which might be blamed for society's ills was that of the Jews. 
The prominence of Jews in areas like finance and politics appeared to coincide 
with the moral decline in those fields. 
John Higham has drawn attention to the interrelationship between the rise 
of social discrimination against Jews in America in the 1870s and the invo1ve-
ment of 'a good many Jewish nouveaux riches in the hectic social competition 
87 
of the Gilded Age.' Similarly, this thesis has referred to the rise of Jews 
in British society, which stimulated hostility in the social group most affected 
by this rise, what might loosely be called the professional classes. As 
Simpson and Younger point out, anti-Jewish feelings arise not just because Jews 
are different but because they become 'effective competitors' within whatever 
field the person exhibiting the hostility is operating, social and/or 
88 
economic. 
This explanation is, however, only partial. Again Higham's study of 
American anti-semitism suggests that social and economic frustrations were not, 
in themselves, an automatic guarantee of ethnic friction. 89 He points to the 
excesses of nationalism as a vital ingredient of the peaks of hostility towards 
Jews; ' ••• anti-semitism in the modern world has reached maximum intensity as 
an integral component of movements aimed at defending the nation from various 
90 perils originating beyond its frontiers.' The anti-German feeling of the 
pre-war period in Britain has already been referred to, and the particular 
hostility directed against German Jews as in, for example, the pages of the 
• 
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91 National Review, has been noted. Whilst Higham points to three periods of 
political anti-semitism in western Europe and America, the l880s and 90s, the 
92 post-war years and the 1930s, it would appear that the British experience 
shows the years immediately preceding the war to be of key concern, at least in 
the formation of attitudes. That the vital ingredient of nationalism was present 
93 in this period cannot be disputed. The link between nationalism and anti-
semitism in Germany and Austria has been well documented. British anti-semitism 
appears to exhibit the same relationship to jingoism and patriotism. One can 
point to the extremes of nationalism following the Boer War and the outcry 
94 
against alien immigration and also to the fervent declarations of patriotism 
by the fascist movements in the 1930s. Thus, the conditions laid down in 
Higham's general model are fulfilled by the British experience in the years 1911-
1914. 
Finally, we can say that the pre-war period plays a significant part in the 
history of British anti-semitism, since it can be seen as laying the groundwork 
for post-19l8 hostility and the acceptance of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion 
95 by many individuals. The Marconi Scandal was still remembered - for example, 
in June 1920, at the height of the publicity for the Protocols. Jew~ fiber 
Alles, a journal published by the Britons, complained that the two chief figures 
in the Scandal had been raised to the highest offices in the "Jew-alition' 
government. There was a Harconi Premier Lloyd George and a Marconi Lord Chief 
Justice Rufus Isaacs. It also referred to the 'Jew Herbert Samuel' and complained 
about his appointment as 'British' High Commissioner for Palestine. In addition, 
two other Jews prominent during the Marconi era had also risen to great heights. 
Godfrey Isaacs controlled the Empire wireless system and Edwin Montagu the 
Indian Empire. Thus was the triumph of the group complete. 'From East to West 
96 
and west to East, it is JEWRY - JEWRY UEBER ALLES.' 
In a wider sense, too, the era of Marconi was important. Writing about the 
publicity surrounding the appearance of the Protocols in 1920, Hartmann and 
382. 
and Husband declared 'It is an indication of the potency of the latent anti-
semitism in Britain that those "Protocols" should have been taken so seriously 
97 
and given coverage in the British press.' Referring to the idea of a Jewish 
conspiracy, they added: 'that it should have been based on such evidence as 
the "Protocols" shows how important the pre-existing conceptions relating to 
Jews were in facilitating the perception and reporting of such specious material 
98 
as possibly valid.' There is ample evidence to show that the kind of anti-
semitism pertaining to a conspiracy theory was being created in the pre-war 
period. Drawing once more on Higham's model, we can see the importance of a 
learning pattern. He places the hostility of the Gilded Age in context, 
pointing out that the 'genial and democratic norms of American life remained 
basically undisturbed'. Its significance is its place in the general history 
of hostility to Jews in America. 
'The story of anti-semitism in the Gilded Age is worth telling, 
however, if~ suggests how the basic pattern of the more serious 
movements of political anti-semitism in the 1920s and 19309 
came into being. For those later movements, the Gilded Age set 
the stage and trained the cast.,99 
The same lessons can be learned from the era of the Marconi Scandal: it 
gives a clear indication of the way anti-semitism in Britain was to develop 
in the 1920s and 30s, a clearer indication than the opposition to immigration 
of the earlier period. 
383. 
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